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# THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL

BY  
SAVILLA ALICE ELKUS, PH.D.

ARCHIVES OF PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY  
FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE

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# CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION .....	iii
CHAPTER I	
COSMOLOGICAL	
The concept of control as a thesis of the philosophical movement expressed in the theories of Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus—The thesis in the fragments of Heraclitus—Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus—The concept indicated in the 'Dialogues' of Plato—The concept in the philosophy of Aristotle—Stoicism—Scholastic philosophy not occupied with the question of control—The concept in the philosophy of Spinoza—The concept in the philosophy of Leibniz—Comparison of the concepts in the cosmological theories .....	1
CHAPTER II	
EPISTEMOLOGICAL	
The epistemologies of Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant concerned with the <i>locus</i> of control; these writers give speculative accounts of the teleological aspect of nature—Locke's position with respect to control in epistemology; his theory of design in nature—Berkeley's theory of control and design—Hume's position with respect to control—Kant's theory of control; his conception of purpose in nature—The concept of control in pragmatism .....	19
CHAPTER III	
BIOLOGICAL	
The concept as revealed in the peculiar categories of biology .....	29
CHAPTER IV	
MECHANISM	
The concept in the method and constructions of physical science .....	34
CHAPTER V	
CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS	
Comparison of all the conceptions which have been discussed—Purpose and mechanism two diverse ways of describing control—Application of the concept in the sciences of mechanics, economics, sociology .....	39

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nent existences, the seeds (*σπέρματα*) of all things, originally together with the *νοῦς* (mind), an external element, produces motion in the mixture and directs the course of movement, resulting in the world of distinct objects. "And whatever things were to be, and whatever things are, as many as are now, and whatever shall be, all these things are arranged in order."<sup>1</sup>

Democritus is impressed with the same fact of an ordered world and is likewise confronted with the same problem—the explanation of such a world. The extent to which he has surpassed his predecessors in the superiority of his conception is evidenced in the embodiment of his formulation in the mechanical theory, which, in its main outlines, constitutes the modern physical theory. Similar to Empedocles and Anaxagoras, he posits permanent elements as the primary, necessary hypothesis for all explanation. But the nature of these elements is such that, granted their existence, all other conditions may be subsequently deduced. No external forces such as love and hate and mind are necessary to cause and regulate movement; the atoms suffice for all these functions.

Concerning the nature of these atoms, we are informed that they are infinitely small, indestructible, homogeneous, impenetrable bodies alike in essence, but different in size and form. They are endowed with perpetual motion (*ἀίδιος κίνησις*), whose direction is guided by no disparate principle, but is due to a principle immanent in the atoms. Thus: "λεκτέον τίνα κίνησιν καὶ τίς ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῶν κίνησις (and there is a certain movement of those primary bodies which is a natural movement)."<sup>2</sup>

The void (*τὸ κενόν*), for Democritus, is the logical consequence of the self-moving atoms, since to render possible motion thought is obliged to conceive the void.

Thus in the doctrine of Democritus is manifested the position that thought, in its endeavor to attain explanation, is compelled to postulate permanent elements in self-regulated motion (the atoms). With this postulate granted, all subsequent constructions are necessary deductions, thereby presenting a system logical throughout, a system which constitutes the essence of explanation.

Summarizing, then, the import of the theories of Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus, we obtain the following: An inspection of these theories carries with it the recognition that the same problem inspires them all. A world, the constitution of which is described in the first instance as dynamic, must in addition be characterized as a process imbued with order, or as a movement controlled. To explain this regulated world-movement there is assumed

<sup>1</sup> Fairbanks, *loc. cit.*, Fr. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Arist., 'de Cælo,' III., 2-300 b.

in every case the existence of permanent elements in motion. In the theories of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, the regulating principle is embodied in elements other than the ones affected, while according to Democritus the movement is determined by the static properties of the atoms. In all the doctrines, however, the guiding principle is a constituent factor of the world, but the explanation of Democritus holds its superiority in being natural as well as cosmic, in contrast to the artificial account necessitated by the character of the elements in the theories of Empedocles and Anaxagoras.

This conclusion accords, then, with the doctrine of Heraclitus in holding that explanation of the cosmos demands the existence of a permanent element determining the world change; which principle is contained immanently in the series of events it controls.

In Plato's doctrine of 'ideas' the existence of the rational is so emphatically affirmed that to it alone is attributed the status of the real. The flux of sensible experience, the immediate, the particular is relegated to the realm of mere becoming (*γένησις*), of mere appearance. Antithetically, the ideas are eternal, universal, immutable, are manifested to reason alone and constitute the realm of real being (*οὐσία*). Sensible objects are real only in so far as they 'participate in the nature of the ideas. With the problem of the relation of these two spheres we are not here concerned.

A second feature of the ideas, and one which is no less emphatically intimated, is that of their connection and dependence. The relationship of subordination among ideas is essential to their existence and to the existence of the universe. Conceptions of measure, harmony, symmetry, order and law occupy a superior position in the structure of the world, and everywhere exhibit their dominion. Finally, supreme among ideas, the highest of all abstractions, the principle of the harmonious relationship of ideas, and thus of all 'being,' reigns the 'idea of the good.'

Thus in the 'Republic' the ideas are designated as 'fixed and immutable principles . . . neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason.'<sup>1</sup> That is, there is a dominating conception which preserves the subordinate conceptions in their ordered harmony, a highest rational principle, the condition of all rationality; this is that which is termed the idea of the good. What light is to the visible object, the indispensable condition and cause of its visibility, so the idea of good, *being* absolute, is the principle necessary to the existence of all knowledge and truth. It is absolute science itself, attained by 'dialectic,' which is the culminating abstraction of reason. Conceptions of number,

<sup>1</sup> Book VI., translated by B. Jowett.

## COSMOLOGICAL

harmony, order, may be said to be contained in it, for they are subservient to this organizing principle, while it in turn is the primary condition of their being. Hence the importance which is attached to the studies of number and calculation in the Platonic scheme of knowledge. Mathematical conceptions are essentially conceptions instrumental to fixedness and order; they maintain diverse elements within their respective limits and thus are conducive to the unity of the whole.

Evinced under a different aspect, but corresponding to the ideal good in the 'Republic,'<sup>1</sup> is the supreme principle of 'measure' in the 'Philebus.' Plato conceives measure as the principle of symmetry, which is due to the regulated proportion of elements in combination, and thus may be identified with beauty. The first rank in the scale of goods is assigned to measure. For the greatest good in the world is to be sought, not in pleasure, not in wisdom, but in the 'mixture' of elements, and above all in the proportion of the mixture. Measure is identical with the principle of their ordered mixture. The universe is an embodiment of this principle of measure for 'there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, as well as a cause of no mean power which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind.'<sup>2</sup> This infinite factor which enters into the composition of the cosmos is controlled by the principle of measure so that 'the assertion that the mind orders all things is worthy of the aspect of the world, and of the sun and of the moon and of the whole circuit of the heavens.'

In the 'Symposium' the supreme principle is revealed under the guise of beauty. The object of all love or impulse is the beautiful and the object of the highest passion is absolute beauty, the principle of all concrete beauties. Beauty is the result and the condition of the harmonious arrangement of constituents. It is the source of the balancing influence of proportion; it is the principle of harmony of order, and is identical with the ideal good.

In Plato's suggestion of a probable cosmological theory,<sup>4</sup> it is plainly evident that he is governed by the necessity of giving such an explanation of the origin and structure of the world as will primarily account for its organized character, for the adjustment of its parts to a consistent whole. This universe is constructed after the eternal, intelligible pattern. Harmony, beauty, order, law, must be predicated of it. Hence a 'world soul,' or supreme organizing

<sup>1</sup> Books VI., VII.

<sup>2</sup> 'Philebus.'

<sup>3</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> 'Timeus.'

principle, is the source of its origination. This is a world reason (*vous*), and is cognizable to reason alone. As the human soul directs the movements of the body, so this world soul or reason controls all occurrence in the cosmos and is the final cause of its existence. Briefly, the intent of this cosmological theory is the expression of the intelligibility of the universe, of the fact that it presents features which manifest a general subjection to regulation.

To recapitulate: While the Platonic dialogues present no attempt at a systematic world theory, the general theme of the doctrine of ideas, as indicated above, is the insistence upon the recognition of the universal prevalence of determination of all things, of the existence of principles regulating becoming or occurrence. These directing principles are intelligible and immutable, as distinguished from the sensible and alterable. They in turn are subordinate features of one supreme regulating principle. That is, the world must be affirmed a system, not a chaos; there is a controlling element, perceptible to reason alone, obtaining in the world of diversity, which renders it a unity, an organization. Since the nature of the sensible and changeable is entirely distinct from the immutable, this controlling principle in a sense appears to be outside the process it dominates.

Aristotle, in his inquiry concerning the fundamental nature of reality, recognizes as the most apparent and immediate presentation of experience the perpetual change of sensible things. But reflection can not pause at this incomplete analysis. Reality is not a series of unrelated particulars; it is an organic unity in which individuals function uniquely in the totality. "If there were nothing besides sensible things, there would be no principle (*ἀρχή*), no order (*τάξις*), no generation (*γένεσις*), no celestial harmony."<sup>1</sup> Science is an indubitable possession and bears witness to the intelligible, systematic character of the cosmos. To discover the ultimate condition of such an organic unity, to demonstrate the existence and nature of the permanently real (*οὐσία*), which is implied in its structure, is the problem of the 'Metaphysics.'

The primary reality (*οὐσία*) is always manifested in the concrete individual and constitutes its essential nature (*τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι*). On the other hand, it must be emphasized that an adequate conception of the essential nature of a thing necessitates a transcendence of any particular embodiment, to the universal character manifested in a process (*κίνησις*). Individuals are subject to production (*γένεσις*) and annihilation (*φθορά*), and the essential nature of the individual can only be apprehended under genetic conditions.

<sup>1</sup> 'Metaphysics,' W. Christ, Ed., Book A, Chap. 10.

What, then, is generation and destruction, what are the characteristics of a process, are questions which must be considered.

Every concrete individual is the result of a union of matter ( $\psi\lambda\eta$ ) and form ( $\epsilon\dot{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ ). Matter, the sum of conditions necessary to the actuality of the individual, is indeterminate. Form ( $\epsilon\dot{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ ) is that which defines the indeterminate matter ( $\psi\lambda\eta$ ) and in combination with it results in the existence of the concrete individual ( $\tau\omicron\varsigma$   $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu$ ). All existence is necessarily individual. Neither matter nor form can originate, nor can they cease to exist; the pre-existence of both is indispensable to the realization of the thing. It is the concrete individual ( $\tau\omicron\varsigma$   $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu$ ) only, that which is composed of both, which can originate and perish. Now all change implies that which is the subject of change, that which subsists during differences, that which is permanent,—in a word, matter ( $\psi\lambda\eta$ ). Matter is capable of being both of two contraries, but at different times. Thus we have attained the conception of the primary real ( $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ ) as the essential nature ( $\tau\omicron\varsigma$   $\tau\acute{\iota}$   $\eta\nu$   $\epsilon\dot{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ ) of the individual, which is only manifested in a process. It must be noted that while the essential nature ( $\tau\omicron\varsigma$   $\tau\acute{\iota}$   $\eta\nu$   $\epsilon\dot{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ ) is universal, it is embodied in the particular; while it is static, it is contained in the dynamic.

Further, movement or change does not occur indiscriminately, but is characterized by certain limitations evinced in its operations. "Nothing, indeed, is moved by chance."<sup>1</sup> This is the import of the doctrine of potentiality ( $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ ) and actuality ( $\epsilon\acute{\nu}\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\upsilon\alpha$ ), which is of fundamental significance in the apprehension of reality. Existence may be either potential or actual. A thing is said to exist potentially, when upon the event of certain conditions its realization or actual existence will take place. Matter ( $\psi\lambda\eta$ ) is potentiality ( $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ ), since it is the condition of the actuality ( $\epsilon\acute{\nu}\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\upsilon\alpha$ ) of a thing. It is indeterminate in so far as its potential existence may or may not be transformed into actual existence, but it is a determining factor in limiting the nature of the actual in case of its realization. Thus, a seed is a plant in potentiality. For if the seed realizes its nature, that is, if appropriate conditions are forthcoming, the seed must develop into a plant and into nothing but a plant. The plant in relation to the seed, the potential ( $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ ), is actuality ( $\epsilon\acute{\nu}\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\upsilon\alpha$ ). It is evident that actuality ( $\epsilon\acute{\nu}\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\upsilon\alpha$ ) must be prior to potentiality. For while the seed, from which the specific plant is produced, must have existed prior to this plant, there must have existed another plant prior to the existence of the seed, from which it was generated. Thus it is only in the case of the particular individual that the potential may be said to exist previously to

<sup>1</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Book A, Chap. 6.



the actual. Generically, actuality (*ἐνέργεια*) must exist prior to potentiality (*δύναμις*), prior in every sense of the term, in time, in knowledge, and in essence (*οὐσία*), for the actual must always define the merely potential.

Aristotle has previously predicated the eternal character of movement, on the ground that if movement or change were not perpetual, something would have to be produced from nothing,—which is inconceivable. Linked to the deduction of the eternal character of movement and a consequent of it, is the affirmation of the eternal character of time.

With the establishment of the conception of reality as a perpetual process, Aristotle has arrived at the final and ultimate stage of the inquiry: What is the fundamental condition of such a process? What is the final cause of the world order? All movement and change imply that which is capable of originating movement, for if movement were not produced by something it would have to arise from nothing. This cause of movement must exist in operation (*ἐνέργεια*); for if it were merely capable of producing movement, but did not operate, it would not account for movement. It must not contain any potentiality (*δύναμις*) in its nature; otherwise its operation would not necessarily be eternal. 'There must, therefore, be a principle, whose very nature (*οὐσία*) is operation (*ἐνέργεια*),'<sup>1</sup> and which must be without matter, since it is eternal. Thus far we have derived the existence of something which is moved, and something which is the cause of movement. But, "Since there is something which is moved (*τὸ κινούμενον*) and something which produces movement (*τὸ κινούν*), there must be an intermediate term; that is, there is something which produces movement without itself being moved, something which is eternal, and both existence (*οὐσία*) and operation (*ἐνέργεια*)."<sup>2</sup> Aristotle's next consideration is the nature of this primary reality (*οὐσία*), this eternal first mover, with the resulting conclusion that it is reason (*νοῦς*). That is, this unmoved mover operates in a manner similar to that in which the desirable and the intelligible cause movement, for that which is desired is always an intelligible object. Again, the desirable must be identified with the good, for we always desire a thing because it is good, and do not deem it good because we desire it. And the principle of will is, therefore, the good itself. Now, it is admitted that the best thing in the world is intelligence. The object of intelligence is the final cause, and this it is which is the cause of all movement and determines it as that which is loved. This mode of existence is life, 'for the operation of intelligence is life and the first

<sup>1</sup> 'Metaphysics,' Book A, Chap. 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Book A, Chap. 7.

reality (*οὐσία*).<sup>1</sup> The Deity is eternal life. Further, what must be the content of this divine thought? If this supreme intelligence (*νόησις*) is the best thing, it can only have for its object the best; but the best is thought itself, therefore it must think itself. Its operation is the seizing of itself by itself (*νόησις νοήσεως*), self-contemplation.

Thought and its object are identical. Nor can this object change, for, being the best, if it changed it would cease to be the best. It is therefore perpetual self-contemplation. This mode of life, which is the eternal possession of the divine reason, is only enjoyed by man in rare moments of speculative thinking. Since all things in the universe exhibit a striving for realization, a tendency toward an end, in all things is this principle immanent, although in different degrees, varying from the lowest type of existence, that of inorganic being, through the intermediate phases of plant and animal life, reaching its culmination in the rational life of man and, peculiarly, in speculative thinking.

The way in which the universe contains this principle is comparable to the relation of a general to his army, or to the organization of a well-regulated household. The general is the cause of the order in the army, and the principle of organization is the condition of the regulation of the household. That is, the universe contains this principle as the cause or condition of its unification. For while all things in the universe exercise their distinctive functions, 'all conspire to a unique result'<sup>1</sup> The self-realization of the individual is identical with the process of the whole.

Gathering up the results of the whole investigation, the essential points of interest to our study present themselves as follows: The preeminent category demanded in an adequate interpretation of the universe is that of a world reason (*νοῦς*), which is evoked to explain the regulated or controlled aspect of reality. The data which have led to this induction, also the particular factors which the argument finds to be involved in the category, may be briefly stated as follows: Starting with the admission that the paramount empirical fact of the universe is change, a subsequent observation compels the acknowledgment of the existence of order in variation, of organic connection between events. These two primary assumptions, change and characteristic alteration, or method, lead inevitably to the conception of reality as a perpetual process, an eternal activity. The question then resolves into: What is the final cause, the ultimate ground, of this determinate world movement? The inquiry discovers it to be: The continuous operation of a principle which, while itself static, controls dynamic nature. Its method of operating is similar to the mode in which the object of desire, the intelligible

<sup>1</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Book A, Chap. 10.

object, determines human action; it influences as a goal to be attained, as an end to be realized. It is not an entity coercing from without, but is contained in the movement, contained peculiarly as an end toward which it tends, as an attraction to which it is impelled, as a result for which it is making. Now all individual things manifest a tendency toward self-realization, and all are constituent elements of the world process. The whole is a unity of its movements. That is, the determining principle, the static, universal element of reality, is identical with the tendency toward self-realization essentially characterizing all particular existences.

The metaphysics of the stoic philosophy proceeds from the thesis that reality is corporeal in nature and is limited to sensible existence. The corporeal must be defined with reference to a dynamic standpoint; force or tension (*τονός*) is its essential character. It presents a twofold aspect: the real is that which acts (*τὸ ποιοῦν*), and that which may be acted upon (*τὸ πάσχον*). Corresponding to this double aspect of the corporeal there exists the difference of finer and coarser in its nature. The finer substance, called fire, ether, air, atmospheric current (*πνεῦμα*), is described as mind, soul, reason; and the coarser is termed matter. But the finer is conceived as everywhere interpenetrating the coarser, and hence ultimately must be viewed as identical with it; reason is in all things and inseparable from them. God is described as both the active force and the subject acted upon, or these looked upon in union with each other.

The world must be considered as a series of events and their consequences bound together by an irresistible necessity, every occurrence of which is in conformity with this necessary order. Hence, the original productive force is called a 'generative reason' (*λόγος σπερματικός*), for it contains within itself the ground of the development of the whole world into its ordered multiplicity. It is 'a reasonable God or an artistic fire (*πῦρ τεχνικόν*), proceeding according to a certain method to the production of the world.'<sup>1</sup> The fixed order which governs the course of events, or necessity, is denoted by the conception of destiny or fate (*εἰμαρμένη*). It must be observed that this necessity ruling all existence is no transcendental principle operating from without, but, consistent with the stoic materialism, is inseparable from the natural force and must be identified with it.

To account for this necessary character of the world movement, for the universal causal series of events, which maintains the elements of the world in perfect balance, and is thus the ground of the whole order and unity, the conception of 'Providence' (*πρόνοια*)

<sup>1</sup> H. Diels, 'Doxographi Græci,' *Plac.* 1. 7. 33, p. 305.

originated. The cause of this destined order is possessed of foresight of everything.<sup>1</sup> That is, with the view to the end to be attained, Providence has foreseen and foreordained the whole process whose method is comprehended in the notion of destiny.

The perfection of the world system is, according to stoicism, almost too obvious to be in need of supporting arguments. Among such, however, is included the acknowledged adaptation of life to environment.

The summary of the position sketched above may be presented as follows: Stoicism maintains that the world must be described as a fixed order of events, the regulated character of which involves the existence of a guiding principle, whose divination of the end determines the character of the process. That is, supervening upon the conception of a definite movement of events, there is the conception of foreordained control. We find no basis for this idea of predestination other than the existence of absolute order, perfection. A preview of the end is thought requisite to control.

The period dominated mainly by scholastic philosophy had little need to occupy itself with inquiry into the nature of control. Since it was accepted as certain, upon authority superior to human reason, that the world was the creation of a divine spirit, its orderly structure presented no problem. Since the ruler of the universe created and directed all things with the view to a particular end to be accomplished, logical effort was concerned chiefly with the task of making the facts of nature fit in this revealed truth, rather than with the search for truth itself.

Conspicuously in the history of philosophy, Spinoza explicitly rejects final causes on the ground that they are inapplicable to reality. The philosophical fallacy of referring this category to the universe consists not merely in a failure to denote any ultimate feature of the world, but is in direct conflict with the fundamental position upon which an adequate construction must rest.

In Part I. of the 'Ethics'<sup>2</sup> Spinoza has exposed at length the origin of this misconception and the ground of its falsity. This is effected with such force and simplicity that I venture to quote a major portion. He says: "All such opinions spring from the notion commonly entertained that all things in nature act as men themselves act, namely, with an end in view. It is accepted as certain that God himself directs all things to a definite goal. . . ." As to the reason why men are so prone to adopt this opinion, he continues: "It ought to be universally admitted that all men are

<sup>1</sup> Diog. L., VII., 149.

<sup>2</sup> Appendix, translated by R. H. M. Elwes.

born ignorant of the causes of things, that all have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they are conscious of such desire. Herefrom it follows that men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire. Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for that which is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it comes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of events, and when these are learned, they are content as having no cause for further doubt. If they can not learn such causes from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them personally to bring about the given event, and thus they necessarily judge other natures by their own. . . . As they look upon things as means, they can not believe them to be self-created; but judging from the means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted everything for human use . . . but in their endeavor to show that nature does nothing in vain, *i. e.*, nothing which is useless to man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods, and men are all mad together."

In essence this contention asserts in the first instance that the ascription of final causes to nature is an anthropomorphic procedure, a projection of human methods of activity to a field where no evidence for such methods exists. Moreover, this is not all. The source of this error is to be traced to a total misconception of the nature of human volition. For that which constitutes the determining cause of actions is not a definite end, in the sense of an external goal, but directly the contrary is the case; the controlling cause of action is embodied in the impulse which leads to the action. "By the end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean an impulse (*appetitus*)."<sup>1</sup> Now it is consciousness of this impulse, combined with ignorance of the efficient cause of action, which gives rise to the notion of freedom in the sense of determination by an independent end, by an extraneous agency. Hence the conclusion results that final cause reduces to 'nothing else but human desire, in so far as it is considered as the origin or cause of anything.'<sup>2</sup> Therefore, in all departments of nature, human as well as non-human, final cause turns out to be a 'mere human figment.'

To disclose the ground for this conclusion, to comprehend the conception which must replace that of the traditional final cause—

<sup>1</sup> 'Ethics,' Part IV., Def. 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Part IV., preface.

the opinion that the processes of nature are determined by an external agency acting according to a preconceived end—against which his polemic is directed, it is necessary to consider Spinoza's metaphysical theory.

Efficient causality, universally predicable of things, is the initial presupposition upon which any attempt to comprehend the universe must take its point of departure. Organized knowledge exists, and implies the dependence of everything upon some other thing. In the adaptations of individual things to each other, expressed in the laws of nature, is presented evidence of such connection.<sup>1</sup> This fundamental premise is expressed by Spinoza in the statement, "There is necessarily for each individual thing a cause why it should exist."<sup>2</sup> While the key to the comprehension of this regulated character of events implied in universal efficient causation is discovered in the proposition, "Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature."<sup>3</sup>

That is, this determination of things can only be understood on the supposition of the world as a unitary system the elements of which contribute to and are dominated by the nature of the whole, 'the necessity of the divine nature.' The individual elements, being determined by other elements, are finite. The whole, that which can have no external determination, is independent. Hence the significance of 'substance' or God to account for this unity, the whole. "By substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception."<sup>4</sup> With this conception of substance established, the regulated character of events is to be comprehended when they are conceived as following from the nature of the whole by an inevitable or 'geometrical necessity.' In Spinoza's terminology, "Individual things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of God or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a fixed and definite manner."<sup>5</sup>

But this whole, this unity, is a whole of constituent parts. The controlling principle of events is not an extraneous agency superposed upon them, but has its being immanent in the individual things. Moreover, according to Spinoza it is this very factor which constitutes the essential nature of an individual thing. Every individual thing is composed of two elements; of the finite or conditioned

<sup>1</sup> Letter XXXII., Van Vloten and Land, Ed.

<sup>2</sup> 'Ethics,' Part I., Prop. VIII., Def. 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Part I., Prop. XXIX.

<sup>4</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Def. 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Part I., Prop. XXII., Cor.

and of the necessary, eternal (out of time relations). In so far as it is individual and a member of the temporal series, it is determined by other individuals (by transient causes). Everything, in so far as its essence is concerned, is eternal, expressive of its universal nature, its immanence in the whole.

This essential, universal, static nature of a thing is expressed in the *conatus* or tendency to persist in existence. For it must be granted that all things manifest this striving for self-maintenance, this principle of inertia. "Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being."<sup>1</sup>

"The endeavor or tendency (*conatus*) wherewith everything endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question."<sup>2</sup> When evinced in man the *conatus* or tendency toward self-realization embraces all forms of human effort and is called impulse (*appetitus*). "Desire (*cupiditas*) is merely impulse (*appetitus*) accompanied by the consciousness thereof."<sup>3</sup>

Thus it is shown that the determinate aspect of the world is the result of, or rather is identical with, that characteristic of all things which is designated a tendency toward self-maintenance, self-realization. This it is which constitutes the static element in the temporal, finite order. This it is the function of reason to perceive, while to imagination is allotted the perception of things in their spatial and temporal relations.

Now have we arrived at the conception which must replace the rejected final cause, whose inconsistency with this interpretation of reality is clearly apparent.

Recapitulation. The presupposition of a dynamic world described by efficient causality necessitates for its ultimate comprehension the determination of all events or objects. The guiding principle of the cosmos is evinced in all things as a tendency toward an end. The end can not be conceived as an external goal, but must be characterized a self-realization. Otherwise expressed—there is in everything that which makes for what is beyond itself, but is intended, or to an extent involved, in its present existence. It is this immanent direction of change, this static element in all the variety of events, which lies at the basis of the controlled aspect of nature.

To Leibniz, imbued as he was with the results of modern scientific investigation, the fundamental philosophical problem presents

<sup>1</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Part III., Prop. VI.

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Part III., Prop. VII.

<sup>3</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Part III., Prop. IX., note.

itself as the necessity for showing that the mechanical conception of cosmic processes requires for its ultimate comprehension the teleological view of nature. Reason can recognize no infringement upon the universal application of the mechanical theory in the perceptible world, the world of matter and motion, in which the actions and reactions of things permit formulation. But the order of events so described is not ultimately apprehended. The mechanical conception of nature is not self-explaining, but demands for its completion a further interpretation. Thus Leibniz asserts that he has found the means of harmonizing the opposition of mechanical and metaphysical systems in his discovery 'that in the phenomena of nature everything happens mechanically but at the same time metaphysically, but that the source of the mechanical is in the metaphysical.'

The perceptible world must be regarded as a phenomenal world, whose inner content and real nature must be conceived as force, activity, life. The dynamic, as contrasted with the static, given in physical description, constitutes the essential nature of things. And the doctrine of the 'monads,' which Leibniz has advanced to the end of disclosing the ultimate ground of the phenomenal world, is a theory of force, activity. In anticipation of the theory, we may note that the notion of 'force,' 'activity' as employed by Leibniz is equivalent to self-originated change, and that in essence the monadology may be interpreted as a theory of regulated movement or change. To make good this position we must have recourse to the doctrine in some detail.

The ultimate elements of things, or simple substances, are units of force to which extension does not pertain. These forces or 'monads' are the real atoms of nature, and are original and indestructible.<sup>1</sup> Every monad is an individual, is distinct from all others, and is incapable of being influenced by anything extraneous,<sup>2</sup> 'for the monads have no windows through which anything could come in or go out.' Extended bodies are the phenomenal effects produced by aggregates of monads; only the effects of force are perceptible. Now all created beings, and consequently the monads, are by their very nature subject to continuous change.<sup>3</sup> But in addition to the fact of change, there is a method of change, that is, a principle controlling the series of occurrences.<sup>4</sup> This is the significance of denoting the monads as characterized by 'perception' and 'appetition.'

<sup>1</sup> 'Monadology,' § 1-7.

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.*, § 2-9.

<sup>3</sup> *Loc. cit.*, § 16.

<sup>4</sup> *Loc. cit.*, § 12.



For change is such that it involves an unchanging element, a static factor. There is a principle of unity, of connection, in the plurality of states or representations of the monads which constitutes it one monad. Hence force, or the intensive nature of things, manifests itself in 'perception.' "The passing condition which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unity or in the simple substance is nothing but what is called 'perception.'"<sup>1</sup> This unifying principle is also designated 'representation,' it is an ideal conception; that is, it is no phenomenon divulged in the material, perceptible world as such, but rather constitutes an intelligible principle. Thus every monad at every state contains the whole world in the sense that it 'mirrors the world.'

Further, the principle of change is determined in its operations. There is a particular order in the succession of states of the monad. Force is evinced in 'appetition,' 'desire.' "The activity of the internal principle which produces change or passage from one perception to another may be called appetition."<sup>2</sup> Now this determining principle is spontaneous, for the monads can not be affected from without. "Each carries in itself the law of the continuation of the series of its operations."<sup>3</sup> This self-active principle is evinced as a tendency to pass from one state or representation to another, and this tendency is directed toward the self-development of each monad. But Leibniz must account this controlling principle in each monad as *one* principle in all nature. So each monad is potentially the whole universe and its process of unfolding its inner nature is identical with the process of realizing the universe. Appetition expresses this tendency to self-realization. Since each monad represents the same universe, its differentiation is due to the fact that it is a particular phase of representation, a particular point of view; that is to say, it is a certain degree of intensity of the world force.

But by definition the monads exclude mutual influence. However, the material world to be interpreted is a realm where reciprocal interaction is the law, and there must be a unity as the ground of the whole. Confronted with the problem of explaining the correspondence in the functions of the monads, the problem of accounting for the whole from the standpoint of the individual, Leibniz resorts to the further hypothesis of a 'preestablished harmony.' Each monad has been so determined originally that spontaneous activity bears the character of a part in a whole. Its natural and independent development appears to be that of an element in a system. The final cause or origin of this relation of

<sup>1</sup> *Loc. cit.*, § 14.

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.*, § 15.

<sup>3</sup> Letter to Arnauld, 1690, Erdmann Ed., p. 107.

preestablished harmony is an uncreated substance, a central monad or God. "God, alone, is the primary unity or original simple substance of which all created or derivative monads are products."<sup>1</sup>

From the above sketch, we conclude that the import of Leibniz's teleological conception may be summarized as follows: The mechanical theory of the world demands for its ultimate interpretation the conception of reality as a process, a specific activity, a controlled change. The determination of the course of events is inherent in the constituent elements; it is manifested as a tendency in all things toward a result. The description of the method of occurrence as a self-development of things, as an unfolding of a specific content, is a mode of expressing this tendency or determinate variation. The function of the doctrine of preestablished harmony is the establishment of the identity between the cosmic principle and the self-determination of individual things.

With the theory of Leibniz we must conclude our investigation of the cosmological conception, since with this system terminates any extensive interest in metaphysical inquiry. Henceforward philosophical effort is influenced by the problem of method, and the question of cosmical control is either totally abandoned or relegated to a minor position in systematic thought.

A review of the various cosmological conceptions of control which have been presented discloses certain salient points of agreement. The two primary assumptions from which all the theories take their point of departure are, first, the fact of a dynamic world and, secondly, a feature which is not so readily apparent to observation and which in the earlier theories is indefinitely designated as order, regularity, harmony, etc., while in the modern accounts it is more precisely described in terms of efficient causality or of the mechanical theory. To explain this characteristic of the world change it is deemed necessary to conceive nature a course of events which is determined, in a word, a process. The requirements of logic demand that the controlling principle be contained immanently in the series of occurrences which it influences. It is a universal in the particular elements, a static existence in the dynamic flux. In the doctrines of Aristotle, Spinoza and Leibniz (most thoroughly of Spinoza) there is exposed the mode in which this principle exists as a factor immanent in the world it constitutes a process. In all individuals is it manifested as a tendency to something beyond immediate exist-

<sup>1</sup> 'Monadology,' § 47.

ence, and by virtue of this relation effecting conservation gives to what would otherwise be discrete happenings the character of results.

On the other hand, there is discovered the view, peculiar to certain theories (Platonism, stoicism, scholasticism), which locates the source of cosmic control in an external principle. In stoicism and scholasticism this foreign agency operates by means of a preconceived end. The justification for this opinion has been discussed.

## CHAPTER II

### EPISTEMOLOGICAL

BEGINNING with Locke, with whom the central interest of philosophy is transferred to epistemology, conceptions of control assume a different status. Now metaphysics as the field for the solution of philosophical problems is abandoned. A theory of knowledge is the only road to the desired goal. If thought would be purged of the inconsistencies with which it had been permeated during the domination of scholasticism, a new method of procedure must be followed. An inquiry into the possibilities and limitations of knowledge must prelude a search for truth. With the rise of epistemology and its fundamental assumption of dual existences, there emerges the problem of explaining the principle of connection at the ground of the world order from this altered standpoint. With experience and knowledge conceived as a relation of some sort between a psychological or mental existence on the one hand and an objective or cosmic reality on the other, there is introduced the question as to the *locus* of the unifying principle and its consequent characteristics. If all knowledge is ultimately derived from sensations, and if sensations as the merely particular are incapable of supplying the principle of connection involved in the complexities of knowledge, then mind, a subjective activity, must in some way be the source of the synthesis. Thus in the theories of Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant, in varying degrees and modes mind is held to furnish the principle of control underlying the world system. For without this principle the world would have to be conceived a chaos.

On the other hand, these writers also display an interest in the teleological conception of nature. But having placed control in epistemology, they were compelled, in the consideration of design in nature, to resort to speculative accounts.

Locke's position with respect to the source of unification is indefinite. Starting from the initial presupposition that the objects of knowledge are confined to ideas, and further that all ideas are traceable to sensations which in their first appearance are separate or detached, Locke vibrates between an internal and external principle as the origin of their combination into the complexities of knowledge. Now the source of synthesis is attributed to the operation of a subjective activity, mind. Knowledge is defined as 'the perception

of the connection and agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas."<sup>1</sup> Again, the principle of combination is referred to an extraneous, metaphysical source variously denoted as substance, the Deity, nature, when knowledge is asserted to be dependent upon the agreement of ideas with 'things without the mind.'<sup>2</sup> But the interpretation which influenced the development of thought immediately after Locke is the doctrine that the subjective activity originates the arrangements of knowledge out of sense-derived ideas.

When Locke comes to account for the purposeful aspect of nature, his position is a reconciliation of reason and theology and inclines to the deistic conception of God and what is known as the physico-theological argument or the argument from design. This view maintains that there is a mind outside of nature, an intelligence and will directing it according to a preconceived plan. According to Locke, the existence of God, a supreme will and intelligence, is an inference based upon the nature of the world and of ourselves. Of our own existence we have an intuitive knowledge, and of things a sensible knowledge. Locke accepts without question the order and regularity apparent in the world, and on the basis of the contingency of our own existence infers the existence of God. Thus, the argument runs: Since our own minds are dependent and not self-produced, and also since the cause of all things can not be lacking in any existing quality, this supreme cause or God must be of our own nature, mind and will. As to just what the significance of mind is, Locke is not clear; what is made evident is that it is a notion subjectively derived and then assumed to account for the regulated character of external nature.

Berkeley, developing to a further stage Locke's thesis that all knowledge is limited to ideas derived from experience, discards substance, which Locke had retained as the material substratum of ideas, and with it any objective principle of connection. For we possess no idea of unity, but only a 'notion' of the same, hence there can be no external reality corresponding to it. The corporeal world is in this way reduced to a system of ideas, and hence for Berkeley the problem of its purposive character presents no difficulties. This system of ideas constitutes a cosmos. There is change and there is order of succession in the change. Since it is obvious that our own minds or wills do not control these ideas, Berkeley proceeds to infer the existence of an incorporeal cause or spirit as the author of the world harmony. What are known as laws of nature are really laws of this spirit. This notion of a supreme mind is based upon the

<sup>1</sup> 'Essay,' Book IV., Chap. I., Sec. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Book IV.

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doctrine of a subjective agent, a spiritual entity in which ideas inhere, which Berkeley had retained when rejecting a corporeal substance.

Hume, carrying to its logical outcome the thesis that all ideas are ultimately traceable to sense impressions, finds that upon this basis there can exist no formative principle of events, no essential unity, no real knowledge beyond immediate sensations and the memory of these.

After banishing Locke's material substance, Berkeley had still held to a substantial, spiritual entity. Advancing a step farther along the same line, Hume shows that the existence of mind, a substantial unity, is an untenable hypothesis. For no impression from which this idea arises can be discovered; analysis discloses what is designated as mind to be a mere 'bundle of perceptions,' with no principle of connection to constitute a unity. Similarly, necessary connection as an essential constituent of the law of causality turns out upon examination to be a mere figment of the imagination, a gratuitous construction, with no basis in reality. Experience presents elements in contiguity and succession, but perception reveals no idea of any necessary connection. With the abolishment of any essential synthesis of the contents of ideas, or the objects of knowledge, Hume is compelled to seek elsewhere for the explanation of what must be accorded complexities of our experiences and the apparent order and uniformity of nature. For reflection can not conceive experience as a chaotic jumble of elements or as an indiscriminate sequence of events.

This explanation of the unity prevailing in the practical world is gained by reference to the psychological processes of association and habit. In the case of the law of causality, repetitions of sequences give rise to the *feeling* of necessity that upon the appearance of one event a particular successor will follow. Thus necessity reduces to a habit of human nature, a tendency of the mind to pass from one event to another, but indicates no connection between the events themselves. It is a relation between ideas as psychical existences, not as contents or objects of knowledge. No real consequence can be demonstrated; arbitrary sequence is all that can be asserted. Hume stops with this negative conclusion; an inquiry into the logical ground of this belief in necessity does not suggest itself.

With respect to the teleological conception of nature, Hume discards the compromise between science and religion as effected by Locke and Berkeley. From the standpoint of an empirical epistemology the argument for design can not be maintained on rational grounds. The assertion of the absolute order and harmony of the



world is unwarranted by the facts of experience. Apart from strictly rational considerations Hume does find that the view of a supreme force regulating the events of the world appears to be pertinent to nature.

Kant's position is fundamentally influenced by the acceptance of the two-world theory of experience, although its form is an essential modification of any hitherto expounded. In accordance with Hume there is the initial assumption of an external reality presented through the medium of sensation. But Hume's consequent conclusion, the ultimate reduction of all knowledge to the passive flux of isolated sense impressions, can not be accepted. Our experience of objects is an indubitable fact, knowledge exists, science exists. Necessary connection, principles of unification, synthetic processes, not only *do* take place, but *must* be operative, since they constitute the very conditions of knowledge. Without a formative principle no object of knowledge would be possible. Since this synthesis, which must be accorded universal and necessary, is incapable of being derived from sensation, marked as this is with particularity and contingency, Kant concludes that it must be referred to the activity of an internal subjective element, mind.

External reality in itself can never be an object of knowledge. The office of sensation is limited to furnishing the stimulus which excites the formative activity. That is, by means of sensations is presented the raw material, absolutely unformed, upon which the shaping process operates, and wanting which it can not be effective. Even to recognize a sensation as such involves relationship, synthesis. To determine the various modes of synthesis which constitute the objects of experience and which are the preconditions of all science is the task of the 'Critique of Pure Reason.'

The primary, general conditions of any object at all are the forms of intuition, space and time. These are the pure forms of perception, the manner in which the theoretical reason operates to combine the manifold of sensation into perceptions.

But nature is not a mere aggregate of perceptions. The existence of any particular object as well as the relation of objects with each other involves a further stage of synthesis. Mere flux, alternations of sensations, could never result in an object or knowledge. For these particulars to be held together, an abiding element is required, a principle of connection, an intelligence. This it is which constitutes the 'ego,' 'the transcendental unity of apperception,' 'the self.' That faculty whereby the creative activity combines the elements of perception into the complexities of the world of experiences is termed the 'understanding.' The 'pure understanding' sup-

plies the concepts which are at the basis of those relations of objects described in physical science, the concepts which underlie the system of the world. Thus it may be said the 'understanding prescribes laws to nature.' The objective world of experience is a phenomenal world, a construction of the theoretical reason.

In agreement with Hume, Kant denies the conception of design as a principle implied in the constitution of nature. On theoretical grounds the validity of the deistic conception is incapable of being established upon the basis of the nature of this objective world. But as a regulative conception, as a principle of the reflective reason, Kant finds the teleological conception useful and justifiable. That is, it is a way of considering things which the mind finds indispensable to a complete interpretation of the world. To understand nature, our intelligence must view it as if it were regulated by design. Thus the conception has its existence only in the mind, it is subjective in the Kantian sense.

From the consideration of this position it is apparent that if we would determine what must be regarded as rationally valid in the teleological conception, or what in the Kantian philosophy must be deemed a principle of the constitutive reason, the query which will guide us resolves itself into, What are those features inherent in the objective world (objective in the Kantian sense) which permit and compel this way of viewing things if they would be comprehended?

In the 'Critique of Judgment' Kant analyzes the concept of purpose to some extent, and marks the distinction between *Zweck* (end) and *Zweckmässigkeit* (adaptation to end, or purpose). *Zweck* (end) is a conception which contains the ground of the activity of an object. "*Zweckmässigkeit* (purpose) is the agreement of a thing with a character which is only possible in accordance with ends."

Kant suggests that it is analogy with our own psychological activity which lies at the basis of the conception. Now, in two instances is there presented this characteristic which must be regarded as purposive; in the unity and uniformity of the world, and in organic beings.

In order that the world may be known, in order that scientific research may proceed, it is necessary to conceive nature 'as if a reason were at the basis of the unity in multiplicity manifested in her empirical laws.'<sup>1</sup> That is, an activity analogous to human causality is postulated to render intelligible the fact of control which is implied in the view that the world is a systematic unity.

Again, organic activity must be regarded as regulated with reference to ends since the parts and the whole in organic beings can

<sup>1</sup> 'Critique of Judgment.'

not be understood independently of each other. The production of the whole organism is determined by the parts and, conversely, the production of the parts is influenced by each other and by the whole. This reciprocal determination, Kant holds, is rendered comprehensible only on the supposition of an intelligence which acts as if it had a purpose in view.

Consideration of both these instances of purposiveness, the unity of the cosmos and organic products, leads us to conclude that that characteristic which is allowed to be an essential element of the objective world, and which the subjective conception is evoked to explain, is a connection of dependence among elements, such a relation of particulars as is conducive to a definite result. What the position further maintains is, that to comprehend this fact it is requisite to entertain a conception analogous to psychological activity, that is, a determination by means of a preconceived idea. It is this opinion which has led Kant to designate the conception of purpose, as applied to the world, subjective. What the above analysis of purpose has warranted us in retaining as an essential trait of the world is the fact of control as a specific relation between events, which relation is the ground of its systematic nature. It must be remembered, however, that the objective world according to Kant is really a subjective construction, hence this determining element in nature in the last instance is the work of mind.

The post-Kantian idealistic movement, developed in the systems of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, destroyed the transcendent cosmic reality which Kant had maintained as the cause of sensations, the unknown matter which was indispensable to the exercise of the activity of reason. Hence the entire phenomenal world is referred to consciousness or reason, either as its creation or as existence identical with it, according to the particular view of consciousness entertained. In the philosophy of Fichte, the transcendent absolute ego determines itself in its unconscious creation of the non-ego or external object. Control of the object becomes a determination of self. Schelling conceives both ego and non-ego, mind and nature, to be the product of a superior, mysterious transcendent principle, the identity of contraries. Finally, as a last phase of this movement, Hegel asserts that neither mind nor matter is transcendent; both are simply successive stages in the one process of reality. The world of experience is just this evolution of consciousness; reason is developing reality. Consciousness, however, is not identical with any human faculty, as Kant had asserted it to be, but constitutes the law of all being. It is the same principle which legislates in both nature and mind, although conscious of itself in the latter. Thus

does the principle of order become the ground of the objective, the external, which it determines; and its operation is the affirmation of the other and the subsequent control of it by the inclusion of its product within itself.

Coming down to the present-day philosophical movement known as pragmatism, we find a fundamental importance attached to the notion of control. This theory advances upon the presupposition that reality must be identified with experience, and that experience is dynamic and continuous in its movement. Moreover, the experience process is not adequately described as a mere flux of the given, an aggregate of successive events, a conjunction of accidentals. The movement is an evolution, each event is a stage in a process, one occurrence is the outcome of another; that is, determination and restraint are essential characteristics of it. The urgency of recognizing and accounting for control is manifested in the fact that it has given rise to one of the main problems of pragmatic epistemology, namely, to explain the determination in an experience process without recourse to any principle extraneous to that process. Direction of the experience movement is predicated, and the element which exercises this guiding function must, according to the basal assumptions, be wholly immanent. Thus experience is conceived to be a *self-evolving* process, a *self-maintaining* activity, and the controlling factor must be sought within these limits. Now, that element which guides activities without going beyond the boundaries of experience is, according to pragmatism, knowledge. Hence knowledge is essentially an instrument, an instrument of control whose office is the directing of the movements of experience in so far as these are other than accidental. Thought is one among other functions of experience and exhibits its peculiar nature in determining the other characteristics. It follows as a consequence of this doctrine, that irrespective of a life process control is meaningless.

In order to determine the significance of control in this theory, to discover just how thought operates as control, let us examine the pragmatic account of knowledge.

It is maintained that since knowledge is essentially instrumental, a function in the process of experience, the consideration of its genesis and consequence is imperative for its comprehension. Thought always arises in a situation which may be described as unsatisfactory, the elements of which are in tension one with another. In order that activity may proceed, a reorganization is demanded. To meet this want the idea arises as an interpretation of the discrepant situation, as a defining of the incompatible elements. Now it is the very essence of such interpretation to lead to a harmonious

or unified experience. For in making explicit the end which must be attained if activity is to go on, there is involved at the same time the tendency toward the realization of the goal conceived, the directing of activity to its achievement.<sup>1</sup>

Thus we obtain the thesis that the idea, being primarily a plan of action or purpose, controls movement, in its quality of reference to an end. The idea as purpose is coincident with the tendency toward a specific future experience or event, as contrasted with a mere happening. Control, then, reduces to a relation between two events of experience such that one (the idea) brings about the existence of the other (a fulfillment).

In this description of the thought function it appears that there are two determining circumstances exclusive of knowledge. The idea itself is somehow conditioned by the antecedent biological situation, and the experience, which is the outcome of the purpose, is likewise dependent upon some additional fact not contained in the idea. "The conditions out of which the idea as purpose arises determine also the fulfillment possible." That is, the idea implies a prior fact, transcendent of experience, by virtue of which its character is determined. And again, the idea, arising in this manner, is only determinative, and constitutes a knowledge if it issues in a completing, satisfying experience. For the objective is such by virtue of the fact that it controls. Now if this resulting situation is not wholly dependent for its character upon the idea, it is obviously influenced by a factor independent of experience. Since it is only upon the actual occurrence of the anticipated event that the idea is said to be effective, it seems that knowledge as control is itself influenced by some extraneous element. Just what part this influence plays, its relation to knowledge as control, or the expression of any implications it may contain, must be deferred to a later stage of this discussion.

The general account of the thought process sketched above embraces all varieties of knowledge, both the critical or scientific and the barely cognitive processes. Since the more involved operations may include and emphasize features which are lacking in the simpler cases, it would facilitate the attempt to reveal the essential character of control as exercised in knowledge if attention were confined to the type in which the least possible degree of complexity existed. Subsequent consideration of the more involved operations would disclose any additional characteristics introduced.

In a recent article by Professor Dewey there is presented an analytic description of a knowledge as such.<sup>2</sup> In this account the

<sup>1</sup> Gathered from 'Studies in Logical Theory,' John Dewey.

<sup>2</sup> 'The Experimental Theory of Knowledge,' *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XV., No. 59.

distinction between a *cognitive* and a *cognitional* experience is emphasized and their differentiae exposed.

That which is denominated a cognitive thing is the simplest type of a knowledge. Let us consider the concrete case cited in illustration of a cognitive experience: a smell which leads to action, the plucking of a rose. The experience which designates this sequence of events an evolution, the final act a result of the first occurrence, is a cognitive experience. Meaning, 'intellectual force and function' are attributed to the smell by virtue of its relation to the subsequent event, the presence of the flower. The smell means the flower. Now it is important to lay stress upon the fact that it is only retrospectively or *ab extra* that meaning or purpose is attributed to the smell. The smell in its original existence was not experienced as a smell, was not an idea, but mere fact. The idea knows the smell as smell because it is related to some other thing, the flower. With this description in mind, our problem takes the form of determining the *locus* of the controlling principle in experience, of discovering in just what the directing function inheres. Undoubtedly it is the cognitive experience (the retrospective experience) which *affirms* the determining relation between the two elements, the smell meaning the rose. But does it not make this assertion, is it not a knowledge, because of its recognition of a transitional experience independent of the knowledge of it? The controlling element, then, must reside in the immediate transitional experience, the connecting link between the elements, and not in the cognitive experience. Knowledge appears to be grounded in control, in the relation, rather than control in knowledge.

Up to this point, then, we find that there is no question of thought as control. The instrumental function of knowledge is yet to be evinced. To revert to the illustration: the smell recurring may consciously intend the flower, may 'mean to mean' a certain terminating experience. This 'cognitional experience is contemporaneously aware of meaning something beyond itself'; it sets up an ideal to be realized. That the meaning so intended is actually effective can only be affirmed after the resulting experience has verified it. When so validated the idea is held to be true. According to the experimental theory, a true idea is one whose conscious intention has been found to terminate in realization. Our query now becomes, Just where does the transformatory or reconstructive function of thought enter in this second type of a knowledge? The answer is, In its capacity for supplying meanings which may be purposeful. This it is able to do because of its predication of determinations which have been operative, *i. e.*, because of a previous

cognitive experience. Knowledge serves to lend direction to the process of experience in so far as it enters into the intentional purpose or meaning. The content of a cognitive experience may be made, consciously made, the incitement to action, and is thereby instrumental in determining experience to the extent that it is capable of expressing ideas which will operate; and to just this degree is experience 'a consciously effected evolution.' That an intended purpose will be effective can never be a matter of certainty; probability, in varying degrees, is the utmost which can be legitimately affirmed.

As a result of this analysis, it appears that knowledge as a knowledge never directly controls experience. An idea in functioning presents no elements which can be distinguished from determination in experience, which was unaccompanied by any awareness of its constraining nature. As an impulse to a specific action the idea regulates that movement in a manner similar to that of any non-logical impulse. In a secondary sense knowledge may be said to be determinative in so far as it indirectly influences a future impetus to action, by reason of its capacity for supplying the content of ideas and thus modifying impulse. That is, knowledge controls in so far as it reflects and harmonizes with a transcendent determination. Experience is a *self*-determined process to the extent that there is a recognition and utilization of an extraneous control.

## CHAPTER III

### BIOLOGICAL

IN times past and present theories of vitalism have been and are asserted which claim to account for certain peculiarities of the organic world which are incapable of explanation by mechanical principles. While the formulations of the theory have undergone modifications with the development of biological science, the logic of the argument remains generally the same. Thus in earlier times a special vital force was presupposed to account for such features as the orderly structure of the living organism, the process of development and the adaptation of organ to function. This specific energy constituted something supermechanical in nature, not subject to the laws of matter and motion, and, according to certain formulations, accomplished its work through a preconceived ideal.

But vitalistic theories, both those which have ceased to attribute a human intelligence to the extramechanical agent and the earlier formulations, are prone to be stigmatized as unscientific. What, then, is the ground of those objections which regard such reasoning as a false step in scientific procedure? The import of these criticisms, I take it, may be stated as follows: Vitalism must of necessity be worthless as a means of explanation since its method of procedure contains within it an inherent inconsistency. With the exposure of this inconsistency, vitalism as a scientific theory falls to the ground. It is due to a failure to appreciate the significance of mechanical explanation. Let it be granted for the sake of argument that there are distinguishing organic features, such as, for instance, the harmonious functioning of the organism. What vitalism presupposes in this case is an entity to account for such an arrangement of the material constituents as induced such a result. That is, in lieu of the forces which describe physicochemical processes, it asserts a principle which it holds to be specifically different, but which actually is assumed for the purpose of exercising the same function. Thus vitalism, in so far as it is explanation, resolves into mechanical explanation, and as such ceases to merit attention as a different method of interpretation, but must stand its ground similarly with any scientific hypothesis.

However, if vitalism proves superfluous as a method of explanation, it may contribute something of value if it calls attention to what have been considered those distinguishing features of living things



which have suggested the need of explanation specifically different from that obtaining in non-vital nature. If the development of biological science, with its increased accuracy in the description of vital processes, has tended to remove the ground for the assertion of peculiar vital characters, yet the investigation of them is of service in the present study since it has been conducive to the analysis of those features which they were invoked to explain.

Thus, it is the contention of a modern vitalist<sup>1</sup> that the creative synthesis of the organism, its harmonious functioning, is a unique attribute of living nature, in that it implies the possession of qualities by the whole which the parts do not display. The objector opposes, and we must add justifiably so, that this constitutes no criterion of difference between the two realms of nature. Every complex, inorganic as well as organic, possesses qualities which are wanting in its constituent elements. The attributes of water are essentially different from those of hydrogen and oxygen.

The subject of development may detain us somewhat longer, not because it requires an extramechanical entity to render it comprehensible, but because it has not so readily been paralleled in physico-chemical description. A recent statement of an opinion of the general drift of research with respect to this subject may help to disclose the nature of those facts of which theories of development must take account. To quote: "The germ consists of two elements, one of which undergoes a development that is essentially epigenetic, while the other represents an original controlling and determining element. The first is represented by the protoplasm of the egg. The second is the nucleus, which, as I have attempted to show, must apparently be conceived as a kind of microcosm or original preformation consisting of elements which correspond, each for each, to particular facts of characters of the future organism."<sup>2</sup>

We are not here concerned with the problem as to whether epigenesis or preformation or both be the proper explanation of development. What is to be observed is, that all the theories are advanced to account for a particular series of events, such a series as must be described as a process of development. That is, these theories indicate the necessity of explaining mechanically (*i. e.*, in terms of matter and motion) what must otherwise be conceived as a process controlled and determined. The future organism is somehow the resultant of original elements. There is an identical factor in the individual stages which constitutes them a connected series. Should development take place by the addition of parts (epigenesis), yet each stage of growth is not merely new, not absolutely unrelated to

<sup>1</sup> Driesch.

<sup>2</sup> E. B. Wilson, 'The Problem of Development,' *Science*, February, 1905.

the foregoing, since this new must be looked upon as conditioned to some extent by the prior stage; thus the changing series of states is designated an evolution.

If it prove that development is capable of analogy in inorganic nature, the fact of development remains unaltered and, if the above conception be sound, must stand.

But it is primarily in the explanation of the phenomena of adaptation that biology has emphasized its peculiar need for the employment of the conception of purpose. To the recognition of this peculiarity (whatever its nature may turn out to be) may be traced the impetus which leads writers on natural theology to employ it as a basis for the 'argument for design.' When Paley compares the eye to a human contrivance, it is its adaptation, its capacity for seeing, that makes the analogy hold. Its structure is an adjustment to a specific environment.

For a profoundly suggestive philosophical treatment of this subject, I refer to the volume of Professor Brooks.<sup>1</sup> In it the author contends that the distinction between the works of non-vital nature and those of life is useful and justifiable, and finds that distinctive character to be expressed by such terms as fitness, use, adjustment, adaptation.

To quote: "Living things are preeminently distinguished by what is best expressed by the word fitness; they are adjusted to the world around them in such a way as to force us to believe that the use to which their organization is put has in some way been the controlling factor of their organization." Darwin has described the method according to which adaptation has arisen, when he expounded his theory of the origin of species by means of natural selection. But in presenting this mechanical explanation of adaptation he has not disposed of fitness, and this is the fact to be interpreted.

Now fitness must be apprehended as a relation, a relation between the responsive organism and external nature, such as tends to preservation. And it must be observed that it is not primarily the individual that exhibits the favorable response which is benefited by it, nor primarily the organism in which the adjustment manifests itself which is preserved from injury or destruction; but otherwise. The impulse which leads to reproduction and achieves its end, the perpetuation of the species, frequently does so at the expense of the parents' life. To cite one among numerous concrete cases of migration, we may refer to the salmon. In the prime of its strength it leaves its abode in the ocean and, struggling against almost insuperable obstacles, finally arrives at the mountain stream which is to

<sup>1</sup> 'The Foundations of Zoology.'

serve as the breeding-ground. There, having accomplished its end, the establishment of offspring, its life is done. Nor does this present anything anomalous in living nature. Thus it is maintained: "In all cases, the structure, habits, instincts and faculties of living things, from the upward growth of the plumule of the sprouting seed to the moral sense of man, are primarily for the good of other beings than the ones that manifest them."<sup>1</sup>

And here we are confronted with an important point. Fitness involves the continued existence of that which is fit. If the being which survived the favorable response were not in some sense identical with the one which manifested the useful quality, there could be no such thing as adaptation. Since, as stated above, the individual whose survival is due to a favorable attribute is frequently other than the one possessing the useful quality, in what does this identity reside? Evidently, in the species. The relationship of adjustment is exhibited in the series of individuals, but not in any single individual of the series. Similarly, when we predicate fitness of an individual organism, the continuity inheres in the variety of changing instances of the individual life, and in particular cases underlies what is known as personal identity. That is, fitness involves genetic continuity, a permanent factor, an intelligible principle in the history of living beings.

Should the particular means by which species have been brought about prove to be 'mutation (the sudden and spontaneous production of new forms from the old stock)'<sup>2</sup> or the gradual accumulation of fluctuating variations, the above position is unaffected. Both theories endeavor to account for adaptation<sup>3</sup> and what it implies, progressive evolution in the organic world, a process wherein only the survivals count; these accumulating in the course of its procedure constitute a history in living nature.

The fact that change in living nature must be conceived to take place under certain limitations constitutes the foundation of the problem of heredity. A theory of evolution must explain two classes of facts, first, the production of new forms of life, and, secondly and primarily, the repetition and preservation of type. The particular means by which heredity is effected appears to be an unsettled question of biology. It is held, on the one hand, that it is impossible to explain the repetition of ancestral form on the theory of the inheritance of individual adaptation to environment; and again, it is maintained by some scientists that natural selection is inadequate to explain the whole phenomenon. What this moot position does indicate

<sup>1</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> De Vries.

<sup>3</sup> Adaptation has been used to signify favorable variation.

is the fact that all the theories of heredity find it necessary to explain the conservation of type, the fact that the new in living nature is not entirely new, but is a transformation of the old.

To sum up the results of the discussion: There is in living nature that which must be conceived as a tendency toward the attainment of something beyond the present individual's existence. This tendency, involving a permanent element in a changing series, makes for accumulation, thus resolving the succession into a history. Otherwise stated, there is a principle of control at the basis of the organic world which gives it the character of a progress or evolution. Organic evolution is an indication of a determining factor since it involves conservation or limiting conditions of occurrence.

## CHAPTER IV

### MECHANISM

THE modern scientific view of nature repeats the observation of Heraclitus of old,—all things change. But that the flux is calculable, that happenings take place in such a way that prediction of them is to an extent possible, that laws of change may be formulated, these facts constitute the very foundation of physical theory. Mechanism is the scheme for describing and explaining physical processes, and the existence of the mechanical theory of nature presupposes and involves a certain determination of occurrence, a regulation in change. In fact, mechanism is in essence a detailed expression of control. The fundamental postulate, upon which science advances, is that there is some constant amid all variation. For did mere change, unrelated elements, embrace the whole of the physical world, science would be impossible. Did observation disclose nothing permanent in alteration, laws of nature could not be constructed. Scientific investigation no less than ordinary observation asserts the interdependence of phenomena, and natural laws are formulated to describe these connections.

Let us see how physical science conceives control (tacitly, if not explicitly), and to this end examine some of the actual constructions as embodied in its basal concepts and principles. Before entering into this, however, since the object of physical theory generally is the formulation of laws, it is pertinent to inquire, What is the significance of a natural law?

Modern writers on the logic of science have called attention to the economical and practical character of natural laws. As an abridged statement, a concise arrangement of a large number of facts, a law facilitates thought in its endeavor to attain a comprehensive grasp of things. The data of which a law is an abstract formula are relations which obtain between elements or groups of elements. Observation discovers particular sequences of happenings, and a law in its descriptive quality resumes these sequences in a simple formula. In order that such a *résumé* may be effected, there must have existed as a prerequisite repetitions of similarities in the phenomena observed. That is, there is a constant factor in the variety of particular sequences and it is this identical feature which a law enunciates and which constitutes a specific relation.

It is obvious that a relation of succession, the outcome of empir-

ical data, does not exhaust the character of a law. A law implies such a sequence to be a consequence. The later happening is viewed as a result of a previous occurrence, and this in turn is regarded as a determining condition of the subsequent event. Otherwise stated, a law formulates a specific method of change. To this property of expressing a determining principle, the practical nature of a law may be traced. Thus one writer defines a law 'as a constant relation between the phenomena of to-day and those of to-morrow.'<sup>1</sup> Not only a past order is described, but prediction of future events may be made with confidence, and all such prophecy has its ground in the principle of uniformity. For every law is a generalization and as such involves the postulate of uniformity, and uniformity is simply an expression of the logical necessity for predicating control in the processes of nature.

It has been said that science makes legitimate prediction possible, and experience in the past has served to justify such prophecy. Now we have observed that all statements with regard to the future have their basis in the postulate of uniformity, and the question arises, What is the foundation of this conception? Is there, as it has sometimes been affirmed, any proof of the view that no arbitrary change can take place in nature? The answer to this query leads us to speak of the theory of probability and the part it plays (more or less consciously) in physical induction.

Of a future event there can be no certain knowledge; nor are we consigned to absolute ignorance in this regard. Probability, a degree of knowledge or ignorance, is our portion and constitutes the basis and outcome of all research. Now every statement of probability in physical science is based upon an hypothesis, upon the conviction of continuity in the processes of nature. Without this assumption no inference as to the probability of occurrence would be possible. Granting this thesis, we have now to consider the view which maintains that uniformity is not merely an assumption indispensable for scientific constructions, not solely a conviction necessary for practise, but that this concept has also a demonstrable foundation in experience.

The probability of an event is defined as the ratio between the number of favorable cases and the whole number of equally possible cases. It is important to note that in this definition the latter clause, the whole number of equally possible cases, is itself an expression of probability. And, consequently, if any specific probability is to be entirely a matter of experiment, the basis for the statement respecting the equal possibility of the total number of cases must

<sup>1</sup> Poincaré, 'Science and Hypothesis.'

be disclosed. The argument which claims to demonstrate uniformity by means of the calculus of probability may be briefly set forth as follows: Cases of non-uniformity have either never occurred or, admitting their existence, their number has been relatively so small as to be negligible in the argument. That is, the number of cases favorable to uniformity has been practically coextensive with experience. We come now to the second term of the ratio, the number of equally possible cases of uniformity. Whence does experience derive its knowledge of these? The answer to this point forms the crux of the argument. Karl Pearson<sup>1</sup> proceeds upon the basis of Laplace's theory that 'in cases where we are ignorant of the condition of the possible cases, there in the long run all constitutions will be found to be equally probable.' Then, comparing the number of favorable cases with the number of equally possible cases, we obtain that high degree of probability of uniformity which amounts to practical certainty. A little attention to the thesis of Laplace discovers that it simply begs the question which is the subject of proof. By what train of reasoning is the fact established that all constitutions are found to be equally probable in cases where we are ignorant? Is it not obvious that this theory is derived by means of that very calculus of probability, with its implied assumption as to knowledge of the equal possibility of all the cases, which it is pretending to demonstrate? That is, this proof of uniformity is based upon the postulate of some principle controlling occurrence, and hence the argument for its experimental basis falls to the ground. Similarly it will be found that those theories which profess to explain the constitution of an ordered world upon a basis of pure chance always employ tacitly, if not openly, some principle of determination upon which the force of the demonstration depends. Control is a postulate logically necessary to the existence of order, but is never merely a result of physical induction.

Let us now turn to some of the constructions of physical science.

Mechanical theory was wont to describe phenomena in terms of matter and motion. These two ultimate conceptions were specific designations of the permanent and the changing, the two irreducible facts involved in all the complexities of physical science. With the development of physical science, the concept of matter has undergone modifications in order to comply with an increasing accuracy and refinement of description; but throughout the whole variety of postulates we find an adherence to the notion of the permanent. Thus in an early stage of its history matter was defined as an entity qualified by existence in space and time. When a later concep-

<sup>1</sup> 'The Grammar of Science.'

tion replaced these characteristics by the trait of impenetrability, it responded to the same general need, the expression of indestructibility. A subsequent physics, finding this matter too gross for its requirements, proceeded to break it up successively into atoms, prime atoms, ions, etc. Despite the abandonment of spatial and temporal properties, the notion of the unchangeable is retained. The atoms were defined as indecomposable particles whose only motion is that of translation. Strain and rotation, changes in its internal nature, can not be ascribed to them. If the ion supersede the atom as the ultimate element, it is called forth to serve the same function, which is identical in all these conceptions and consists in the expression of the fact of inertia.

In its first significance, motion designated change in matter as extensive. This concept gave way to force, an entity to express the cause of motion, while in the science of to-day force is conceived as a ratio of acceleration, and this means a specific description of variation. Thus these various conceptions of motion are shown to be diverse modes, more or less adequate, of indicating change.

Finally, in the widest generalization of physical science, the principle of the conservation of energy, there are embraced facts both of fixity and of change; and upon ultimate analysis this principle of energy reduces to the assertion that there exists a certain identical element throughout physical processes, a limiting factor in change.

Mach says:<sup>1</sup> "If we estimate every change of physical condition by the *mechanical work* which can be performed upon the *disappearance* of that condition, and call this measure *energy*, then we can measure all physical changes of condition, no matter how different they may be, with the same common measure and say: *The sum total of all energy remains constant.*" We look in vain in the textbooks for a definition of energy. But we learn from such statements as the above that energy is measured by mechanical work. Now mechanical work is equivalent to change in the configuration of things. Energy, then, denotes the fact of change, or, rather, measurable change, such change as can be quantitatively determined. The conservation of energy is an affirmation of a quantitative identity maintained throughout all change. For we learn that energy has various forms, such as heat, light, electricity, magnetism, and that these are convertible; that is, there is a definite relationship existing throughout all variation, a permanent element in the transformation. The great advance which mechanism has made in the explanation of phenomena is largely due to the fact that it is able to express its laws in the form of mathematical equations. Such quan-

<sup>1</sup> 'Popular Scientific Lectures,' translated by T. J. McCormack, 1898, p. 164.



titative determination of change supplies a detailed account of the principle controlling nature.

It is important to observe that the principle of the conservation of energy is not a truth experimentally derived. An inquiry into its origin and the employment of it in investigation discloses (as shown by Mach, Poincaré and others) that it is an assumption logically necessitated in the explanation of physical processes and indispensable for scientific research. Experience verifies its existence, but can not originate the principle. Further, the whole force of this principle in physics necessitates that the principle determining change exists inherently in the process it characterizes. Were the principle regulating change located in a foreign agent, mechanism would be meaningless.

The fundamental dimensions of physical science, mass, length and time, derive their significance from the fact that they tend to supply means of determining the exact conditions governing occurrence, the quantitative limits within which change may take place. These dimensions are independent kinds of measurement, and as such constitute so many different ways of expressing relations between phenomena, of designating specific modes of interdependence. For measurement is the definition of one phenomenon by another,<sup>1</sup> and thus description of things in quantitative terms is rendered possible.

To conclude, then, this investigation of the concept of control as evinced in mechanism: The general assumption of a regulation of occurrence forms the basis of mechanical explanation. The fundamental constructions of physical science characterize the limiting factor of change as a permanent element in variation. As a description of change in measurable terms, mechanism is compelled to assume a quantitative identity maintained throughout alteration. It is required that the determining factor exist inherently in the process it influences.

<sup>1</sup> Mach, *op. cit.*, p. 206, note.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS

OUR study of these different instances illustrating the logical necessity of affirming control and the way in which this demand has been satisfied, reveals certain fundamental agreements and dissimilarities among the conceptions. Everywhere (*i. e.*, in the cosmological theories, in the epistemological conceptions, in the principles of biology and mechanism) there is the initial assumption of a world of change, and in all these cases there is the additional affirmation of *definite* movement involving an identical element in variation, a static principle in the dynamic flux, an intelligible feature in sensible existence. It may be said that pragmatism does not assert a permanent factor in the experience process; but since it defines experience as an evolution, each stage the result of a previous condition, one situation or portion of experience a *transformation* of another, we feel justified in saying that the permanent is implied in this description, if not explicitly stated.

The cosmological conception, pragmatic epistemology, the principles of biology and mechanism agree in placing the directive principle wholly within the movement it constitutes a process. That is, the determinate relation between elements is dependent for its nature upon the specific particulars it connects. It is manifested in individuals as a tendency toward results, it is a reference of elements to a dominating whole.

In contrast, according to the epistemological movement terminating with Kant, the regulative principle has its origin in a source distinct from the material which it unifies. It is constituted a subjective activity, reason; while that which it influences is a cosmic reality. The history of thought succeeding this epistemological movement has disclosed the inconsistencies and paradoxes involved in the assumption of a dualism of realities, and thus has evinced the need of a different method of approaching the question.

This leaves us with the moot problem: Is the principle of control a cosmological conception, or is it a function of human experience? Must it be designated a characteristic of a life process, or is it a metaphysical concept to which the psychological is subordinate as a special case?

In the analysis of the conception of pragmatism, it was discovered that knowledge, a controlling function of experience, points to and involves a transcendent control, a determination independent of our

experience of it. Further, it was maintained that knowledge is knowledge by virtue of this property of cognizing a metaphysical control, and exercises its peculiar function in rendering possible an intensification of a cosmical reality. If this position be accepted, psychological control becomes a particular instance of a general cosmical determination.

As an outcome of this discussion of control, it appears that the concept when applied to reality results in two specific modes of describing the nature of things, distinguished by the terms employed. On the one hand, there is the qualitative aspect of nature, incapable of being adequately rendered in physical terms, and whose fundamental nature is described in the category of purpose. I say purpose, for it seems that this term as used by Greek philosophy is best fitted to express the intelligible character of reality designated as a tendency toward results. Again, in mechanical explanation we have things described in their quantitative aspect, or in spatial or physical terms. It is obvious that these two modes of describing one fundamental feature of reality are not mutually exclusive nor contradictory, but coexist. Neither can be reduced to terms of the other; both are diverse but essential modes of denoting the same characteristic expressed in the concept of control.

A word as to some current applications of the category.—The sciences of mechanics, economics and sociology, in investigating the laws of movement respectively describing their distinctive phenomena, include as a fundamental prerequisite the recognition of a set of static principles which present the conditions of equilibrium, or the unchanging. Mechanics has its department of statics, treating of those principles of movement which are the condition of stability. The elaboration of these principles is a necessary antecedent to the formulation of the kinetic laws, since these static principles constitute the controlling elements in the entire field of dynamics. Similarly, economics in its constructions of the laws governing the distribution of wealth in a changing social organization presents as an indispensable preliminary, in its theory of static social economics, the principles which would be operative in an unchanging world. Since existing society always is dynamic, these principles must be abstractions and can have no independent status. Nevertheless the static laws are actually dominant in the variations of wealth occurring in the development of society and constitute the standard to which fluctuations tend to conform. Sociology describes the process of society as a moving equilibrium. The laws which are found to govern social development embrace as a fundamental part social statics, the laws of social coexistence, the conditions which would maintain a social stability.



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
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WILL TO BELIEVE

AS A BASIS FOR THE

OF RELIGIOUS FAITH

CRITICAL STUDY

BY

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## CONTENTS

Prefatory note .....	v
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### INTRODUCTION

James's general standpoint—Voluntarism—James's historical place—The task .....	1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---

### PART I

#### EXPOSITION OF JAMES'S DOCTRINE

Introduction: Plan of exposition .....	5
----------------------------------------	---

#### CHAPTER I

##### THE DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS FAITH

James's <i>Weltanschauung</i> —The place of religious faith in James's philosophy—The content and significance of the religious hypothesis .....	6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---

#### CHAPTER II

##### THE BASIS OF THE DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS FAITH: THE THEORY OF JUDGMENT

Belief, its nature and the conditions which give rise to it—Belief as will—The freedom of will and of belief—Summary .....	19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

### PART II

#### CRITICISM OF JAMES'S DOCTRINE

Introduction: The method of the critique—The charge of subjectivism ....	31
--------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

#### CHAPTER III

##### JAMES'S DOCTRINE AS A DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS FAITH AT THE COST OF PURE KNOWLEDGE

The relation of faith to knowledge and its significance for the overthrow of intellectualism—Paulsen's contribution to the solution of the problem of the relation between intellect and will—Criticism of Paulsen's contribution to the problem—James's contribution to the solution of the problem of the relation between intellect and will—James's solution of the problem on the basis of free belief—The result of James's solution and the dilemma in which it leaves us .....	34
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

#### CHAPTER IV

##### JAMES'S DOCTRINE AS A DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS FAITH AT THE COST OF OBJECTIVE REALITY

The epistemological presuppositions for the subjectivism of a theory of free belief—The epistemological presuppositions of the 'psychology	
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--

of belief'—The individuality of James's theory of judgment—The epistemological presuppositions of James's theory of judgment—The importance of these facts for James's solution of the problem of the overthrow of intellectualism—Positive evaluation of the will to believe as a basis for the defense of religious faith, and summary ..... 55

## CHAPTER V

### THE DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF AS A VICIOUS CIRCLE

The freedom of belief as a justifiable free postulate—The problematic attitude in its relation to the defense of religious belief—The basic presupposition of James's justification of freedom ..... 78

## CONCLUSION

James's relation to the other representatives of voluntarism—Evaluation of his doctrines as a contribution to the voluntaristic interpretation of the world ..... 93

## PREFATORY NOTE

THIS critique was written a few years ago, at a time when no one term—neither pragmatism nor humanism—had been generally adopted as a label for Professor James's philosophic standpoint. Pragmatism was associated more particularly with the work of Professor Dewey and his school, humanism with that of Dr. Schiller. The term 'voluntarism,' however, was established by usage in German philosophic literature as a designation for that mode of philosophizing which attempts to construct a *Weltanschauung* upon the fundamental fact of the primacy of the will in both the practical and the theoretical spheres. Obviously the term voluntarism is sufficiently vague to include many divergent theories of knowledge and reality, yet sufficiently definite to draw a sharp line between its own philosophical property and that of intellectualism, whether rationalistic or empirical.

Now the following pages have to do mainly with James's religious philosophy and with his theory of knowledge in so far as they afford a foundation for the structure of his defense of religious faith. In criticizing his doctrine I have adopted two methods of discussion; first, its comparison with related doctrines for the purpose of bringing into relief its individual character, and second, an examination into its coherence for the purpose of exhibiting its utter inherent inconsistency.

For this latter mode of criticism it may be considered immaterial with what name the philosophy under discussion be etiquetted; the criticism is directed against individual philosophical conclusions, be the method by which they are reached or the general standpoint from which the thinker views his field pragmatic, humanistic or voluntaristic: the method or point of view itself is not involved in the criticism excepting in so far as we may suppose it to be responsible for the results reached. The first manner of treatment, however—that of comparison—contains the explanation for our application of the label of voluntarism to James's philosophy. For the closest relatives of James's doctrine—both epistemological and *religions-philosophisch*—have seemed to me to be those theories which have designated themselves and have been designated in philosophical literature as 'voluntarism.' Whether this incorporation of James's doctrine into the family of voluntaristic philosophies, rather than into the pragmatic family or any other, be justified or not the

following pages will show; the propriety of such a proceeding can not be assailed if we find that without doing violence to the facts we thereby gain insight at once more comprehensive and more definite into that body of James's doctrine which, starting from the immediate experience of simple affirmation, finds in the fact that simple affirmation feels like will, the basis for an ultimate proclamation of the right to believe whatever lies in the line of one's needs.

I wish to add another word in justification of my phraseology. In a recent public utterance<sup>1</sup> Professor James repudiated the term 'The Will to Believe' as a title for his collection of essays published in 1898 and suggested the title 'The Right to Believe' as more representative of their teaching.

Undoubtedly the two phrases are conceptually distinct on the face of them; but just as undoubtedly, as the following critique will, I hope, show, the 'right to believe' in James's usage means the right to choose a belief or to will to believe. In a word, the title 'The Right to Believe' replaces the title 'The Will to Believe' by including it: for conceptually it is nothing but a shorthand for 'The Right to Will to Believe.'

<sup>1</sup> In the course of a series of lectures on pragmatism delivered at Columbia University during February, 1907.

# THE WILL TO BELIEVE AS A BASIS FOR THE DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS FAITH

## INTRODUCTION

THE doctrine which is to be treated in these pages is, in the broadest sense of the terms, a theory of the freedom of judgment. As the title indicates, this theory is to be criticized not only for its intrinsic validity, but also, and more especially, in its character as a foundation for the defense of religious belief.

Professor William James has been the first to give this character to a psychological theory of judgment: he first has advanced an exhaustive theory of belief, relating it to other trains of thought in order to draw its implications into a conclusion which virtually amounts to a justification of religious faith. It is his doctrine, therefore, which will form the center of our discussion.

The general movement in which Professor James's doctrine may be included is known to the philosophy of the day as 'voluntarism'; a movement of thought which seems to promise deliverance from the narrow confines of the intellectualistic view of the world, whether its final wisdom is embodied in empirical or in rationalistic systems. Every attempt at solving philosophical problems which seems to lie in this direction is therefore hailed with expectancy and is welcomed as having special claims to attention. It is in this spirit that Professor James's contribution to the voluntaristic explanation of the world has been received. So we find a recent writer, in an answer to James,<sup>1</sup> placing his doctrine at the terminal point of a line whose direction is indicated by the names of Kant, Fichte, Lotze, Sigwart, Paulsen, Jevons and Mr. Balfour, and whose trend is characterized by the assertion of the 'supremacy of the will.' In James's doctrine he welcomes the first perfectly definite expression of the independence of this supreme will. For, in distinction from his predecessors who still attempted to a greater or less degree to establish the supremacy of the will, with the consent of the reason, James takes his stand on 'sheer volition.' He vigorously preaches the 'liberty of believing,' 'the lawfulness of voluntarily adopted faith,' 'the right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced.' In

<sup>1</sup> D. S. Miller, 'The Will to Believe and the Duty to Doubt,' *International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1899.

short, James is here conceived as bringing into explicit terms the implications of the voluntaristic interpretation of the world.

Paulsen, too, seeks an historical place for James, and finds it—in his own immediate neighborhood! In the introduction to the German translation of James's essays, he writes: "Professor James belongs to a movement indicated by the names of Hume, Kant, Fichte and Carlyle: on a positivistic foundation, an idealistic philosophy with energistic tendency. The will determines life, it is its elementary right; therefore it surely has the right to influence thought as well, not, to be sure, in the determination of single facts: here the intellect ought to judge solely according to the facts themselves; but rather in the conception and interpretation of reality as a whole."<sup>1</sup> In what manner James's standpoint thus interpreted is related to that of Kant, we learn from Paulsen in the conclusion of his 'Kant.'<sup>2</sup> It is here stated that one of Kant's most valuable and lasting contributions to philosophy is contained in his doctrine of the relation between 'knowledge' and 'faith.' Knowledge is a matter of the intellect, and the intellect "is perfectly free to examine critically all the facts of the spiritual and the historical worlds, and to explain them causally on the assumption of strict determinism. . . . Scientific research is the only means for attaining truth in questions of historical facts." However, this scientific knowledge is limited both empirically and transcendently. Empirically, because it can never exhaust the infinite world of experience, and transcendently, because even if the empirical world were fully explained we should be in possession of 'an accidental view of reality only, a projection of things on our senses': the intelligible world would still be an impassable barrier to scientific knowledge. "Only an intellect that creates things—an '*intellectus archetypus*'—knows them as they really are: an intellect to which they are presented through the medium of the senses can not transcend the knowledge of their external nature only. Hence the non-phenomenal transcendental world is matter for faith; the interpretation of the meaning of the sensible world from the point of view of the intelligible is the task of faith, and results in a metaphysic. This faith is a practical attitude springing from the volitional side of human nature, and therefore not subject to impugment on the part of the intellect." Kant's second great merit lies, according to Paulsen, in the fact that he first gave the will its rightful place in the general scheme of

<sup>1</sup> James, 'Der Wille zum Glauben und andere populärphilosophische Essays. Uebersetzt von Dr. Th. Lorenz,' Stuttgart, 1899.

<sup>2</sup> F. Paulsen, 'Immanuel Kant, sein Leben und seine Lehre,' pp. 393-397, Stuttgart, 1899.



things, by means of a chain of thought intimately related to the one just presented. On the will and not on the intellect depend, first, a man's value as a complete human being, and secondly, his *Weltanschauung*. This latter fact forms the proper foundation for a correct valuation of the validity and of the certitude of our truths. "Moral certitude is the final test of all certitude. The ultimate and most profound truths, the truths by which and for which man lives and dies, are not grounded in the intellect; they spring from the heart of man—from his will."<sup>1</sup> Every one makes assumptions and holds convictions which he can not prove, but which, though they have no logical certitude, have the highest moral certitude, inasmuch as they are the very conditions of life and of activity. Our belief in humanity, in progress and in the victory of the true and the good, is a conviction of this kind, as is also our religious belief.

According to Paulsen, now, James's historical importance lies in the fact that his doctrine is an amplification of this Kantian thought, in that he shows how science itself is based on what is a mere assumption, the possibility and the validity of knowledge or truth; and that if science then proceeds to identify this absolute knowledge with demonstrable knowledge and to reject all divergent conceptions of knowledge as 'unjustifiable assumptions,' she obviously proceeds in a totally arbitrary, dogmatic and inconsistent manner.<sup>2</sup> In conclusion Paulsen refers to his own similar standpoint as set forth in his 'Einleitung in die Philosophie,' a standpoint to be considered at length later on in these pages.

On the question of the propriety of incorporating James into the Kant-Fichte movement of philosophy, judgment must be reserved until we shall have reached critical conclusions. That such an interpretation of his doctrine is the obvious one, and that a special dignity and importance are conferred on James by this interpretation, are patent.

We have to do, then, not with an isolated theory, but with one which has been related to the most significant tendencies in modern thought, and whose critique involves a consideration of the entire voluntaristic movement; more especially so because, as we shall see, James's doctrine contains suggestions of almost every variety of voluntarism.

Our task, then, is to present James's doctrine, and after having shown what it professes, to subject it to a criticism which will enable us to judge both of its intrinsic validity and of its value as a contribution toward the voluntaristic explanation of the world.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 397-399.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 398 and foot-note.



## PART I

### EXPOSITION OF JAMES'S DOCTRINE

A COHERENT and connected presentation of James's theories must necessarily be more or less of a construction, for James's own work is not systematic.<sup>1</sup> Out of an abundance of demonstrations and expositions a logical argument must be extricated; a task rendered the more difficult by the fact that conflicting statements may not be ignored, as inconsistency is sometimes as essential to the nature of a theory as consistency.

The presentation of this doctrine falls naturally, as the title indicates, into two parts. First, the theory of judgment or belief, which forms the basis for the defense of religious belief; and secondly, the defense itself, as it rises upon the basis of this theory.<sup>2</sup> In concordance with the author's own thought process, we shall first present the significance and meaning of religious faith in his *Weltanschauung*; then, the justification it receives on the grounds of a psychological theory of judgment; and lastly, the theory of judgment itself.

<sup>1</sup> This remark is not made in a critical spirit, as the essays do not pretend to be systematic. I merely wish to point out that a systematic presentation of a work which has no systematic foundation given it by its author, is bound to be an interpretation in that it is forced to select its essential points independently.

<sup>2</sup> In a general way it may be said that the theory of judgment is found in James's 'The Principles of Psychology,' New York, 1893; and his defense of religious belief in his works 'The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy,' New York, London and Bombay, 1898; and 'The Varieties of Religious Experience,' New York, London and Bombay, 1903.

## CHAPTER I

### THE DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS FAITH

James's *Weltanschauung*—The place of religious faith in James's philosophy  
—The content and significance of the religious hypothesis.

JAMES'S general philosophical standpoint is most clearly outlined in his essay 'The Sentiment of Rationality.'<sup>1</sup> Philosophy is man's attempt to rationalize the world, and the mark whereby he knows whether he has reached his goal is a subjective one: a feeling of 'ease, peace, rest.' This feeling of rationality is, to be sure, negative rather than positive; it is constituted by the absence of any feeling of irrationality. Just as unobstructed respiration is accompanied by no especial feeling of pleasure, whereas obstructed respiration produces intense pain, so any 'fluent course of thought awakens but little feeling'; when the movement is impeded, however, a feeling of distress results. "This feeling of the sufficiency of the present moment, of its absoluteness,—this absence of all need to explain it, account for it, or justify it,—is what I call the Sentiment of Rationality. As soon, in short, as we are enabled from any cause whatever to think with perfect fluency, the thing we think of seems to us *pro tanto* rational."

In a theoretical way this fluency—this sentiment of rationality—can not be obtained unless two demands have been satisfied: the theoretical passion or need for simplification of the manifold, which is brought about by generalization, and the sister passion for distinguishing, in order to gain clearness in regard to the unique and particular.

A mediation between these two syntheses of reality, diversity and unity, is the aim of philosophic unification; the first step thereto is the classification of things into extensive 'kinds'; and classification of their relations and conduct into extensive 'laws' is the last step.<sup>2</sup> But this unification is obviously only an abstraction, for it regards things from a limited point of view only, and can never really substitute the concrete manifold. In other words, the real essence of things can never be determined by theoretical philosophy—only different essences; and concepts, kinds, etc., are

<sup>1</sup> 'The Will to Believe,' p. 63.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67 ff.

teleological instruments created in the interests of a definite purpose. Now this interest in theoretical rationality is, to be sure, an invincible human impulse, but it is, after all, but one of many. And even if its goal were attained and the world were conceived simply, not so very much would have been gained after all. The ultimate question expressed by 'Why?' which is forced upon us by the notion of non-entity, would still be unanswered.

A wholly rational theoretical world-conception can not be attained, then; intellectual activity meets with an insurmountable obstacle and is checked. The question to arise, then, is this: Can the stream of theoretical contemplation be diverted into the practical sphere; and if so, 'what conception of the universe will awaken active impulses capable of effecting this diversion' and giving back to the mind the free motion which is the mark of true rationality? It is possible and conceivable now that different systems of philosophy should be equally satisfying to our purely theoretical needs—in this case, too, the theories must be submitted to the will side of our nature, and the one most suited to its needs will be pronounced the more rational. The tests of this practical rationality are the following: The conception or system must in the first place '*in a general way at least, banish uncertainty from the future.*' For this reason philosophies that explain the world *per substantium* have always been popular and satisfying.\* In the second place, and this is the essential test, the philosophy must define the future '*congruously with our spontaneous powers,*' it must provide our active propensities and desires with an object to press against, and our feelings with a meaning and with relevancy to universal affairs.<sup>1</sup>

Of the relationship between practical and theoretical rationality we learn more in the 'Dilemma of Determinism.'<sup>2</sup> Philosophy as well as empirical science grows out of man's invincible impulse to rationalize the world of experience. So far the world has lent itself to the transformation, but to what extent it will continue to do so, no one can foretell: the trial must be made again and again, and conceptions of moral rationality as well as of mechanical and logical rationality must be applied for this end. The two kinds of rationality are coordinate; that which does not satisfy moral needs may be doubted or thrown overboard with the same justification as that which contradicts the logical intellect. Rationality yields subjective satisfaction only: theoretical demands—such as causality and uni-

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82 ff.

<sup>2</sup> 'Will to Believe,' p. 146 ff. James cites Sigwart, 'Logik,' Vol. II., p. 382, on this occasion.

formity—being quite as ‘subjective and emotional’ as moral demands. And, indeed, the study of physiology and psychology makes us realize, not only that the cognitive faculty of theorizing—the intellect itself—is nothing other than a means to action, but further, that its transformation of the world of perceptual experience is effected in the interest of the volitional side of human nature.<sup>1</sup> It would thus seem that theoretical knowledge is of a secondary nature, is but one means toward rationality among many, and is, after all, but a subjective expression of will. We *want* a rational world, because we must stand in relation to it. In this sense we accept the postulates of science, uniformity and causality, to construct on them our body of knowledge.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, in ‘The Varieties of Religious Experience’ we read that theoretical rationality can be gauged and tested by practical results only. The significance of any thought lies in its consequences, its influences on conduct and practise.<sup>3</sup> The conclusion to be drawn for the relation of practical and theoretical rationality from this ‘pragmatic’ point of view, is that ‘the true is what works well, even though the qualification “on the whole” may always have to be added.’<sup>4</sup> The uses to which a thing may be put are thus the best arguments that truth is in it. A thing is real in so far as it shows real effects. It is not sufficiently recognized how exclusively the intellect is built up on practical interests, although the doctrine of evolution is to-day contributing much toward the realization that knowledge remains imperfect until it issues in action. The cardinal question in reference to a newly presented object of consciousness is not the theoretical question, ‘What is it?’ but the practical question, ‘What shall I do with it?’ And the same is true when the object consists of the cosmos in its totality. In regard to it, too, I must react in some way or other, and if a philosophy demands that my attitude be of a definite character, it has acknowledged that the nature of the cosmos is known. And, indeed, all great periods of revival of the human spirit have been characterized by the propagation of the text, “The inmost nature of reality is congenial to *powers* which you possess.”<sup>5</sup> Now, one of the most important powers we possess as willing and acting beings is that of ‘faith.’

<sup>1</sup> ‘Reflex Action and Theism,’ *ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 124-131. James again cites Sigwart, ‘Logik,’ Vol. II., p. 25, where the primacy of the will is advocated in the sphere of logic even, for the reason that the processes of thought with which logic has to do rest upon a ‘will for truth.’

<sup>3</sup> ‘The Varieties of Religious Experience,’ New York, London and Bombay, 1903, p. 444 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 458.

<sup>5</sup> ‘Will to Believe,’ p. 84 ff.

"Faith means belief in something concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible; and as the test of belief is willingness to act, one may say that faith is the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in advance."<sup>1</sup> The necessity and justification of this faith as a mental attitude is affirmed, as was shown, even by scientific philosophers, but, by a perfectly arbitrary procedure, only for the case of a single doctrine, that of the uniformity of the course of nature—a postulate pursued, as we know, in the interests of cognition and of action. In just the same manner, however, a religious dogma is postulated and accepted in the interests of our volitional nature. Faith has meaning as an hypothesis with which one operates, and the differences in hypotheses are only these, that some may be proved or disproved in five minutes, and that others defy centuries of research; that some are sufficiently unimportant to permit us to delay our decision until perceptual verification can be obtained, while others are so momentous that we are forced to come to an immediate decision. To act upon unverified hypotheses is, to be sure, a risk, because the results of the action alone can show whether the faith in the hypothesis was justified: whether I was right. But, in the case of religious faith it is a risk in which nothing can be lost and everything may be gained; for in adopting the religious hypothesis and with it the risk, a man feels something like this: "I *expect* then to triumph with tenfold glory; but if it should turn out, as indeed it may, that I have spent my days in a fool's paradise, why, better have been the dupe of *such* a dreamland than the cunning reader of a world like that which then beyond all doubt unmasks itself to view."

To sum up in a word: It would seem that, according to James, faith, belonging to the practical side of human nature, is both the root and the crown of all knowledge of the world. In the broadest sense, it is basic, because theoretical knowledge or cognition—rationalization of the world—arises out of practical interests and has for its goal practical interests, although not always conscious of it; in a word, cognition is but a means to action. In a narrower sense, faith is at the basis of knowledge, inasmuch as faith, one of our strongest practical powers, is constantly presupposed by scientific knowledge, for even as purely theoretical intellects we are constantly working with unproved postulates and hypotheses, toward which we assume a believing attitude. At the goal of the process of knowledge faith again comes to its rights, inasmuch as the theorizing faculty finds itself unable to perform its self-imposed task—the rationalization of the world—and the volitional and practical facul-

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 90.

ties must therefore attempt it. And in a narrower sense again; inasmuch as man is constantly confronted with hypotheses which form real options, that is, which must be decided immediately because they must immediately be acted on, and which, nevertheless, can not be decided on purely intellectual grounds, here faith not only *may*, but *must* intervene and pronounce its yea or nay over against a possible problematic attitude.

If we seek to determine the place for religious faith in James's philosophy, it is with this latter class of hypotheses that we must occupy ourselves. We find this class treated at length in the essay 'The Will to Believe.' Here James first defines his conception of a true option.<sup>1</sup> He gives the name of hypothesis to anything that is proposed to one's belief, and considers it 'live' if it appeals to one as a possibility—if a tendency to believe in it exists. An option, now, is defined as the decision between two hypotheses. "Options may be of several kinds. They may be, 1, *living* or *dead*; 2, *forced* or *avoidable*; 3, *momentous* or *trivial*; . . . a *genuine* option . . . is of the forced, living, and momentous kind." An option is living if it appeals, even slightly, to our belief; it is unavoidable if it forms a logical dilemma and a choice must be made; if, for instance, I am told, "Accept this truth, or go without it," for in such a case I am obliged to take sides. And finally, it is obvious that an option may be more or less momentous in its consequences. With a genuine option of this sort, then, we are concerned when we seek for the place of religious faith in James's *Weltanschauung*. Before demonstrating this, however, James cursorily considers the rôle that belief, conceived as an expression of will, *actually* plays in the formation of human opinion. He shows how will in general, that is to say, not only deliberate volitions, but all factors of beliefs, such as fear, hope, passion, prejudice of caste and sect, have been powerful collaborators to the sum total of our opinions. We believe, but why? We hardly know. As an example of this kind of belief James cites our belief in truth itself. He says: "That there is a truth, and that our minds and it are made for each other,—what is it but a passionate affirmation of desire, in which our social system backs us up? We want to have a truth; we want to believe that our experiments and studies and discussions must put us in a continually better and better position towards it; and on this line we agree to fight out our thinking lives. But if a pyrrhonistic skeptic asks us *how we know* all this, can our logic find a reply? No! certainly it can not. It is just one volition against another,—we willing to go in for life upon a trust or assumption which he, for his part, does not care to make."

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.



This case, although cited as an example of the unconscious non-intellectual influences on opinions and knowledge, leads us into the domain of deliberate volitional decisions—into the field of options. For here, where we consciously face a dilemma and must come to a decision for or against an hypothesis, the deliberate volitional act is called for. Here faith may decide; that is, the volitional side of one's nature may express itself through faith, one may believe what one will.

Nay, more: "*Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that can not by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under the circumstances, 'Do not decide, but leave the question open,' is itself a passional decision,—just like deciding yes or no,—and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.*"

This thesis, James continues, is based on two general presuppositions. Epistemologically it is based on the foundation of empirical dogmatism, a standpoint which is dogmatic in that it acknowledges truth and our ability to attain to it; empirical, in that it denies that we can always know *when* we have attained the truth. For as empiricists we are forced to admit that every one of our convictions may be reversed, and that the sole criterion of the truth of an hypothesis is the confirmation it receives from the 'total drift of thinking.'<sup>1</sup> Now it is this standpoint on which the thesis cited above rests; for, inasmuch as we are not in possession of infallible intellects with objective certitude, and inasmuch as no bell rings in us when we have attained the truth, we can not feel bound to wait for such a bell to ring, we are not bound in loyalty to any infallible organ. That we may wait, if we choose, can not be denied; but we must realize that in such a case we are taking the same risks as if we decided not to wait, but to believe.

In the second place, the thesis defended above presupposes as the ideal of knowledge, not the negative imperative of avoidance of error, but the positive imperative of the attainment of truth. But these two imperatives are logically distinct; for obviously errors may be avoided without bringing us nearer the truth, and therefore it is really at bottom a matter of feeling to which one of the two we shall adhere. James personally makes a choice of the positive imperative—the one which drives a man into battle even at the risk of wounds—over against the negative imperative which leaves him inactive, a prey to everlasting suspense. But this observance of the positive imperative to the neglect of the negative one is advocated only for the cases of genuine options. In purely scientific research

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

we are told that it is possible to wait for objective evidence and therefore possible to follow the second imperative; even in most practical matters options are seldom unavoidable and momentous. If so, we ask with James: Where do the really genuine options, that can not be decided on intellectual grounds, lie?

In our search for the place of religious faith, we have followed James far enough to look back upon the following steps in the structure of his argument. First, the goal of philosophy is the rationalization of the world. Secondly, the intellect, or, as James puts it, the theoretical side of man, can not reach this goal unaided. Thirdly, this intellect rests upon the will, inasmuch as faith, which is a practical attitude, assists theoretical knowledge in the attainment of truth. Fourthly, faith not only actually has influenced knowledge at all points, but indeed must be the final judge in cases where objective evidence is wanting and where a decision must nevertheless be reached, in cases of genuine options. We have now reached the point where James asks, Where do such options exist? And the answer to this is at the same time the answer to our original question, Where does religious faith find its place in James's philosophy?

Among the questions to which life obliges us to give some definite answer, and which are not susceptible of objective evidence, James cites, first of all, questions of value, judgments of worth, moral questions. "The question of having moral beliefs at all or not having them is decided by our will"; and so, too, are questions of the truth or falsehood of our moral judgments; the intellect can decide nothing in these cases. "Moral skepticism can no more be refuted or proved by logic than intellectual skepticism can."<sup>1</sup> But under this general class of questions, there falls a more special type of genuine option, and it is to this special type that the religious hypothesis belongs. The characteristic of this new type of option is this, that faith is not only justified in deciding the option because knowledge based on objective proof is wanting, but that faith is indeed logically *forced* to decide, *inasmuch as faith is a necessary factor in the realization of its object*. "*And where faith in a fact can help create the fact*, that would be an insane logic which should say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the 'lowest kind of immorality' into which a thinking being can fall."<sup>2</sup> To this class of options, now, belong not only the religious hypothesis, but all sorts of decisions about personal and every-day attitudes, and as an example of this latter kind of option I cite the following case, especially interesting for our purpose because James himself cites it

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

on several occasions as a perfect analogy to the option formed by the religious hypothesis. "Suppose, for instance, that you are climbing a mountain, and have worked yourself into a position from which the only escape is by a terrible leap. Have faith that you can successfully make it, and your feet are nerved to its accomplishment. But mistrust yourself, and think of all the sweet things you have heard the scientists say of *maybes*, and you will hesitate so long that, at last, all unstrung and trembling, and launching yourself in a moment of despair, you roll in the abyss. In such a case (and it belongs to an enormous class), the part of wisdom as well as of courage is to *believe what is in the line of your needs*, for only by such belief is the need fulfilled. Refuse to believe and you shall indeed be right, for you shall irretrievably perish. But believe, and again you shall be right, for you shall save yourself. You make one or the other of two possible universes true by your trust or mistrust, — both universes having been only *maybes*, in this particular, before you contributed your act."<sup>1</sup>

The question to be answered now, is this: What does James's religious hypothesis, which forms this latter type of option and is an analogy to the cited case, assert? How does James conceive its content?

In 'Reflex Action and Theism' we learn that God is the object of religious belief and that God's essence lies in this, that He is the deepest power of the universe. He must be conceived as a mental personality for the reason that he ascribes worth to certain things and recognizes our attitude toward those things. God is a power not ourselves, 'which not only makes for righteousness, but means it, and which recognizes us.'<sup>2</sup> This optimistic side of religion is emphasized most especially in those essays in which James recommends

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59. As this is a case of belief verifying itself, it bears an outward resemblance to James's later pragmatic theory: that truth is verified belief. It is therefore interesting to note that this resemblance is entirely outward; in its implications our theory is absolutely opposed to the pragmatic view of action or workability as a test of belief. For every belief which verifies itself by first creating the fact it refers to 'works' and has validity: there is no possibility of its not working, and thus action or workability can no longer be considered the test of validity of a belief. "You make one or the other of two possible universes true by your trust or mistrust": the validity of your trust or mistrust is not then tested by the fact that one or the other only *can make a universe*.

<sup>2</sup> 'Will to Believe,' p. 122. In this paragraph it is not possible, as in the last, to give a purely objective account of James's position, for his statements are too varied and apparently too contradictory to be presented uncritically, while it would be misrepresentation to simply ignore their inconsistencies.

religious faith to voluntary choice. Accordingly, in the 'Will to Believe' religion is conceived to affirm two theses; first, that the best things in the universe are the eternal things—the ones that have the final word—the 'overlapping' things; in short, that 'perfection is eternal': and secondly, that we are better off, even now, if we believe these affirmations to be true.<sup>1</sup>

In 'The Varieties of Religious Experience' another formulation of the content of religious belief is given. Here we are told that it includes the following beliefs: first, that the visible world is part of the more spiritual universe from which it draws its chief significance; secondly, that a harmonious relation with that higher universe is our true end; thirdly, that through inner communion with its spirit we receive an influx of spiritual energy which produces effects within the phenomenal world.<sup>2</sup> It is in this production of effects—in this influence on conduct—that the significance of religion is conceived to lie: religion posits facts which if believed make a difference in the moral life. Thus religious belief is always characterized by 'the feeling of uneasiness, the sense that there is something wrong about us as we naturally stand,' and the sense 'that we are saved from the wrongness by making the proper connection with the higher powers.' "In . . . developed minds . . . the wrongness takes a moral character, and the salvation takes a mystical tinge."<sup>3</sup> Again: "The unseen region . . . is not merely ideal, for it produces effects in this world. When we commune with it, work is actually done upon our finite personality, for we are turned into new men and consequences in the way of conduct follow in the natural world upon our regenerative change. . . . The universe, at those parts of it which our personal being constitutes, takes a turn genuinely for the worse or for the better in proportion as each one of us fulfills or evades God's demands."<sup>4</sup> According to this conception, the significance of the religious hypothesis would, then, appear to be drawn solely from its relation to the moral life. This conception of religion is clarified and elaborated in the essay 'Is Life Worth Living?' Here the essence of religious belief is found to lie in the belief in an invisible world-order of some kind, in which the riddles of the natural order are solved, 'and in its relation to which the true significance of our present mundane life consists.' For only the belief in such a world-order lends worth to life, because only then can one feel certain that the courage and patience of this life will eventualize and bear fruit in another—a

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Lecture XX.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 308.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 516-517.

spiritual—world. This life, then, is worth living because we can make of it morally what we choose; the spiritual world is a possibility which our faith realizes. The question whether life is worth living or not is therefore analogous to the option cited above: life is worth living if I believe it to be so.<sup>1</sup>

It would seem, then, that faith in the unseen order is contained in one's faith in the worth of life, for only by means of religious faith can one believe life to be worth living and only because of one's faith in the worth of life can one make real the worth of life. James expresses this relation as follows: "Now, in this description of faiths that verify themselves, I have assumed that our faith in an invisible order is what inspires those efforts and that patience which makes this visible order good for moral man. Our faith in the seen world's goodness (goodness now means fitness for successful moral and religious life) has verified itself by leaning on our faith in the unseen world. But will our faith in the unseen world similarly verify itself? Who knows?" James gives his answer to this question: "I confess that I do not see why the very existence of an invisible world may not in part depend on the personal response which any one of us may make to the religious appeal. God himself, in short, may draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity."<sup>2</sup> But how are we to understand this answer of James? In the first place, it is not clear how the existence of a world-order can be *partially* dependent at all, and how we can properly speak of differences in the quantity of God's vital strength. But there is a further difficulty presented in the relation that the worth of life is said to bear to religious faith. The argument used by James for establishing this relation may best be exposed by duplicating it in an analogous case of an every-day nature. A child asks himself: Is this day, so full of unpleasant tasks, which I must either do or leave undone, worth living? Shall I rise, or shall I pretend to be ill and remain in bed? If now the child, although he has no certainty, should believe that his mother will give him a gift 'to-morrow' in case he should perform his tasks properly to-day, this expected reward will make the day worth living, and faith in the consequences of his industry will stimulate him to industry; he will rise, work, and accomplish his tasks. Thus James's argument. But is it logical? Is the to-day indeed worth living for the child on account of the task accomplished by him? What was the definition of the worth of the to-day with which we started? Was it not dependent upon that other day, the to-morrow which was to complete it, by presents, etc.?

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52 ff.

<sup>2</sup> 'Will to Believe,' p. 61 ff.

The belief in the possible rewards of this to-morrow engenders the belief of to-day's worth in the child's mind. The worth of to-day may not therefore be ascribed to the fact that the child was industrious and good. Indeed, it can not be so ascribed, for it was only on the strength of that other belief that the child performed its task and realized the worth of to-day. Logically, the realization of the gift is implied in the realization of the worth of to-day. Therefore, James may not answer with any 'maybe' or compromise. It follows with absolute necessity that if life is made worth living through faith in its termination in another world-order, this other world-order is somehow (difficult as it may be to conceive just how) realized when the worth of life is realized. The subsequently introduced conception which ascribes the worth of life to the intrinsic worth of a will for the good, is logically uncalled for. Indeed, on the contrary, the moral life, the life of exertion and sacrifice to duty, is valuable only because, according to James, it is the life which 'bears fruit' in that other world-order. The thought is, in brief, this: believe in the spiritual world-order and you must necessarily believe that life is worth living, for you will believe in the moral life; and in living the moral life you will realize the moral world order, which, if it be not the religious world-order, at least implies it.

And, in truth, it would seem that James's unseen spiritual world-order is at bottom a moral world-order; for how else can an order in which our moral actions and willing attitudes are recognized and bear fruit, be conceived than as a moral world-order?

Indeed, in his essay 'The Sentiment of Rationality' James identifies the two explicitly. The question of the morality of the universe is here pronounced to be the fundamental question of life, and its negation is termed 'materialism.'<sup>1</sup> But in a preceding passage it had been stated that he who stood for God, immortality, morality and freedom, was in the lists against materialism. It would therefore seem that according to our author these questions are the religious questions after all. And we know that the moral world-order belongs to a class of truths that demand personal effort for the realization of their objects, and hence for their very existence as truth, and that this personal effort is dependent on subjective energy, and subjective energy in turn on a previous belief in the truth itself.<sup>2</sup> To quote James's own words: "In every proposition whose bearing is universal (and such are all the propositions of philosophy)"—to which the hypothesis of the moral world is reckoned—"the acts of the subject and their consequences throughout eternity should be included in the formula."

<sup>1</sup> 'Will to Believe,' p. 103 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95 ff.

If  $M$  be the entire world, *minus* the reaction of the thinking individual, then the entire world which forms the material and matter of philosophic propositions must be represented by  $M + X$ ,  $X$  standing for the reaction of the thinker and its results. The character of the whole, then, obviously depends on the character of the  $X$ . This fact, says James, must be considered in the question of optimism and pessimism. The world can be made good or bad only through our power to produce good and bad: the  $X$  gives the  $M$  its value. Therefore it may be said that "wherever the facts to be formulated contain such contribution, we may logically, legitimately and inexpugnably believe what we desire. The belief creates its verification. The thought becomes literally father to the fact, as the wish was father to the thought."<sup>1</sup>

Just so in the case of the question whether or not the universe is moral. Materialism denies absolute value, whereas the moralists believe that the moral order rests upon an ultimate and absolute 'thou shalt.' Here again it is the  $X$ , the personal attitude, which gives to the world its kind and degree of value, and we can not properly speak of objective evidence or verification until the last man has had his say and has contributed his share to the still unfinished  $X$ ; and if we decide not to react because still in doubt, we are making a decision of practical importance for the reason alone that through our decision to doubt we may miss the goods which we might have gained by a decision to believe. In moral matters skepticism is no possible attitude; he who is not for is against.

However this passage may be interpreted, in the essay 'The Will to Believe' James takes a definite stand. Religious faith, which holds the good and the righteous things of the world to be the everlasting ones, is here explicitly asserted to be a self-realizing faith, and the religious hypothesis is incorporated in the class of self-realizing options. Indeed, the essay's object is to prove that religion is a truth which depends on our personal attitude, and that therefore faith based on desire, that is, free belief, is not only justifiable but imperative. It is justifiable, because we have in the religious hypothesis a real option; momentous, inasmuch as there is much to gain or lose; and unavoidable, because if we decide to doubt we lose the good as surely as if we cast our decision against it. Here, then, the skeptical attitude is not avoidance of the choice, but is itself a choice of a special kind: it is a decision to risk the loss of truth rather than to accept the possibility of error. Here is a decision, not of the intellect over against mere feeling, but of one volitional impulse over against another, both combined with the same risk.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 103.

Surely man has the right, if he run a risk, to choose the kind he prefers.

But religious faith is not only justifiable, but also logically imperative. This is clear when once it is understood that religion is essentially a truth dependent for its very existence on preliminary faith in its existence. Of such truths we are told: "*And where faith in a fact can help create the fact*, that would be an insane logic which should say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the 'lowest kind of immorality' into which a thinking being can fall."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25, and see above, p. 12.



## CHAPTER II

### THE BASIS OF THE DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS FAITH: THE THEORY OF JUDGMENT

Belief, its nature and the conditions which give rise to it<sup>1</sup>—Belief as will—The freedom of will and of belief—Summary.

THE traditional theory of judgment asserts that a judgment is a proposition connecting 'ideas' by a copula, and that propositions may be positive, negative, hypothetical and so forth. It is obvious, however, that in a disbelieved or doubted proposition, as well as in a question, the same combination of ideas obtains. We must say, therefore, that 'the way in which the ideas are combined is a part of the inner constitution of the thoughts, objects or content,' and that the object is a whole, whether it be simple or composed of related parts—such as the relation of subject and object, for instance. After the inner constitution of an object has been defined in a proposition, the question comes up in reference to the total object: Is it real? Is this proposition true or not? And in the answer to this question lies the new psychic act, which is called 'belief.' In every proposition, so far as it is affirmed, doubted or denied, there are four different elements: subject, predicate, their relation—three elements which form the object to be judged—and lastly, the attitude of the mind in regard to this object; and this latter is the element of 'belief.' Belief, then, is 'the mental state or function of cognizing reality.' Every one has the experience, and thus knows the difference between merely imagining a thing and believing in its reality. In its inner nature belief is a feeling closely akin to that known to the psychology of will as 'consent.' Both consent and belief are characterized by the facts that the stability of their objects is such as to fill the mind to the exclusion of all contradictory ideas. But this inward stability of the content of the mind is as characteristic of disbelief and negation as it is of belief. An object, in fact, is disbelieved only when some contradictory object is believed, and therefore it may be said that disbelief is in essence only 'an incidental complication of belief.' The psychological opposite of belief is not disbelief, but doubt.

Of the inner constitution of belief nothing more can be said; with Mill, it must be held to be 'primordial and ultimate,' a state of mind

<sup>1</sup> 'Psychology,' Vol. II., Chapter 21, 'The Perception of Reality,' p. 283.

*sui generis*, and the only question we can therefore profitably ask is: What are the conditions of belief—under what circumstances do we think things real? The first condition is put in this way: "Any object which remains uncontradicted is *ipso facto* believed and posited as absolute reality." The truth of this may be realized by the following example. Let us imagine the mind of a new-born child waiting for experience. Let us suppose that experience begins in the shape of a visual sensation, a burning candle against a dark background, and nothing else. This picture fills the child's mind completely, and constitutes its entire universe. If now the candle were merely imaginary and no 'original' corresponded to it in the outside world, would this hallucinatory candle be taken for real? Most assuredly it would be believed by the mind of the child, for it constitutes its entire universe. It is its all; its whole attention is absorbed by it, and no alternative can come up at all. The child's mind can not, therefore, do otherwise than ascribe reality to the candle. Spinoza long ago recognized these facts and illustrated them in the example of the boy and the winged horse. He showed how the very idea of the horse present in the boy's mind would necessarily awaken belief in its existence, were it not for the fact that another idea annulling the horse's existence was joined to it. In short, every imagined object is affirmed, unless it clashes with other objects. The next question to come up is: How can objects clash? How can one thing thought of be contradicted by another? And the answer is: They can do so only if one thought expresses something 'inadmissible' about the other. If the child says of the candle, or the boy of the winged horse, that the candle or the horse exists in the outside world, even when not perceived, he asserts something to be true of the outer world which is contradictory to everything we know of that world. A choice must then be made between the present perceptions and the other knowledge of the outer world. If the other knowledge of the outer world be adhered to, the present perceptions must be rejected at least 'so far as their relation to that world goes.' If one merely dreams of a winged horse, it occasions no clash; the horse exists in its own individual place, and claims no connection with other places of the world. If, however, I identify the winged horse with the horse in my stable, and assert that my horse has grown wings in the stable, I am asserting something which contradicts what I know of the world in which the stable stands.

These two examples illustrate still another distinction, that between existential and attributive judgments. 'The candle exists as an outer reality' is a case of the former, and 'my horse in the stable has a pair of wings' is a case of the latter sort of judgment, and it

follows that 'all propositions, whether attributive or existential, are believed through the very fact of being conceived, unless they clash with other propositions believed at the same time by affirming that their terms are the same with the terms of these other propositions.' The dream candle has existence, but not the same kind of existence (existence *extra mentem meam*) as the candle for the waking consciousness has. "The whole distinction of real and unreal, the whole psychology of belief, disbelief, and doubt, is thus grounded on two mental facts—first, that we are liable to think differently of the same; and second, that when we have done so, we can choose which way of thinking to adhere to and which to disregard." The things we choose become our realities; the existence we adhere to becomes our real existence; but those other objects, to which we do not consent, the rejected things, what becomes of them? In practise these rejected objects are considered non-existent. They do not count; but as they actually have existence, namely, existence as phantasms, as errors, etc., they must in theory, certainly, be counted a part of the universe as well as the 'realities.' Indeed, the universe with which the philosopher is concerned—the world in its totality—consists not only of realities plus fancies, errors and illusions, but of many more sub-universes, which the practical man can distinguish but dimly, but which the philosopher attempts to relate and connect into a world-whole. The most important and most frequently discriminated sub-universes are:

1. The world of sense or of physical things, as we apprehend them, such as heat, sound and color.
2. The world of science, or of physical things as the learned conceive them, in which nothing is real but solids, fluids and their laws of motion.
3. The world of ideal relations or abstract truths, formulated into logical, esthetic, ethical, mathematical and metaphysical propositions.
4. The world of prejudices, or 'idols of the tribe.'
5. The many supernatural worlds; worlds of faith and of fancy.
6. The worlds of individual opinion.
7. Those of madness and vagary.

"Every object we think gets at last referred to one world or another of this or of some similar list." These different worlds are, as was said, in man's mind in a chaotic mix-up; and every world is real in its own way while it absorbs the attention; 'the reality lapses with the attention.' As every one, however, has dominant habits of attention, these practically elect from among the various worlds some one which for him will become the world of ultimate realities. This world will then be his test—whatever contradicts it is shoved

into another world or rejected. And, as all the worlds have existence in the strict sense of the term, this process shows the 'everlasting partiality of our nature, our inveterate propensity to choice.'

Everything that is conceived, then, may have reality in a metaphysical sense, reality for God; but man needs practical reality, and in order to be practically real an object must not only be conceived, but must be found *interesting* and *important*. The worlds, whose objects are neither one nor the other, are neglected, are rejected as unreal. In this relative sense, then, reality over against unreality means simply 'relation to our emotional and active life . . . whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real.' If an object affects us in such a way as to call forth consent and recognition, we 'believe' in it, it is real; not otherwise. The object of belief, then, reality or real existence, is something other than all other predicates of a subject. If we add predicates to a subject, we enrich the latter's content; if we believe in an object, and assert its reality, we merely establish practical relations between the objects and ourselves. These relations are our real relations unless or until they are superseded by others. "The *fons et origo* of all reality, whether from the absolute or the practical point of view, is thus subjective, is ourselves." As logical thinkers without emotional reactions, we would indeed ascribe reality to all thoughts and phenomena; as "thinkers with emotional reaction, we give what seems to us a still higher degree of reality to whatever things we select and emphasize and turn to *with a will*."

We reach conclusions: all reality is anchored in our sense of our own reality and life—in the ego considered as an active and emotional term. Reality, radiating from the ego, transmits itself to those things which have an intimate and continuous connection with life. As Descartes made the indubitable reality of the *cogito* go bail for all that the *cogito* included, so we attribute reality to all that is immediately connected with the indubitable reality of our present existence, and the only question that remains to be answered is: What are these objects that are so connected with our present reality as to have the power of awakening our interest? A simple and direct answer can not be given, for is not the history of human thought itself the unfinished attempt to answer the question of where our true interests lie and what things shall be called realities? Psychology can point out a few facts of its own, however. Sensible experience is always considered real, because its vividness compels attention, and it is safe to say that no conception which does not terminate in the world of orderly, sensible experience can prevail. A conceived object will appeal in vain for belief, if it have no vivid

and permanent sensible object for its 'term.' In short, 'conceived objects must show sensible effects' in order to be believed. This is what is meant by verification in science. "Sensible vividness or pungency is then the vital factor in reality when once the conflict between objects, and the connecting of them together in the mind, has begun." Among sensations themselves those which are the practically important ones will be considered the most real, along with the most permanent and esthetically apprehensible ones. So, for instance, the real color of an object is the color sensation it gives when most favorably lighted for vision. Of all sensations, however, those are most belief-compelling and the most real which are productive of pleasure and pain—a theory already expressed by Locke.<sup>1</sup>

Next in reality to sensible objects are those which arouse the passions and active impulses. "Every exciting thought in the natural man carries credence with it. To conceive with passion is *eo ipso* to affirm." In short, all conceived objects that awaken interesting emotions—as hate, desire and fear, or motor impulses—are believed. "Our requirements in the way of reality terminate in our own acts and emotions, our own pleasures and pains;" these are the fixities on which is suspended the chain of our beliefs.

As for theories, now, one may say in general: they are judged according to the same simple standards, however difficult the application may prove in detail. Of alternative theories, the one which explains most satisfactorily the world of sensible experience will be believed; of two theories equally strong in this respect, the one which in addition satisfies our volitional and emotional needs, is bound to prevail. The system which is richest, most simple and harmonious, will be chosen for belief.

We have seen that, according to James's conception, the essence of belief manifests itself in the act of choice; our next task will be to learn his views on the relation between will and belief in detail. After that, his theory of the will itself will be presented.

Will, as well as belief, we have been told, is nothing other than a certain manner of attending to objects, and consenting to their stable presence in consciousness. The objects of the will are those whose existence depends, on the one hand, on our thought, on the other hand, on our actions; while objects of belief 'do not change according as we think regarding them.' But this difference in objects of will and of belief does not affect the attitude of the mind toward them; in both cases it is the same: the mind conceives the object and consents to its existence, it chooses it for its reality. "Will and be-

<sup>1</sup> 'Essay,' Book 4, Chapter 2, paragraph 14; *ibid.*, Chapter 11, paragraph 8.

lief, in short, meaning a certain relation between objects and the self, are two names for one and the same *psychological* phenomenon. . . . The causes and conditions of the peculiar relation must be the same in both. The free-will question arises as regards belief. If our wills are indeterminate, so must our beliefs be, etc. The first act of free will, in short, would naturally be to believe in free will, etc."<sup>1</sup> "The most compendious possible formula perhaps would be that *our belief and attention* are the same fact. For the moment, what we attend to is reality; attention is a motor reaction; and we are so made that sensations force attention from us."<sup>2</sup> But if belief is a motor reaction, it is pertinent to ask, How can man believe freely, how can he 'will to believe'? He *can not* do so *suddenly*, is James's answer, but there is a very simple method by which he can bring himself to believe as he chooses *gradually*; he need only act *as if* a thing *were real* and continue so to act, and the object will finally grow to have such a connection with his life that it will become real.

Thus will, belief and attention would seem to be different names for the same mental attitude, and if we ask just how will and belief resolve themselves into attention, we find the answer in James's 'Theory of the Will,' which may be summed up as follows, in James's own terminology.<sup>3</sup>

Every representation of a movement realizes in some degree the actual movement which is its object; and awakens it in the maximum degree whenever it is not kept from so doing by an antagonistic representation present simultaneously to the mind. The express fiat, or act of mental consent to the movement, comes in when the neutralization of the antagonistic and inhibiting idea is required. When the conditions are simple, no express fiat is needed, for the reason that consciousness is in its very nature impulsive. "Movement is the natural immediate effect of feeling, irrespective of what the quality of the feeling may be. It is so in reflex action, it is so in emotional expression, it is so in the voluntary life." The voluntary fiat comes in in deliberate action, that is, when the mind is the seat of many ideas related to one another in antagonistic or in favorable ways. One of the ideas is that of an act. By itself this idea becomes a movement; some of the additional ideas present to consciousness, however, block the motor discharge, while others again may solicit it to take place. The result is the feeling of unrest known as indecision. While it lasts we are said to deliberate, and when finally the original suggestion either prevails and makes the movement take place, or gets

<sup>1</sup> 'Psychology,' Vol. II., p. 321.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 322, foot-note.

<sup>3</sup> 'Psychology,' Chapter XXVI.

definitely quenched by its antagonist, we are said to decide, or utter our voluntary fiat in favor of one or the other thought. The reinforcing and inhibiting ideas meanwhile are termed reasons or motives by which the decision is brought about.

Now the immense majority of human decisions are, to be sure, decisions without effort, but there are some decisions in which effort is a necessary factor, and although its existence in consciousness can not be doubted, its significance is a matter about which great difference of opinion has prevailed. Questions as momentous as those of the existence of spiritual causality and of predestination—as against free will—depend on its interpretation. What, then, are the true conditions under which the feeling of volitional effort is found? When we say that consciousness (or the mental process which goes on with it) is in its very nature impulsive, the proviso must be added: if it be sufficiently intense. Now there is a certain normal ratio in the impulsive power of different sorts of motive which characterizes what may be called ordinary healthiness of will. Compared with states of consciousness representing objects of instinctive reaction, or with feelings, or ideas of pleasure and pain, or with ideas to which we have grown accustomed so that the habit of reacting on them is ingrained, or with the idea of objects comparatively near in space or time—compared with all these states of consciousness, all far-off considerations, all abstract conceptions, unaccustomed reasons and motives, have little or no impulsive power. They prevail, when they do prevail, with effort; and the normal sphere of effort is thus found wherever non-instinctive motives for behavior are to rule the day. Effort comes in wherever a rarer and more ideal impulse is called upon to neutralize others of a more instinctive and habitual kind, wherever strongly explosive tendencies are to be checked, or strongly obstructive conditions are to be overcome. The facts may be symbolized thus: *P* standing for the propensity, *I* for the ideal impulse and *E* for effort:

$$I \text{ per se} < P$$

$$I + E > P$$

Therefore ideal or moral action is action in the line of the greatest resistance; that is, in the line of *I per se*, which, upon addition of effort, becomes victorious over the line of the least resistance, *P*. As to the nature of this effort, it is, of course, inner effort—effort of attention—which makes the idea dominate in consciousness; and ‘attention with effort is all that any case of volition implies.’ The essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most voluntary, is to attend to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind.

The so doing is the *flat*; and it is a mere physiological incident that when the object is thus attended to immediate motor consequences should ensue.

"Effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will." The terminus of the psychological process in volition, the point to which the will is directly applied, is always an *idea*. The only resistance which our will can possibly encounter is the resistance which such an idea offers to being attended to at all. To attend to it is, then, the only volitional act it can perform, and if we want a single term to cover the conditions upon which the impulsive and inhibitive quality of objects depends we had better call it *interest*. In fact, 'what we attend to' and 'what interests us' are synonymous terms. In the chapter on 'Attention,' we come across a new and somewhat divergent formulation of this theory.<sup>1</sup> Here our interest in objects is given as the only reason we can have for attending to them. Our interest is asserted to be the *cause* of our attention. Attention itself is here classified as, first, either immediate or derived; immediate if the stimulating object is stimulating *per se*, derived if it is interesting only through its association with some other object. Secondly, attention may be either passive, reflex and effortless, or active and voluntary; and 'voluntary attention is always derived; we never make an effort to attend to an object except for the sake of some remote interest which the effort will serve.'

The question now of free will and hence of free belief, according to this theory, relates solely to the amount of attention or consent which we can at any time put forth. Are the duration and intensity of this effort fixed functions of the object, or are they variable quantities, so that, given the same objects, more or less effort might be put forth? In other words, is voluntary attention a resultant or a force, cause or effect? James holds that this question admits of no answer on psychological grounds. Determinism and indeterminism are theoretically of equal worth, as it is simply impossible to know whether within any given case more attention could have been bestowed or not.

Theoretically, then, one must be agnostic, in that from the scientific point of view it is problematic whether determinism or indeterminism is in the right; but, practically, the freedom of the will may and indeed must be accepted on the very grounds of the theoretical *non liquet*, for the following reasons: first, because we need freedom in the interests of our moral life; and secondly, because if freedom really existed, we could never get at that truth excepting by freely choosing to believe it. In short, '*freedom's first deed should*

<sup>1</sup> 'Psychology,' Vol. I., p. 402 ff., especially p. 416.



*be to affirm itself.*' To be sure, man need not affirm freedom. He has the right to remain agnostic, only he must fully realize that in such a case he is adopting an attitude which is precisely the same sort of volitional decision as the attitude which freely declares for freedom of will and belief.<sup>1</sup> This latter attitude is the one which James decides to adopt. He freely wills to believe in free will.

We have before us a theory which, if not systematic in form, is, at least, rich and full in content. Beyond the limits of demonstrable knowledge there lies no longer the not-yet-known or the unknowable; a whole world of possibilities and the free opportunity to grasp all it desires, tempts the spirit. For demonstrable knowledge forms at best but a fraction of the convictions with which life is judged and lived, and is itself built upon a foundation of unproved and unprovable postulates; indeed, knowledge is in essence nothing other than belief. When I judge, I believe, and that means that I express my volitional nature, and choose my experience. But evidence for the correctness of my judgment is obtainable in few cases; in the far greater part of human decisions one can not afford to wait for evidence, and in some others the nature of the case excludes evidence prior to the belief, in that belief is itself a necessary factor for the existence of its object. Here the rule for behavior reads: do not adopt a problematic attitude, but judge, decide, and believe freely what you choose, for you will make real what you have chosen to believe through the very fact of your belief. Such a case is presented by the religious hypothesis.

The treatment of the relation of practical and theoretical rationality may be considered a first step in the argument leading to these conclusions, or, more accurately put, a presumption in favor of the religious hypothesis. For he who holds the practical ego to be at the root of all theoretical activity, must admit that such a state of affairs disarms every argument directed against practical needs and practical rationality as 'merely' practical and hence of inferior validity. But, as at the same time we are told that the intellect has a function, nay, even the right to rationalize according to its principles wherever it can, and the practical will finds its place only where the intellect is incapable of fulfilling its task—the justification of practical needs given above can not be considered a defence of any one volition or practical need.

The positive argument in defense of religious belief only sets in when it is shown that there are 'options' in which the intellect can not come to a decision, and that the religious hypothesis forms such an option.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I., p. 447 ff.; Vol. II., p. 569 ff.

Having reached this point, the negative results contained in the first step are turned to positive account, for now we are told: in the case of the religious hypothesis and similar options, a problematic attitude is itself a passional decision and is therefore combined with as much risk as a passional for or against. Hence no reason holds good why the will should not decide in the line of its needs, while there are decisive reasons why it should, in that as practical creatures we are continually forced into action. Therefore faith or volitional decision without evidence coercive to the intellect is justified.

The last step in the argument attempts to prove that the religious hypothesis belongs to a special type of options the intellect can not decide, a type characterized by the fact that belief is a necessary factor in the realization of the fact to which it refers. Only if man's actions are inspired by a belief in the existence of the religious world-order can the religious world-order become a reality.

Obviously belief is here measured by action; and thus "the whole defence of religious faith hinges upon action. If the action required or inspired by the religious hypothesis is in no way different from that dictated by the naturalistic hypothesis, then religious faith is a pure superfluity, better pruned away, and controversy about its legitimacy is a piece of idle trifling, unworthy of serious minds."<sup>1</sup> But the action itself depends, we are told, on belief: when I stand on the precipice and must jump to save my life, or when I am to fulfill my moral ideal, I must *freely choose to believe* (for my intellect can not decide), in the one case, in the strength of my muscles, and in the other case, in the unseen spiritual world-order. Here belief, being a necessary factor in the creation of its object, is not only justified, but is imperative, and we are told: Will to believe, express your volitional ego in choice, and freely adopt whatever belief is in the line of your desires and needs.

Thus the defense of religious belief presupposes the psychological possibility of free belief. And as it is just this possibility which James attempted to prove in the theories contained in his 'Psychology,' we are justified in considering these theories the foundation for his defense of religious faith. First, then, we learn that belief is the kernel of all judgment whatsoever; secondly, that it is the same psychical attitude as will; thirdly, that both will and belief resolve themselves into voluntary attention; and fourthly, that voluntary attention may be assumed to be indeterminate or free.

Having thus established the possibility of a free will to believe, or free belief, nothing remained to be added but a hint how to effect such a freely willed belief in practise; and this information could be

<sup>1</sup> 'The Will to Believe,' p. 29, foot-note.

given in one sentence: *act* in cold blood as if the thing in question were real, and keep acting as if it were real, and it will infallibly end by growing into such a connection with your life that it will become real.



## PART II

### CRITICISM OF JAMES'S DOCTRINE

IN the criticism of this unsystematically formulated doctrine, we shall keep as closely as possible to the order of our presentation. We shall first, then, treat of the relation between theoretical and practical rationality, that is, we shall criticize the foundation that James gives to the standpoint, which, formulated in short, reads: You are justified in choosing to believe religiously because all knowledge is in essence belief, and belief is in essence a volitional act. We shall then ascertain whether James's theory of judgment really establishes free belief as a foundation for such a defense of religious faith, as would indeed be the case if James succeeded in showing that all knowledge is in essence freely chosen belief.

After that, we have to determine whether the theory of judgment confirms the existence of a free and self-realizing belief of the sort presupposed in a still more immediate way in the second step of James's argument, which, summed up, runs: You can realize the religious hypothesis *only through believing in it*; will to believe the religious hypothesis, and your belief will prove to be true. For this purpose a detailed analysis of the theory of judgment will be requisite. After learning why this theory of judgment can not serve as a foundation for James's defense of religious faith, we shall point out where the doctrine's essential logical mistakes lie. For, in our criticism, James's own premises shall be taken for granted. By these premises I understand, first, his conception of religion as a divine world-order guaranteeing that moral world-order which can be realized by us only if our conduct is inspired and stimulated by a belief in God and in the final triumph of righteousness; secondly, the doctrine that knowledge is in essence a feeling of reality or an affirmation of reality, in other words, that judging is in essence belief. Taking for granted these two premises, we shall endeavor to prove that the latter does not, and can not logically, serve as a foundation for the defense of the former. This proof will consist, on the one hand, in the disclosure of the implications of these premises, and of their incompatibility with the conclusions that James deduces from them, and, on the other hand, in the demonstration of their inherent inconsistencies.

Now there are two very obvious criticisms to be made on James's doctrine, both of which have, as a matter of fact, been brought against it. First, the accusation that in this defense of religious belief, religious belief is defended at the cost of knowledge itself. The argument runs: James's justification is based on the relation of knowledge and faith, of intellect and will. Religious belief, on the one hand, and knowledge resting on a principle of certainty, on the other, can be brought into harmony only if knowledge is traced back to belief and a principle of certainty found for belief. Such a transformation of the intellect leads, in truth, to a real overthrow of the standpoint of 'intellectualism,' based as it is on the dualism of will and intellect. In James's doctrine, however, this dualism is neither obviated nor surmounted. In it, knowing and believing are not harmonized, but are separated, and if it is then asserted that the will may undertake the function of the intellect, when the latter is no longer capable of functioning, such a manner of surmounting the dualism must be considered a pseudo victory, gained at the expense of the conception of knowledge itself. This criticism has been advanced by Rickert in his essay on 'Fichtes Atheismusstreit.'<sup>1</sup>

The second criticism brought against our doctrine is the charge that it is based on a standpoint of absolute subjectivism, and obviously this criticism is closely related to the one just presented. It asserts that religious belief is defended at the cost of absolute reality itself, in that the will to believe is treated as wholly distinct from the will to know the truth. Upon analysis this will turns out to be, in fact, a will to deceive oneself, that is, to produce subjective results. These subjective results may, of course, be convictions, but they have no connection with objective validity, which is dependent on a relation between the convictions and an independent reality. This latter charge has been concisely formulated by D. S. Miller in the above-mentioned critique.<sup>2</sup>

However, it must be evident that neither one of these charges is exhaustive. In regard to the first, it is true, to be sure, that James has coordinated and separated the will and the intellect, but it is equally true that he has identified the two in his theory of the relation of will and belief. Neither can a pure subjectivism, as in the case of the second criticism, be true without further consideration; for opposed to such a charge stands James's theory of judgment, which

<sup>1</sup> H. Rickert, 'Fichtes Atheismusstreit und die Kantische Philosophie.' Berlin, 1899.

<sup>2</sup> Dickinson S. Miller, 'The Will to Believe and the Duty to Doubt,' *International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1899.

seeks to trace reality, and with it truth, to the act of judgment itself.

A closer examination into these inconsistencies and the determination whether and whereby these criticisms can be confirmed, must then be our task. We proceed then to James's attempt to solve the problem of the overthrow of 'intellectualism.'

### CHAPTER III

#### JAMES'S DOCTRINE AS A DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS FAITH AT THE COST OF PURE KNOWLEDGE

The relation of faith to knowledge and its significance for the overthrow of intellectualism—Paulsen's contribution to the solution of the problem of the relation between intellect and will—Criticism of Paulsen's contribution to the problem—James's contribution to the solution of the problem of the relation between intellect and will—James's solution of the problem on the basis of free belief—The result of James's solution and the dilemma in which it leaves us.

OBVIOUSLY enough the most contradictory tendencies exist side by side in James's theory of the relation of intellect and will. On the one hand we find, especially in the point of view of the essays, a decided dualism respecting knowledge and faith. It would here seem as if faith were to function only when the intellect reaches its limits. Intellectual rationality must first be satisfied, and only if this satisfaction can not be obtained in an immediate way, may it proceed through the medium of faith. But this is a subordination of both knowledge and faith under the category of thought, faith being conceived as a mere supplement to knowledge. And, indeed, James goes farther; he admits that the objects of this faith can never be quite certain, that it is always possible to doubt them. This avowal, together with his definition of faith as belief without proof, seems to give to faith a still more subordinate function, of some importance, perhaps, for the man of action, but without interest for the thinker and seeker for truth. Rickert's criticism is justly directed against this side of James's doctrine, but as a criticism of his doctrine in its totality it is in need of further proof.

The starting-point of Rickert's criticism is a historical survey undertaken for the purpose of determining the differences in philosophies of religion, so far as these differences bear upon the *Atheismusstreit* between Fichte and Forberg.<sup>1</sup> In the course of his analysis he finds that such differences may be traced back to differences in the conception of the relations between faith and knowledge. The formulation of all possible standpoints in regard to this problem leads him to a classification and criticism of James's theory. The first conception of the relation of will and intellect to which Rickert calls attention is the one in which faith is held to be an imperative, commanding, Act as if this or that were true; but assert-

<sup>1</sup> Rickert, 'Atheismusstreit,' p. 2 ff.



ing nothing that could claim to rest upon any principle of certainty. Here, obviously, faith and intellect are so completely separated that two unrelated worlds are the result. In the world of action, the will is authoritative, and in the world of truth-seeking, the intellect. Faith is an imperative for action, and the intellect is authoritative within the sphere of thought; no reconciliation whatever has been effected between the two.

In the second place, the relation of faith and knowledge may be so conceived that faith becomes valid not only as an imperative for the man of action, but also as an imperative for the truth-seeker, inasmuch as here faith is held to be rooted in the very nature of thought itself. For an evaluation of James's historical position, it is important to realize that this standpoint is the standpoint on which Fichte's doctrine is grounded; and I therefore recapitulate in short Rickert's analysis of Fichte's attitude.<sup>1</sup> For Fichte, then, faith is certain, because it is the imperative for the truth-seeker as such. This means, that obligation (*Sollen*)—the original practical law or the conscience—is prior to knowledge. Knowledge itself rests upon the conscience or the will, inasmuch as knowing is, in the last analysis, believing in accordance to the law of 'obligation,' that is, in essence, an intellectual act of will. This practical law, this moral imperative only can contain certainty; and only in so far as it is obeyed, and realized in theoretical activity, does thought become knowledge—become certain. Thus, by his doctrine of the primacy of the moral law, Fichte creates a new conception of the relation between faith and knowledge. Knowledge is certain just because it is based on practical faith or belief, and religious faith or belief can therefore no longer be held to be knowledge of an inferior degree, justifiable only when the more valuable theoretical knowledge reaches its limit. Indeed, faith in the moral law and the moral world-order is the corner-stone of all certainties. From this point of view the apparent coordination of the functions of intellect and will becomes in truth an identification, for it has been shown how knowledge and its principle of certainty are based on practical belief. Faith or belief, in short, is the foundation of all conviction.

Finally a third conception in view of our problem is possible. The intellect and the will may be differentiated and to the will may be accorded the right to pass judgment in cases where scientific proof is wanting. Here the will is subordinated to the intellect and knowledge is supplemented by faith. It is this conception of the relation between will and intellect which Rickert claims is the basis of much of the voluntaristic philosophy of the day, and he

<sup>1</sup> Contained in the pamphlet referred to above.

has in mind more especially the doctrines of Paulsen and of James. He points to the fact that in the case of these thinkers we find the argument that the voluntary side and character of a philosopher have always, as a matter of fact, influenced his system of thought, and that man has always reached his fundamental convictions through the voluntary side of his nature rather than through theoretical considerations, and that this influence is not only actual, but also justifiable, when the intellect fails to reach conclusions, as, for instance, in the synthesis and interpretation of the world in its totality. Rickert points to the leap from the *quæstio facti* to the *quæstio juris* which is here exemplified. He condemns this coordination of faith and knowledge as one which no philosophy professing to proceed scientifically can accommodate. Philosophy, he claims, seeking for truth, has room only for knowledge conceived as independent of the will. Within its sphere, faith must be regarded as the clouding of scientific knowledge. He who philosophizes in order to obtain results of universal validity must disavow the promptings of the will, if will and intellect are distinct; and most especially in the case of the philosophy of religion, where the ideal of a theoretical solution of the problems seems most difficult of attainment, and where such solution is of the greatest practical importance, infinite care must be taken to preserve intact the purity of the intellect. The overthrow of intellectualism through a bestowal of a partnership upon the will within the sphere of scientific activity is nothing else than the overthrow of the intellect itself. A real victory over intellectualism is possible only by means of a logically valid demonstration of the fact that, in the relation between the intellect seeking for truth and the evaluating will, the latter is logically prior to the former. Such a standpoint is the only justifiable form of voluntarism.

Now it is the pseudo-voluntarism expounded above with which Rickert charges James's and Paulsen's doctrines. But, although we must admit it to be true that such tendencies are strongly represented in James's doctrine, our detailed exposition has shown that these tendencies are not the only ones, nor even the prevailing ones, in the drift of James's teaching. On the contrary, James has explicitly striven to give to his doctrine a substructure in the form of a theory identifying will and knowledge. In Paulsen's work, too, there are traces of an attempt really to overcome the one-sidedness of intellectualism, and to attain harmony between intellect and will through a transformation of the conception of the intellect itself, and the reduction of theoretical knowledge to practical belief. A comparison of his arguments with those of James is instructive because it will enable us to perceive with greater clearness the new and characteristic elements in James's work.

In the introduction we saw to what historical position Paulsen considered himself entitled, and how he interpreted Kant's general standpoint. His own doctrine may be found in his 'Einleitung in die Philosophie' and 'Kants Verhältnis zur Metaphysik.' This doctrine may be summed up as follows: Philosophy is knowledge, and professes to be knowledge, but contains elements of faith in so far as it pretends to give a *Weltanschauung* and to 'disclose the meaning of things,' for this meaning is matter for the will and for faith.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of this statement it would seem that Paulsen does not, after all, ascribe to philosophy the task of *disclosing* the meaning of the world, but rather that of giving meaning to the world, for the very next sentence in this context reads: "The philosopher reads into the world as its goal that which he himself regards as the highest good and the ultimate end of life, and only imagines that he has discovered it there by subsequent contemplation." Philosophy would thus seem to be an attitude toward the world, an evaluation of the world. It is a matter of personal faith: "Philosophy is never the product of the intellect merely, it grows out of the personality as a whole; the will gives it its direction, its goal and its fire."

The method to be employed by philosophy in the production of a *Weltanschauung* is that of the interpretation of historical life. But faith in the future is 'the firm starting-point' of such an interpretation, hence one may call this faith the 'principle of formation' of every philosophy. The interpretation of historical life then proceeds in conformity with the ideal of perfection characteristic of the philosopher, by which he sets up the *terminus ad quem*, and by means of this the *terminus a quo*, of the historical process, and thereby of nature and of the world. The *important* is thus the *essential*—here is the point at which head and heart meet and are united.<sup>2</sup>

Such are the actual facts, continues Paulsen, and Kant has formulated these thoughts in the doctrine of the postulates and of the primacy of the practical reason. "We, to be sure, would say rather: We are not here concerned with an imperative, *exacting* faith from the conscience, but with the bald fact that no one does nor can believe that reality is inimical or even indifferent toward that which he holds to be the ultimate end of life and its highest good."<sup>3</sup> But

<sup>1</sup> F. Paulsen, 'Einleitung in die Philosophie,' Siebente Auflage, p. 339 ff. Berlin, 1901.

<sup>2</sup> Here Paulsen hints at the psychological theory carried out by James. Attention is aroused only by objects important for us; objects are important in proportion as they are related to our practical purposes and ideals; by arousing attention the important becomes the real.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 347.

he who believes in the final victory of reason and of truth, thereby acknowledges a moral world-order. Kant, now, attempted to justify this actual faith, not by means of any objective proof for the predominance of the good, but by the consideration that, as the practical reason recognizes values, and as the moral law is the foundation of this valuation, faith in the moral world-order is based on the absolutely certain moral law or imperative. This fundamental thought of Kant's is correct, says Paulsen, but may be better formulated as follows: To a human being whose will is guided by the 'highest purposes of mankind' a belief in the moral world-order is 'natural and necessary' and inevitably becomes the corner-stone of his philosophy.<sup>1</sup>

Paulsen then proceeds to set up certain values as the highest values, and he challenges those who deny a moral world-order to prove that these values are not realized in this world. But such a proof, he avers, is not within the province of the intellect. The intellect can not solve the question, but if it nevertheless wishes to take a stand, it would, guided by biological theories, be obliged to decide that of all possible worlds this world is the one best suited to mankind.

These considerations on the subject of religious belief, now, do not purpose to serve as a theoretical proof of the validity of religious faith nor as a factor in the generation of religious faith; their object is merely to insure one's judgment against the adoption of the contrary attitude—that of negative dogmatism. Religion never can be produced by philosophy; it is constituted by historical concrete symbols. Nevertheless, religion may harmonize with philosophy, 'faith with free thought.' "Religion does not exact from man that he shall hold what is untenable, but that he shall believe that which satisfies his will, and does not contradict his intellect."<sup>2</sup>

It is difficult to draw any definite conclusions concerning Paulsen's standpoint from these remarks. But so much at least is clear: he identifies philosophy with *Weltanschauung*, and bases the latter on faith—on those beliefs, namely, which are innate to the philosopher, and by means of which he attempts his task, the interpretation of the world by the interpretation of the world's history. These beliefs, constitutive of the fundamental principle of philosophy, are, according to Paulsen, the beliefs in the future, in progress and perfection, and they are said to lead directly to a belief in the moral world-order which is somehow connected with the will 'guided by higher purposes.' To a being with such a will for

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 349 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 361.

the good, faith in a moral order is 'natural and necessary' and therefore justified. The philosopher, then, may harbor any faith that is compatible with the willing and feeling side of his nature and is not incompatible with his intelligence. This last confrontation of intellect and will is carried out no farther. Although the chapter in which it occurs is entitled 'Knowledge and Faith,' the reader is left in the dark as regards just how faith and reason can contradict one another, and if so, why reason should have the primacy over faith, if faith be the very principle of formation of philosophy. The only explanatory hint to the solution of this riddle is contained in the psychological theory indicated above. The difficulty grows still more complicated when one becomes acquainted with Paulsen's further remarks on the subject in his book '*Kants Verhältnis zur Metaphysik*' (p. 25 ff.).

Here philosophy is no longer conceived as an evaluation of the world according to articles of faith. Philosophy—which may, no doubt, be considered identical with metaphysics—is said to be a science whose task it is to supply a foundation for "a general conception or synthesis of reality (a *Weltanschauung*) by means of a process of thought constructed on the basis of given facts. These facts are to be taken from the special sciences, and thought must progress from these empirical actualities, which form its only sure foothold, up to the contemplation of things in their totality." Contrasted with philosophy or metaphysics, religion is now introduced, and is said to rest on faith, more especially on the particular belief that reality is ultimately determined by the good—by will directed toward the good. This belief can not claim to be knowledge, because it can be proved neither by experience nor by speculation.

In this new formulation of his position, Paulsen considers himself again in agreement with Kant. Religion is now separated from philosophy; philosophy has become a science through becoming demonstrable, whereas religion rests upon the fact that man believes in the realization of his good will. As is known, Kant did not, however, accept this faith as a mere fact, but attempted to ground it on the certainty of the moral law, and to derive this certainty from an analysis of the nature of the reason itself. It is perhaps this doctrine of Kant's—the doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason—that Paulsen has in mind when, in speaking of Kant, he remarks: "It is in the form of the foundation and exposition of these thoughts only that I should pursue a different course, one which a number of thinkers of the nineteenth century, with Kant as their starting-point, have pursued; I mention Schopenhauer, Beneke, Lotze, Wundt. In conformity with these thinkers I should

turn the procedure of metaphysics into more empirical and psychological channels." This statement Paulsen modifies later on in telling us that in religious faith we have to do not with the decision of an arbitrary will, but of a universal and necessary will, the practical reason. The religious hypothesis, Paulsen proceeds, which asserts 'the ultimate ground of all reality is the good will,' does not then rest on proof, but on faith, and the grounds for belief in this assertion lie in the fact that it is 'a necessary condition of our necessary will attitudes,' and may therefore be assumed to be true. This defense of religious belief Paulsen claims to be superior to any defense of the assumption of the presuppositions in the theoretical sphere, for the reason that the practical tasks and values are the higher tasks and values, since it is true that a man's value is determined by his morality. This practical justification of faith is held by Paulsen to furnish evidence not only for the validity of religious belief, but incidentally also for the impossibility of demonstrating the truth of religion theoretically. Nevertheless, this practical justification is said to be susceptible of the reception of a sort of 'theoretical substructure' through the science of psychology. "I mean," says Paulsen, "it is possible to show that side by side with the practical necessity of faith there is its psychological inevitability, which is in truth evidenced by the historical fact that the will, the essential will, always does determine belief and *Weltanschauung*."<sup>1</sup> Here we find Paulsen setting up as an ideal what James appears to have carried out, namely, the psychological foundation of a standpoint accepted on other grounds. Paulsen even indicates the special theories already known to us through James: that of knowledge as an instrument in the struggle for survival, and that of the will as a guide to the apperceptive processes, inasmuch as interest directs apperception and hence determines the elements out of which *Weltanschauungen* are constructed. Finally, too, a slight suggestion of the theory of judgment and belief is contained in Paulsen's remarks on the law of identity. This law, he says, expresses no assertion or 'indicative' (Paulsen uses the terminology of the traditional theory of judgment), but rather an 'imperative.' "*A-A* means, accordingly: that which I have posited as *A* shall be and shall remain *A*." The same holds good for the assertion of causality: I consent to the assumption of lawfulness through an act of will, because such a conception of reality as lawfulness represents, is purposive and helps toward the preservation of life. "But if these be the conditions," Paulsen concludes, "if thought and knowledge are in the last analysis determined by the will, then it is inconceivable that the

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.

intellect should turn against the will and force it to views that are antagonistic to its very nature." Indeed, it is impossible for any man to believe that which is incompatible with the dictates of his will. His *Weltanschauung* will always be the valuation of life dependent on his volitional nature, and only that *Weltanschauung* is fit to be believed which admits of faith in God and in the supremacy of the good.

This, in brief, is Paulsen's doctrine. Its starting-point is the theory that a man's *Weltanschauung* is the product of his willing, evaluating and believing nature, and leads to the religious hypothesis as necessary for this side of his nature. The religious hypothesis, because of this practical necessity, and because of the further fact that it asserts nothing incompatible with the intellect, is justified.

Here we have, as was said above, a complete separation of will and intellect, with no further elucidation of their relation; the will produces the conception of the world, but as final judge (at least negative judge) the intellect steps in, inasmuch as it may deny whatever conflicts with its views. Philosophy would thus seem to be supplementary to science, with a right to function only when science can reach no conclusions.

But this interpretation of Paulsen's standpoint is inconsistent with his further explanations, in which he favors a scientific procedure for metaphysics and again divorces religion and philosophy. Here we find a more precisely formulated relation between philosophy, knowledge and religion. Philosophy is knowledge, and leads to a conception of the world in its totality; religion is faith, and gives this conception a certain coloring, by taking into account the demands of the will. The *Weltanschauung* arrived at metaphysically is knowledge, for it rests on demonstrable empirical facts derivable from the special sciences. According to Paulsen, such a *Weltanschauung* leads to the belief—in the sense of knowledge—that the ultimate basis of reality lies in one undivided will—and the religious stamp it receives is the belief that this will is a good will, a divine will. This, he says, is not knowledge, but faith; for it is not a demonstrable fact, but an assumption made by the will in the interests of the good will.

In this second formulation the point of view is completely changed. Philosophy or knowledge is adequate for the formation of a *Weltanschauung*. There is no need or place for faith within the province of metaphysics. Faith is absolute only in the religious sphere, for here the world is to be interpreted according to practical ethical ideals. This is the work of the will, and such a world is

believed in because it guarantees the most valuable interests and develops the most ideal character. Philosophy, then, can fulfill its task of rationalizing the world without the help of faith. The will is of importance for one's religious interests exclusively, and in this sphere of conduct alone faith is a necessary assumption.

The two faculties are again divorced; knowledge is the concern of philosophy and metaphysics aspiring to a conception of the world, whereas in the first formulation philosophy was not knowledge, but a construction of the individual philosopher, in accordance with his individual beliefs. In the first formulation, moreover, the religious conception of the universe was said to be the most satisfying conception produced by philosophy because, without antagonizing the intellect, it conformed to the demands of the will. In this second formulation, the religious conception of the world is again proclaimed to be the most satisfying because of its ethical importance, but now it can no longer antagonize the intellect because it is not a matter with which the intellect concerns itself; it is founded not on knowledge, but on faith, and has validity exclusively for the ethical, the willing and acting individual.

However, even this second formulation is not the final—or, I should say, the chronologically final—formulation; a third and again essentially different standpoint grows out of Paulsen's further considerations of the question. This latest standpoint is foreshadowed in the assertion that the justification of religious faith on the basis of its validity for the ethical and active man is as good a justification, nay, even a better one, than the analogous justification of the presuppositions of science, for the reason that the voluntary attitudes and interests are higher and more valuable than those of knowledge. The foundation of this standpoint is furnished by the psychological theories mentioned above, which were to serve as a 'theoretical substructure' to religious faith, heretofore considered by Paulsen theoretically undemonstrable. The argument purposes to show that the will, and thereby faith, always (even in the case of metaphysics) determine one's views, inasmuch as knowledge itself is dependent on the will; first, because the intellect itself was produced by the will as an instrument for the preservation of life; secondly, because apperception, and therefore the material for philosophical thought, are guided by the will; and thirdly, because the presuppositions of knowledge (such as the law of identity) are posited by the will. Therefore, says Paulsen, *every standpoint whatever* rests upon assumptions accepted on faith: even that of pure agnosticism makes the assumption of the existence of truth itself and of theoretically



demonstrable knowledge as the only method for attaining to truth.<sup>1</sup>

Thus we have still another relation of knowledge to faith in this latest formulation. Will, because actually determining and evaluating the world and life, may justly subordinate knowledge to itself, may lead, direct and judge it. Truth means that which is satisfying to the willing attitudes of man, and as religious faith is so to a superlative degree, religious faith is superlatively true. Where the sphere of knowledge lies, and why demonstrable truth is of any value, we do not learn. The most interesting point in this third formulation is the fact that Paulsen reaches his standpoint by empirically scientific psychological considerations.

These three distinct points of view in regard to the relation of will and intellect are approximately those pointed out by Rickert. First, we have the subordination of the will to the intellect: one is justified in believing freely where he can not know. In the matter of a conception of the world one can know nothing with certainty, hence one may believe what one wishes, providing the objects of faith do not conflict with the intellect. Secondly, we have the divorce of will and intellect, so that there result two unrelated worlds, the world of knowledge for the truth-seeking man and the world of faith for the acting man. Thirdly, we have an attempt to overcome this dualism of two unrelated worlds by means of a deeper insight into the nature of knowledge itself, and by the disclosure of its practical factors. Faith or belief is here asserted to be at the basis of all conviction. However, in Paulsen's case even this third standpoint is not unequivocal. He constantly speaks of the determination of knowledge through the will. Now one can very well hold that belief is always and in all cases determined by the will, and yet conceive will and knowledge to be separable and distinct, in that the will may be thought of as a faculty which is moved and influenced by another faculty. And this is certainly what Paulsen appears to hold. Thus even his attempt to reconcile will and intellect is based on a dualistic conception of their relation; a conception to be criticized later on in our consideration of James's views on the subject.

It must be apparent that Paulsen's and James's standpoints show a certain amount of similarity. But Paulsen's predominating tendency is, after all, to reserve for the intellect the functions of producing a *Weltanschauung*, and for the will the function of modifying, supplementing and coloring this philosophical conception conformably to the will side of man's nature, but never in contradiction to the affirmations of the intellect. The religious hypothesis may

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34. Paulsen here refers to James's 'Will to Believe' as an amplification of these thoughts.

be assumed to be true, first of all because it does not collide with the metaphysical hypothesis and only in the second place because it guarantees certain ethical interests and is essential to the practical life. Against this standpoint the charge of pseudo-voluntarism formulated above is directed with every right, and the fact that there are suggestions of contrary views in Paulsen is no argument against this criticism, but only a proof of his inconsistency. In Paulsen's case, such inconsistency may be ascribed to the fact that he has attempted no foundation of his standpoint, but in James's case there is inconsistency in spite of a detailed foundation; for in his doctrine the tendency to divorce faith and knowledge is strong, to be sure, but yet the opposite tendency to overcome this dualism through the identification of will and knowledge is, after all, the very basis and foundation of his whole doctrine.

James, too, starts with a coordinated will and intellect, for, as we know, according to his theory, the rationalization of the world proceeds in the interest of the practical as well as the theoretical needs of man. The intellect is to be satisfied in the first place, and only when knowledge fails to grasp the world in its totality does faith or practical belief find its place as a means toward the rationalization of the world. Here there is the old dualism between demonstrable knowledge and faith in the sense of undemonstrable conviction. In the final formulation of the 'thesis' according to which a problematic attitude may be abandoned in favor of voluntary belief, this dualism is especially strong; and, finally, how else can the many limitations put upon the function of faith be understood unless we suppose the intellect to be absolutely authoritative wherever it is in a position to come to a decision? Indeed, are we not told that the intellect is authoritative even in cases where it can not come to a decision, and the decision is not important for the practical man? Therefore faith, or free belief, is in order only when a decision important for man as a practical being can not be reached on logical grounds. In other words, there is logical theoretical truth, and side by side with it there is moral conviction, but the latter may never contradict the former, and plays no rôle so long as we are within the field of scientific knowledge.

James has sought to overcome this dualism in two ways. One way is the one with which we have become acquainted in that portion of Paulsen's doctrine which we called his third standpoint. James differs from Paulsen only in the far greater explicitness and clearness with which he grounds his thoughts. To be sure, the biological-genetic consideration of the origin of knowledge and its methods—a

point of view generally approved and most interestingly applied to physiological questions by James—can not here be taken into consideration, because we are concerned not with the question of the origin of knowledge, but with the question of the validity of faith compared with that of certain knowledge. These historical considerations, however, seem to take a turn toward epistemology in a variety of pragmatic doctrine which James appears to espouse in 'The Varieties of Religious Experience.' We learn there that no fact is real unless it shows real effects in action, and that truth is that which in a general way works well. But in James's case this pragmatic conception of the relation of theory and practise can not be regarded as a solution of his problem, and for two reasons. In the first place, he has failed to give any foundation to these assertions, and surely the definition of the real as that which shows real effects, being a definition in which the predicate contains the concept to be defined, calls for some further explanation. Likewise in the assertion that the true is that which in a general way works well; what are we to understand by the 'well'; what test is to be applied in order to judge of truth—that of efficiency—utility—morality? But the vagueness of the pragmatic standpoint as here formulated by James does not need to trouble us, for in spite of his claim to have adopted the pragmatic point of view by applying it to the criticism of religious facts, James did not really do so, as the following passages would seem to show conclusively: "Taking creeds and faith-state together as forming 'religions,' and treating these as purely subjective phenomena, without regard to the question of their 'truth,' we are obliged, on account of their extraordinary influence upon action and endurance, to class them amongst the most important biological functions of mankind. . . .

"At this purely subjective rating, therefore, religion must be considered vindicated in a certain way from the attacks of her critics. It would seem that she can not be a mere anachronism and survival, but must exert a permanent function whether she be with or without intellectual content, and whether, if she have any, it be true or false.

"We must next pass beyond the point of view of merely subjective utility, and make inquiry into the intellectual content itself."<sup>1</sup>

James then considers what this nucleus of intellectual content, empirically common to all religious assertions, is; he finds it to consist in certain beliefs, in regard to which he writes: "So far, however, as this analysis goes, the experiences are only psychological phenomena. They possess, it is true, enormous biological worth. Spiritual strength really increases in the subject when he has them,

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 506-507.

a new life opens for him, and they seem to him a place of conflux where the forces of two universes meet; and yet this may be nothing but his subjective way of feeling things, a mood of his own fancy, in spite of the effect produced. I now turn to my second question: What is the objective 'truth' of their content? . . . The word 'truth' is here taken to mean something additional to bare value for life, although the natural propensity of man is to believe that whatever has great value for life is thereby certified as true."

The tests which James applies for discovering the 'truth' of these practically effective and useful beliefs are, first, once more the empirical test of actual universality—he looks for 'a common body of doctrine'; and secondly, its ability to be formulated in terms 'to which physical science need not object.' "This [a science of religion] might adopt as her own reconciling hypothesis and recommend it for general belief. . . . Who says 'hypothesis' renounces the ambition to be coercive in his arguments. The most I can do is, accordingly, to offer something that may fit the facts so easily that your scientific logic will find no plausible pretext for vetoing your impulse to welcome it as true."<sup>1</sup>

Here evidently practical effectiveness is not only not conceived as the essence of reality or the test of truth, but theoretical truth and practical utility are conceived as absolutely discreet: James has effected no reconciliation whatsoever between them.

Another argument from what may be called the logical point of view is contained in the theory that all knowledge, even demonstrable and certain knowledge, rests on 'postulates,' that is, on undemonstrable belief; and in this theory we have indeed a real attempt to overthrow 'intellectualism.' As we saw, Paulsen cited James in support of this argumentation, and we know with what justice. Besides James, Royce only has come out so emphatically for this standpoint. Royce as well as James emphasizes the thought that as theoretical knowledge itself is constantly working with 'postulates,' and rests on 'postulates,' practical faith surely may and must do the same. In other words, that faith has the same certainty as theoretical knowledge, inasmuch as the latter in the last analysis rests on faith. Science itself is founded on 'postulates'; on that of the uniformity of natural law, for instance. The scientist believes in theoretical rationality, why should he not believe in moral or practical rationality? The scientist believes in truth and in the possibility of attaining it, and finally, does he not believe his methods to be the only means to this end? But all these assumptions are mere 'postulates.'

So far it would seem that a solution of our problem had in truth

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 511.

been found. All so-called theoretical knowledge rests in the last analysis on faith, in that one can not do any scientific thinking at all without presupposing definite 'postulates.' If these postulates contain the principle of certainty, it must be reflected by them on knowledge. But do these postulates contain such a principle of certainty? Is this faith truly knowledge? In short—how are these postulates conceived?

We know that according to James they are, so to say, dogmatic articles of faith; truth and the possibility of attaining to it are articles to which as dogmatists we voluntarily subscribe, whereas the skeptics reject them. At the same time, being empiricists, we must admit that all our truths (the objects of our belief) may at any moment be corrected or overthrown, and that we can, therefore, never know whether we are actually in possession of the truth. Absolute objective evidence and absolute certainty do not exist, then, for the consistent empiricist; yet he accepts as a practical criterion of truth the confirmation a fact receives from the total stream of thought. But if absolute certainty does not exist, James certainly can not claim it for his dogmatic articles of faith: truth and knowledge. So that if there be any reconciliation of faith and belief in the foregoing standpoint, it is effected in this way: they are equally uncertain, for knowledge itself and its goal, truth, are mere postulates. To be sure, not even this standpoint is held to consistently, for, as we saw, a valid test of truth was subsequently introduced in the confirmation of a fact by the total drift of thought, and objective proof was recommended as a means of verification, where no real option in James's sense was involved. Objective evidence is, in fact, called 'coercive' evidence, and is said to be the nearest approach there is to certainty, but unfortunately it is at the same time a method of verification for which as practical men we can not always afford to wait.

Herewith we are back again at the old dualism of knowledge and 'mere' faith. Faith is less certain than knowledge, in spite of being the basis upon which knowledge rests.

In the case of Royce, with whom James claims to agree, the matter is simpler.<sup>1</sup> His definition of a postulate indicates the degree of certainty that he ascribes to it. "A postulate," he writes, "is a mental way of behavior." Postulates are voluntary assumptions of a risk. The way to adopt the postulate is to 'voluntarily determine to act in a given way, not being rationally forced to do so, and well knowing the risk.' For, 'in general, to believe that a thing exists is to act as if a thing existed.' The reason for making assumptions

<sup>1</sup> Josiah Royce, 'The Religious Aspect of Philosophy,' Chapter IX., p. 291 ff. Boston, 1897.

connected with a risk, is for the sake of a 'higher end.' Scientific laws are postulates of this kind, and the religious hypothesis may perhaps be regarded as a practical, unavoidable postulate; not certain, to be sure, but assumed at a risk. This standpoint requires no criticism. It is evident that we have no certainty here and Royce himself admits this in writing: "These postulates must be confirmed if possible, and subordinated to higher results. . . . We have seen how postulates, theoretically uncertain, but practically worth the risk, are at the foundation of our whole lives. Hereafter we shall seek to dig beneath these foundations for that other sort of theoretical certainty. . . . After all, is not this business of postulating into the void a dangerous one? Is it not a hollow and empty activity, this, if we really reflect upon it? Courage indeed we must have; but is religion no more than courage? Nay; we must have, if possible, some eternal truth, that is not our postulate, to rest upon. . . . And may there not be some higher relation of our lives to that truth—such a relation that the truth shall be neither the arbitrary product of our subjective postulates, nor a dead external reality such as was the world of doubt?"<sup>1</sup> Although this theory is not identical with James's, it can not be denied that James as well as Royce so conceives the 'postulate' that its validity lies in its relation to some purpose it serves rather than in the conviction it carries with it. In considerations such as these religious faith remains 'mere' faith, and the attempt to prove that knowledge rests on faith does not confer greater certainty upon faith, but only deprives knowledge of its certainty.<sup>2</sup>

Enough has been said to show that if the train of thought just presented is to be accepted as the one most conformable to the 'total drift' of James's thought, he proves to be a strange skeptic—one who defends religious faith for the reason that we mortals can attain no absolute certainty and are therefore privileged to believe as we will. In thus denying the certainty of knowledge and truth, James can not, to be sure, be refuted; neither does he need to be refuted, because he can not consistently claim to be uttering a truth.

It seems to me, however, that James's most characteristic theory is his theory of judgment, and that in it we have a much deeper and

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 332.

<sup>2</sup> This doctrine differs *in toto* from those which, while basing demonstrable knowledge on undemonstrable faith, claim absolute certainty for the content of faith. So, for instance, Jacobi, for whom faith, though indeed undemonstrable, is nevertheless the most certain of all knowledge; in fact, the immediate evidence and revelation of reality. Compare Kuno Fischer, 'Geschichte der neueren Philosophie,' II, p. 104, Heidelberg, 1900; also Windelband, 'Geschichte der neueren Philosophie,' p. 212, Leipzig, 1899.

more thoroughgoing attempt to overcome the one-sidedness of intellectualism. Here a real attempt appears to be made to find a principle of certainty for faith through the transformation of the conception of knowledge.

This theory of judgment, as has been said, may be regarded as an amplification of the suggestions found in Paulsen's third formulation concerning the relation of the processes of apperception to the will. As we know, in his theory of judgment, James adduces the truth that all cognition is in essence belief, because the practical attitude of the will is the essential thing in judgment. Therefore, though the term knowledge in the narrower sense may be reserved for cognition resting on perceptual evidence, this knowledge, too, is in essence belief. But belief is the 'function of cognizing reality'; it is the affirmation of the reality of objects and of the truth of propositions. Immediate conviction or faith is the final court of appeal—the final and only evidence of reality and truth. Only if affirmed and believed does an object become true and real. Now this affirmation is, as we know, volitional in nature, it is the same psychological attitude toward an object as that which we term will. And as both will and belief resolve themselves upon analysis into volitional attention, a total identification of cognition and will is effected. From the further fact that both in the act of judgment and of will we are *free to choose* our experience and our reality, it follows that in some cases this free choice of a belief makes possible the realization of its content: so in the case of the religious hypothesis. Therefore we may say: Let us freely elect to believe in a moral world-order; for through acting on that belief we realize and make true a moral world-order.

We are now ready for the question: Is this identification of will and belief really a refutation of intellectualism; are faith and knowledge harmonized through the reduction of the certainty of knowledge to the certainty of faith? This is not only not the case, but upon a closer examination of this defense of the freedom of belief on the grounds of the identity of belief and will, it becomes evident that this identification itself, and indeed James's very conception of the will, reintroduce free belief or faith as the logical contrary of certain knowledge. The following analysis will make evident the truth of this statement.

The essential act of will, the psychic attitude which is said to be identical with belief, is the 'fiat' which is pronounced when a choice must be made between several ideas simultaneously present in the mind. This fiat is expressed in the form of attention with effort. Choice of an idea and voluntary attention are, therefore, one and the same act. We know, however, that according to

James, voluntary attention—or free will—is always ‘derived.’ “We never make an effort to attend to an object except for the sake of some remote interest the effort will serve.” Indeed, in the very conception of a conscious choice, a principle of choice is involved: I can not consciously make a choice without being motivated, any more than I can act purposively without having a purpose. In other words, voluntary attention is motivated; and as voluntary attention and belief are one and the same fact, belief is determined by outside factors. When I consent, affirm, choose or believe, in the face of the possibility of rejection or doubt, what, then, guides my decision in the case of *freely* chosen belief?

We know that in the case of involuntary attention, unconscious will, impulse or whatever we wish to call this psychological process, the attention is captured by those ideas which have the quality of arousing interest. In James’s phrase, the impulsive strength of an idea lies in its power to excite interest. We react on that which is practically interesting to us, by giving it attention—thus it becomes our reality. The important point here is the fact that James concedes no activity to this involuntary attention; it is effected from the outside and is passive, caused, therefore, not free.

The active free will functions only when the natural reaction of the attention is to be influenced, changed and guided; only when a conscious choice is to be made. Only then do we rightly speak of free will; and it is a free will of this character which forms, as has been shown, the basis of James’s defense of religious belief. If, then, the fiat intervenes in the natural process in a way so that the attention is guided to an idea which in itself does not excite it, this fiat must itself be guided or determined by some motives or reasons. I consent to, agree to and choose a belief, but why? No explicit answer to this question can be found in James’s teaching; and naturally enough, for does he not conceive of freedom as indeterminism?

Herewith we have encountered an inconsistency, than which a greater one can not be imagined, within the boundaries of James’s theory of the will. His explicit doctrine of freedom teaches that freedom is dependent on the possibility of putting forth an indeterminate amount of effort of attention or consent. Freedom of will means that attention is indeterminate in quality and direction, and this again means that effort of attention is not effect, not result of a fixed function of the object, but that, given a constant object, more or less effort may be made: it is an independent variable. Certainly this effort “appears to us indeterminate, and as if, even with an unchanging object, we might make more or less, as we choose.



If it be really indeterminate, our future acts are ambiguous or unpredestinate: in common parlance, *our wills are free.*'<sup>1</sup>

It is not our intention to criticize the validity of this conception of freedom as such;<sup>2</sup> we wish to show, rather, that the possibility of freedom as above defined is inconsistent with James's psychological theory of the will, according to which the essence of volitional acts manifests itself only where a choice is to be made between mutually antagonistic ideas, and where this choice is a conscious and deliberate one. Only when a struggle between such antagonistic ideas must be settled, is effort called for, and the will involved; only in choice is the will *free*. But obviously such attention with effort must not only be motivated, but, moreover, wherever it is involved and the will consciously chooses an idea in order to make it prevail, there a definite principle of choice is involved, and the will is not and can not logically be conceived to be indeterminate in any direction. Applying this argument to the activity of judgment, belief or consent, we must recognize that here, too, we are motivated and determined in our choice; in other words, if we consciously will to believe, we choose one belief rather than another for some definite reason. Therefore the act of consent or belief itself is not the final ground for choice; in the case of a freely adopted belief, the freely chosen idea and its 'certainty' rest not upon the belief it awakens, but upon some further facts which have acted as determinants in the choice, on the part of the self, of this particular belief.

Therefore it can no longer be claimed that faith and knowledge are identical, because in the last analysis they both resolve themselves into will, for we see that in the very conception of free will and free belief there lies fully developed a dualism between the practical active factor, the voluntry fiat, and its guiding principle, the conscious choice. The principle of certainty is no longer contained in immediate conviction or belief itself, but in the determinants of belief. It must depend on the nature of these latter factors whether or not certainty is conferred on belief.

Here it will suggest itself to the reader that this might well be the point of departure for the doctrine which conceives the freedom of will and belief to consist in their voluntary obedience to the norm; a doctrine whose best formulation may be found in Windelband's 'Præludien.' From this point of view thought is free when motivated by the will for truth, and guided by normative laws leading to

<sup>1</sup> 'Psychology,' Vol. II., p. 571.

<sup>2</sup> For a brief refutation of the theory of freedom as indeterminism, see W. Windelband, 'Præludien,' Freiburg and Tübingen, 1884, especially 'Normen und Naturgesetze'; also A. Riehl, 'Der philosophische Kriticismus,' II., p. 216.

truth, and just because judgment or belief subordinates itself to the value of truth, it is here considered a practical or volitional attitude. As a matter of fact, however, there are no traces of such a theory in James's teaching. If we seek for the determining motives of his free belief or will to believe, we will find no elucidation in the chapter on 'The Perception of Reality,' but are here referred to the theory of will, with the remark that everything said concerning the freedom of will is valid for belief. But in his theory of will, James, as we know, comes out in favor of indeterminism. We are therefore left to search his religious philosophy for a statement of what we ought to consider the motives for willing to believe, or free choice in belief.

As we have seen, the content of the religious hypothesis is said to belong to that group of phenomena whose realization depends on man's attitude toward them. It lies in his hands entirely whether or not the religious world-order will be realized. His conduct is the determining factor. But this conduct in turn is determined by his mental attitude: only if inspired by belief in the religious hypothesis will his conduct be such as to realize the religious hypothesis. If, then, he decides to adopt religious belief, he is determined neither by the reality of the religious world-order nor by the truth of the religious hypothesis, for prior to his belief they are neither real nor true. Rather is he determined to affirm and believe religiously as a means to the end of realizing a state of affairs which gives satisfaction to his practical needs. Belief here is not the function of cognizing reality or recognizing truth, but 'I believe' is correctly paraphrased by 'Something ought from a moral point of view to be, and therefore I assume that it is.'

Once more we are back in the 'postulate' theory. Belief in the not yet real moral and religious world-order is not cognition of the truth of the religious hypothesis and can not, therefore, claim any certainty whatsoever, if we continue to attach any meaning to the word certainty; it is rather an assumption made at a risk, and expresses a readiness to act on the assumption for the sake of the end to which the action may lead.

The identification of the volitional and judging processes, and the freedom of belief logically deduced from this identification, which was to serve as a basis for the defense of religious belief, have failed in their object. The free belief which the realization of the religious hypothesis calls for, is of an essentially different nature from that belief which we have seen to be involved in the act of judgment and to form the essence of all knowledge. Such belief

conceptually includes reality as its object, and was defined by James as the function of cognizing reality or truth. If the freely chosen or free belief of the religious hypothesis is justified, then, for the reason that all knowledge is in essence belief, this justification, in conceptually separating knowledge from reality and truth, deprives knowledge of all meaning. Religious faith is indeed justified, but at the expense of knowledge. We are told: You may affirm a thing without holding it to be true.

To sum up the conclusions reached by this analysis: First, we have seen that James continually vacillates between a coordination and an identification of will and intellect, faith and knowledge. Secondly, that his identification and the conclusions drawn from it, which were to serve as a basis for the justification of religious faith, in that they victoriously overcame the dualism of faith and knowledge, either leave this dualism unadjusted or else adjust it at the cost of knowledge itself. In other words: I must either coordinate knowledge and faith and count the religious world-order among the objects of faith, concerning whose reality I can pass no judgment claiming to be true (and this is a dualistic standpoint at which no philosophy can stop, and which James tried to adjust); or else, I may claim to be justified in affirming the religious hypothesis, and in this case I affirm a fact without holding it to be real or true, and thereby destroy the conception of knowledge as thought related to objective reality. The charge that James's defense of religious faith sacrifices the possibility of knowledge seems to be established.

And yet a way out of this dilemma discloses itself. James's justification on the basis of his theory of judgment failed for the reason that the free belief of the religious hypothesis proved to be no affirmation of reality or truth, whereas the belief at the basis of all cognition was, according to James's theory, the function of cognizing reality. If, now, it should prove that another and different conception of belief, knowledge and reality is, after all, characteristic for James, it might still be possible that this belief, which can be freely adopted or willed, could be shown to be the essence of all judgment and knowledge. Indeed, that part of his theory of judgment which asserts that all belief is a choice on the part of the practical ego, with its practical needs and desires, and that 'reality' is but the sum total of what is chosen or believed—this seems to point directly to freely willed belief or free belief as the kernel of all knowledge, and the fountain of all reality. Now the question whether James can defend such an epistemological standpoint consistently with his psychological theory of judgment, is the identical question which must be answered in connection with the charge of

subjectivism. We must, therefore, reserve judgment on this question until the end of the next chapter, when it will become evident whether James's epistemological standpoint opens a path of escape from the dilemma with which we are confronted. If our answer should be negative, our next duty will be to analyze the nature of this freely willed belief advocated for the religious hypothesis. So far this free belief has been described only negatively. It is, as we know, no form of cognition, has no validity as knowledge, and *is not determined by a will for truth*. Its positive nature will become apparent at the end of the analysis in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER IV

### JAMES'S DOCTRINE AS A DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS FAITH AT THE COST OF OBJECTIVE REALITY

The epistemological presuppositions for the subjectivism of a theory of free belief—The epistemological presuppositions of the 'psychology of belief'—The individuality of James's theory of judgment—The epistemological presuppositions of James's theory of judgment—The importance of these facts for James's solution of the problem of the overthrow of intellectualism—Positive evaluation of the will to believe as a basis for the defense of religious faith, and summary.

At the beginning of the last section we indicated why the charge of subjectivism, such as Miller, for instance, brought against James, could not be upheld without further proof. The charge, namely, based on the fact that as judgments in order to be true must correspond to some independent reality, the will to believe or free belief according to wish might indeed exist as a will to deceive oneself, but could have nothing in common with a will for truth. This criticism would be self-evidently just, if James were obliged to admit that this presupposition is correct, namely, that judgment or belief must correspond with objective reality in order to be true. The truth of this presupposition is not, however, acknowledged by James. On the contrary, his theory points to the conclusion that no such objective reality can be posited; that reality is nothing other than the sum total of what the mind wills and affirms, and that no fact is real until the mind performs the act of relating it to itself. If such be the case, the charge of subjectivism in the form before us becomes untenable. Our question is, therefore, Must James, if consistent, acknowledge the presupposition on which the charge is founded, or has he carried out his theory of belief in such a way that it makes possible an epistemological standpoint which the charge does not touch?

In order to answer this question, we shall first of all analyze the characteristic and peculiar traits of James's theory of judgment. We shall then be able to see whether this theory is indeed fitted to support an epistemological structure which can escape the charge of subjectivism, for the reason that this charge is tenable only on the presupposition of a contrary epistemological standpoint. The best method for presenting the individual and peculiar features of

James's theory is to compare it with other related theories. The following short preliminary survey of such theories is therefore adjoined.

James's theory, and those related to it, may be comprised under the conception and term 'psychology of belief,' inasmuch as the psychological examination into the state of mind, belief (conceived as the kernel of cognition), is their common task. The psychologists who interest us most in this connection are Hume, the two Mills, Bain, Sully, Stout and Baldwin.

Hume, who first agitated the question of the nature of belief as an original psychic phenomenon, may be considered the pioneer in the endeavor to find its answer. And although Hume did not quite succeed in formulating a satisfactory answer to his question,<sup>1</sup> he did succeed in formulating the essential points in the problem of belief in a way which still obtains in modern psychology, and which is strictly adhered to in James's theory of belief.

Hume's own answer to the questions of the essence of belief and of its causes and conditions and of its relation to other mental phenomena, is as follows:<sup>2</sup> Belief must be differentiated from conception, because 'we conceive many things which we do not believe.' Yet belief in the existence of an object is not a new idea added to the original conception of the object. For when we conceive of God, on the one hand, and when we conceive of Him as existing, and believe in His existence, on the other, our idea of Him neither increases nor diminishes. "But as 'tis certain there is a great difference betwixt the simple conception of an object and the belief in it, and as this difference lies not in the parts or composition of the idea which we conceive, it follows that it must lie in the *manner* in which we conceive it. . . . But when I would explain this *manner*, I scarce find any words that fully answer the case, but am obliged to have recourse to every one's feeling in order to give him a perfect notion of this operation of the mind. An idea assented to *feels* different from a fictitious idea that the fancy alone presents to us: and this different feeling I endeavor to explain by calling it a superior *force*, or *vivacity*, or *solidity*, or *firminess*, or *steadiness*." Philosophically, then, we must content ourselves with the statement that belief is a something felt by the mind which confers on ideas greater force, greater importance and greater stability and renders them the

<sup>1</sup> See Theodor Lipps, 'Treatise on Human Nature,' translated by Lipps ('Traktat über die menschliche Natur,' Hamburg and Leipzig, 1895), p. 356, foot-note, 334.

<sup>2</sup> 'Treatise on Human Nature,' Part III., Section 7 ff., Ed. Green & Grosse, London, 1886.

governing principle of all our actions. In searching for the causes of belief, Hume searches for the conditions of lively and vivid ideas, thereby inconsistently identifying the lively idea itself with the lively manner of conceiving it, in which he had previously found the essence of belief to consist. He set up the maxim 'that when any impression becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity.' Especially the relations of causality, resemblance, and temporal and spatial contiguity lend this preeminent vividness to associated ideas, that is, awaken belief in their reality. In regard to the relation of belief to other states of consciousness, Hume reaches the following conclusions:<sup>1</sup> Belief is not a special attitude annexed to the conception, in the manner that will and desire are. Belief is not distinguishable from the conception, but is merely a peculiar feeling accompanying a firm manner of conception, and a fast hold on the object. In reference to this theory, Lipps remarks that the distinction Hume makes is not a clear one, and that a more searching examination would no doubt have made Hume realize and admit that belief and will are indeed analogous attitudes toward objects.<sup>2</sup> To us this seems extremely doubtful, however, as Hume has expressed himself quite definitely on the subject of the relation of belief and will on the occasion of a second definition of belief in the appendix. Here the conclusion that belief can not be an idea is deduced from two facts, the one, that we have no abstract idea of existence separable from the idea of particular objects, and the other—and this is the point in question—that the mind has command over its ideas, and that, therefore, if 'belief consisted merely in a new idea . . . it would be in a man's power to believe what he pleased.' As belief, however, 'depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles of which we are not masters, it must be a feeling or sentiment.'

How has the problem of belief developed since Hume? That belief is conceived as consciousness of reality or truth, over against mere conception, is of course the logical condition of its examination, for only as a unique mental attitude does belief become a problem. But although the psychologists mentioned above agree with Hume in considering this reality-consciousness a non-intellectual or non-conceptual state of consciousness, they differ widely in their positive definitions of its nature.

John Stuart Mill in a frequently cited passage expresses the

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, appendix.

<sup>2</sup> Lipps's translation, p. 356, foot-note 334.

theory that belief is not analyzable, because it is an 'ultimate and primordial' fact, which is joined in every act of judgment to the intellectual combination of ideas contained therein.<sup>1</sup> In another place he says:<sup>2</sup> "To determine what it is that happens in the case of assent or dissent besides putting two ideas together, is one of the most intricate of metaphysical problems." Searching for the conditions of belief, he finds that we believe in the first place all that is sense-given, and then, all that is associated with the sense-given.

Bain, on the other hand, regards as the essence of belief readiness to act, and accordingly defines belief as that upon which we are willing to act.<sup>3</sup> That this is a description of the results of belief rather than of the nature of belief is self-evident. A similar confusion may be found in the theories of James Mill<sup>4</sup> and of Herbert Spencer,<sup>5</sup> which define belief as 'indissoluble' or 'inseparable association'; whereas, logically, association can be conceived only as the cause or condition of belief.

Sully endeavors to gain as comprehensive a conception of belief as is possible, by including in his definition all the factors above mentioned. Its intellectual aspect is the reference of thought beyond itself to a real object, its representativeness. Hume's conception of belief as feeling is also recognized, but interpreted to mean that we must feel interested in a thing in order to feel convinced of it. Finally, too, Bain's so-called conative element (readiness to act) is adopted and incorporated into Sully's definition. In his analysis of the conditions of belief, Sully finds that vivid, coherent and stable concepts are believed because they approach sense-perception in vividness, and, therefore, assume the form of representatives of reality, reality meaning an object existent in the external world.<sup>6</sup>

In the more recent theories of Baldwin and Stout we find belief again explicitly defined as feeling. Baldwin, to be sure, distinguishes between simple reality-feeling, and belief as the feeling of assent and confirmation; both, however, are feelings. The former

<sup>1</sup> Note to the 'Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind,' by James Mill, 2d Edition, I., p. 412.

<sup>2</sup> 'System of Logic,' Book 1, Chapter V.

<sup>3</sup> 'Mental and Moral Science,' 3d Ed., p. 371 ff., London, 1872. In the appendix this theory is strongly modified. Here belief is defined as an original disposition to follow a line already experienced and to expect the same result. This conception of belief is described by Bain as an 'intellectual one'; in regard to its strength, however, belief is said to be dependent on conative and emotional impulses.

<sup>4</sup> 'Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind,' Chapter 11.

<sup>5</sup> 'Principles of Psychology,' London and Edinburgh, 1870.

<sup>6</sup> 'Outlines of Psychology,' p. 397 ff., London, 1889.



he describes as the simple feeling of the presence of a thing before consciousness, the mere recognition of an object; the latter as a feeling of confirmation, a consciousness of the presence of a thing as fitted to satisfy a need. In other words, 'belief is the consciousness of the personal endorsement of reality.'<sup>1</sup>

Stout, who next to James has given us the most comprehensive and complete theory of belief, adopts James's definition of belief as the mental function of cognizing reality. Doubt and disbelief are classified by him as forms of belief, for the reason that they, too, imply an 'acknowledgment of objective existence.'<sup>2</sup>

As for the conditions of belief, that is, of 'acknowledgment' of objective existence, Stout concludes after an exhaustive examination that 'the apprehension of real existence depends on the limitation of our volitional activity by the material upon which it is exercised'—volitional activity here embracing both the process of fixing attention and the movements of the body. The principle to be applied is that of the limitation of attention by the nature of the presentation attended to. Real existence essentially consists in the manifest independence and self-existence of the object in its relation to the volitional activity through which it is cognized. "To know is not to create; . . . the object as such is independent of our will."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 'Handbook of Psychology,' New York, 1891; 'Feeling and Will,' p. 149 ff. See also 'On Selective Thinking,' *Psychological Review*, 1898.

<sup>2</sup> 'Belief,' *Mind*, October, 1891; also 'Analytic Psychology,' Book 1, Chapter 5.

<sup>3</sup> Not very dissimilar to this theory is that of Lipps, 'Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens,' Kap. XVII., p. 395, Bonn, 1883. He, too, conceives judging to be 'an act of consent,' and remarks: "We assent to that which presents itself with a claim for recognition" ("Wir erkennen aber an, was uns mit dem Anspruch auf Geltung entgegentritt"). As a second formulation of the concept of judgment, the following one, very similar to Baldwin's, is given: "Judgment is conception + the consciousness of reality" ("Urteilen ist Vorstellen mit dem Bewusstsein der Wirklichkeit"). Every judgment, continues Lipps, asserts reality; even the proposition 'Pegasus has wings'; here the objective reality of the psychological fact that 'Pegasus' denotes a winged creature is asserted. "But to have the consciousness of reality means to have the consciousness that an idea is necessary, must or ought to be" ("Das Bewusstsein der Wirklichkeit haben, dies heisst das Bewusstsein haben, ein Vorstellen sei nothwendig, müsse oder solle sein"). An idea is true, then, if in contrast to mere conception, it is accompanied by the feeling of necessity or 'constraint,' that is, if my power of free subjective conception when exercised on the idea arouses in me a feeling of 'vain effort.' "Thus reality-consciousness, or consciousness of validity and of objective significance, consists in a feeling of constraint or effort, or, to take them collectively, in a feeling of resistance, which is aroused in us when our free ideational process meets with a superior ideational experience" ("So be-

Belief, or the feeling of reality, then, according to Stout, arises from the obstacles offered to volitional attention by the nature of the objects to which it is turned, and from the corresponding limitations of volitional movements by material hindrances. In short, belief in reality is conditioned throughout by limitations to subjective activity.

Baldwin, too, finds an ultimate and unbridgable disparity between will and belief, and formulates it as follows: "There is a distinct difference in consciousness between the consent of belief and the consent of will. The consent of belief is in a measure a forced consent: it attaches to what *is*—to what stands in the order of things whether I consent or no. The consent of will is a forceful consent, a consent of what *shall be* through me." "It is not true, that we can believe what we will. To say we believe what we need, is not to say we believe what we want." And again he asserts, approximating Stout's position even more closely: "Sensations of resistance become the primary criterion of all external reality. Anything that resists my will is believed to have present reality."

This necessarily very cursory survey of the 'psychology of belief' makes it evident that although in detail the theories considered differ widely enough to show hardly a common point of departure, nevertheless several fundamental points of view characterize every one of the theories and form the basis on which the whole 'psychology of belief' rests.<sup>1</sup>

steht überhaupt das Wirklichkeitsbewusstsein oder Bewusstsein der Geltung und der objektiven Bedeutung in dem Gefühl des Zwanges oder der Anstrengung, oder wenn wir beides zusammenfassen, dem Gefühl des Widerstandes, dass sich dann in uns einstellt, wenn unser freier Vorstellungsverlauf einem übermächtigen Vorstellungsgeschehen begegnet").

<sup>1</sup> I have not treated Brentano's theory of judgment for two reasons. In the first place, I agree with Cornelius ('Versuch einer Theorie der Existentialurteile,' p. 82, München, 1894) in considering it identical in principle with Hume's theory of belief. In the second place, Brentano, because of his epistemological and logical interests, introduced the logical aspect of the concept of existence into his theories, which unfortunately not only complicated his problems immensely, but rendered their solution incoherent. (Compare Cornelius, *Ibid.*, p. 82 ff.)

It may also be questioned whether Professor John Dewey's psychology of belief belongs to this general class or not. But it shows so many points in common with the theories presented that some account of it seems here called for. In 'Beliefs and Realities' (*Philosophical Review*, March, 1906) we learn that the pragmatic statement of knowledge reasserts the principle of belief, conceiving belief as the kernel and the starting-point of all knowledge. In the process of inquiry called thinking, we are told, beliefs are the working hypotheses, while their systematization—their development and test—constitutes

The first of these fundamental points of view is the conception of belief as 'cognition of reality' in the sense of a conviction that the conceived idea refers to a real object, or corresponds with some reality, or however one wishes to express oneself in describing the dualistic conception of an objective world of reality and a sub-

knowledge. When we ask, however, in what relation belief as inquiry stands to reality (bearing in mind that the psychology of belief presented, conceived belief as reality-feeling or conviction of truth), we get the following answer: First, that beliefs are instigated by reality, and secondly, that they are themselves real, and manifest their reality 'in the usual proper way, namely, by modifying and shaping the reality of other real things.' But this seems to tell us only that beliefs arise in the course of experience and that they in turn give rise to action which modifies the further course of experience, and an insight into their relation to reality, from which a conceptual difference between belief and error and doubt could be deduced, would seem to be possible rather when we ask, If belief is inquiry, what does it inquire into? In answer to this we learn that belief inquires into reality, but not into a fixed ready-made reality, finished for all time, to which belief as a mere subjective 'unreal' attitude would vainly try to accommodate itself. This rationalistic view of the relationship of knowledge and reality calls for revision, we are told, 'a revision which should start frankly from the fact of thinking as inquiring, and purely external realities as terms in inquiries.' It seems, then, that the pragmatic conception of belief, too, calls for reality as its term, reality so far definite that it can be described as 'external realities'; and in so far Professor Dewey would seem to be in agreement with the psychologists presented above. Obviously, however, belief as working hypothesis is conceptually different from belief as reality-feeling or acknowledgment of truth. A working hypothesis may be a guess whose degree of certainty ranges from mere possibility through all stages of probability to absolute conviction, and it seems very plausible, therefore, that, as we are told later on, 'all beliefs are willful' and that 'because the freedom of belief is ours free thought may exercise itself.' Nevertheless, I think that a consideration of what Professor Dewey gives as the actual processes of thinking and the tests of belief reduces this apparent freedom of belief to a freedom to merely *conceive* any hypothesis, and to attempt to test it; its actual ability to be tested, that is, to be systematized and developed, is strictly controlled, as is also its actual purposiveness which first gives the holder of the working hypothesis a feeling of its validity, a conviction of certainty. The control in the first direction seems to me to be contained in the following statement: "Belief, sheer, direct, unmitigated personal belief, reappears as the working hypothesis; action which at once develops and tests belief reappears as experimentation, deduction, demonstration; while the machinery of universals, axioms, *a priori* truths, etc., is the systematization of the way in which men have always worked out, in anticipation of overt action, the implications of their beliefs with a view to revising them in the interests of obviating the unfavorable, and of securing the welcome consequences. . . ." But this systematization, this development, implies a body of previous truths as its instrument to test the new hypothesis. The new hypothesis would seem to have first to connect with a body of established truths if it is to develop into that intelligent action which gives rise to further realities and is the final and supreme test of its validity. It would seem, therefore, that if systematization of a belief—the process called knowledge—is pos-

jective cognition of this objective world. Not only is such a dualistic world posited, when the question is asked: How must conceptions be constituted in order to be believed, that is, in order to be valid for the objective world?—but, moreover, this presupposed objective world to which ideas must apply in order to be true is the extra-mental world, the spatial and temporal world as given through the medium of the senses. Only on the assumption of an objective world of this sort is it possible to search for the causes of cognition and of belief. In fact, an assertion of the reality of the 'physical' over against the sensible only with the aid of a body of truths with which to connect the new hypothesis, the very existence of the new hypothesis is controlled. In the second direction, in that of the control of the validity of an hypothesis, it would seem as though the very fact that there are always some 'external realities' whether brute facts or an indefinite unformed *ûλη* to which the hypothesis must apply and accommodate itself in order to work as a reconstructive function of other parts of experience, establishes a perfect control over the validity of working hypotheses, since 'truth is the union of abstract postulated meanings and of concrete brute facts in a way which circumvents the latter by utilization as a means, while it fulfills the other by use as methods, in the same personally active experience.'

James himself in a recent pragmatic formulation of the thought process ('Pragmatism's Conception of Truth,' *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. IV., p. 141), differing fundamentally from his elaborate psychology of belief, brings out this element of control very strongly, as the following extracts may suggest: "Truth, . . . meaning nothing but eventual verification, is manifestly incompatible with waywardness on our part. Woe to him whose beliefs play fast and loose with the order which realities follow in his experience: they will lead him nowhere or else make false connections." "Between the coercions of the sensible order and those of the ideal order, our mind is thus wedged tightly." "Any idea that helps us to deal with either the reality or its belongings, that doesn't entangle our progress in frustrations, that *fits*, in fact, and adapts our life to the reality's whole setting, will agree sufficiently to meet the requirement. It will hold true of that reality." "We must find a theory that will *work*. . . . It must derange common sense and previous belief as little as possible, and it must lead to some sensible terminus or other that can be verified exactly. To 'work' means both these things; and the squeeze is so tight that there is little loose play for any theory. They are controlled as nothing is." And finally: "Pent in, as the pragmatist, more than any one else, sees himself to be, between the whole body of funded truths squeezed from the past and the coercions of the world of sense about him, who so well as he feels the immense pressure of objective control under which our minds perform their operations?"

So it would appear that the will to believe or free belief has no place in the pragmatic account of belief and knowledge. If both doctrines be held by a thinker at one and the same time it points to his inconsistency. Inconsistencies can, however, be accounted for, partly at least, by the nature of the conflicting doctrines. A study of pragmatism with a view to its hospitality to subjective doctrines such as that of the will to believe is a tempting task, but does not, I think, call for further elucidation in connection with our own doctrine, which receives its complete foundation, as we have seen, on non-pragmatic grounds.

'psychical' is contained in the very definition of belief as consciousness of the real existence of objects contrasted with mere ideas of or conceptions of such objects. If, in addition to this, the theory is held that the 'real'—the objective world independent of the individual consciousness—is known and believed by the fact that it limits volitional attention, as Baldwin and Stout explicitly assert, then any possibility of influencing or shaping knowledge on the part of the will is precluded. The real is, independent of any subjective activity. True ideas are those which correspond to reality, and this correspondence is recognized by certain signs; that is, I believe, am convinced, assent to the reality of the conceived object, if the conception have certain subjective traits. Now even from this standpoint a will to believe, or freely chosen belief, although not psychologically impossible, has absolutely no validity as knowledge for which reference to an objective world independent of volitional activity is requisite. It is, indeed, a will to deceive oneself.

But if we go farther and assert that the objective world can be known only by its influence in constraining the activity of the will, then we adopt a standpoint from which will and belief are, indeed, seen to be antithetical in principle: I believe or ascribe reality and extra-mental existence to my ideas, *just because* I and my will can not control them, but are, on the contrary, controlled by them.

Now this standpoint, which is not only dualistic, but is, moreover, full of assumptions concerning the nature of reality, can hardly be objected to, for it is difficult to see how psychology could find its problems without making and resting upon these assumptions. For the essential psychological problem is that of the individual consciousness's cognition of the objective physical world, and this presupposes the world of things and of other individuals as universally valid realities. Here, in the questions regarding the nature of the cognition of the external world, the conditions of its generation and the relation of different states of consciousness, psychology finds its legitimate problems. The examination of the validity of its presuppositions is not within its own sphere. But that this is psychology's only possible basis and standpoint is generally admitted, and calls for no further comment.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> James himself upholds this point of view in his remarks on the methods of psychology as a natural science ('Psychology,' Chapter VII.). He says the psychologist does not inquire into the possibility of knowledge *überhaupt*, he assumes it. "The knowledge he criticizes is the knowledge of particular men about the particular things that surround them" (p. 184). "To the psychologist the minds he studies are *objects*, in a world of other objects." These minds are always the minds of 'distinct individuals inhabiting definite portions of a real space and a real time' (p. 183).

If in view of these facts we ask ourselves not only how James came to regard a will to believe as a possible and justifiable process, but how he went so far as to identify will and belief, the only answer possible is that the epistemological assumption that the reality cognized by belief is the external objective world, is one to which James does not subscribe.

Cornelius in an interesting critique of the 'psychology of belief'<sup>1</sup> points out that there are two possible methods for a research into the conditions of belief. One may either start with a fixed definition of the real, and then deduce from it what marks our ideas must show in order to be characterized as real; or one may proceed inductively, and search for the common qualities of those ideas which are generally believed, and thus determine the nature of reality. Obviously now it is the first of these methods that the psychologists considered above have employed; whereas James attempted to carry through the second method. As we have seen, James began his examination into belief by contrasting it with 'mere' conception, and thus gained his definition of belief as the cognition of reality. When he began to search for the conditions of belief, however, he found that every conceived object is *eo ipso* believed, unless it contradicts other believed objects. Among contradictory or conflicting conceptions some one must prevail, and the function of belief was found in the task of settling the conflict by an active choice. Consent or belief thus became the subjective activity of choice. The problem therewith shaped itself in such a fashion that James could examine how objects chosen by the mind were constituted, and in finding their attributes to be that of practical importance and intimacy with the ego, he found the characteristic mark of reality. In order to determine in further detail the content of reality, he had but to determine what things are as a matter of fact the practically valuable and interesting and, therefore, the 'believed' things. By this apparently inductive method James reached the conclusion that reality consists in the relation of things to the volitional self, and that this volitional self alone can confer reality upon objects, inasmuch as the willing and consenting ego only can establish the relation between itself and the objects in which reality consists. Here two factors are mutually dependent upon one another. First, the fundamental psychical fact, according to James, that as the mind can think differently of the same, a choice of what it shall adhere to is open to it, and constitutes the peculiar function of belief. Secondly, the view that reality is the sum total of the objects chosen and consented to by the mind. This

<sup>1</sup> Hans Cornelius, 'Versuch einer Theorie der Existentialurteile,' p. 72, München, 1894.

second proposition may not only be regarded as a corollary of the preceding one, but the first proposition, which asserts that through belief I choose my reality, can no longer be considered a falsification and sacrifice of the conception of reality, for belief is now conceived as logically prior to reality.

Such a theory could not, to be sure, escape the charge of subjectivism, but it certainly would not be touched by the particular charge of subjectivism which bases on the fact that because an idea must correspond to some fixed objective reality in order to be believed, a free will to believe can but be a will to deceive oneself. On the contrary, James's doctrine thus interpreted (and he explicitly tries to shape it in such a way) is a more complete form of subjectivism than is even Miller's interpretation, as may easily be realized if it be contrasted with the standpoint with which it has a strong outer and a slight inner similarity; I refer to Rickert's epistemology.<sup>1</sup>

Rickert, starting from entirely different points of view—from logical, methodological and epistemological points of view, namely—analyzes the judging activity. He finds it to be in essence a practical or volitional process, inasmuch as it is an attitude toward alternatives, and therefore logically involves an acknowledgment of the value of truth. And because this reference to truth (*Beurteilung*) is implicitly contained in every judgment whatsoever and because the concept reality has meaning only as the predicate in a judgment, it follows that the act of belief, the judgment of truth, is logically prior to that of reality. Thus for Rickert, too, reality is not a given or fixed being with which true judgments correspond, but the conception of reality is gained in the act of judging or believing: reality is the total content of all true judgments. The two theories differ totally, however, in that Rickert bases the objectivity of his standpoint on an exhaustive epistemological analysis, from which the points quoted above were extracted for the sake of comparison and shall now in a cursory sketch of his epistemology be returned to their proper places. The presentation of this theory may serve to make clear how necessary an epistemological foundation is for any similar standpoint, and how James, neglecting any such foundation of his doctrine, remains submerged in the most impossible subjectivism.

Rickert, then, first reaches the suggested point of view of 'subjectivism' by rejecting the epistemological standpoint which holds

<sup>1</sup> Carried out in his books 'Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis,' Freiburg, 1892, and 'Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung,' Tübingen und Leipzig, 1896-1902; cf. especially Kap. V. of the latter.

knowledge to be a copy or representation of a reality independent of consciousness. He does this on the strength of the recognition that a correspondence between ideas and a reality beyond experience could never be known, even if such a reality existed; that, in a word, thought could never grasp such being. We have, therefore, a body of knowledge affirmed in the act of judgment which can not be said to be universally valid in the sense that it portrays an absolute and given world of reality. But if so, how can the validity of knowledge be established? What can the objectivity of that which is affirmed in judgment and believed mean under these circumstances? The proof or 'grounding' of objectivity proceeds through a disclosure of the implications contained in the definition of the judging act itself. In judging, it was shown that we adopt a practical attitude; we affirm or deny; we take a stand. This implies that we are face to face with a value, which we recognize as such. Only if we recognize truth as a value, and acknowledge or will it, are we ready to make a choice, to judge. It is this free subordination to a recognized value, this willing of truth for its own sake, which guides the act of judgment. Thus for Rickert the 'choice' involved in judgment, far from being an arbitrary and indeterminate attitude, as in James's case, becomes one guided by the intellectual conscience, or the sense of 'obligation' toward a value.<sup>1</sup> Now this 'obligation' is capable of fulfilling the function of the rejected world of being and of conferring objectivity on knowledge inasmuch as it refers to an absolute and over-individual value—to that of truth—and is itself, therefore, over-individual and transcendental, and must be acknowledged as such by every judging subject. For as the will, affirming the value of truth and subordinating itself to truth as 'constraining' in the act of judgment, is the logical presupposition of *every* act of judgment, the absolute validity of this 'constraint' or 'obligation' can not be contested. Then again, the logical priority of this obligation over reality is established in that reality can mean nothing else than that which is 'judged to be real'; while in the judgment itself is comprehended the recognition of absolute value and of dutiful subordination to it. It is this subordination to the value of truth, then, or sense of obligation, which, in guiding the individual in his acts of judgment, confers objectivity on them. True or objectively valid judgments are judgments that 'ought' to be. Reality becomes conceptually that 'order of the

<sup>1</sup> Rickert's term is *das Sollen*, which has no equivalent in English. I use obligation and constraint as the closest approximations.



world which is affirmed by true, that is by dutiful (*gesollte*), judgments.<sup>1</sup>

Even this scant outline of Rickert's doctrine will serve to show how necessary an epistemological foundation is to a theory of knowledge which does not start out with a fixed conception of reality; and a comparison between it and James's doctrine will make plain that the latter lacks all traces of such a foundation. James's theory, with its individual judgments, determined by individual practical interests, resulting in a world of purely individual realities, remains a form of pure subjectivism.

Having shown that even if the rejection of a dualistic epistemology is justifiable on James's part, it can not save his doctrine from the charge of subjectivism, I shall now proceed to the proof that such is not the case, that, on the contrary, James's theory, like the other presented theories of belief, rests and must necessarily rest upon a naïve dualistic conception of reality.

Attention has before been drawn to the fact that James gets his definition of belief by contrasting it with 'mere' conception, and finding that in the former case besides conceiving an object, reality is ascribed to it. James identifies belief—reality-feeling—with judgment, because he holds judging to consist essentially in the

<sup>1</sup> Professor James criticizes this argument as rationalistic, on the one hand, and as a fantastic flight, trivial in its results, on the other hand ('Pragmatism's Conception of Truth,' *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. IV., p. 141). But classifying Rickert as a rationalist is surely doing violence to the word; his thoroughgoing voluntarism is entirely obvious and even his absolutism pretends to be grounded in experience. While his theory of knowledge as presented in the work quoted by Professor James is undeniably formal in its conclusions to the point of barrenness, to consider it trivial in the sense of conceiving it to say 'you ought to seek the truth on general principles' (analogous to 'you ought to amass wealth or take care of your health') is to utterly misconceive it. What Rickert's absolutism means to say is that any assertion or statement claiming to be true implies an acknowledgment of truth as an absolute value, and one's obligation to submit to it. The sense of obligation or subordination is unconditional for the reason that it is contained in every act of judgment claiming validity. Professor James's argument against the unconditional obligation to acknowledge truth, as he himself admits, is directed against particular concrete truths, no one of which, as he convincingly shows, need at all times occupy one's attention. But if every judgment implies a recognition of the difference between truth and falsehood and a passive acknowledgment of truth as the guiding principle and voluntary submission to it, the only condition limiting 'the application of the abstract imperative,' according to Rickert's conception, is the condition of a man who makes no statements claiming to be true or false, the man who is indifferent to the value of his thoughts—a condition of mind which might perhaps not inaptly be described as pathological.

affirmation of the reality of an object. To assent to a proposition means to hold it to be true, that is, to hold that the total object defined in the proposition is real.

Now, although this definition asserts that belief and judgment refer to a reality which stands contrasted to mere ideas, the nature of this reality is still indefinite. However, in his 'historical' study of the conditions of belief, James tells us that every object is believed through the very fact of being conceived, and as belief is cognition of reality, we must infer that every conceived object, every idea, is real. But obviously, now, this fact cancels the difference between reality and unreality, and robs the concept reality of any possible meaning. To make disbelief, doubt and reality conceptually possible, James is therefore obliged to modify this statement. He does so by adding that not all conceived objects are believed, but only those which remain *uncontradicted*: disbelief and unreality are made possible by the fact that one object may conflict with or contradict another. How this state of affairs is possible, James tries to illustrate by the example of the winged horse. The winged horse as a dream horse, as a mere idea or phantasma, may and will be believed because it conflicts with nothing; the winged horse as existing in the external world will not be believed because it is contradicted by the horses of the physical world, concerning which it is an accepted fact that they have no wings. This is said to point to the two fundamental mental facts, first, that we may think differently of the same, and second, 'that when we have done so we can choose which way of thinking to adhere to and which to disregard.' The function of making this choice is ascribed, as we know, to belief, and thereby a new conception of reality is introduced: the real world becomes the world believed in, in the sense of being chosen and adhered to by the volitional, active ego.

In this development of the causation of belief and reality there are more logical inconsistencies than could be treated from any one point of view. I shall limit my criticism to the following remarks: The fundamental error at the bottom of all this confusion of thought lies in the fact that in the argument leading to the conception of reality as that chosen by the active ego, one step, namely, the possibility of a conflict between two objects, is based not only on the assumption of a fixed and recognized reality, but, moreover, on the assumption of a reality whose nature is perfectly definite. The reason why this knot is difficult to untangle lies in the very confusing equivocation in James's use of the term belief. Let us try to realize this state of affairs by means of James's example of the new-born mind. The child, whose first experience is a candle (from the standpoint of the

psychologist, a hallucinatory candle) will believe in it, we are told, and ascribe reality to it. *Ex definitione* this means that the candle, of whatever sort its reality may be, is not a 'mere' idea. The child's whole world consists in the candle and is determined as to its nature by the nature of the candle. James states this in saying, "That candle is its all, its absolute. Its entire faculty of attention is absorbed by it. It *is*, it is *that*; it is *there* . . . no alternative, in short, suggests itself as even conceivable; so how can the mind help believing the candle real?" When later on we are told that the idea of the candle is contradicted if the child asserts, 'The candle exists in the outer world,' whereas it was uncontradicted as an illusory candle, the following criticism in regard to this argument is called for: If objects are disbelieved only when conflicting with other recognized or believed objects, the principle obviously obtains that the chronologically prior belief is the logically prior; and James himself seems to realize this, when he says that the child believes in the candle because it is its first and only experience. If this is true, however, it follows that it could never occur to the child to understand by the real outer world anything else but the spatial experience in which the candle he believes in (the illusory candle) is placed; wherefore a conflict between the two worlds is logically impossible. A conflict between them means and implies that the difference between mere subjective conceptions and existence *extra mentem meam* is already known, for to recognize the candle as illusory or subjective means that it has been judged in reference to an extra-mental world. But the child can disbelieve (judge as unreal) neither the candle nor the winged horse without first positing an outer world contrasted to mere conception as the *real world*. On the other hand, the child could say with perfect consistency 'The illusory candle is real,' for this, according to James, is but a paraphrase for 'I believe in the illusory candle.' Such a judgment becomes paradoxical only if by real is meant compatibility with the world *extra mentem*;—only then does it contain a contradiction. If the child, then, must recognize the candle as an illusion before it can conflict with the candle of the outer world, it must have recognized the outer world as the real world.

This fundamental error may be elucidated by a second chain of thought. To believe in the candle as a mere idea is a paradox according to the conception which holds belief to contrast with a mere idea. To recognize an object as 'merely' imagined or conceived, is to reject or to disbelieve it. But disbelief is possible only, we are told, if something conflicting is previously believed. In order to disbelieve the illusory candle, the child must previously have believed in the candle of the outer world, that is, have adhered to it as the

real candle. Now many passages might be quoted from James's own pages where this is explicitly stated; so, for instance, the explanation that the child does not, to be sure, know the candle to be unreal, but that the onlooking psychologist does, and that he thereby means 'that there is a world known to *us* which is real, and to which we perceive that the candle does not belong,' and that this world is the outer world of space and time. Indeed, we find the very words:<sup>1</sup> "In both existential and attributive judgments a synthesis is represented. The syllable *ex* in the word existence, *da* in the word *Dasein*, express it. 'The candle exists' is equivalent to 'The candle is *over there*.' And the 'over there' means real space, space related to other reals. The proposition amounts to saying: 'The candle is in the same space with other reals.' " This would seem sufficiently clear if the next sentence did not again assert that the real existence of these other things resolves itself into a relation to the ego, in the sense of the criticized point of view. Thus the whole process is again reversed and the old inconsistency obtains.

The explanation of this constant confusion lies, as was said, in an equivocation in the use of the word belief. First we have belief explicitly defined as belief in the *reality* of an object, and then it is tacitly taken for granted that belief may also refer to an idea *qua* idea (we may believe in the candle as an illusion). By idea we must understand a mere idea (a phantasm, illusion, image, or whatever we wish to call it), for to speak of the recognition of and belief in an idea in the sense of a state of consciousness merely is absurd, as everything appearing before the consciousness is before it, exists for it, and can neither be doubted nor disbelieved as a mere fact. To state anything of the sort explicitly is no assertion, but only a tautological phrase.<sup>2</sup> It follows from the definition, however, that belief in a conceived object as a mere conception is a logical paradox, and yet the possibility of a contradiction of two objects and the subse-

<sup>1</sup> 'Psychology,' Vol. II., p. 290, foot-note.

<sup>2</sup> I can not, therefore, agree with Cornelius when he asserts in his otherwise very subtle and successful polemic against James's theory ('Existentialurteile,' p. 75 ff.) that its chief error lies in the fact that James did not realize that 'an idea as such must necessarily be recognized, assented to . . . that, therefore, no special feeling of belief need supervene in order specially to acquiesce in the idea, which, on the contrary, is, as soon as it is presented, *eo ipso* assented to or believed' (p. 77). James surely does not dream of denying so self-evident a fact, and understands by belief, as he defines it too, the sense of the reality of a conceived object—the use of the word object over against idea is, for that matter, significant. The only question to come up is, What does he understand by idea in speaking of belief in the reality of an idea as an idea? He means and must mean the reality of an idea as a 'mere' idea, as a phantasm, in distinction from an idea to which a real object corresponds.

quent choice in the act of belief depended on just this possibility of both believing in objects as *extra mentem* and believing in them as mere ideas.

We need only remember that recognition of the object of a proposition as a mere idea is equivalent to disbelief in it, and can, therefore, be engendered by a prior affirmation of a contradictory proposition only in order to realize that the affirmation of reality as the outer world is contained in the denial of the reality of mere conceptions. Belief is belief in a reality *extra mentem meam*, and only by the assumption of such a real outer world, which it is the function of belief to cognize, can James consistently develop the process which leads him later on to identify belief and choice. 'Choice,' we may incidentally point out, is evidently a metaphorical expression in this context. The object can not be judged otherwise than according to whether or not it belongs to the real world, already recognized, and characterized by certain qualities; and there is, therefore, a definite 'constraint' in the decision expressed by the so-called act of choice, which is not, certainly, suggested by the term 'choice.' What these marks are by which reality is cognized, whether they consist primarily in a limitation of the activity of attention, or, rather, as James thinks, in their power to arouse the attention and the interest and relate themselves intimately to the practical ego—this is a purely material question. Logically, there is no objection to James's opinion that reality is known by its power of arousing the feelings and awakening interest, so long as the impression is not thereby given that through cognition or belief the reality is *created*. The reality is the world outside the mind of the psychophysical individual, and is cognized in the act of belief.

The essential point is, that this being the case, there is as little room for volitional choice in James's theory of belief as in the other presented theories, for if knowledge is a relation between ideas *in mente mea* and objects *extra mentem meam*, and these objects are realities independent of belief, then a will to believe, or judgment in accordance with wishes, can indeed be nothing other than a will to deceive oneself; and the will to deceive oneself is logically incompatible with the will for truth. That willing to believe is psychologically possible may for the present remain uncontradicted; that freely willed belief is no form of cognition of the objective world has been proved.

Now this standpoint of naïve dualism is the very *conditio sine qua non* of psychology. Psychology deals with the individual mind surrounded by an outer world filled with other individual minds and objects. This implies that states of consciousness have already been

conceived as psychical over against the physical objects to which they refer. The psychological problem of knowledge thus becomes the special problem of how the individual in his psychical processes cognizes the independent world of space and time. The confusion of this problem with the epistemological one of the objectivity of all states of consciousness, counting as such the physical world as well as the other individuals and the individual himself so far as it is possible for him to be an object of consciousness to himself—this confusion leads to the extraordinary confusion which may be generally observed in the treatment of the problems of knowledge.

The possibility of escaping the dilemma which confronted us at the end of the last chapter is lost. It was there shown how the justification of religious belief on the grounds that all knowledge is free belief or faith led to a dilemma, in that the identification of knowledge with that free belief necessary for the realization of the religious hypothesis led either to the nullification of the conception of knowledge or to an unbridgable gulf between knowledge and faith. The argument used to prove this presupposed that for James judgment or belief was the cognition of reality and truth: only under these circumstances could the distinction between the belief at the basis of all judgment and the freely chosen or willed belief of the religious hypothesis be made.

We are now in a position to see that this presupposition was justifiable. Belief for James is cognition of reality, and herewith we have demonstrated that the defense of the religious hypothesis by means of the arguments that belief is a necessary factor in its realization and that we may freely will to believe because belief is the essence of all knowledge, nullifies knowledge itself. In other words, the whole undertaking was self-destructive, for in attempting to prove the validity of faith or free belief, it was obliged to nullify the conception of valid knowledge itself.

It has been shown, then, that if belief or judgment be held to be cognition, we are not 'free' in judging or believing. If we decide to believe 'freely,' or 'will to believe,' we decide in favor of self-deception. Belief having no reality for its object is deception; belief when conscious of this fact is self-deception.

Furthermore, in identifying the conception 'freely chosen belief' with 'the will to believe,'<sup>1</sup> James unconsciously shows that it was not

<sup>1</sup> This identification is not only tacitly made in the essay 'The Will to Believe,' as is indicated by its title; it may be found again and again in the 'Psychology.'

possible to carry through the identification of will and belief. For what meaning could otherwise attach to the expression 'will to believe'? It would be as tautological as, for instance, the expression 'will to will' or 'believe that you believe.' And, indeed, the preceding argument directed against the possibility of conceiving belief as choice, contains the proof of the inconsistency of the identification of will and belief. For it was through the conception of belief as a choice in which the individual and his interests were manifested, that its identity with the will was inferred. Both belief and will were then referred to the choice performed by the attention. As we now know, that belief can not according to James's own presuppositions be conceived as a choosing of reality, but only as cognition of it, and that the will, on the other hand, as set forth by him, must be conceived as a choice of the objects to be realized and performed, it follows that the identification of will and belief no longer holds good. On the contrary, it is now evident that James's religious standpoint stands in distinct contradiction to his theory of the will. The only remarks on belief to be found in his psychology consistent with the standpoint on which his 'Will to Believe and other Essays' rests, are those at the end of the chapter on the 'Perception of Reality.' Here, it will be remembered, the *difference* between belief and will is formulated in such a way that belief is said to have to do with objects 'which do not change according as we think regarding them,' whereas in the case of will their existence is said to depend on our thoughts and on the movements of our bodies.

But if it is true that this dualism of will and belief is the only logical conclusion to be inferred from James's premises, we must brand all contradictory statements as unjustifiable. Such a total contradiction is contained in the theory that belief, being identical with will, is a purely inner activity directed to inner phenomena; in other words, that belief and will are reducible to attention to an idea and consent to its presence before the mind. Regarding this theory we are now in a position to say: According to James's definition belief is not the recognition of an idea as such, but the cognition of a reality independent of the idea. Freely chosen belief thus resolves itself into a 'will to believe.'

Logically, now, this 'will to believe' is, as we saw, a will to deceive oneself. But how is it constituted from a psychological point of view: is it indeed possible to will to believe; and if so, how can it be done? Just what are we to understand when we are told: Choose freely to believe in a fact which it is possible to doubt, or which does not yet exist, for only by believing will you be inspired to

act in such a way that you will realize the object or recognize the fact?<sup>1</sup>

Obviously now, this belief, although related to knowledge in no other way, must share with it the condition of *feeling* like a conviction of the reality of its object, which, according to the premises, is *not* real. How can the individual produce this inner feeling of conviction? Two methods are conceivable. The first is a process which has been described by Miller (in the article mentioned) as follows: (The subject is supposed to be communing with himself.) "This thing seems to my best intelligence doubtful; but I will subject my mind to such a course of treatment; I will so tempt and beguile it by presenting this one matter for its credence, and withholding rivals; I will so hypnotize it by keeping its gaze on this one brilliant object that I shall presently find myself reposing in the peaceable possession of a full belief."<sup>2</sup> This method rests upon the assumption of two theories: first, that the will is identical with voluntary attention and has the power of controlling absolutely the ideational process; and secondly, that an idea which commands attention is *ipso facto* believed. Now it is evident that those psychologists who do not agree to the second proposition, but hold rather that an idea must not only appear and be attended to in order to be believed, but must appear in a certain manner—be it as an obstacle to voluntary attention or otherwise—these psychologists must, if consistent, reject this method of producing belief. The question to come up for us then is: Has James proved his right to subscribe to these two propositions? As for the first, we know that James does ascribe to attention with effort the power of influencing the conflict of ideas and its normal development by throwing itself on one or the other idea and strengthening it. But to assert that the will has power enough to successfully control the whole ideational process, this is to assert that the will can exert an indeterminate amount of effort, that, in James's sense, the will is free. If we consider now the case cited above as analogous to the religious hypothesis, namely, the case of the decision to leap the abyss, it presents itself as a case in which just this unlimited freedom of the will must be assumed before one would be inclined to expect perfect success on the part of the will. For if one stand on the edge of a precipice and must make a difficult leap to save his life—a performance possible only if he believed in his power to accomplish it, and if an equally strong doubt of his power is

<sup>1</sup> Here the two conceptions of faith, as a factor first in the realization and second in the cognition of a fact, are taken into account, although the first conception is the one characteristic of James's doctrine as a whole.

<sup>2</sup> Compare James, 'Psychology,' Vol. II., pp. 572 and 573.



simultaneously present in his consciousness—an unlimitedly free will to believe would indeed seem called for to quash the consciousness of a lack of power which in its consequences spells death. The question of James's right to the assumption of such a free will has not yet been considered; until we have come to a decision on this point, the question may be left open. Its answer is not imperative at the present moment anyhow, in view of the fact that James certainly can not defend the second proposition upon which the possibility of this method rests.

Concerning this second proposition, several things may be said. The first obvious point is that even if it were true that an idea is believed through the mere fact of being attended to, these facts could not apply to the religious hypothesis; for James tells us that voluntary attention to an object is possible only for several consecutive seconds.<sup>1</sup> After this period of time other associated ideas push themselves to the fore of the attention. If we are not to suppose, then, that action follows upon the voluntarily attended idea within the period of a few seconds, the voluntary effort can have no importance for action. But what meaning and what application can such a fact have for the case of the religious hypothesis? One might, perhaps, direct his attention to the idea of the divine world-order, but a belief in it would last only so long as the contradictory idea of the unreality of this world-order was held in abeyance or dislodged from consciousness. With the cessation of the effort to attend, the belief in the unreality of the divine order would again assert itself, and one could no longer deceive oneself. But, as the belief in the divine world-order is said to be *continually* necessary as a stimulus to right action, one can not see of what value a merely periodically recurring faith could be. Inasmuch as the attention can hold an idea only temporarily, one could never then believe a thing once for all by the method of attention with effort.

As a matter of fact, however, James can not consistently subscribe to the theory that whatever is attended to, is *ipso facto* believed.<sup>2</sup> As we know, he held that only 'uncontradicted' ideas were

<sup>1</sup> 'Psychology,' Vol. I., p. 420, Vol. II., p. 568.

<sup>2</sup> Such a theory of the generation of a belief in validity is in direct contradiction to the pragmatic conception of belief, as was shown above. I find a passage which expresses this opposition in a few words, and therefore quote it. (Dewey, 'Studies in Logical Theory,' p. 74.) "'Blue' as a mere detached floating meaning, an idea at large, would not gain in validity simply by being entertained continuously in a given consciousness; or by being made at one and the same time the persistent object of attentive regard by all human consciousness. If this were all that were required, the chimera, the centaur, or any other subjective construction, could easily gain validity."

believed, and we saw that by uncontradicted he really meant uncontradicted by the outer world of experience. So, for instance, if I will to turn my attention to the idea of a blue tree, I would believe in its reality in case there were not previously in my mind a conception of reality as an outer world in which no blue trees grow. It is this real world which prevents me from believing in the blue tree, no matter how much effort I expend on attending to it.

These rather obvious objections to method one had to be emphasized because the only other conceivable method of 'willing to believe,' although psychologically much more comprehensible, is from a logical point of view totally paradoxical. The process of this method is as follows: "We need only in cold blood *act* as if the thing in question were real, and keep acting as if it were real, and it will infallibly end by growing into such a connection with our life that it will become real."<sup>1</sup> No one will feel inclined to deny that this method is psychologically possible, and we are therefore constrained to regard it as the only possible one for any one wishing to 'will to believe' the religious hypothesis. But thereby we gain an insight into the totally paradoxical nature of James's attempted defense of religious belief. On the one hand, we are told: You are justified, nay, obliged to believe in the religious world-order, because your belief in it is a necessary factor to its reality, in that by a belief in God will you alone be inspired to act in such a way as to realize the moral order which guarantees Him. ("The whole defense of religious faith hinges on action." Religious faith, because necessary for right action, brings about the reality of its object.)

On the other hand, we are told: You can not will to believe in the sense of believing abruptly at will—instantaneous beliefs are not to be attained by the will—but you can *act* as if you believed, thereby the object of belief—in our case the divine world-order—will grow real; then you can indeed believe in it.

✓ A summary of the results of our criticism is now in order. James's theory of judgment is unsuccessful in supplying a foundation for the justification of religious faith. First, inasmuch as religious faith and knowledge are not harmonized, for the free belief called for by the religious hypothesis proved to be a different mental attitude from that belief which the theory of judgment established as the essence of all knowledge. The reason for this was shown to lie in James's peculiar conception of freedom, according to which free belief, although supposed to be a conscious choice and therefore logically demanding determinants, could not be held to be deter-

<sup>1</sup> James's 'Psychology,' Vol. II., p. 321; *cf.* above page.

mined by the perception of truth or of reality. If then, belief, in the sense of judgment, does not create reality but cognizes it, free belief or faith is not cognition but self-deception.

In the second place, free belief is unsuccessful as a basis for religious faith inasmuch as its identity with free will had to be denied, and it was recognized to be merely a feeling of conviction, which might be produced or annulled according to wish. That the only method the mind could employ to accomplish this end was a process of 'make-believe,' was shown. As the justification of this will to believe rested on the assumption that the belief was a necessary factor for action leading to the reality of the religious world-order, we are now in a position to see that this belief depending upon the realization of its object (the divine order) can not come into existence at all: it is its own presupposition.

So even 'free belief' in the sense of a 'will to believe' supplies no basis for the defense of religious faith.

## CHAPTER V

### JAMES'S DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF AS A VICIOUS CIRCLE

The freedom of belief as a justifiable free postulate—The problematic attitude in its relation to the defense of religious belief—The basic presupposition of James's justification of freedom.

UNTIL now we have taken for granted that James is justified in assuming the freedom of the will and of belief. We have shown merely, that, owing to his peculiar conceptions of the will as choice and of freedom as indeterminism, free belief has nothing in common with belief claiming to be true, but resolves itself rather into a desire or a will to believe. The method for producing this belief was, as we saw, that of making believe. We now purpose to show that the reason James's argument in defense of religious faith led to conclusions so different from his intended results, lies in the fact that his argument is a vicious circle. Free will, and with it free belief, was not theoretically grounded, but *freely assumed or postulated* on the grounds of practical needs. Let us hear James's own words on the subject: "The most that any argument can do for determinism is to make it a clear and seductive conception, which a man is foolish not to espouse, so long as he stands by the great scientific postulate that the world must be one unbroken fact, and that prediction of all things without exception must be ideally, even if not actually, possible. It is a *moral* postulate about the universe, the postulate that *what ought to be can be, and that bad acts can not be fated, but that good ones must be possible in their place*, which would lead one to espouse the contrary view."<sup>1</sup>

And, continues James, if moral and scientific postulates conflict, and objective proof is wanting, the only method of deciding between them is that of voluntary choice; for the seeming alternative—doubt or skepticism—when systematic, is itself voluntary choice. "If, meanwhile, the will *be* undetermined, it would seem only fitting that the belief in its indetermination should be voluntarily chosen from amongst other possible beliefs. Freedom's first deed should be to affirm itself. We ought never to hope for any other method of getting at the truth if indeterminism be a fact."

This passage must be so understood that it presents the conflict between theoretical and practical rationality as a case for free choice

<sup>1</sup> 'Psychology,' Vol. II., p. 573.

in favor of the one or the other. In the beginning of the essay 'The Dilemma of Determinism'<sup>1</sup> James describes the situation more exactly: "If a certain formula for expressing the nature of the world violates my moral demand, I shall feel as free to throw it overboard, or at least to doubt it, as if it disappointed my demand for uniformity of sequence, for example; the one demand being, so far as I can see, quite as subjective and emotional as the other is."<sup>2</sup>

This justification of free will is based upon a perfect coordination of theoretical and practical rationality. Both are valid in that

<sup>1</sup> 'The Will to Believe,' p. 147 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Lipps's standpoint forms a curiously close parallel to this one. In a consideration of the relation between faith and knowledge ('Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens,' p. 403) the following passage occurs: "All knowledge is objectively valid in so far as it follows of necessity from the universality of human nature and its laws of belief. For the same reason we must ascribe objective validity to moral convictions in so far as they flow from the universality of human nature and the laws of its valuation. . . . The final result might perhaps be a conflict between actual and objectively valid moral convictions and knowledge with its most certain results. In such a case we should, in accordance with our nature, be condemned to a state of doubt. That our moral conviction would have to give way to our intellectual conviction in all cases is to many a self-understood matter. I, however, search in vain for a psychological fact from which this law could be inferred. Both have their ultimate basis in different spheres of our human nature. And who shall say, This sphere of human nature has precedence over that other? In one individual the former, in another the latter, side of human nature may predominate. This is a question which the individual must settle for himself. But he has absolutely no right to obtrude his personal feeling upon others. . . . There always will be questions, which from the point of view of knowledge may be answered by either 'yes' or 'no.' When this is the case it is no more than right that moral needs should throw the decisive weight in the scales." ("Alles Erkennen hat objektive Geltung, insofern es mit Notwendigkeit aus der allgemeinen menschlichen Natur und ihren Gesetzen des Fürwahrhaltens herfließt. Ebenso müssen wir der sittlichen Überzeugung objektive Gültigkeit zuschreiben, sofern sie mit Notwendigkeit aus der allgemeinen menschlichen Natur und den ihr eigenen Gesetzen der Wertschätzung herfließt. Schliesslich könnte freilich sich ergeben dass auch wirkliche und objektiv gültige sittliche Überzeugungen der Erkenntnis und ihren sichersten Ergebnissen widerstreiten. Dann wären wir unserer Natur nach zum Zweifel verurteilt. Denn dass die sittliche Überzeugung der verstandesmässigen unter allen Umständen weichen müsse, scheint zwar manchem selbstverständlich. Ich sehe mich aber vergeblich nach der psychologischen Tatsache um, aus der dies Gesetz fließen könnte. Beide haben ihren letzten Grund in verschiedenen Bezirken der menschlichen Natur. Wer aber will sagen dies Gebiet der menschlichen Natur habe den Vorrang vor jenem. Beim einen mag diese, beim andern jene Seite des menschlichen Wesens überwiegen. Das hat er dann mit sich selbst auszumachen. Dem andern seine persönliche Eigenart aufzudrängen, dazu fehlt ihm jedes Recht. . . . Immer wird es Fragen geben, auf die vom Standpunkt der Erkenntnis Ja und Nein als Antwort möglich ist. Wo es so steht, ist es nur Recht, dass das sittliche Bedürfniss ein entscheidendes Gewicht in die Wagschale werfe.")

each has its own kind of truth. Nevertheless, these kinds of truth may be incompatible, and a choice must then be made. The 'more rational' rationality, the 'truer' truth—and that again can only mean that which assists the fluency of thought in the individual in question—is to be freely adopted.

As a reply to such a form of subjectivism, based as it is on the complete disruption of the concept truth, this *argumentum ad hominem* may suffice, that the assumption of this theory completely inhibits our fluency of thought, appears irrational therefore, and hence must be untrue.

But in the justification of the freedom of the will, as before in that of religious belief, James has pursued still another course, one that opened out to him upon his admission that the question of free will is insoluble on strictly psychological grounds.<sup>1</sup> Theoretically, we are told, neither determinism nor indeterminism can be proved; for the question of freedom is the question whether the duration and intensity of the amount of effort of attention which we can at any time put forth are fixed functions of the object or not. If not, it means that we might exert more or less of it as we choose. That it seems so to us is a fact, but whether it is or not we can not decide, continues James, because in order to know that 'we should have to ascend to the antecedents of the effort, and defining them with mathematical exactitude, prove, by laws of which we have not at present even an inkling, that the only amount of sequent effort which could *possibly* comport with them was the precise amount which actually came.'<sup>2</sup> This method of proof will forever be beyond human reach, says James, and just therefore, because the question is an open one, we may adopt one or the other postulate as we choose. A number of passages from the 'Dilemma of Determinism' in support of this point of view might be cited; from among them we select the following: "Now, evidence of an external kind to decide between determinism and indeterminism is . . . strictly impossible to find."<sup>3</sup> And again: "I now repeat what I said at the outset, that, from any strict theoretical point of view, the question is insoluble."<sup>4</sup>

But if this foundation of the defense of freedom is James's characteristic one, and this can not be doubted, we have before us a classical example of James's 'thesis' cited above.<sup>5</sup> We are face to face with an option which can not be decided on intellectual grounds and toward which a problematic attitude is itself, according to

<sup>1</sup> 'Psychology,' Vol. II., p. 572.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 572.

<sup>3</sup> 'Will to Believe,' p. 150.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 159.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11; *cf.* above, p. 11.

James, a 'passional decision'; therefore we have at least as much right to decide yes or no as to leave the question open. Indeed, the justification is far greater. For, supposing that the theoretically doubtful freedom of the will be a fact, we could never know it excepting by believing it; 'freedom's first deed should be to affirm itself.'

Before demonstrating the circular nature of this argument, I shall interpolate a criticism of James's assertion that the problematic attitude is not an intellectual or theoretical, but a passional, decision, attended with the same risk of losing the truth as the passional decisions yes and no. It must not be lost sight of, that, as this argument about the problematic attitude plays the same rôle in the defense of religious faith as in the defense of freedom, its criticism in the following paragraph is a supplementary criticism of James's defense of religion as well.<sup>1</sup>

When James tells us that the attitude of leaving a question open is a passional decision, 'just like deciding yes or no, and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth,' we must first of all ask ourselves: With what sort of decision is the passional decision contrasted? Evidently now with the theoretical decision, yes or no, also called intellectual decision by James. For the sake of clearness we must ask further: What distinguishes these two kinds of decisions, the theoretical and passional? The only answer to be derived from James's explicit statements is that the former type of decision consists in judging according to 'objective evidence,' which is at times called 'coercive evidence,' whereas the passional decision is a decision without objective evidence: it is a decision to act on an uncertain fact for the sake of the end to which the action may lead. If, then, the theoretical judgment is a decision based on objective evidence, is the problematic judgment of a theoretical or a passional nature? What, in short, is the problematic judgment in essence?

Sigwart, as is known, casts the problematic judgment out of the family of true judgments, because it lacks the consciousness of objective validity.<sup>2</sup> He formulates the problematic judgment to read: *A* may be *B*, in the sense of *A* is perhaps *B*. As this judgment is an

<sup>1</sup> In Chapter II., where the relation of knowledge and faith was treated, there was no occasion to consider this special argument. There we could assume that having proved that James did not establish a relation between knowledge and faith capable of conferring certainty upon faith, his particular argument in regard to the problematic judgment was thereby invalidated. As this may not on the face of it be entirely convincing, the following discussion may be considered supplementary to the critique of that chapter.

<sup>2</sup> Sigwart, 'Logik,' Vol. I., p. 229 ff., Freiburg, 1889.

expression of uncertainty regarding *A*, the proposition, if conceived as a judgment about *A* (as it is conceived in the formulation), is not a decision, but a renunciation of decision. If, then, every judgment is an affirmation or denial of a question, a proposition which neither affirms or denies anything can not be a judgment. "To leave a question undecided is no sort of decision, and to be uncertain is no degree of certainty; and in spite of the law of contradiction, the two propositions, *A* is perhaps *B*, and *A* is perhaps not *B*, would be valid at the same time." ("Es ist keine Art der Entscheidung, die Frage unentschieden zu lassen, und keine Stufe der Gewissheit, ungewiss zu sein, und dem Gesetz des Widerspruchs zum Trotz wären: *A* ist vielleicht *B*, und *A* ist vielleicht nicht *B*, zugleich gültig.") Sigwart admits, nevertheless, that the problematic judgment contains at least one real assertion, namely, this: The hypothesis *A* is *B* is uncertain. As this assertion leads to no judgment concerning *A* that could be coordinated with a positive and negative judgment, it must be considered a subjective attitude, having indeed a certain validity for knowledge in general, but not for knowledge about *A*. "So long as this is not the case, the hypothesis remains an undecided problem, and it but confuses us if we subsume the expression of subjective uncertainty and the expression of certainty of the objective validity of a proposition under one and the same concept." ("So lange das nicht der Fall ist, bleibt die Hypothese als unentschiedenes Problem stehen, und es kann nur verwirren, wenn man den Ausdruck der subjektiven Ungewissheit und den Ausdruck der Gewissheit der objektiven Gültigkeit eines Satzes unter denselben Begriff des Urteils subsumiert.")

In the greatest possible contrast to Sigwart's point of view stands that of Windelband, who regards the problematic judgment not only as a judgment *überhaupt*, but as one to be coordinated with the positive and negative judgments. This point of view is based on an entirely different conception of the nature of the judgment itself. According to Windelband, the essence of judging does not lie in the fact that something is asserted about something, but rather in the supervening 'assent or dissent' to the combination of ideas already made or about to be made in the proposition '*A-B*' ('billigende und missbilligende *Beurteilung* der schon vollzogenen oder erst zu vollziehenden Vorstellungsverbindung *A-B*.') This mere combination of ideas expressed in what James calls the hypothesis, is called by Windelband the 'theoretical judgment'; and the real judgment is said to be a judgment about a judgment, about the truth-value of a judgment ('die *Beurteilung* eines

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 234.



Urteils').<sup>1</sup> But this judgment is a practical attitude; if, for instance, it be a negative judgment, it is 'the expression not merely of a combination of ideas, but of the dissenting attitude of the mind to an attempt at such a combination.' As soon as 'an assertion in regard to the truth-value of an idea or combination of ideas' is considered the essence of judgment, the coordination of negative and affirmative judgments and the classification of judgments according to quality are demanded.<sup>2</sup> Inasmuch as judgment so conceived is a feeling of conviction or certainty, it admits of a gradation in regard to intensity. If one imagines the different grades of probability schematized along a line, the two ends would represent perfect certainty; at one end affirmation, at the other denial; and these two through gradual toning down would approach a point of indifference where neither affirmation nor denial would exist. This point of total indifference is represented by the question, because it is a mere complex of ideas or hypothesis without any decision as to its truth value. On the other hand, the problematic judgment is defined as 'critical indifference,' because here upon reflection the knowledge has been gained that there is no evidence for the affirmation nor for the denial of the hypothesis. The condition of uncertainty, then, finds its expression in the problematic judgment. "The proposition, *A* may be *B*, which confessedly is valid simultaneously with the other proposition, *A* can not be *B*, is a truly problematic judgment only when it means that nothing shall be asserted concerning the validity of the proposition, *A-B*." ("Der Satz *A* kann *B* sein, welcher bekanntlich mit dem andern Satze *A* kann nicht *B* sein, zugleich gilt, ist nur dann ein wirklich problematisches Urteil, wenn er bedeutet, dass über die Geltung der Vorstellungsverbindung *A-B* nichts ausgesagt werden soll.") The problematic judgment is, therefore, an explicit *suspension* of judgment, but differs from the 'question' in that it 'results from a knowledge of the insufficiency of the evidence for and against, wherefore it is a real act of knowledge.' ("Aus einer Einsicht in die Unzulänglichkeit der bisherigen (oder auch überhaupt möglichen) Gründe pro et contra hervorgeht und deshalb ein wirklicher Akt der Erkenntnis ist.") This self-conscious attitude, this renunciation of affirmation or negation, is an 'independent decision concerning the attitude which the judging

<sup>1</sup> I know of no adequate way in which to give the distinction between *Beurteilung* and *Urteil* at the basis of this theory, in English words; henceforth I shall reserve the term judgment for *Beurteilung* and translate *Urteil* by proposition, object or hypothesis. This theory of Windelband's is to be found in his 'Beiträge zur Lehre vom negativen Urteil,' *Strassburger Abhandlungen zur Philosophie*, S. 170, Freiburg und Tübingen, 1884.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 186 ff.

subject adopts toward the combination of ideas presented by the question, and the problematic judgment must, therefore, in a classification according to quality, be coordinated with the affirmative and negative judgment.' ("Eine selbständige Entscheidung der Stellung welche der Urteilende zu der in der Frage vollzogenen Vorstellungsverbindung einnimmt, und das problematische Urteil ist in der Einteilung nach der Qualität dem affirmativen und dem negativen Urteil zu koordinieren.")<sup>1</sup>

In view of the diametrically opposed nature of these two theories of the problematic judgment, it is a significant fact that they agree in several essential points. In the first place, both logicians formulate the problematic judgment similarly, namely, as *A* may be *B*; which Sigwart supplements by adding, 'in the sense that *A* perhaps is *B*.' Both deny that this proposition asserts anything about the truth of the hypothesis *A-B*. Finally, both Sigwart and Windelband hold that the problematic judgment is an act of knowledge in that it contains a real assertion and makes a real statement. According to Sigwart's formulation, the assertion it makes is this: the hypothesis '*A* is *B*' is uncertain; while according to Windelband, the proposition '*A* can be *B*' is a truly problematic judgment only if it means 'concerning the validity of the proposition *A-B* nothing can be said.'

At first blush it would seem probable, in view of this agreement, to attribute the conflicting nature of the results arrived at by the two thinkers to the fundamental difference of their respective conceptions of the act of judgment itself. But on a closer inspection it will be seen that this explanation is not justifiable; the truth is that in both cases the results reached concerning the problematic judgment are due to a confusion of thought.

To discuss Sigwart first, then: In his case it is not quite clear what subject a proposition must assert something of in order to be a true judgment, whether about *A*—the subject of the proposition—or about the validity of the total proposition—the synthesis *A-B*—obviously two entirely different 'objects' of judgment. If the problematic judgment must be a judgment about *A*, then, as it says '*A* is perhaps *B*' and thus asserts nothing claiming to be true about *A*, it certainly can not be a judgment proper. If this view of the matter be held, namely, that the problematic judgment is no act of knowledge, we are logically bound to banish the so-called problematic judgment from the domain of logic. Just this conclusion, however, leads us to reconsider the premises. For, in the first place, no one will be inclined seriously to support the view that the problematic

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 189 ff.

judgment contains no real assertion, and then again, this view is in opposition to Sigwart's own words. For, as we saw, he admits that the problematic judgment expresses a real assertion in that it affirms the impossibility of reaching a decision; and he adds that 'this knowledge has its value.' It appears, then, that unless we are ready to deny this, we must drop the theory which holds the problematic judgment to be an assertion concerning  $A$ , in the sense of stating ' $A$  is perhaps  $B$ , or is perhaps not  $B$ .' Considered an act of knowledge, the real assertion it makes should read, according to Sigwart: The hypothesis  $A-B$  is uncertain. But this assertion is said to refer only to the speaker's attitude toward the hypothesis, or at most to the general subjective attitude toward it; the hypothesis itself remains an undecided problem, Sigwart claims, and 'it can but confuse us if we subsume the expression of subjective uncertainty and the expression of the certainty of the objective validity of a proposition under the same concept.' These last words, now, seem to contain the other conception of the judgment, to which we drew attention above. It appears here that a judgment is no longer to be considered an assertion about  $A$  (the subject of the proposition), but rather an assertion about the validity of the proposition as a whole. The conclusion is then drawn that as the problematic judgment asserts nothing about the validity of the proposition  $A-B$ , but lets it stand as a problem, it is no real judgment, only an assertion of subjective uncertainty. But it is perfectly obvious that just on the assumption that a judgment is an assertion about the validity of the proposition as a whole, the problematic judgment is a true judgment, for in Sigwart's own formulation it asserts: the proposition 'The hypothesis  $A-B$  is uncertain' is objectively valid.

Sigwart's conclusion is fallacious, because it is based on the tacit assumption that the proposition or object concerning whose validity the problematic judgment attempts to assert something, is the proposition  $A-B$ , whereas even according to his own formulation this is not the case. If once we realize this, the conception of the problematic judgment as an expression of subjective uncertainty falls to the ground. The mind is not uncertain concerning its attitude toward the object of the problematic judgment, the proposition, namely, 'The hypothesis  $A-B$  is uncertain'; if so, the problematic judgment would read, 'I am uncertain whether  $A-B$  is uncertain,' which is absurd; the mind is uncertain only in regard to the subject of the proposition which it is to judge—the formal  $A$ .<sup>1</sup> As we

<sup>1</sup> The formal  $A$ , the subject of the proposition, is in the case of the problematic judgment the hypothesis  $A-B$ . Therefore the problematic judgment would indeed be no judgment if its function were to predicate something about the subject of the proposition.

have dropped the conception of the judgment as an assertion about the subject of the proposition, this fact is of no importance. We see, then, that just on the assumption that a judgment is a decision on the validity of the proposition as a whole, the problematic judgment is a real judgment, claiming to contain certain knowledge. Its object, the proposition concerning whose validity it decides, is, however, not  $A-B$ , but, in Sigwart's formulation, ' $A-B$  is uncertain.' Only then is it comprehensible how Sigwart could ascribe validity as knowledge to it.

In Windelband's case the facts lie differently, but his conception, too, of the problematic judgment is not unequivocal. Like Sigwart, he first formulates the problematic judgment in the proposition ' $A$  may be  $B$ ,' and from a foot-note in his '*Beiträge zur Lehre vom negativen Urteil*'<sup>1</sup> it is clear that he, too, understands this to mean ' $A$  is perhaps  $B$ .' In the light of his standpoint, from which a real judgment is a judgment of the validity of the combination of ideas represented in the question or the hypothesis, we must reject this formulation as inconsistent and inadmissible. Windelband himself appears to have felt this when he adds that the formulation given above must mean that nothing can be asserted concerning the validity of  $A-B$ ; in other words, that the problematic judgment is an expression of the suspension of judgment. At the same time he holds the problematic judgment to be a real act of knowledge in that it expresses the insufficiency of the reasons *pro* and *contra* a decision about the hypothesis. The more surprising, therefore, that he has not formulated the problematic judgment accordingly. The reason doubtless lies in the fact that, in spite of holding the problematic judgment to be an assertion of the impossibility of judging the hypothesis  $A-B$ , Windelband coordinates it with the positive and negative judgments, which obviously would be justifiable only on the supposition that the three forms of judgments judge one and the same object or hypothesis, which, however, is not the case, as will be shown.

Affirmative as well as negative judgments are, according to Windelband, judgments in the sense of decisions concerning the validity (truth value) or invalidity of the ideas as they are combined in the proposition. Judgment is the attitude which the mind takes toward a proposition as a whole.<sup>2</sup> The problematic judgment, on the contrary, is, according to Windelband, a decision concerning the

<sup>1</sup> P. 189, foot-note 3.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. '*Præludien*,' p. 29 ff. Here we are told also: The pure theoretical judgment is really given in the so-called problematic judgment, which expresses a certain combination of ideas without pronouncing upon its truth. As this formulation is contradictory to all Windelband's other definitions and expositions, we may regard it as a transitory opinion only.

*attitude itself*, that the mind takes toward the validity of the proposition. It is, therefore, a judgment about a judgment; the problematic judgment judges, not the validity of the proposition, but the validity of the decision itself.

We come to the conclusion, then, that the problematic judgment is an act of knowledge and therefore must necessarily be considered a judgment claiming to assert something. It follows, that it is neither an expression of subjective uncertainty, as Sigwart inclines to think, nor, on the other hand, a judgment about the validity of  $A-B$ , as Windelband appears to believe. In accordance with Sigwart's general standpoint, it must be conceived as an assertion of the uncertainty of the hypothesis  $A-B$ , and accompanied by the conviction of objective certitude or validity. According to Windelband's general standpoint, it is an affirmative attitude toward the proposition 'There are no sufficient reasons for decision in regard to the validity of  $A-B$ .'<sup>1</sup>

If we turn to account the insight we have gained into the nature of the problematic judgment for our answer to the question which was raised by James's assertion that the problematic judgment is a passional decision, while the theoretical judgment is based on objective evidence, we are now in a position to reply: The problematic judgment is an assertion claiming to be true. It can be formulated as an affirmative judgment, and in point of form, if not in point of content, is of precisely the same nature as the latter. It is based on the same sort of objective evidence as are the affirmative and negative judgments, the evidence referring, of course, to the objects of the judgments; the object of the problematic judgment differing, to be sure, from the objects of the original affirmative and negative judgments. The judgment 'There are insufficient reasons for a decision concerning  $A-B$ ,' or, in James's logical terminology, 'There

<sup>1</sup>This analysis throws a peculiar light on Lipps's remarks about the problematic judgment. ('Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens,' p. 396.) He here defines the judgment as an assertion of objective reality or validity. "Propositions expressing mere possibility, such as ' $S$  may be  $P$ ,' may now, he says, be cited as evidence to the contrary." "But," he continues, "all propositions are not judgments. The one above (' $S$  may be  $P$ ') may intend to express the positive renunciation of judgment. Or it may mean to say that there are reasons for the decision ' $S$  is  $P$ ,' but the reasons are not sufficient to permit a *certain* judgment. In this latter case the proposition is an assertion of a consciousness of reality, but of an *uncertain* consciousness of reality." (1) ("Aber wiederum sind Sätze kein Urteil. Jener Satz kann die ausdrückliche Verzichtleistung auf ein Urteil bekunden wollen. Er kann aber auch sagen wollen, es seien zum Urteil  $A$  ist  $B$  Gründe vorhanden, die Gründe genügten aber nicht, um das Urteil mit Sicherheit zu fällen. Dann ist der Satz Ausdruck eines Wirklichkeitsbewusstseins, nur eines unsicheren.")

is no objective evidence for a decision concerning *A-B*,<sup>1</sup> is based on a knowledge of the conditions expressed in the judgment—that is, on objective evidence—in precisely the same way as the judgment '*A is B*' or '*That A is B is false*.' The problematic judgment is not, therefore, a decision dictated by volition and feeling, but in James's sense is a true theoretical judgment.

James could misunderstand these simple facts and believe the problematic judgment to be a passional decision because he confused the problematic judgment with what he calls the skeptical judgment, which according to him may be paraphrased: We should not decide when there is no objective evidence, for a theoretical decision alone is justified. Only if the problematic judgment be so conceived can we understand what James means when he calls the problematic judgment '*a decision in favor of skepticism*,' but as we now know that the problematic judgment asserts nothing concerning the relative justification of the theoretical and practical attitudes, we know that it can express no comparison at all, but is merely an assertion of the non-existence of objective evidence for the decision of a given opinion. By implication this is an assertion of the incapacity of the mind to pronounce a theoretical decision on this option and gives rise to the attitude of leaving the question open. But a decision that the theoretical judgment based on evidence is the only justifiable form of judgment, is a further statement, with which the problematic judgment itself is not concerned.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The burden of truth that an option should not be treated as an open question when it has been established that there is no evidence for deciding it, but should be settled by a passional affirmation or denial, is thus thrown on him who contests the propriety of pronouncing theoretical judgments only. This defense of the problematic judgment, if successful, also lays bare the inaccuracy of the term '*forced option*.' There are no forced options within the sphere of thought as there are within the sphere of action. If thinking is inquiry and does not result in conclusions—in '*yes*' or '*no*'—there is always the possibility of doubting, that is, of continuing to inquire. In James's example, '*accept this truth or go without it*,' this state of affairs is obscured by the illicit use of the word '*truth*,' for as soon as a statement evidences itself as a truth it becomes unnecessary to urge it on any one, and there is then but *one* alternative for the judge who wants the truth. If we change the word truth to '*statement*,' which it stands for, the third possible attitude immediately discloses itself; accept, or go without the implications of the statement, or inquire further into the statement, in order to determine its truth. The problematic judgment is the judgment which states that further evidence is necessary in order to determine the truth. The assumption upon which the validity of this argument bases, is, of course, the '*will for truth*' in him who judges, and not the will for action; thus in cases where belief or judgment is said to create its own reality and thus its own validity, the nature of the decision is immaterial from the logical point of view, as any decision whatsoever verifies itself.

A passional decision in favor of the religious hypothesis can then no longer be defended on the grounds that even if we suspend negative or affirmative judgment, we are pronouncing a passional decision and running as much risk of losing the truth. If James wishes to prove that free or passional affirmation has the same justification as the problematic attitude, he must first prove that free, passional or practical affirmation has the same validity for knowledge as the judgment based on objective or coercive evidence. That he has failed to prove this, the preceding chapters of our critique have tried to show.

In connection with the narrower problem with which we are dealing, namely, the justification of the assumption of the freedom of will and belief, these facts point to the following conclusions: The justification of freedom which is based on the fact that because we can come to no theoretical decision about freedom we must in any case—even if we decide to suspend judgment—judge passional, falls to the ground. Some other justification for a passional decision in the question of freedom is called for.

A second argument for the justification of the belief in freedom, similar to if not identical with that used in the defense of religious belief,<sup>1</sup> is contained in James's assertion that freedom, if a fact, could never be known as such if it were not freely adopted or believed. The significant point here is that both arguments are based on the theory that belief is free; for does James not say: You are justified in believing in 'free' belief for a number of reasons. First of all, you may 'freely' choose to believe—though not intellectually coerced—because you can not come to a theoretical decision. Secondly, you may choose to believe 'freely' because you are logically forced to 'freely' adopt this belief, if you wish to know whether you can 'freely' adopt beliefs. In other words, believe 'freely' if you wish to know whether you can believe 'freely.'

We have before us a circle which vitiates the entire argument we have been considering. For freedom of will and of belief can, according to this circular theory, be assumed or believed only if one can freely choose to believe: the very point in question. If, with James, we are to hold will and belief to be the same mental attitude, his justification of freedom reads: You are free, because you may freely choose to be free. The proof of freedom is, in James's own words, dependent on a 'free' passional decision for freedom: freedom is its own supposition, and accordingly has itself for a condition of

<sup>1</sup> Because here belief is a factor necessary to the *cognition* of freedom, whereas in the case of the religious hypothesis belief was necessary to its reality.

its existence. The real question, 'Am I really free from the beginning; can I freely choose to believe in freedom?' James answers by saying, 'Freedom's first deed should be to affirm itself.' He herewith uses an argument which has as much validity as the one a man might employ in defending determinism by saying, 'You are predetermined to doubt or deny determinism, therefore determinism is a universal fact.' In both cases the question is evaded by being tacitly presupposed.<sup>1</sup>

The fundamental error of this whole train of thought seems to lie in the fact that James has established no real relation between the concepts of psychology, science in general, epistemology in particular, and the living reality as it is given in pure experience. For to him the belief in freedom and religion is, after all, negatively dependent on the existence of scientific proof; only if science does not reject an hypothesis is its passionate affirmation justified. And, again, postulates can be freely believed, realized and made true, only by means of action, and so the whole process is transferred from the sphere of knowledge into that of life.

Our final results may be summed up: Free belief or the will to believe, which was to serve as the foundation of the defense of religious faith from two points of view, first, in that all knowledge was held to be free belief, and secondly, in that the religious hypothesis was said to be dependent upon a belief in it—this free belief has proved a concept which is not suited to serve as a foundation for either one of these assertions. Not only is the will to believe materially inadequate as a basis for James's defense of religious faith, but it has been found that from a formal point of view it transfers the argument used for the defense into a vicious circle, inasmuch as it is a postulate in need of the same proof as the postulate it is intended to support. In other words, it is its own presupposition.

<sup>1</sup> There is another tender spot in this argument for freedom, to which attention must be drawn. In the eyes of one who believes that something definite may well be theoretically stated about the problem of freedom, the whole argument falls to the ground. In asserting that 'the most a defender of freedom can do is to prove that the evidence for determinism is not coercive,' James admits that if the determinist can show determinism to be a scientifically grounded theory, he invalidates the argument for freedom.



## CONCLUSION

IN the introduction to this work we defined our task as a critique of James's doctrine calculated to lead to the evaluation of his work in its character as a contribution to the voluntaristic explanation of the world, and to a determination of his relation to the other representatives of this voluntaristic movement in philosophy.

The preceding critique has presented the essential points for an answer to these questions; the isolated points made there shall here be summarized and supplemented. The essential point we have tried to make in our criticism was the proof of James's absolute subjectivism. The individual aspects of this subjectivism we have become acquainted with in detail; we shall now consider how this subjectivism differentiates James's voluntarism from other forms of voluntarism, and how unfitted his doctrine is to contribute a scientific-philosophical explanation of the world.

Paulsen, as well as Miller, brings James into line with Kant and Fichte. Is this historical classification admissible? In Chapter III. we saw how Fichte, interpreting Kant, endeavored to bridge the chasm between knowledge and faith by demonstrating the primacy of the practical reason or the will even for the case of the truth-seeking and judging mind. The universal necessity and validity of knowledge were based on the universal necessity and validity of the practical will that manifests itself in the conscience. In James's case, too, knowledge was reduced to faith or free belief, but no principle of certitude was found for faith. In order to present this contrast more fully, it may be well to compare James's doctrine as a whole with those of contemporary philosophers in harmony with Fichte in all essential points. Sigwart, Windelband and Rickert are here to be considered.

Like Fichte, Rickert seeks to ground his voluntarism on the primacy of the practical will in the theoretical sphere. He tries to prove that the recognition of one's obligation toward the truth-value and subordination under it, is the logical presupposition of all judgment and, therefore, of all knowledge.<sup>1</sup> From this point of view it follows that logical thought in general is based on a will for truth and that the logical presuppositions of science in particular are valid because they are 'universally and necessarily willed.' Now these latter views are defended by James as well. But we know that

<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 65 ff.

James conceives the postulates of natural science and of scientific thought in general to be 'freely' adopted—that is, voluntarily chosen—postulates, which the individual can and may reject, and which, because unproved, have no 'coercive' certitude. If we remember that, according to James, the lawfulness of nature, nay, even truth itself and our power to possess truth, are all postulates in the sense above, the absolute subjectivism of his standpoint fully manifests itself. That Rickert does not hold the presuppositions of science to be dependent on volitional choice and arbitrary passion decisions of the individual, must be clear from the sketch of his standpoint given above. His fundamental thought was the theory that the proof of the priority of the practical element in the sphere of knowledge might and must confer *objectivity* on knowledge. From the same source the presuppositions of science gain objectivity: they are valid because they are the inevitable means to the end and aim of science; and the will for science, again, is objective, because it is 'a necessary recognition of absolutely valid over-empirical values'; science itself being the most perfect substitute for that perceptive knowledge of the world ever beyond the reach of the finite mind.

This is not the place to enter into Rickert's doctrine in detail.<sup>1</sup> Our only purpose was to point out the difference between his and James's conception of the 'over-empirical' and undemonstrable presuppositions of natural science. For James they are assumptions which the individual may adopt or reject, as appears proper to his practical rationality feeling; Rickert, on the other hand, seeks to give a teleological foundation for the objectivity of the laws of nature, which 'shall make the validity of these laws independent of any merely arbitrary recognition, to which the consistent empiricist must confine himself.' His foundation "leaves untouched the convictions of empirical science, but reinterprets the epistemological conception of scientific activity in such a manner as to transform the concepts of a reality totally divorced from the cognizing subject, into the concept of a recognition of an over-individual value necessary for every cognizing subject. In short, it is not a 'reality,' but a sense of 'obligation,' which must direct knowledge, and which forms the objective of the knowledge of natural law as it does of all knowledge."<sup>2</sup> So much for James's subjectivism in his conception of natural science.

<sup>1</sup> I can not enter into this theory more fully. It is both too profound and too intricate to permit of more than a suggestion in so brief a notice. See 'Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung,' S. 673; especially Chapter V., Parts 4 and 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 681.

As for James's apparent agreement with Sigwart, this appearance, too, rests on a misunderstanding. Sigwart defines logical thought, in contrast to voluntary thought, as a process which has for its end and aim necessary and valid knowledge, and for its motive and basis the will for truth. Truth is recognized as the aim of thought, when thought proceeds in a logical manner; that is, when we judge. But that nothing is more remote from Sigwart's intentions than the assertion that the individual may choose whether or not there shall be truth, is definitely proved by his denial of any relation between truth and the practical volitions of individuals, which is made in the following words: "Truth and falsehood are as independent of our feeling and of our will as are beauty and goodness."<sup>1</sup> Moreover, Sigwart conceives judgment to apply to the validity of a proposition and yet to be a theoretical and not a practical attitude, and this implies, of course, that he regards truth as a relation between the mind and the object, which is not *established* by the former, but only *confirmed* by it. "We reject error because it is false; it is not false because we reject it; the theoretical insight into the truth or falsity of a proposition precedes and gives rise to the feeling, just as the recognition of the purposiveness of a judgment must precede its choice."<sup>2</sup> If Sigwart then does not acknowledge that judgment, though directed by the recognition of truth, contains a practical element, he can hardly be understood to regard the recognition of truth itself as a decision of the will. On the contrary, his will for truth is a will to know the truth, and has no similitude with James's will to believe that there is a truth.

Accordingly, James's will for truth is nearer to the conceptions of Windelband and Rickert, who hold that knowledge presupposes truth as an absolute value, and that the practical will posits values, or evaluates; in short, they hold truth as a value to be dependent on the will. As was shown, the difference between their standpoint and that of James lies in that, for them, the practical evaluating will is the over-individual will because the truth value is necessary and valid for theoretical activity. In James's case, on the contrary, the will which chooses to recognize truth and rationality is the individual will, and the choice is nothing less than inevitable and necessary.

Here, in fine, we reach the very kernel of James's doctrine. In

<sup>1</sup> 'Logik,' Vol. I., foot-note to p. 154.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 159. It must be admitted that the point of view here developed, with a view to combating Windelband's conception of judgment as a practical attitude, is difficult to harmonize with that expressed by Sigwart in 'Logik,' Vol. II., Introduction.

his essay 'The Will to Believe' he tells us that he considers himself an empiricist for the reason that, although he decides in favor of the postulates that 'there is truth, and that it is the destiny of our minds to attain it,' he rejects the absolutist view that we can *know when* we have attained to knowing truth. "To *know* is one thing, and to know for certain *that* we know is another." Objective evidence and certitude are fine ideals, but where on this "moonlit and dream-visited planet are they found?" There is but one certain fact, and it is the fact that the present phenomena of consciousness exist; but this is not knowledge, only its starting-point.

Before saying the final word in evaluation of this standpoint, light must be thrown on a certain unclearness in its formulation. In what does the distinction consist which James draws between the skeptic who denies truth itself, as well as man's power to attain it, and the empiricist who holds to the existence of truth and our power to attain it, but denies that we can ever know when we have attained it? Is there a real distinction between these two standpoints? Are the three judgments here expressed, the one concerning the existence of truth, the second concerning the knowledge of truth, and the third concerning our knowledge of the knowledge of truth—are these three judgments logically distinct?

Given certain conditions, a logical distinction of this sort can, indeed, be carried out, and when we have determined the nature of these conditions, we need only to determine whether the conception of truth fulfills these conditions in order to test the distinction made by James. It is conceivable, for instance, that on the supposition that our ideas copy and represent an independent world of things, three attitudes toward this world might be assumed and the three judgments in question passed. First, we might simply affirm the world, and either say nothing of our power to know it, or else deny it. (This is approximately the thing-in-itself standpoint.) In the second place, we might believe that our ideas actually represented or reproduced this world: that we are capable of knowing it. In the third place, it is conceivable that one might take the standpoint that, although a portion of our ideas represented the independent world, we could never tell with certainty, never really know, which ideas did so. But it must be evident that for this conceptual differentiation we needed to posit an objective world of things completely independent of thought. Only under these conditions could the object of knowledge exist without being known or knowable, and only so can it be potentially knowable without being actually known.

As soon as we realize, however, that 'truth,' no matter how it be

thought of, can never be conceived as something independent of knowledge, but on the contrary has meaning only in connection with knowledge, it becomes clear that the conditions under which the three attitudes toward the knowledge of the thing were possible, are not fulfilled. The three standpoints distinguished resolve themselves into two, as may be shown by the example used above.

If, as in standpoint one, I admit that there is reality, but suspend judgment concerning my ability to know it, and if by truth I understand that thought which corresponds with reality—then obviously I have declined to judge whether truth exists. As soon as I adopt the second attitude, however, and hold that we are able to attain to a knowledge of reality, I hold and recognize the possibility of truth: I hold that truth exists. The so-called third judgment, that although reality is known (truth exists), I can never know when I know, can mean nothing else in regard to truth than that I can never attain it. No other attitude is possible toward the existence of truth, as soon as we realize that truth is not an independent reality, but a quality of our judgments, of knowledge. Truth can refer only to judgments, and to concepts so far as they are the results of judgments; those which are universally valid are true. If we hold, then, that there is truth, we can mean nothing else than that there are judgments of universal validity; if we go farther and assert that we are able to attain to truth, we assert that we are able to cast valid judgments. The further modification, that we can never know whether we have attained truth, is simply nonsensical, for I can not assert that although I pass judgments of universal validity I do not know whether they have universal validity. Judgments do not affirm a special truth, but, in conforming to certain conditions, they themselves are true. If, then, James denies that we are able to pass absolutely valid and certain judgments, his standpoint is identical with that of a skeptic who denies our ability to attain to truth, and it needs no other refutation than skepticism receives.<sup>1</sup>

If we ask ourselves why James's voluntarism threw him into the quagmire of extreme subjectivism, the answer is that it lies in the peculiar foundation he gives to his voluntarism. In Chapter III. we presented Paulsen's relation to James at length; we wish to call attention to two points made there. It was shown how Paulsen declared himself in agreement with Kant, inasmuch as he, too, held religious faith to be valid because necessary to guarantee success to the will for good. This doctrine was shown to be rooted in a dualistic or two-world standpoint: religious faith as valid from the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. above, p. 48.

point of view of action only, and knowledge from the point of view of thought. From this practical imperative as a point of departure, Fichte's doctrine set in, proclaiming the imperative obligatory for theoretical activity as well, and it is this standpoint which is receiving further development in that branch of voluntarism represented by Windelband, Rickert and others. But Paulsen, too, was not satisfied with the form the original Kantian standpoint took, and suggested, as we know, its completion, or restoration, rather, in the form of a substructure for the primacy of the practical will; this substructure to be gained from biological and psychological material. We saw how he then suggested one or two special theories which might be utilized for this purpose, and we saw further that what Paulsen suggested, James carried out.

The utilization of natural science, and especially of psychological theories, is, then, characteristic of James's foundation of voluntarism. The system constructed on such a foundation was bound to become a voluntaristic psychology, which, when expanded into a *Weltanschauung*, led inevitably to subjectivism, and through it, implicitly, at least, to skepticism.

Concerning this voluntaristic psychology itself, a few words may be added. Our critique has made it sufficiently clear that James's theory of belief is full of incompatibilities and contradictions, and that it could not be held to have established the identification of will and belief. This, however, is in itself no proof against the principle or conception of a voluntaristic psychology. Nevertheless a voluntaristic psychology, attempting to reduce all psychical processes and states to processes and states of will—conceived as active spontaneity—may very well be held to be fallacious in principle. It depends, to be sure, on one's conception of psychology as a science. According to Miller's view of the matter, James's merit lies precisely in the fact that he represents modern psychology, which no longer describes the 'laws and elements of the mind . . . in chill, mechanical terms, from which the vital heat of conscious life has long escaped.' In James he sees the genial mind, able to give life and warmth to psychological work, and endowed with a special sense for the 'differential, unique, irreducible.' "Here is the very romanticist in psychology," says Miller, "keen to trace the scarlet thread in the tissue of things, his back turned upon the theories that seem to make of mind a mere passive flow and association of lifeless ideas—the pallid theories of the eighteenth century. Here is the predestined interpreter of the rich variety, the 'warmth and intimacy' of consciousness. . . . In the hands of this author,

## CONCLUSION

psychology becomes in no mocking or unmeaning sense the science of the soul."<sup>1</sup>

No one even superficially acquainted with James's work will incline to think that Miller has exaggerated James's genius for grasping and interpreting the active life of the soul. On these points, and also on that of the literary quality of his presentation, no over-estimation is possible. And yet one may very well doubt whether an interpretation and description of the real experience of the soul be the task of psychology. Indeed, if one conceives the essential purpose of science to be the transformation of reality as it is given in immediate experience in the interest of its simplification and causal explanation, and if one conceives psychology to be a science, it is not easy to see how anything of scientific value can be reached by a genius for grasping and describing the 'differential, unique and irreducible' in consciousness. It is precisely the relating of the differential, the classification of the unique and the reduction of the irreducible which constitute the end and aim of science. Certainly, the scientific transformation of experience has for its pre-supposition the mastery of its material, in our case the experience of the soul. That James is a master in this field, and a master in communicating to others his own broad point of view, every student of psychology will gratefully acknowledge.

A last word in evaluating the presented and criticized doctrine: As an appeal to the individual as a moral being, this doctrine is surely of importance. In a certain sense it claims to be a sermon, and as a sermon, owing to its fullness of suggestion and of wisdom, it is of irresistible charm. But we set ourselves not the task of writing an appreciation of its qualities as a personal *argumentum ad populum*, but rather that of examining whether the intellect could accept this defense of religious faith. In other words, our task was to pass judgment concerning the *truth* of James's defense of religion.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the essay cited above.

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
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
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**RELIGIOUS VALUES**  
**AND**  
**INTELLECTUAL CONSISTENCY**

**BY**  
**EDWARD HARTMAN REISNER**

Submitted in Partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree  
of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Philosophy  
Columbia University

**ARCHIVES OF PHILOSOPHY**  
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


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
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## OUTLINE

	PAGE
CHAPTER I. Religious Values and Intellectual Consistency.	1
CHAPTER II. The Origin, and the Disintegration of the Intellectual Setting, of Classical Christianity	5
1. The Growth of the Dogma. <i>Revelation</i>	5
2. The Disintegration of the Intellectual Setting of Classical Christianity .....	8
CHAPTER III. Modern Values and the Religion of Idealism..	15
1. Fichte .....	16
2. Hegel .....	17
3. Royce .....	27
CHAPTER IV. A Descriptive Study of Religious Experience and the God-concept .....	39
1. Religion below the Plane of the God-concept	40
2. The Various Theisms .....	42
3. A Religion Compatible with Modern Science	48
4. Practical Conclusions .....	59



# RELIGIOUS VALUES AND INTELLECTUAL CONSISTENCY

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## CHAPTER I

### RELIGIOUS VALUES AND INTELLECTUAL CONSISTENCY

WE are taught by modern psychology that emotion is secondary to physical changes taking place in the subject. These physical changes are directly dependent upon the presence of objects or ideas to which the subject ascribes value in an immediate judgment. The emotion of fear, for example, follows on the perception of an object or the having of an idea that points to disturbed or destroyed values, as the loss of life or limb, friend or fortune. The emotion of joy arises in the presence of an object of desire and accompanies the presence and the continuance of welfare. And so on we might run through the list of emotions and find that in every case there is an original perception of value in connection with an object or an idea.

No less do emotions call for a certain consistency of objective experience. The play that can not present a convincing case is called melodrama. The expressions of esteem that are ill-founded and casual are called "gush." The religion that arouses a high pitch of feeling on ill-defined and vague grounds is condemned as being "hysterical" by one who demands an adequate reason for the enthusiasm.

Whatever else it may be, religion is an emotional attitude toward the whole of one's experience. As such, it turns upon judgments of value and demands a certain amount of intellectual consistency.

To illustrate the need of intellectual consistency, Augustine refused the proffered solace of Christianity until he came to interpret the grand appeal in terms of Platonic thought. Locke, too, had to qualify his acceptance of the Christian faith to the extent of relieving it of its unbelievable materials through positing human reason as superior to revelation. Likewise, a man imbued with the spirit of modern science must modify his acceptance of the Christian tradition to an extent that is often considered fatal to the spirit of that faith.

We must remember, however, that intellectual consistency in

religious experience is only a relative matter, as it is in business, politics, or literary composition. What will constitute consistency for any one depends upon his type of mind and the depth of his interest. A man who may exact absolute consistency in the details of a building plan, will be blissfully careless in the details of a political argument. Another who must find consistency to the hundredth of one per cent. in the conditions of an international loan may accept very broad discrepancies in the particulars of a religious faith. A knowledge of science may well comport, if our knowledge of men tells us anything, with miracles and hell-fire. Accordingly, when we talk of the necessity for intellectual consistency in religious matters, the term is used in the relative sense of what may constitute consistency for any given individual.

For the overwhelming majority of those who are called by the name of Christians to-day, the classical statement of the faith suffices, and among them are those who are not to be accounted weak of understanding. As a case in point, the will of the late J. Pierpont Morgan begins with an unqualified statement of his acceptance of the classic dogma of the Church. It is a striking tribute to the simple majesty of the orthodox faith that a man of Mr. Morgan's gigantic intellectual powers found solace therein. And not only for the sake of this one tribute, but because of millions of lives that have drawn comfort and power from that message, we must acknowledge the fundamental appeal of the theistic world-plan. It is majestic in its simplicity, its beauty, and its practical logic, and amply justified in the works of many of its believers.

But we must recognize the fact that a different way of looking at the problems of existence causes some men of our time to regard classical Christianity as a stupendous and beautiful ruin. The facts they learn in the laboratory, or through a study of history, or from a pursuit of philosophy, demand a new intellectual setting for their religious experiences. At its best, they regard the Christian plan of sin and salvation as a remarkable poetic conception, worthy of admiration and never to be despised, but nevertheless unable to furnish the intellectual background for their free spiritual development; and at its worst, as a nest of logical inconsistencies, involving a barren saying of names and practise of forms and favoring maudlin and ineffective sentimentality.

Certainly many men of this latter type of intellectual temper are not less devoted in their lives, have no less a need for a total point of view from which their own individual significance may be evaluated, and probably have no less attained to such a point of view, than those of the former. Furthermore, they no less represent the

historical development of our Western religious tradition. The entire question of the significance of the intellectual background of the religious experience, accordingly, is for us a matter of acute concern, just as it has been for Christians generally during the best part of two thousand years.

But not only does religion demand a certain amount of intellectual consistency. [As an emotional attitude toward the whole of one's experience, it turns upon judgments of value. To be informed as to how thoroughly this is the case, one has only to turn the pages of any devotional book or to attend a church service. Continued life, here and hereafter, health of body and mind, material prosperity, the welfare of friends, ethical purity and the furtherance of God's kingdom on earth, are some of the most notable values with which men are concerned.]

Since religion is so largely concerned with values, it necessarily follows that it contains a large amount of contingency; for values are empirical in their origin. [To be sure, there is almost unanimous recognition of a certain group of values that are very closely related to the preservation of biological integrity. These values represent man's dependence on his physical environment. As the main conditions of life are everywhere the same, we find in our own devotions petitions that have made their appeal to mankind through all ages. On the other hand, there are values that are highly contingent. These occur in connection with the ethical life and vary with economic, political, and intellectual conditions. The ethical values that we discover in the experience of successive heroes of our religious history differ vastly from one another. Abraham, Moses, Samuel, Elijah, Amos, Deutero-Isaiah, Ezekiel, Jesus, Paul, Benedict, Luther, Fichte, to come no nearer the present day, may each be said to stand for a significant change in the valuation of conduct. Among them is a wide variation in regard to what is to be called good. Some of the values held to directly contradict and annul others. But all are parts of the same developing tradition, all are referred to God for his sanction, and each, in its time and place, expressed the current need.]

We wish, then, to recognize two facts [that the main concern of religion is with human values, and that the spontaneity and richness of the religious experience depend upon an intellectual consistency among the objects that carry those values. Furthermore, one who is acquainted with the history of Western religious thought must see that vast changes, both in values held to and in intellectual settings accepted as self-consistent, have occurred. During the entire process of evolution of our religion, a single concept, God, has done duty as

the guardian and sponsor of values;] and, what is more, this same concept has been the chief point of contention among those who have demanded readjustment of intellectual foundations. The preliminary situation that has developed indicates that a treatment of the God-concept, historical in spirit, gives large promise of throwing light upon its origin and meaning, and of furnishing us with a clue that will go far toward clearing up many of the difficulties of religious philosophy that are current and that have been recurrent ever since Greek philosophy threw its spell over the naturalistic faith of Jesus.



## CHAPTER II

### THE ORIGIN AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE INTELLECTUAL SETTING OF CLASSICAL CHRISTIANITY

#### 1. *The Growth of the Dogma*

CLASSICAL Christianity has been produced by the fusion of the religious experience of the Hebrews with the religious philosophy of the Greeks. The Hebrew tradition begins with Jehovah's call of Abram to leave his native land and with Abram's acceptance of Jehovah as the patron divinity of his house and tribe. The relationship between Jehovah and the tribe is strictly clannish, involves mutual obligations, and reflects the crude morality of nomadic life. At the time of Moses, the general relationship between Jehovah and the Hebrew people is little changed from that of the earlier period, but, if anything, Jehovah is more definitely recognized as the guide of his people, who have developed a more specialized conception of their tribal ties. The development within the tribe of a set of mores that is representative of a finer sense of reciprocal social obligations is reflected in the moral demands of the Jehovah of the Ten Commandments. The exigencies of a hard struggle to win a footing in the Land of Canaan, followed by a phenomenal national growth under Saul, David, and Solomon, developed to a high pitch the feeling of racial solidarity and of dependence upon, and love for, the God who had brought national success. But the period of national prosperity was followed by crushing vicissitudes that resulted both from internal dissension and from the aggressions of more powerful neighbors.

The kaleidoscopic changes that took place in the political fortunes of the Jews, since these changes were so closely bound up with the conception of Jehovah's guidance, led to searching consideration of such conduct as was consistent with the possession of his favor; and the final loss of political autonomy at the hands of the Babylonian Empire could lead to no other conclusion than that the sins of the people and their disregard of chastity, temperance, justice, charity, and humility were the causes of their destruction as a nation. God's chastisement of his people through the agency of foreign nations was only an indication of his universal influence; so the religious leaders of the Jews set up as their ideal of life just such a character as was believed to be desired by a universal God—accordingly, to be of

universal significance. The political ambitions of the Jews were modified by their great spiritual leaders, to the expectation of the establishment of God's kingdom in a world-wide order of peace and good-will.

The culmination of the Hebrew tradition occurs in Jesus's identification of himself with the expected messenger of this new order and in his preaching of the expected coming of the new kingdom. History has never told us and probably never will tell us just what relation Jesus conceived himself as bearing to the new kingdom, nor even just what that kingdom was to be and how and when it was to be established; for the generation of Jesus distinctly exhibits the influence of Greek thought on Hebrew religious tradition, and the rapid changes in the intellectual setting of the religious experience occurring at that time had their effect on the accounts of his life that we have from his disciples. This is true to the extent that it has been impossible to separate satisfactorily the beliefs and attitudes of those who handed down and formulated the Christian message from that message as it was delivered by the Master.

The main outlines of the Greek intellectual life with which the Hebrew religious tradition fused during the cosmopolitan period of the early Church may be summed up as follows: The inner essence of reality is eternal, rational, creative Unity. It is the uncaused cause of the phenomenal, changing world. It is the law and order of the universe and the principle of reasonable, virtuous conduct in men. These phases of Being were separately viewed, on the one hand, as God, the principle of inner unity, of unimpeachable perfection and of causation that was unaffected by its creative office; and, on the other hand, as the Logos, the begotten of God, the principle of natural law and of moral excellence in humankind.

The similarity in position, function, and meaning between the Jehovah of the later prophets and the God of Greek thought made easy the identification of the two forms. Paul, standing on Mars Hill in Athens, quotes the Hymn of the Stoic Cleanthes and claims that the Perfect Beings of the two racial traditions are one and the same. The peculiar position given Jesus by his disciples immediately after his death, namely, as the founder of the Kingdom of God and the only Son of the Father, made it easy to substitute his name and office for that of the Logos. And, finally, the kingdom of the redeemed, the Church, was composed of those whose lives had been touched by the purifying Spirit of God and transformed by its presence. Thus we have a point-for-point substitution within the Christian faith of the main elements in the Greek philosophy. God is pure being; Jesus and the Holy Spirit in the community are the Logos, viewed, firstly, as individual and, secondly, as common possession.

The practical results of this fusion were not slow to make themselves felt. When the Logos was identified with a person, a temporal succession was involved that extended back into history before that person and reached forward into all time to come. The Hebrew tradition, as pointing forward to Christ, is specialized as the embodiment of the Spirit before Christ came; and the Church, the Beloved Community, as Royce describes it, became the custodian of grace for future generations. This narrowing down of the field of operation of the Logos was not without its effect upon the definition of the virtuous life. Virtue became limited to the virtue acceptable within the Church, which had its ideals materially influenced by the accidents of persecution and outlawry and by the expectation of a speedy coming of an eschatological kingdom. The world and all the interests thereof, as untouched by the transforming influence of the spirit of the community, were depraved and lost. "For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world." A profound distrust and condemnation of all things biological and natural was the sharply defined attitude of the Christian community. All values were believed to be found within the realm of Grace and were believed to have been created through the redemptive office of Christ. Furthermore, the doctrine of an immortal life was a handy vehicle for the transposition of all interests to the heavenly kingdom, for which life on earth was to be regarded only as a preparation.

The detailed accommodation of the Hebrew and the Greek elements, while represented in the doctrines of the Church, is the work of the Middle Ages and occurs in its most thoroughgoing form in the work of Thomas Aquinas, the official philosopher of the Catholic Church at the present day. While recognizing a difference between the realms of natural reason and of faith, he subordinates the former to the latter and thus finds a place for the dogmas of the church that are not demonstrable by means of the natural reason. The conception of God, however, is for Thomas a strictly demonstrable fact, for there must be a first cause of the world, a final link in the otherwise unending chain of natural causation. In Aristotelian terms, Thomas thought of God as pure, immaterial form, as pure actuality, wholly free from potentiality, the efficient and final cause of the world. Other important scholastic proofs of the existence of God are the ontological and the teleological. The former passes from the conception of an absolutely perfect Being to the actual existence of that Being on the grounds that perfection must include actual existence. The latter concludes, from the presence of law and order and apparent design in the world, that there must be a great architect who

formed the world in its perfection. A more comprehensive statement of these proofs will be given later on in connection with Kant's criticism of their validity.

## *2. The Disintegration of the Intellectual Setting of Classical Christianity*

The foregoing description of the elements that came together to form classical Christianity is intended to present, in sufficiently detailed fashion for our purpose, the setting of the stupendous struggle in regard to both the intellectual elements of religion and the values concerned therein, that has been going on in Western Europe for the last two hundred years and the end of which is not yet. This conflict has often been described as being between Christianity and science, but it might better be spoken of as being between Greek metaphysics and modern empirical science. A second factor that enters into the situation is the development and the acceptance of a new set of values, which, however close they may be in the main to the values of classical Christianity, are quite independent of the traditional realm of grace and, in some particulars, directly opposed to the accepted values of the Church.

We must recognize the fact, however, that the reconstruction of the intellectual setting of religious values that is mentioned above has not taken place in the whole of society taken in cross-section, but only within a very limited part. Classical Christianity still survives in the Catholic Church without acknowledged change; and for the orthodox Protestant, which means practically every member of the sects of the present day, the intellectual setting of the religious life remains to all intents and purposes the same as it was in the flowering period of the Church. But there has taken place among certain elements of the intellectual class a change of attitude that is profound, and it is with the experiences of this portion of society that we shall be primarily concerned in the discussion to follow.

As was said above, the developing influence of modern empirical science has been responsible, more than any other agency, for the overthrow of the authoritative position of Greek metaphysics in our intellectual life and, consequently, for the discrediting of a creed representative of Greek thought. When men had only Hellenic philosophy to turn to, they found their way ordinarily to some sort of belief in the dogma; but when they gained independent intellectual interests that were in no sense related to the dogma, their allegiance to the doctrines of the Church was seriously disturbed.

The first notable influence of modern science on the Christian

faith came in connection with a criticism of the scientific conceptions of the Bible. The Copernican system of astronomy (1543), for example, ran counter to all the astronomical references of the sacred writings. With a new cosmological theory in vogue, proved by the highest sort of intellectual authority known to the times, a book that set forth an inconsistent and disproved theory necessarily lost prestige. Furthermore, the narratives of miraculous events, as given both in the Old and in the New Testaments, were distasteful to the newly-awakened scientific sense. When the claim of divine revelation stood opposed by these inconsistencies, the choice was between a retreat from the position gained by the progressive learning and the denial of the divine character of the Bible and its literal revelation. As it turned out, the explanation of the physical universe begun by the pioneers Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo and completed by Newton, was too convincing, too real, too authoritative, to allow the less strongly substantiated biblical conceptions to stand before it.

The disintegration of the classical intellectual setting of the Christian religion had thus begun in the attack upon the divinely inspired character of the Bible. So far the classical conception of God had not been disturbed except in so far as God had been considered as the inspirer of Holy Writ. The quarrel of science had so far been only with the book and the idea of revelation. In proof of this, Descartes's God is that of St. Anselm and he uses the same proofs of his existence. Locke uses the teleological proof to demonstrate the existence of the identical omniscient, eternal, omnipotent Being that his times accepted as a legacy from medieval thought. Leibnitz began his "Metaphysics" with the following: "The conception of God which is the most common and the most full of meaning is expressed well enough in the words,—God is an absolutely perfect Being." He did not criticize the concept on his own account, but accepted it *in toto* from tradition and common opinion. English Deism might reject the doctrine of the Trinity and deny the mediation of the Christ between an angry God and the sinner; but it retained its confidence in the power of reason, unaided by any miraculous means, to prove the existence of the single, all-wise, all-perfect Creator of the universe. Voltaire might rage against "*l'Infame*," proclaiming unceasingly against priestcraft and fanaticism, but he never denied God's existence. The God of the Enlightenment may be defined in the terms used in the Westminster Shorter Catechism, as "a spirit infinite, eternal and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth."

The beginning of the critical overthrow of the above conception of God occurred in Locke's statement about substance, namely, that

he had "no other idea of it at all except a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us."<sup>1</sup> Again he defines it as "nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine can not subsist without something to support them." Locke did not work out the implications of his definition, but used his position to defend his belief in spirits, and hence in the Absolute Spirit, on the ground that it was no harder to conceive the existence of a spirit than of a body.

The forcing in of the wedge planted by Locke, which takes place in the work of Berkeley and Hume, is known to all. Berkeley developed the position that matter is not an entity and that its existence is limited to the sensations that are referred to it for support. To be is to be perceived. Spirits and their ideas comprise all of reality. But as Berkeley was pleading the special cause of spirit, and therein of the God of religion, he failed to see that the same criticism that he had so well applied to matter was no less cogent in its reference to spirit. This point was developed in the philosophy of Hume, who insists that if one is to be truly empirical in his procedure, as becomes your true scientist, he will accept nothing except what he gains through his experience. Under such drastic conditions, Berkeley's recognition of spirits as substantial entities is unwarranted, for one never so much as perceives his own self, or spirit. What one gains from looking into his experience consists of some isolated and particular sensation or feeling. He can perceive that one idea follows another, but he is altogether unable to discover or to prove the presence of connections and causal linkages between them. If the direct perception of spirit is as impossible as the direct perception of matter, then on the basis of experience as the warrant of belief, we have as little ground for belief in spirit substance as we have for belief in matter substance. But not only are we unable to gain a direct knowledge of substance; we are not able to gain an inferential knowledge of it, because the linkages of experience that might lead to the proof of such a unity are undiscoverable. Take for example the conception of cause and effect. We see the motion of a ball and its contact with another, and we say that the first ball's motion caused the motion of the second. But all we know is that the second ball moved after it was struck by the first. We do not know why it moved and the only warrant for our expecting the same phenomenon to be repeated is force of habit. We are acquainted with the fact of succession, but not with the fact of necessary connection.

Hume's criticism may be seen to have set a number of problems

<sup>1</sup> "Essay," II, Ch. 23, Sect. 2.

for philosophy. If spirit substance does not exist, then what of God and what of the finite ego, both of which had up to that time been defined as substances? If there are no discoverably valid linkages between the individual facts and perceptions that we discover in consciousness, then what can be the ground of a unified and law-abiding experience of a natural order and of our own personal selves? But his skeptical attitude toward the constitution of experience went so far as to contradict the actual conditions of an experience that might be shown as already possessed. For our experience does hold together as a unity. Every item of it has for each of us a personal reference and its relationship to other items within the same experience. The objective world holds together in cause and effect series. No object is perceived except in space, which is discoverable as a precondition of any objective experience whatever. No variety of experience is possible except on the condition of temporal succession, which is equally recognizable as an ineradicable inner quality of experience.

On such grounds as the above, Kant is led to consider experience as the product of reason acting upon the raw materials of sensation. Experience must exhibit spatial and temporal quality, cause and effect relations, unity and continuity, for these are of its inner constitution. However, if Kant is thus able to validate experience and thereby the possibility of mathematical and physical science, he is compelled to limit judgments that are to pass as matter of fact to the field of verifiability. The judgments of mathematics and physics are justifiable because they can be tested. If they are proved and not found wanting in a fruitful manipulation of experience and a control of further fact, they are to be accepted. Otherwise, not.

This result of the Kantian criticism substantiated Hume's scepticism regarding the possibility of discovering the substantial ego and of demonstrating God's existence as a spiritual substance. For, if Kant proved to his own satisfaction that there is a unity of experience, a central reference and practical connection and continuity that establishes empirical selfhood, he was no less urgent in his contention that to posit a substantial, immaterial, imperishable ego from the presence of experience in its empirically knowable form, was an induction entirely beyond the facts. "I think, therefore I am," had been expanded without warrant into "I think, therefore I am spiritual substance and substantial ego."

Not less unjustifiable than the attempt to verify by theoretical reason the existence of the pure ego, was the attempt to describe a completed cosmos. Kant showed that it was equally possible to prove that the world has had a beginning in time and has a limit in

space, and to show that such a temporal beginning and such a spatial limit are unthinkable; to prove that the world is composed of indivisible atoms and to prove that there can be no limit set to the divisibility of things in space; to prove that there must be a free first cause of the finite series of cause and effect, and to show that such examples of free causation can never exist in the natural order; and, finally, to prove that the world as a whole must depend on a necessarily existent Being, and to show that there is no support for belief in the existence of such a Being. Such contradictions arise from the attempt to consider a constantly developing experience as at some one time completed and static, and to apply to that experience, viewed as a connected whole, conceptions that occur only within the network of its living and expanding unity. For example, the principle of cause and effect is one of the established relations of experience. Unless its elements were bound together in cause and effect series, experience would not be what it is. But it is a confusion of terms to attempt to apply a conception that is valid within experience to the same experience viewed as a whole, for "the whole of experience" is really *extra*-experiential. The conceptions of a finished cause and effect series and of a necessarily existent Being are precisely such conceptions as we can find no empirical warrant for, because they lie outside the jurisdiction of experience. In general, we may say that Kant establishes, through his discussion of the Antinomies of Pure Reason, the necessary limitation of legitimate cosmological speculation to the field of empirical fact and to hypotheses that represent only an extension of such expectations as are verifiable within known experience.

A further negative result of the Kantian criticism is its discrediting of both the methods and the findings of dogmatic theology. As has been said before in this paper, the traditional proofs of the existence of God were three: the Cosmological, the Teleological, and the Ontological. Of these, the Cosmological is based upon the theses of the third and fourth antinomies discussed above. God exists because there must be free causation to explain the beginnings of causal series, and the existence of the contingent world of fact must be based upon an absolute and unchanging reality. The same argument that was used by Kant in opposition to these theses, namely, that experience gives us no possible link of a series of causation that can be possibly conceived of as independent of a like causal relation to that which it maintains with the rest of the series, is applicable in connection with the Cosmological proof of God's existence. It is simply impossible to reconcile the demands of experience with the conception of a Being that lies quite outside the conditions of that experience.



The Teleological proof argues from the presence of order and design in nature to the existence of a great architect who planned the perfection of things. But could such design be substantiated it would only point to the existence of a very powerful and very wise manipulator of given materials and would still necessitate proof of the existence of a creator as well as of a builder. And, at all events, neither the Teleological argument nor the Cosmological could prove that the First Cause was the Perfect Being that is the conception of theology and the object of religious worship.

The last prop of dogmatism is, accordingly, the Ontological argument, in which proof is brought that existence is necessarily an attribute of the most perfect Being. Existence, it is said, is the final badge of perfection, without which our conception of God would be a self-contradiction. Much has been said about the validity of the Ontological argument, and Kant has been accused of failing altogether to see its real significance. Most baldly stated, as in Falckenberg's "History of Philosophy,"<sup>2</sup> Kant attacks the argument on the grounds of "the impossibility of dragging out of an idea the existence of the object corresponding to it." Just as a dream of one hundred dollars does not increase my purchasing capacity, just so my idea of a Perfect Being, no matter what its attributes, does not give that Being existential reality independent of my idea. According to Kant, then, the Ontological argument is an absurd tautology.

There is, however, a certain sense in which Kant's critics may accuse him, not of misunderstanding the ontological argument as it existed at his time, but of failing to take into account the enlarged significance of the argument for post-Kantian Idealism, for which his own philosophy was the propaedeutic. To say that in every triangle the sum of the angles is equal to two right angles, is to posit the existence of the triangle *as a conception*. It does not imply the existence of any triangular plot of ground or any triangular outline upon the blackboard or triangular anything whatsoever. But, it is said in truth, the exemplification of the triangle is not, after all, its reality; when you have stated the conditions of its existence, you have *ipso facto* posited that existence. The same application may be made on a larger scale to the Reality of Absolute Idealism, and is made, in fact, by Hegel. But for Kant's day and in the spirit of Anselm, certainly there was had in mind to correspond to the existence of God, a kind of existence that was quite independent of experience.

By way of summary, we may say that Kant's critical philosophy undermined the intellectual foundations of classical Christianity. It

<sup>2</sup> Tr., p. 380.

disproved the existence of a scientific proof of a substantial ego that could be saved to immortal life; it showed the impossibility of a scientific proof of a creative act by means of which God would be seen as responsible for the initiation of the physical cosmos and the human race; and, finally, it exhibited the futility of ever trying to make consistent with the facts of science, the conception of a perfect spiritual Being outside the realm of human experience.

It would be interesting to follow Kant in his attempt to rebuild the religious structure, that he had so badly shattered, on the new foundations of active moral purpose and "practical" autonomy that he described as actually experienced. But to do so would be to follow Kant back into the spirit of the very philosophy that his critical efforts had discredited. The forward movement of modern philosophy leads beyond Kant into forms of speculation that are hardly less subversive of the principles of science than the dogmatism that he so vigorously and successfully attacked. We expect, however, in the course of our argument to return to the spirit of the Greater Critique and to the methods of scientific description.

### CHAPTER III

#### MODERN VALUES AND THE RELIGION OF IDEALISM

IN turning away from the discredited intellectual structure of Classical Christianity to a new formulation of beliefs about God, it is necessary to take into account the development of a fundamentally different set of values, according to which man and his natural interests and proclivities are appraised at a very different rating than under the conception of the realm of grace. It will be obviously impossible, in such a treatment as this, to do justice to the historical evolution of the new spirit as it has developed in Europe since the fourteenth century, so we shall be content with indicating some of the earlier results. By the eighteenth century, a voice was found to speak out the belief in the dignity and worth of humanity; and from that day to this it has never been stilled, but is gaining in force and power of speech. It has moved giant arms to do its bidding and is so moving them to-day.

[The Enlightenment in almost all its aspects and through most of its representatives is a strong statement of man's independence and power as a thinking being. It also sounds the note of human worth, of the intrinsic value of the individual as an individual.] To Rousseau, however, we are indebted for embodying in language this new sense of the instrumental character of institutions and their real mission of ministering to the larger life of the man, whose happiness, welfare, and self-expression become thereby the end and object of states and laws. Rousseau calls upon his nation to take up again the power which resides within the citizenship and make of the forms of social organization just what they should be and what they ideally are, ministrants to human welfare and the embodiments of mutual rights and obligations. The French Revolution is the great response to the growing conviction among the people of France of the fundamental truth of the propositions voiced by Rousseau and others. It is the great practical demonstration in Europe of the existence of a new sense of values and of the widespread and emphatic conviction of the worth of man and the importance of his earthly existence. The American Declaration of Independence and American democratic institution indicate the same trend of ideas. The appeal of Bentham in England for social forms and conditions that would insure "the greatest good of the greatest number" is a theoretical formulation

of the same spirit. The general impulse of the times was felt also by Kant, who lends content to his rationalistic ethics through his statement that every man should be considered as an end in himself and never as a mere means to some one else's end. For him, conduct universally rationalized turns upon individual rights and individual worth as its center. But it is when we come to the philosophy of Fichte that this conviction of the truth of social democracy as the larger setting of man's entire ethical life, gets its most elaborate and emphatic presentation and is taken up as the value element of a religion.

At this point we may briefly indicate the general characteristics of the new intellectual life that furnishes a setting for the conception of values outlined above. The philosophical movement may be described as post-Kantian Idealism, and it may be said to build upon the foundations of the "Critique of Pure Reason." But the things-in-themselves, last relics of a philosophy that Kant discredited, are banished into the limbo of speculative antiques, and the world of experience, the world of the Esthetic and the Analytic, is accepted as the realm within which philosophy may work or dream or upon which it may erect superstructures of invention. The conditions of mental life that Kant describes as the guarantee of safety and sanity, are magnified into world-large forms and made the indwelling and active soul of the world of phenomena. Instead of going beyond phenomena, and explaining them by means of independent noumenal substances, post-Kantian Idealism links together the facts of experience and makes of them a unity, just as Kant represented the experience of an individual as holding together by means of the transcendental unity of apperception. The universe was regarded as a developing, purposeful consciousness.

### 1. *Fichte*

The initial development of Idealism, as exhibited in Fichte's philosophy, was one-sided and incomplete. Fichte saw in the phenomena of experience only the necessary raw material for the development of a moral World-Self. This World-Self finds its expression in the individual lives of men, coming to self-consciousness only upon the recognition of a duty to be performed. Action, effort, conquest, are the price of selfhood. Reality is a process of moral evolution. The aim of the World-Self, realized through the individuals that represent its own particularization, is the production of values. The religious implications of this philosophy are that God lives in the lives of men. His reality is the net sum of their moral worth. He is in the world of action, not outside it. His existence is in the ideals

and moral strivings of men. The story of his life is in the development of humanity out of slavery to natural, sensuous impulses and into the life of reason as revealed in the stern call of social duty.

It is needless to say that spiritual pantheism of this sort is a new kind of philosophical religion. It is *new* because it represents God as being inside the world instead of outside it, and because it identifies God with the spiritual life of man instead of separating him in abstract, lonely grandeur, from any concerns of humankind. We recognize it as *philosophical* religion because it is the result of speculation and stands or falls with the intellectualistic postulates upon which it rests. Just as the validity of theism and deism depends upon the autonomy of the mind in dealing with ideas that lie beyond the possibility of experiential testing, just so the religion of post-Kantian Idealism depends upon the justification of the mind's reading into the sum-total of the phenomena of experience, a conception of unity and purpose that equally lies beyond the possibility of experiential testing. And, finally, *it is religion* because it represents a formulation of the current sense of values—human, social, democratic values—as set into the matrix of a consistent intellectual background.

The story of German Idealism shows that Fichte's system was not satisfactory on the grounds of intellectual consistency, as it did not take sufficient account of that order of experience which is obviously independent of human wishes and notoriously unresponsive to human efforts. In Hegel we get the first full flowering of the idealistic movement, and it is to him that we turn for a more complete exposition.

## 2. Hegel

The groundwork and the limit of Hegel's speculation is the realm of experience; by the adoption of which conditions, he shows himself the lineal descendant of Kant. But in the life that he reads into experience, he is far enough removed from the spirit of the Critical Philosophy. Whereas Kant sets up a realm of potential experience, Hegel posits an Absolute experience: the world for him is a living Spirit.

Kant describes the world of possible experience as created through the cooperation of human individuals, and the categories were for him the inner constitution of human, individual experience. Hegel uses the same world as Kant's world of possible experience, but it has its life and existence prior to the point where the experience of human individuals collaborates in the development of self-consciousness. Taking the universe over all, according to Hegel it exhibits the characteristics of a living, conscious, and self-conscious experience. It

possesses constituent relations, or categories, ready-formed within it; it finds content in the sense objects of a physical order, and it possesses self-consciousness of the inner unity of the apparently diverse aspects of form and content. This conception of the nature of the spirit-life of the universe takes account of a triangular framework within which there is exercised continual activity and initiative. The three sides of the triangle are Being, Nature, and Spirit. Being may be described as the original life of the world-self. It has a development of its own and a variety and wealth of self-expression. Hegel's Philosophy of Being presents the constituent character of the spirit-life of the Universe, which may be said to correspond to the Kantian categories; but, whereas for Kant the categories are discoverable upon analysis of experience, for Hegel they possess an independent and necessary life of their own. The life of Being begins in the simplest and most abstract category, Being, and develops successively into the categories of Becoming, Quantity, Quality, and so forth, up to the richest and most inclusive category, the Absolute Idea.

The second side of the triangle is Nature, which represents a continuation of the self-development of Absolute Spirit. Nature is the necessary complement of the categories, for without objectification in a concrete experience, the framework of that experience would be null and empty. Nature, as well as Being, possesses a rich and self-connected life that is in process of development.

The third side of the triangle is Spirit, as exhibited in the consciousness of human beings. It is at once a culmination of the life of the Absolute Self and a return upon itself of the entire process of self-development of the Idea. For in the self-consciousness of humanity the process becomes known for what it is, and thereby alone is made what it really is, namely, the absolute and indivisible unity of a spiritual life.

With the appearance of consciousness in the human individual, the World-Spirit has produced a being which approximates its own nature. Man is self-conscious and free. At first concerned only with the recognition and assertion of its own individuality, the life of the Spirit is Subjective; but with the recognition of the rights of others and the appearance of the social bond, Spirit has entered into a higher plane, that of Objectivity. Rights of others come to be regarded as the personal concern of the individual, and these rights are secured by means of law. Still higher stages of the development of the Idea in Objective Spirit are found in the self-motivation to good on the part of the individual, irrespective of law, and in the reduction of social-minded action to group habit, or custom. Objective

Spirit has run its full course when men live together in peace and harmony under institutions that guarantee the free development of the individual and are only the codification and objective statement of what the needs of the individual demand.

The third and final phase of Idea within the stage of Spirit represents the complete return of the Absolute upon itself in the experience of individual men. There are three phases of Absolute Spirit, namely, art, religion, and philosophy. In art, Spirit is striving for self-expression in material forms,—in rock and mortar, clay, marble, colors, sounds, letters. Art is always conscious of its failure to embody its conception: the outer reality is obstinate and ultimately victorious. In religion, the strivings of the human spirit win their own, for the religious experience passes immediately over the material obstacles lying between it and its self-expression and posits spirit as superior to things. And, finally, Spirit Absolute, through the insight of philosophy, combines the reach of art with the grasp of religion and sees things and ideals as mutually complementary. Both are necessary aspects of an Absolute Idea that expresses itself in the dual rôle of conception and fact.

In our attempt to describe the general form of Hegel's philosophy, it has been impossible to ignore the principle of movement that is exhibited throughout. If reality is a triangle whose sides are Being, Nature, and Spirit, it is a self-tracing and living triangle. Reality is a development, and its three aspects are moments within a process. In this day when evolution is a commonplace conception, it is necessary to understand clearly the kind of evolution of the Absolute Life that Hegel had in mind. In defiance of the danger of repetition, we may say that Hegel conceives of Being as the first stage in the development of the Absolute Life, the world of Nature as the second, and the life of Spirit as the third and last. Yet he does not think of Being as causing Nature, nor of Nature as causing Spirit. While Being is prior in existence to Nature, and Nature to Spirit, these relations of priority and succession are only the exigencies of the inner life of the Absolute. As long as Hegel is working with Pure Being, there is a natural relationship of necessity in the way in which one conception passes over into its opposite and combines with it on a higher plane of self-expression. But when he passes out of the realm of Pure Being into the world of physical nature and human beings, the causal leadings between successive manifestations of the Absolute are lacking. The development, while recognized as progress, is from within. It takes place in the private subjective life of the Absolute; and the successive forms are only the laying bare to human eyes of its inner urge and necessity of seeking self-expression.

Hegel's philosophy is meant to serve as a religion. To be sure, he makes a distinction between philosophy and religion, saying that religion is reason thinking naively. But he continually leaves the religious expression behind and speaks in terms of his philosophy. And, after all, it is his philosophy that is his religion, for it is only after one has comprehended the figurative language of religion in its philosophical meaning that it can be acceptable to him. He says: "God exists only for the man who thinks, who keeps within the quiet of his own mind. The ancients called this enthusiasm; it is pure theoretic contemplation, the supreme repose of thought, but at the same time its highest activity manifested in grasping the pure Idea of God and becoming conscious of this Idea."<sup>1</sup> This preference for the rigorously philosophical point of view is further illustrated in the discussion to follow.

Hegel believed that religion was essentially a knowing relation, and that, as such, an object of knowledge was required. He says: "If something objective is to be really recognized, it is requisite that I should be determined as universal, and should maintain myself as universal only. Now this is none other than the point of view of thinking reason, and of the man who thinks rationally,—who as individual posits himself as Universal, and annulling himself as individual, finds his true self to be the Universal. Philosophy is in like manner thinking reason, only that this action in which religion consists appears in philosophy in the form of thought, while religion as, so to speak, reason thinking naively, stops short in the sphere of general ideas, or ordinary thought."<sup>2</sup> "The standpoint of religion is this, that the true, to which consciousness relates itself, has all content in itself, and consequently this condition of relation is what is highest of all in it, is its Absolute standpoint."<sup>3</sup> "The true home of religion is absolute consciousness, and this implies that God is himself all content, all truth and reality."<sup>4</sup>

Most comprehensively taken, religion for Hegel is no more nor less than the finite individual's recognition of his own participation in the life of the Absolute. *The finite individual is nothing in himself*, for his reality is indissolubly joined with that of the Absolute; *but he is something in himself* because he represents the particularization of the Absolute and is essential to its self-realization. Hegel says, "Religion is therefore a relation of the spirit to absolute Spirit: thus only is spirit as that which knows also that which is known.

<sup>1</sup> "Philosophy of Religion," tr. Speirs and Sanderson, III., p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> *Id.*, 193-94.

<sup>3</sup> *Id.*, 204.

<sup>4</sup> *Id.*, 205.



This is not merely an attitude of the spirit towards absolute Spirit, but absolute Spirit itself is that which is the self-relating element, which brings itself into relation with that which we posited on the other side as the element of difference. Thus when we rise higher, religion is the Idea of the Spirit which relates itself to its own self—it is the self-consciousness of absolute Spirit.”<sup>5</sup> Or again, “Religion is the Divine Spirit’s knowledge of itself through the mediation of finite spirit. Accordingly, in its highest form, religion is not a transaction of man, but it is essentially the highest determination of the absolute Idea itself.”<sup>6</sup> The emphasis is thus seen to be put upon the fact that God is not a Being, independent of human experience, as is the God of dogmatic theology. On the contrary, God is always produced through the medium of individual minds and only so. He is spirit, at once human and divine.

In the act of worship, the finite spirit is lifted up, says Hegel, to a conscious recognition of his oneness with the absolute Spirit, while retaining his sense of individuality. “The finite in relation to the Infinite is posited as the negative, the dependent, that which melts away in relation to the Infinite. When the two are brought together, a unity comes into existence through the abolition and absorption of the finite in fact, which can not maintain itself against the Infinite. . . . On the one hand, I determine myself as the finite; on the other, I am not annihilated in the relation,—I relate myself to myself. I am, I subsist; I am also the Affirmative. On the one side I know myself as having no real existence; on the other, as affirmative, as having a valid existence, so that the infinite leaves me my own life.”<sup>7</sup> “If I now go further and begin to consider the matter from a spiritually higher standpoint of consciousness, I find myself no longer observing, but I forget myself in entering into the object; I bury myself in it, while I strive to know, to understand God; I yield myself up to it, and if I do this I am no longer in the attitude of empirical consciousness, of observation. If God is no longer to me a something above and beyond me, I am no longer a pure observer.”<sup>8</sup> “All particularity belongs to it (the Universal Object); as universal it overlaps or includes me in itself, and thus I look upon myself as finite, as being a moment in this life, as that which has its particular being, its permanent existence, in this substance only, and in its essential moments.”<sup>9</sup> To recapitulate, as I worship, I recognize both my separate individuality and my unity with God, while my sense of weakness, finitude, and unworthiness is swallowed up in the realization of my oneness with the infinite selfhood known as God.

<sup>5</sup> *Id.*, I., 205.

<sup>6</sup> *Id.*, 206.

<sup>9</sup> *Id.*, I., 197.

<sup>7</sup> *Id.*, 174.

<sup>8</sup> *Id.*, I., 176.

It is easily seen from the foregoing that Hegel's philosophy of religion is only a reduplication of the main outlines of his entire philosophy. Indeed, his interpretation of the dogma of the Trinity, which he recognizes as fundamental in Christianity, the Absolute Religion, is only a restatement of the divisions of the great triad, Being, Nature, and Spirit. We may, accordingly, sum up Hegel's understanding of religion in saying that the individual, who is at once the embodiment and the self-expression of the Absolute, is in a religious frame of mind and takes on an attitude of worship, when he recognizes himself in his absolute and universal capacity. [The values that Hegel takes account of are those of the modern Western world. He puts a positive valuation upon life and effort and self-expression. His ethical ideals are social, for he says that only as man coerces his impulsive, self-aggrandizing tendencies in the interest of the social whole, is he truly good. Institutions and laws are the embodiment of the principles of most advantageous self-expression in community and national existence; and the philosophy of history is just the record of successive development of the Absolute into more and more adequate forms, culminating in such institutions as represent wholly and perfectly the balance between the rights and the obligations of the citizens of the state.]

If the philosophy of Hegel is a satisfactory intellectual setting for the accepted values of his experience, and represents those values as a consistent part of the reality which his philosophy describes, we must say that it is, in the truest sense of the word a religion.

#### DOES HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY EXHIBIT INTELLECTUAL CONSISTENCY?

We have endeavored to maintain throughout this paper that there must be self-consistency in the intellectual description of reality if it is to be competent to bear the treasure of human values. In our study of Hegel, we have witnessed his deliberate attempt to set forth an interpretation of reality that is intellectually consistent in all its parts and that, at the same time, embodies the values of our Western life. [It is our present purpose to consider his system from the standpoint of its success in giving us an account of reality that is sufficiently satisfying intellectually to enable it to support the element of value.]

At the expense of some repetition, we may say that Hegel's philosophy takes account of three positions. The first of these is equivalent to the Kantian ego-machinery, the categories. The second is concrete, objective experience, living nature. The third is the self-conscious awareness of the reciprocity that exists between the first

two positions, or the self-realization of the Idea in human consciousnesses.

The network of relations, or categories, that Hegel develops, constitutes the nature and substance of Being, and in all the particularity of its inner life represents the first stage of the life of the World-Self. Furthermore it is said to exist logically prior to the diversity and the particularity that constitute its Other-of Self, the world of nature and living things. But if one accepts a fact basis and utilizes the most authoritative knowledge available in the present generation, he must recognize consciousness as a development, as something that came into existence as consciousness from non-existence as consciousness. Granted the presence of experience, it may be analyzed and its subjective and objective phases may be exhibited as the opposite and complementary aspects of reality. For example, I recognize cause and effect as one of the never-absent conditions of the experience I possess. We may call it, to be consistent with historical usage, a category of our experience. We further recognize cause and effect as an aspect of objective reality, or experience as viewed from an opposite and external standpoint. Now, if Hegel's classification of the categories as given in the "Logic," means anything, it means that he is pointing out the universal, underlying characteristics of experience. As such, his work is analagous to that of the grammarian who exhibits the forms or principles underlying speech, or that of the logician who exhibits the possible combinations used in practical and concrete thinking. Ostensibly, Hegel found his categories of Being before a true self appeared and quite independent of experience as had in and by a human self. Actually, he was analyzing out the general relations that are discoverable in concrete experience. Granted that his analysis is correct, it means no more than that he has reduced to definite and nameable form an abstruse phase of experience. The categories are implicit in experience, and it is a task of investigation to make them explicit. As such, the procedure is scientific and subject to revision after more satisfactory analysis.

However, Hegel claims much more for his work in connection with the categories than the facts seem to warrant. He thinks of his results as going beyond experience; the categories are the constitution and make-up of Being prior to the existence of the only kind of experience that we are able to find. The stage of Being, with all its show of life, depends for its existence upon a condition to which, for him, it is logically prior. Hegel's Being is the shadow of experience; but in his system, the shadow exists before the thing it shadows. If one proceeds with a due regard for experience and at-

tempts to find its *prius*, he encounters a nexus of biological forces and a sum of chemical equations, which in turn possess meaning only in terms of the same experience that was to be explained. Accordingly, it does not seem too much to say that Hegel has no basis of fact for his forcible disjunction of the categories of Being from that actual experience in which they are discoverable. And, furthermore, if he is not justified in his diremption of what he calls Being from its natural and necessary objective counterpart, then his treatment of the latter, under the heading of the Philosophy of Nature, suffers equally from the fault of "abstractness," in the sense of his own pet aversion. And, finally, the third phase of his system, the Philosophy of Spirit, with its work of connecting the first two, is left without any moments to fuse and conjoin, and consequently becomes functionless.

Not less slow to exhibit its limitations than the place of the categories in Hegel's system, is his speculative, unempirical formula of evolution when strictly applied to the facts of history. It is, of course, not to be considered a condemnation of Hegel to say and to prove that his conception of the evolution of Idea is hypothetical. Science lives by hypotheses, and philosophy may find a use for them as well. But the temper of the intellectual life changes from time to time, and what was once a satisfactory sort of hypothesis is no longer regarded as such. Kepler might think, in his early years, of angels as responsible for the orderly movements of the planets, but such an hypothesis is laughed at to-day. The same change of attitude has affected Hegel's hypothesis. It was the product of a romantic age, and had its fellow in Goethe's *Zeitgeist*. Even to-day it has its value when we recognize its poetic origin and quality; for it is undeniably a stirring conception to think of the changes of nature and human institutions as the life of a World-Spirit. But we recognize the figure as a figure; and when we use it we know that we are dealing in terms of poetry and not in terms of fact. As poetry, even though rather crabbed and pedantic poetry, we must recognize the worth of Hegel's world-conception; for its scope and sweep are universal; it is epic in its subject-matter and in its proportions. But as scientific hypothesis, demanding respect and belief, it simply no longer makes an appeal.

Hegel's conception of evolution is in reality not an evolution in the sense in which we have come to use the term. It is rather a series of aspects of a changing subject-matter. The unity is conceived from without and externally imposed. The development is not development within the subject-matter, but of the schema.

It is essential to the development of a drama that the characters

exhibit development either in their circumstances or in their attitudes. The same individuals must be continued through succeeding acts. It would hardly be called a play if each scene or act should introduce new characters, allowing the old characters to continue side by side with them, altogether indifferent to the actions and the attitudes of the new company of players. A drama must be more than a mere succession of unrelated panoramas. And yet, Hegel's drama of the Idea is simply that,—a succession of panoramas. The stages of Nature, namely, Mechanics, Chemism and Organics, do not develop into one another, but exist side by side. Subjective, Objective, and Absolute Spirit do not successively disappear into one another: there is no reciprocity, no give and take among them, but only the exhibition of succeeding phases along with the continuance of the older. For example, the religion of sorcery (China) does not develop into the religion of phantasy (Brahminism), nor does Brahminism change gradually into the religion of inner contemplation (Buddhism). The religions of Nature in general do not develop into the religions of Freedom. The former were and even now are, after these thousands of years. Nothing about them is taken up and modified into that which succeeds them. They exist and are evaluated by Hegel, and other religions in turn come into being and are evaluated; and when the course of history has been traversed, the catalogue of religions is susceptible of arrangement and classification according to Hegel's preconceived principle. Of evolution, meaning transformation and development of a given conception, or organization, or institution, there is none.

What is more, Hegel's schema does violence to the facts, omitting details that do not fit in and supplying others to fill out the arbitrary diagram. A good example of Hegel's partiality in choosing facts is his failure to take any account of the Mohammedan religion. His classification of religions falls into three heads: the Oriental objective religions, in which God in Nature stands over against the human individual; the Religions of Freedom, in which man reads his subjective nature into the Godhood; and the Absolute Religion of Christian revelation, where God as object expresses himself in human spirit, thereby combining and synthesizing objectivity and subjectivity in an indivisible unity of self-experience. In the course of development as historically exhibited, Mohammedanism should be the cope-stone of the structure, but this stone which should be the head of the corner is never noticed by Hegel.

A further example of what the writer regards as partiality in arranging his facts on the part of Hegel, occurs in his classification of the religions. It seems evident that the Hebrew religion of the

prophetic period is the nearest approach to the religion of Jesus, called by Hegel the Absolute Religion, of any that we have record of. Indeed, Jesus builds upon the Hebrew religion, using it as his foundation. He averred that it was his intention and purpose to bring new life into the "law" of his day by infusing into it the true spirit of prophetic religion. Hegel, however, tracing a line of historical development, interposed both the Greek and the Roman religions between the Hebrew and the Christian. Rather would it seem that the frank naturalism of the Greek mythology, with its immature ethics, and the formalism of the Roman pantheon, are in no sense logical forerunners of the exalted spirituality of Christ's teachings about the nature of God.

Hegel may be said to have tried to use an evolutionary hypothesis in the interests of a perfectionist plan of reality. He has put a descriptive instrument of modern science to work as a teleological agency. It is no wonder, then, that the philosophy of Hegel encounters difficulty and exhibits ambiguity and inconsistency when it undertakes to force contingently developing circumstances into the rigid moulds of a preconceived logical schema. For evolution, as a descriptive formula, is quite independent of final causes; and changes occur both for the worse and for the better, as we express our judgment from a given and prejudiced standpoint. Furthermore, quite apart from the question of moral purpose, Hegel considers the evolution taking place in the physical, organic, and social world, as the outward expression of the changes of the internal, subjective volition of the Absolute, which, in the hidden depths of its life, evolves according to its perfect character. But evolution, as science can understand it, always takes place on the fact plane, the plane of phenomena. There is true evolution in the preparation, by means of mechanical and physical forces, for organic life, and the passing over of mechanical and chemical forms into organic existence. But it is the phenomenal materials that register and undergo the changes. There is development from Brahminism into Buddhism, but it is the exigencies of experience that bring about the new adjustment. There is evolution of the Hebrew religion, but it takes place on the plane of experience as seen in economic, or political, or ethical, or intellectual changes, or in all four together. But such evolution is not of an inner core of reality; rather is it of human experience facing incompleteness and dissatisfaction and going on to something new and different that fills up the lack.

In conclusion of our discussion of the philosophical religion of Hegel, we may say that the intellectual setting for the system of values that we believe in with him, is unsatisfactory. He has tran-

scended the fact-world to find an interpreter of reality, and, as a result, his interpreter does not speak the sober language of fact. Where Hegel raises the characteristics of phenomenal human experience to Absolute heights, those characteristics fall to their proper level because they have no support of fact; and where he attempts to confine the infinitely rich and waywardly contingent life of phenomenal experience to his preconceived, Absolute forms, it overflows his schema.

### 3. *Royce*

[In the philosophy of Hegel, we have seen the logical completion of a movement of thought that considered reality in its physical, psychical, and social aspects as the expression and the embodiment of a single life striving for fullness of truth, goodness, and beauty. Hegel's method was to try to embody within his system the concrete life of nature and man and nations; and we have been at some pains to show why we believe that the concrete reality he was describing does not fit into his logical forms except with a very large remainder.] It was at once the strength and the weakness of his philosophy that it attempted to be specifically concrete. Its strength, because in making of the drama of cosmic and human history the developing selfhood of the Absolute Life, it invested with eternal and absolute significance the daily actions of finite beings and showed the meaning of each finite aspect of reality to be connected with its true existence in the living whole. Its weakness, because, on the one hand, the facts of our experience of men and nature are too diverse and contradictory to fall into the pattern of a single developing self-consciousness, and, because, on the other hand, in order to keep in touch with facts, the schema intended to include them is made purely hypothetical and fails to exhibit any analogy with selfhood as we can understand that concept.

The development of Hegelianism at the hands of Hegel's followers has been in the direction of inner self-consistency with the analogy of selfhood. Finding it impossible to account for the variety of human experience in all its concrete beauty and ugliness, goodness and evil, truth and error, and to arrange the facts of experience in accordance with a logical schema such as Hegel's, they have emphasized the rational necessity of a certain Absolute constitution of experience and have let concrete details shift for themselves. We may say with reference to this philosophical tendency that we believe that the distortion of fact necessary to meet an idealistic programme is so pronounced as to vitiate the logical advantages it possesses, through its reduction of all experience to a dead and mean-

ingless formalism. As an example of this later form of Absolute Idealism, we have chosen the philosophy of Josiah Royce.

Royce describes reality in terms of experience, and his dialectic in opposition to realism and mysticism is certainly in the interests of true philosophy. For objects that can be known at all are in experience and can never be considered understandingly as outside of experience. This, of course, implies that there is an inner and indivisible bond between the object known and the experience for which it is an object at all. Likewise, the direct intuition of the mystic is a complete negation, for it pretends to be independent of the experience series. If Realism represents an aggressive denial of the original and necessary setting of objects within experience, mysticism represents an elusive escape from such an enmeshment. The true object of knowledge, for the mystic, lies beneath the troubled waters of experience. The whorls and the bubbles that mark the spot of its disappearance are the only evidence of its existence; but who, then, shall say that the object is at all? For the whorls are naught and the bubbles are naught: indeed, the whole wide sea is nothingness. Certainly, philosophy can not deal with a reality that is always just beyond the vanishing point and denies the evidence of its own disappearance.

But if reality is not to be defined either in terms of realism or in terms of mysticism on the grounds that both these forms of speculation deny the fundamental conditions of our experience of objects, we must find a means of representing reality that will have due regard for the matrix of experience out of which and into which the object is born. The most obvious method to follow at this point is just to postulate the object as a form of experience and nothing more. The sun is just as warming, just as large, occupies just the same position with regard to the earth and the other planets and heavenly bodies, wheels through space just as unerringly, and meets our astronomical expectations just as satisfactorily, if we think of its reality as summed up in these empirical manifestations, as it would if it had a different sort of reality that could not be made consistent with the conditions of knowledge. And so with all the realm that we describe in terms of physical science and the world of sociology and history. That the facts we know are more than our facts; that experience implies more than experience; that reality as it is known and reality as it exists are possibly two different things,—philosophy is simply content to leave on one side as irrelevant questions. For what does it profit the philosopher to go beyond the materials that are amply sufficient to give him an orderly, regular world, in which scientific laws reign, in which experiences are put together



precisely and inevitably, in which hypotheses may be verified and questions asked and answered, and in which the whole realm of human values is discoverable?

When reality is defined as above in terms of validity, we have to all intents and purposes the world of Kant's critical philosophy, leaving out of account the realistic elements provided in the things-in-themselves. But Royce recognizes the incompleteness of such a philosophy as defines reality as merely validity of experience. He endeavors to supply a lack by so filling out experience as to give it independence, autonomy, and substantial reality. He takes Kant's world of experience and binds it together into a purposeful consciousness. Kant's substratum to experience is ignored, because Royce finds no need of taking it into account. Reality is reality in terms of knowledge. The world is a self-conscious Being, a Person, an Individual. It is the external representation of an internal meaning, just as the song you sing or the tune you pick out upon the piano is the outward expression of the melody that haunts your inner consciousness. The world of suns and Milky Ways, of inorganic and organic evolution, of states and religions and art, of private struggle, hidden grief, and personal triumph, is the song of the Infinite Being. Or, to change the metaphor, the World is the game which the Absolute is playing out as his objectified purpose. As a corollary of this main theorem, space, in its absolute sense, contains no here and beyond, for all space is present in the conscious glance of the All-knower. Time rolls up like a scroll, and the Absolute knows all things, past, present, future, in one indivisible and undivided time-span. Cause and effect are simply the before and after in a series and the relations are absolutely reversible. The effect that follows—as an element in an absolutely fixed and certain reality—is to be viewed teleologically as the cause, for both cause and effect are subordinate to the reality in which they are elements. Each individual thing is so called because it is a unique and essential expression of the life of the Absolute; and because it is just so a unique and necessary aspect of the self-expression of the Absolute, each finite act, viewed in the light of all Reality, is a free and purposeful representation of that Absolute purpose. Viewed from the standpoint of the finite individuals, they, in all their uniqueness and freedom, are the active agencies of the World Individual. The stars that clash headlong in sidereal space are thus freely and uniquely expressing their own and the World Individual's purpose that new heavenly bodies be formed; the atoms at work in the hidden recesses of the mountain, here or in other solar systems, are thereby living their own purposeful lives and thereby performing the will of God; the

races of men that have struggled up to social democracy or have slipped down to savagery, the individual man that slays his fellow or devotes himself to a righteous cause,—are all doing the will of the Absolute, finding their own reality and asserting their own precious freedom. The evil that men experience, singly and collectively, not to mention the hypothetical heart-burns of atoms and animals, is self-elected and self-borne by the Absolute. Evil exists, truly enough, but only as an element in the larger reality that means well and has in advance secured a positive result. The World is one and infinite, but present here; eternal, but present now; indivisible, but self-broken into an infinitude of elements that are not meaningless fragments, but comprehensible and fitting parts. The World is conscious; it is active; it is purposeful. What is, is known as necessary and as good in a vast experience of "the whole, all at once." "By the absolute reality we can only mean either that which is present to an absolutely organized experience inclusive of all possible experience, or that which would be presented as the content of such an experience if there were one."<sup>10</sup> "The terms Reality and Organized Experience are correlative terms. The one can be defined as the object, the content of the other."<sup>11</sup>

The dialectic by means of which Royce clinches his argument for the existence of the Absolute experience is given concisely in his "Conception of God." Therein<sup>12</sup> he reduces the possible alternative considerations to two. "The first alternative to saying that there is no such real unity of experience is the assertion that such a unity is a bare and ideal possibility. But there can be no such thing as a merely possible truth, definable apart from actual experience." The second consideration "appears when we ask our finite experience whereabouts is in any wise even suggested the actually experienced fact of which that hypothetical proposition relating to the ideal or absolute experience, is the expression. What in finite experience suggests the truth that if there were an absolute experience it would find a certain unity of facts?" And the answer to this question is as follows: "Any finite experience must regard itself as suggesting some sort of truth. To do so, an experience must indicate what a higher or inclusive—i. e., a more organized experience would find presented thus or thus to itself. . . . Granted that there is no absolute experience as a concrete fact, but only the will to have it; then this absolute erroneousness of the real experience will be the absolute truth. . . . The very effort to assert that the

<sup>10</sup> "Conception of God," p. 24.

<sup>11</sup> *Id.*, p. 27.

<sup>12</sup> Pp. 27-30.

whole world of experience is a world of fragmentary and finite experience is an effort involving a contradiction. Experience must constitute, in its entirety, one self-determined and consequently absolute and organized whole. For truth is, so far as it is known. Now this proposition applies as well to the totality of the world of finite experience as it does to the parts of that world. There must then be an experience to which is present the constitution (*i. e.*, the actual limitation and narrowness) of all finite experience, just as surely as there is such a constitution. But this fact that the world of finite experience has no experience beyond it could not be present, as a fact, to any but an absolute experience, which knew all that is or that genuinely can be known."

As is to be expected, Royce identifies God with his Absolute. In the work quoted above<sup>13</sup> he says that in advance of any proofs of God's existence he will mean by the word God a being who is conceived as possessing to the full all logically possible knowledge, insight, and wisdom. His final description of God is as follows:<sup>14</sup> "God is thought that sees its own fulfilment in the world of self-possessed life—in other words, a thought whose ideas are not mere shadows, but have an aspect in which they are felt as well as meant, appreciated as well as described,—yes, I should unhesitatingly say, loved as well as conceived, willed as well as viewed. Such a thought you can also call in its wholeness a Self; for it beholds the fulfilment of its own thinking, and views the determined character of its living experience as identical with what its universal conceptions mean. . . . God is known as thought fulfilled, as Experience absolutely organized, so as to have one ideal unity of meaning; as Truth transparent to itself; as Life in absolute accordance with idea; as Self-hood eternally obtained."

Obviously, the implication of Royce's philosophy as finally formulated in "The World and the Individual" is that religion consists in the conscious acceptance on the part of the finite individual of his part in the life of the Absolute. His little life is to be viewed as secure and meaningful in its universal setting. He is a part of a purposeful plan, and thereby does his finite effort receive value and are his finite failures and weaknesses swallowed up in the guaranteed success of the infinite reality of which he is a significant element. The evil that life brings him he will suffer bravely, for does not God agonize with him? His sword may snap in the conflict; he may even die in the heat of it; but even so he has a share in the glory of the victory, for he is a known and valued compatriot of the great Leader, and he is sure that the battle is the Lord's.

<sup>13</sup> P. 9.

<sup>14</sup> P. 22.

## THE CONCEPTION OF INDIVIDUALITY

As has been said above, Royce conceives of reality as a self-conscious, purposeful Individual. All reality is comprised within its grasp and there is no other individual in the world beyond itself. Our first objection to such a conception is this: If there be only one individual in the universe, then it can have no individuality, for individuality depends for its existence upon alternatives, upon choice, upon clash of wills and purposes; in short, to use Royce's own phrase, as it occurs in "The Problem of Christianity," individuality depends upon "the possibility of interpretation." Royce says:<sup>18</sup> "Metaphysically considered, the world of interpretation is the world in which, if indeed we are able to interpret at all, we learn to acknowledge the being and the inner life of our fellowmen; and to understand the constitution of temporal existence, with its endlessly accumulating sequence of significant deeds. In this world of interpretation, of whose most general structure we have now obtained a glimpse, selves and communities may exist, past and future can be defined, and the realms of the spirit may find a place which neither barren conception nor the chaotic flow of interpenetrating perceptions could ever render significant." If I understand Royce's meaning of the world of interpretation, it seems to be a most valuable contribution to a true philosophy of experience; for it insists upon the existence of the linkages that make a world of experience possible. Experience is a social product that depends upon meanings, upon interpretations, for its being. It is not constituted by a set of eternal concepts, nor by myriad direct perceptions or intuitions. Rather it is a complex composed of direct and immediate data, which are at once known and described and modified and used in the light of such past experience as we possess. Conceptualism abstracts the linkages of experience and elevates them to a lonely grandeur of especial distinction. Intuitionism denies the linkages and sets up a world of fragments. The true philosophy of experience must recognize both these elements as functionally fused into an instrumental product that means acquaintanceship and understanding and the possibility of manipulation.

Returning to Royce's conception of the Absolute Experience, we may well ask how, if the world of experience is a world of interpretation, any single individual can have meaningful experience. Royce frequently implies his own answer to the question. The world may be an individual because it possesses its own infinite variety for its content. But we may further ask what is the need of interpretation

<sup>18</sup> II., p. 160.

and where is its possibility if the life of the Absolute is present before it as a *totum simul*, involving an immediate knowledge of all time, all space, all purpose, and all fulfilment. Interpretation is a triadic relation, as Royce defines it, involving the knowing individual, the object to be interpreted and the body of social experience in the light of which the object has meaning and through which the interpretation may be justified. How then can an experience which is essentially an immediate knowledge have room for any interpretation whatsoever? It might be said that the interpretation lies in the conscious life of finite individuals, and that, as the Absolute is ultimately within its parts, interpretation is truly the process by means of which its own life is built up. But on such a basis, the Absolute recedes to the vanishing point and ceases to possess an independent life of its own. Needless to say it would be impossible to arrive at an Absolute experience through a process of summation.

Granted, however, that the Absolute exists, then what of the finite individual? Royce believes that the finite being has his own rights, his own purposes and his own freedom in conception and in performance. The true status of absolute and finite individuality is expressed in the following alternatives: Either the Absolute exists and the finite selves are only his objects of self-realization; or the finite selves exist in a unique and purposeful way and the Absolute is only a name. In other words, either the finite variety of the world is only the objectification of a unified inner purpose that requires just that variety of objects and no other for the Absolute's self-realization, in which event the finite elements or selves are controlled by a power beyond them; or the finite selves engaged in living their own lives and fulfilling their own ends, represent an incalculable element in reality that breaks through and evades any attempt to coerce and control it in the interest of a preconceived end. In the former event, the term individuality is inapplicable to the finite selves, for they are thus made puppets of a larger will; in the latter event, the term individuality is inapplicable to the Absolute, for the sum of purposes represents no single purpose and seeks no single goal. Royce's philosophy can meet neither alternative and stand.

Royce identifies freedom with uniqueness of self-expression. Certainly such a definition of freedom is empirically satisfactory; for what greater freedom a man could ask than the freedom to act unconstrainedly in the pursuit of an end that is representative of his whole selfhood, is hard to conceive. If we accept Royce's Absolute, then every act that takes place in the world may be regarded as unique and necessary for the complete expression of the Absolute purpose—an act that completely fulfils the purpose and for which no

other could be substituted. But even that is only to say that the Absolute is free and not that the finite individual is so, for the given quantity in the case is made to serve at the same time in an active and a passive rôle. It is passive as the embodiment of an Absolute will; it is active as the expression of a unique meaning for itself. The dual rôle of finite individuality, each phase of which is incompatible with the other, presents an insuperable difficulty.

#### INDIVIDUALITY AND TIME

We have so far criticized Royce's conception of the Absolute Individual on the grounds of his own description of the World of Interpretation, in which it was said to be essential to the existence of experience that it represent functional linkages within a triadic community of interest. From another point of view, his conception of Absolute Individuality seems to be vitiated by his treatment of the element of time, for we believe that, to treat the conception of time as Royce does, is to eliminate from your philosophy all consideration of values. As we know, Royce reduces all time to the present experience of the Absolute, whose time-span is coequal with the entire series of total reality. In the life of the Absolute, there is no past, no future, but one eternal now. The primeval nebula and the last clash of frozen suns are even now present in his knowledge, while the little play of human races upon the planet Earth is at once begun and ended.

Royce makes a vigorous effort in his philosophy to take account of the presence of evil in the world. His treatment consists of showing that all evils that finite individuals suffer are *ipso facto* suffered by the Absolute as well, and that in his divine insight these evils, while recognized as such, are viewed and known as necessary for the fullness and the perfection of divine life. But, manoeuvre as he may, Royce can not bring upon the field of his Absolute Experience anything that can be called an evil. For even as an event is called evil, it is at the same time known as good in the larger vision. There is no evil, for there is no real disturbance or destruction of values. Whatever is, is right and desired. This Triangle Fire, this Titanic Disaster, this system of industrial economy that results in poor pay and long hours and frightful accidents to the workmen, yes, this very human existence where Love and Death keep watch together,—are all to be viewed in their ultimate reality as good, for they are all part of the divine will and purpose and their final significance is even now consciously present to the Absolute.

But it is just the strain of expectancy, the horror of destroyed

values, the slow and sometimes never-accomplished process of healing life, that constitute the evil of finite experience. If we could know in advance the fate of the life that is hanging in the balance, if we could discount our dead losses at some universal clearing house, and could experience here and now the ministry of healing days and months and years, then we, too, might understand the Absolute economy that Royce speaks of. But life is lived in time; and time means waiting, strain, expectancy, endurance. Time, in its human sense, is necessary for the production, the enjoyment, and the disappearance of values. Satisfaction in possession is closely linked up with the joys of expectation and the pangs of regret. If we could know in one conscious present the uncertainty of anticipation, the fact of possession, and the ultimate gain that comes from loss, wherein would be the significance of what we now describe as the value element of experience?

The conception of time is likewise closely bound up with the significance of action and purpose. Since Royce describes his own philosophy as Absolute Voluntarism, it is to be expected that the system make adequate provision for just these elements of action and purpose, but an Absolute philosophy of the type of Royce's is unable to do this. His world is a finished world. There can be no action, for everything is already done. There can be no purpose, for nothing remains to be done for which a purpose might be formed. The time-span is present; the world is here and now spread out before the Absolute consciousness with the divine purpose eternally fulfilled. But it is just the looking forward to the consummation of a purpose *not* now fulfilled that constitutes what we call by that name. When we say that a certain end was my purpose, and that it was realized or given up, then it is a dead purpose. It is in the pickling solution of retrospect. When I say, here and now my purpose is fulfilled, I thereby give myself the cue for the formation of new and unfulfilled purposes. Purposes look to the future. They represent potential existence. They may come to realization or they may not, and there is always connected with them an element of contingency, as they must await the passage of time. Ideally, the result is present; but if ideal presence were a guarantee of actual occurrence, one would never go to the trouble of forming plans and setting up ends at all. For it is just the fact that the coming to pass of the thing hoped for, the realization of the evidence of things unseen, depends on what I may do, upon my skill, my persistency, my ingenuity, or even upon aleatory elements over which I have no control, that causes my purpose to have a definite relation to my actions and to be a significant aspect of my self-expression. Purpose possesses

meaning only in the light of future contingency; and if for the Absolute there is no future and no contingency, he can not be said to have the power of setting up purposes.

#### THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF ABSOLUTE INCLUSIVENESS AND INDIVIDUALITY

A final objection to Royce's conception of the Absolute Individual arises in connection with the infinite catholicity in accepting moral standards that such an individual must exhibit. Inconsistency of action is, of course, a common enough phenomenon. We say that no one is all bad or all good. But we do classify persons with reference to their common tendencies to action of different sorts in given situations. We say that a person has a strong individuality when he commonly acts decisively and consistently with standards that he clearly recognizes. He who is lacking in decision, or who fails to recognize any standard or plan of life that he may call his own, is described as being deficient in individuality; and when an extreme form of chameleon-like propensity is developed, we say of a man that he is a nobody, a nonentity.

If, now, we view the Absolute from the standpoint of the contradictory actions of the finite individuals that constitute his self-expression, he appears to be a moral nonentity. From the point of view of the preceding section, the Absolute has no choice of ends because the result is already accomplished. From the present point of view, he makes no choice of ends because he is both alternatives. He is the natural order that decreed the *Titanic* disaster, while at the same time he is the heroism of the dying, the heartache of the living, and the moral purpose of the investigations that followed the event. He is the stern economic order that decrees hard conditions of life and labor, while at the same time he is the suffering humanity, either wise or foolish, self-destroying or fate destroyed, that labors under the hated yoke. He is, furthermore, the spirit of philanthropy that strives for better conditions, the spirit of the Beloved Community that endeavors to link all men together in the embrace of a humane and other-regarding social regime. The love of the Absolute for the finite individual is compatible with any amount of cruelty; his wisdom, with any excess of stupid folly; his warfare on the side of right, with any victory for the party of evil. His ultimate triumph is consistent with infinite delay in bringing the triumph to pass. He is not "the fairest among ten thousand," for in his person he bears the blots and blemishes, the disfigurements and deformities, of every one of the ten thousand, along with their beauty and their strength. Such a conception as Royce's may be called an Individual; but in



the moral sense it can never mean what we are trying to express when we use the word in ordinary speech.

The implication of the incompatibility between individuality and all-inclusiveness for ethical and religious concerns is just this: the Absolute is neither the object of moral endeavor nor of religious fervor, for it is impossible to make a definitive statement of moral and religious purpose except in terms of selected ends which carry their own empirical values. It is of no small significance that Royce frames his ethical ideal, that of loyalty to loyalty, in empirical terms, and his religious ideal in the very practical, unmetaphysical conception of a Beloved Community. To be loyal to loyalty means, be loyal to such causes as can command your allegiance and to respect a like devotion on the part of others. The formula, indeed, seems to be needlessly abstract and to have its edge dulled by being compelled to include too much. For loyalty to B's loyalty on the part of A quite possibly cuts across the boundary line of their separate causes. A serves his flag and B, his, of a different nation. A's loyalty to B's loyalty is than a rather empty matter, for A is hacking might and main at B's cause. Except for the sound of the thing, they might as well be enemies. But both A and B may justly be supposed to be interested in furthering justice and equity upon the earth, and thus their common cause is large enough to include both their lesser loyalties. On the other hand, B may be consciously devoted to a cause that is in every sense incompatible with that of A. He may be engaged in an iniquitous traffic that opposes in spirit the promotion of happiness among men. In that case, A would seem to have no alternative except both to oppose B's cause and to attempt to break down his loyalty to that cause.

Royce's latest formulation of the object of the moral and the religious life represents the adoption of just some such universal cause, some such ideal of the spread of human values, as has been indicated above. In the "Problem of Christianity," he describes the object of Christian loyalty as the Beloved Community, in which all members are devoted to the upbuilding and the extension of a life of mutual forbearance, affection, and helpfulness. "Loyalty, in the individual, is his love for an united community, expressed in a life of devotion to that community."<sup>16</sup> "The realm of grace (synonymous with the Beloved Community) is the realm of the powers and the gifts that save, by thus originating and sustaining and informing the loyal life. The realm contains, at the very least, three essentially necessary constituent members: First, the ideally lovable community of many individuals in one spiritual bond; secondly, the

<sup>16</sup> I, p. 178.

spirit of this community, which is present both as the human individual whose power originated and whose example, whose life and death, have led and still guide the community, and as the united spiritual activity of the whole community; thirdly, Charity itself, the love of the community by all its members, and of the members by the community."<sup>17</sup> Royce, of course, does not identify the Beloved Community with the Universal Community of the Absolute Life, but rather regards it as a type of the latter. In so far as the Beloved Community exhibits the ideal of loyalty and is engaged in furthering the coming of the Absolute Community, it is consistent with his philosophy. Assimilate and apply the creed of loyalty "and you have grasped the principle of Christian institutional life in the past, and the principle which will develop countless new institutions in the future, and which will survive them."<sup>18</sup> We may sum up the religious bearings of the work in Royce's own words: "Aid toward the coming of the universal community by helping to make the work of religion not only as catholic as is already the true spirit of loyalty, but as inventive of new social arts, as progressive as is now natural science. So you shall help in making, not merely happy individuals (for no power can render detached individuals permanently happy, or save them from death or from woe). You shall aid towards the unity of spirit of those who shall be at once free and loyal."<sup>19</sup>

Royce has herein very acceptably described a most important aspect of true religion; but the arguments we have brought forward in this section lead us to consider it a mistake to suppose that the Universal Community that Royce would have us aid in bringing to pass, is in any sense identifiable with his Absolute. The finite individuals that are known as mankind, do not comprise any such community to-day, and it is problematical if they ever will. But mankind has made vast strides in that direction and we accept the working ideal that some day a true universal community may be realized. It is just such an ideal that we adopt as the great cause to which we are loyal. To posit this ideal as certain of realization, is simply to say that your faith is so strong that you must believe in the final outcome so firmly as to set it up as at present, here and now, assured. But as far as the logical consistency of Royce's Absolute is concerned, every man's hand might as well be lifted against his brother, and human ethical values might disappear from the face of the earth.

<sup>17</sup> I., p. 192.<sup>18</sup> II., p. 429.<sup>19</sup> II., pp. 431-32.

## CHAPTER IV

### A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND THE GOD-CONCEPT

IN a previous chapter of this paper we have followed the disintegration of the intellectual supports of Classical Christianity under the criticisms of modern science and philosophy. It is our belief that Kant has totally discredited the possible existence of the central figure of the Theistic and Deistic world-plans as a Being independent of the cosmos and human experience. He did this by placing such a conception outside the boundaries of scientific demonstration and making it unacceptable to the scientific sense. In addition, we have described the attempt of Absolute Idealism to establish the existence of God through a philosophy of religion. And as we have examined such systems as those of Hegel and Royce, we have been compelled to deny on the very basis of intellectual inconsistency the success of these efforts to manufacture a God out of whole cloth.

It is our belief that any attempt to elaborate a God through philosophy will fail. God must first exist to be discovered and described, or he does not exist at all. The work of science, and of philosophy as science, is to analyze, classify, delineate, explain; never to produce, except as better understanding is real production. Philosophy as applied in the study of religion must abide by the same rules of procedure. It can not produce a religion; it can only describe one as given. If it can be shown that God and religion have empirical sources, and if these sources can be laid bare, then we shall feel that a methodology will have been established that may be applied as well to the religion of Caliban as to that of Jesus or Paul. To this end, the writer will rehearse the anthropological commonplaces that go to show that religion was present in the life of mankind before the conception of any God arose; he will try to show that the conception of God has been very variable and has undergone, in our Western religion at least, continual change, and, finally, that just as religion has existed before the God-concept arose, just so it may exist at the present time after the demands of science have [reduced the meaning of God to a name representative of certain values,] that is adopted and used as a convenient and historically significant means of self-expression. In other words, our last point means that the conception of God as a Being represents an

historical phase of religion that modern scientific knowledge finds no place for; and that the religious man who is at the same time scientific adopts this name only as a convenient vehicle of self-representation.

### 1. *Religion below the Plane of the God-Concept*

Anthropologists have differed largely among themselves as to the meaning that should be conveyed by the term religion. Tylor, one of the pioneers in this field, would have the minimum definition of religion imply "the belief in spiritual beings." J. G. Frazer insists that the word religion should be limited to apply only to "a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life." This definition aimed to make a distinction between primitive scientific control and the worship of spiritual beings. Primitive men have been found to believe very generally "that the course of nature is determined, not by the passions or caprice of personal beings, but by the operation of immutable laws acting mechanically." Personal beings were to be propitiated by worship; the impersonal forces of nature were to be controlled by the possession of the proper charm or the performance of the proper ceremony, before which there was no denial.

This clear-cut distinction between religion and magic that Frazer made, has, however, been denied in the more recent anthropological literature. Rather, it seems that there is no division line between the two. Shotwell, in an article entitled "The Rôle of Magic"<sup>1</sup> says: "Religion was no special creation midway along the centuries of human groping; it was but the intenser action of that mystic power which lay at the heart of magic," And again, "For mana (the mysterious power behind contagion) does not die out when animism appears, nor when animism grows into anthropomorphism, nor even when polytheism passes away before monotheism. Its maleficent element grows less and less apparent and its beneficence more, until, as divine grace, it nourishes the faith and strengthens the moral purpose of the Christian world. In the sacraments of the Church it still works by the laws of sympathetic magic. In the realm of faith it has at last left the material media of its long prehistoric phase."<sup>2</sup> The point made by Professor Shotwell is well illustrated in our Western religious tradition by the automatically communicable magic of the ark, or pork, or of manna collected in quantity, as related of that phase of Hebrew religious evolution when Jehovah was as yet a polytheistic deity.

<sup>1</sup> *Am. Jour. of Soc.*, Vol. 15, p. 791.

<sup>2</sup> *Id.*, p. 791.

More recent attempts to define religion make it coterminous with the range of objects to be described by such words as *sacra*, *hiera*, *mana*, *manitou*, etc. Certain experiences of the primitive man seem to be more highly charged with the essence of life than others. It is as if the all-pervading current of reality produced sparks at certain given points, which thereafter represent *par excellence* the force behind life. Such places, persons, or things are set apart as different, exceptional. They are to be employed carefully, for, while rightly used they are powerful aids, wrongly used or carelessly approached, they are extremely dangerous. Hence the meaning of *sacra*, *mana*, etc.

The conception of *mana* appears in the religions of Melanesia. It means psychic energy of all kinds and is, essentially, created by human beings. It may, however, act through the medium of water, or a stone, or other natural object. The chief point in Melanesian religion is to get this *mana* for oneself or to get it used in one's behalf. Whatever has come to be regarded as *mana* exerts an extraordinary power.

The Algonkin conception of *manitou* is described by William Jones in the *Journal of American Folk-Lore*,<sup>2</sup> in part as follows: "In the first place the term *manitou* is a religious word; it carries with it the idea of solemnity; and whatever the association it always expresses a serious attitude, and kindles an emotional sense of mystery. The conception involved in its use can best be shown by taking up some features of Algonkin religion.

"The essential character of Algonkin religion is a pure, naive worship of nature. In one way or another associations cluster about an object and give it a certain potential value; and because of this supposed potentiality, the object becomes the recipient of an adoration. The degree of the adoration depends in some measure upon the extent of confidence reposed in the object, and upon its supposed power of bringing pleasure or inflicting pain. The important thing with the individual is the emotional effect experienced while in the presence of the object, or with an interpreted manifestation of the object. The individual keeps watch for the effect, and it is the effect that fills the mind with a vague sense of something strange, something mysterious, something intangible. One feels it as the result of an active substance, and one's attitude toward it is purely passive.

"To experience a thrill is authority enough of the existence of the substance. The sentiment of its reality is made known by the fact that something has happened. It is futile to ask an Algonkin for an articulate definition of the substance, partly because it would be something about which he does not concern himself, and partly be-

cause he is quite satisfied with the sentiment of its existence. He feels that the property is everywhere, is omnipresent. . . .

"The ceremonial lodge is a holy symbol; it means a place where one can enter into communication with higher powers, where with sacrifice and offering, with music and dance one obtains audience and can ask for things beyond human control; it means a place where one can forget the material world and enjoy the experience of that magic spell which one feels is the sign that not only is one in the presence of the supernatural property, but in that of the beings who hold it in high degree. It is a function with a very definite purpose. It is to invoke the presence of an objective reality; the objectified ideal may be animate or inanimate. And the effect is in the nature of a pleasing thrill, a sense of resignation, a consolation. This effect is the proof of the presence of the manitou."

In summing up the meaning of primitive religion, R. R. Marett, in the article "Primitive Religion," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, says it is "the consecration of life, the stimulation of the will to live and to do." He adds that "this bracing of the vital feeling takes place by means of imaginative appeal to the great forces man perceives stirring within him and about him, such appeal proving effective doubtless by reason of the psychological law that to conceive strongly is to imitate." The general effect of contact with the sacred objects or "churinga," is said by Spencer and Gillen in their works on the Central Australian tribes, to be to make the tribesman "glad." It likewise makes him "good," so that he is no longer greedy and selfish. It endows him with second sight, gives him success and confidence in war, and strengthens him in unlimited ways.

## 2. *The Various Theisms*

Anthropology has as yet been unable to furnish a thoroughly satisfactory classification of religions in an ascending series. But it seems enough to say that religion begins in the primitive forms discussed in the preceding section and exhibits development until it reaches the plane of monotheism. The worship of sacred objects develops into animism, the worship of spirits. The savage, tripping over the vine that lay concealed in his path, feels that he has had a contact with an evil spirit. Returning from a bootless hunt, he blames his ill-fortune upon an unfriendly genius of the woods; or, staggering homeward under the heavy weight of spoils, he is careful to offer up to his good spirit the choicest morsel of the quarry. He lives in a world that is peopled with spirits. The river, the tree, the thunder-cloud, the fruitful field, the shining crystal, the peaceful moon, the life-giving rain, the grateful sunlight,—all are more than

just river, crystal, and sun: they are living spirits and have an attitude of praise or blame toward him. There are spirits of earth and sky and air; spirits of the nation, of the province, of the district, of the hills, of the lakes, of the grains: spirits that guard the crafts and guilds of the industries and agriculture; spirits for the household operations, for the kitchen range and the sauce-pot; spirits protecting the threshold, the door, the hinge; spirits fertilizing the land with water-springs, the givers of corn and wine and oil; spirits that guard the mores of the tribe and punish transgressions against the established ways of acting.

Group life, with its institution of common worship, tends to reduce to common possession all those values that represent the welfare of its members. Such aspects of their experience as appertain to all,—the group-ancestor, the arching sky, the broad river, the moon, the sun, or the storm-cloud, are celebrated in chant and dance and sacrifice. As any or all of these objects of experience become matters of common knowledge and regard, the culture of the group ministers to the perpetuation, the enlargement and the coordination of the tradition that concerns them. As one or other object of worship becomes preeminent within the group, a special cult arises and the deity gains in definiteness and distinctness of conception. Thus there develop gods of nature, such as Varuna, Dyaus, Neptune, Apollo, and Zeus; plant and animal deities; ancestral gods; gods of social institutions and national feeling, such as the hearth-fire gods, city gods and national deities; and gods that represent the sentiments and affections of men and consecrate their moral energies; as well as others too numerous to mention.

It is difficult to believe that religion is other than a natural psychological product. It begins with the conception of sacred objects that foster or decrease human values; it continues in the attribution of particular values to the control of certain spirits, and ends with the attribution of all, or at least much more numerous values to the disposal of a divinity or a group of divinities. No one is likely to question the subjective element in the process of god-making if the reference is to the phenomena of animism, for that is to be regarded as akin to a belief in ghosts. Nor is there likely to be any objection to one's saying that gods are subjective creations, arising out of the poetic impulse, if the term god is applied to the divinities of the Greek or Roman pantheon, the mythology of the Aryans or the Norse Saga. But when one attempts to show that God, the God we worship, was originally just such an autochthonic divinity, there is likely to be considerable demurring and frequently flat denial. To be sure, the God of the present-day Western tradition is not the same

as the God that brought the Children of Israel out of the land of Egypt; but he is the lineal descendant of that God, Jehovah, who was one God out of many that arose among the Semites, just as Zeus and Apollo did among the Greeks, and was no more than the subjectively originated divinity who represented the values held dear to the descendants of Abraham.

One can ask for no better illustration of the elements that enter into the conception of a god, and of the progress through polytheism to monotheism, than the naturalistic, poetic creation of God at the hands of the Hebrew prophets and teachers, as represented in the course of the history of the Jewish people. Hebrew literature abounds in examples of the way in which those values that relate most directly to man's biological continuance and enjoyment were attributed to Jehovah. It was he that gave or withheld fertility of soil, sunshine, rain, increase of flocks and herds, many children, long life and protection from enemies, disease and the violence of nature. He is the sublime and worshipful one, whom the psalmist apostrophizes and whose glories he sings.

The ethical values that Jehovah favors originate in the moral practices and ideals of the Hebrew tribe or nation, and are easily and spontaneously transferred to him. The beginning of the Hebrew tradition occurs when "Jehovah said unto Abram, get thee out of thy country and from thy kindred and from thy father's house, unto the land that I will show unto thee.") Jehovah was then not even a tribal god, but the patron divinity of a single family. He met with his protégés at springs of water, in clumps of trees, and upon high places, appearing in apparitions and dreams and talking with them in the most open and democratic way. He was no less approachable for Hagar, the servant in the tent of Abraham, than he was for the patriarch himself. His protection was over the members of the family, and he brought them peace and plenty. They worshipped him at the sacrificial meal, pouring out his portion upon the sacred rock or smearing the sacred pillar with fat and oil. In morals, he was as easy-going as they, and accepted the crude nomadic code. Abraham's harsh treatment of Hagar and his willingness to offer up his first-born son, Isaac, are imputed to him for righteousness. Jacob's deception of Isaac, aided and abetted by his mother Rebecca, a heroine of the early story, is related only as a tale worth the telling. Evidently, Jacob's moral obliquity (from our point of view) had no fatal consequences to his peace of mind, for on his journey from home to escape the wrath of Esau, he had reassuring heavenly visions. Lying, drunkenness, adultery, and incest are unrebuked elements in the moral life of the patriarchs.



The laws promulgated by Moses at the Mount exhibit a distinct advance over the earlier moral standards of the Hebrews; and, accordingly, they represent God as ethicized to the same degree. By this time, the exigencies of a more intricate group life have compelled and brought about a more involved and definite statement of mutual obligations and privileges within the tribe, although the members of the out-group remain as yet without moral status. At this stage of the historical development, Jehovah is thought of and worshipped as the giver of just laws for the governance of his chosen people. Whether or not Moses wrote the fundamental mores of his tribe upon tablets of stone and presented them to the people for ratification, is neither here nor there; but that the historic consciousness of the group recognizes the occurrence as a fact is all-important. When the people of Israel accepted their obligation to do the will of Jehovah, the God of Nature and the guardian of their national destinies, they brought deliberately into consciousness the moral demands of that divinity and took upon themselves the consequences of failure to fulfil their part of the contract. For, in that act, their relation to Jehovah became one of contract, entailing mutual obligations. Service of Jehovah on the part of the people was recognized as bringing national prosperity and tribal success; while a falling away in service was inevitably followed by loss of Jehovah's favor. And the converse was equally true; national or individual calamity was the sign of sin, secret or known, and prosperity was the indication of satisfactory performance of obligation.

When wider political contacts and crushing national vicissitudes in the late centuries of the Two Kingdoms had caused the religious geniuses of the day to see the cosmopolitanism of virtue and the world-sweep of moral movements, the religion of the Hebrews came to possess its universal significance. Jehovah is recognized as the guide of all national destinies and not as simply the champion of a given race. His function is no longer to guarantee the success and sanctity of a single set of mores, but he is recognized as the commander-in-chief of all the forces of good everywhere in the world. And if Jewish religion thus gains in universality, it gains no less in intensiveness. Each individual is to know his moral independence and his moral responsibility. Outward ceremonial gives way to inward experience. The fat of lambs and the blood of slain beasts are distasteful to a God who insists upon the sacrifice of an humble and contrite spirit. Mercy and justice and humility are required of man, but only such manifestations of a regenerated and purified life are of worth in God's sight.

The mouthpieces and the creators of religious opinion during this

period were the great spiritual innovators, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and others of scarcely less power. They studied the social and ethical conditions of their day and cried out against the greedy, swinish guilt of the orthodox followers of the cultus. Without hesitation, they ascribed to Jehovah characteristics that were called for in their own application of the principles of ancient custom, but missed in the formal application of law and rule, or voluntarily set aside. Of their own initiative they broke through the inconsistencies connected with using a tribal unit in ethical concerns and extended wide the frontiers of the moral kingdom. "Are ye not as the children of the Ethiopians to me, O children of Israel? saith Jehovah. Have not I brought up Israel out of the land of Egypt, and the Philistines from Caphtor and the Syrians from Kir?"<sup>4</sup> [They recognized new ethical values, produced by changed political and social conditions, and they unhesitatingly spoke of them as the requirements of Jehovah for his people. The prophets literally remade their God to include an intensive, spiritual, and universal morality.]

The next phase of the developing Hebrew religion is to be regarded, from the standpoint of a later time and a more inclusive retrospect, as a backward step. Israel returns from captivity with a codified system of moral and religious practise, but without the political freedom that had been the main source of ethical movement in the earlier centuries of its history. An ecclesiastical feudalism takes the place of the monarchy. A petrified legal code is substituted for the free spiritual life that had fostered the insight and the influence of the prophets. Regulation and systematization of the religious practises, as laid down in a book of laws, supplant the former autonomy of worship. Scribes and lawyers are needed to interpret the intricacies of a general code when it is to be applied to the exigencies of daily practise; and their decisions come to represent precedent that may never be disregarded. Hebrew religion becomes the practise of a legal code, and God himself is made subservient to the power of the Book. As was to be expected, the spirit of life fled the religion of later Hebraism, and the dry bones of a static creed stultified the Holy of Holies of spiritual insight and moral endeavor.

The true succession of the Hebrew prophetic tradition occurs in the life and teachings of Jesus of Nazareth, which represent the revolt of a truly religious and moral nature against the death of legalism and class pride. Steeped in the writings of the great prophets of an earlier day, and possessed in himself of a spirituality that was adequate to the work of ethical and religious innovation, Jesus interpreted to his fellow-men a conception of God and of the

<sup>4</sup> Amos, 9:7.

higher life that has not to the present day been superseded in our Western world and which seems to be universal in its appeal.

Jesus primarily conceived of God as a Father of humanity, and much has been made of this preference. In subsequent estimates of the significance of Jesus, the figurative expression has been exalted to the plane of literal fact. Our own belief is that Jesus no more thought of himself as the only son than did the Psalmist who applied the name father to Jehovah. Jehovah is a Father just as he is a Shepherd, a Protector and Shield, a Teacher, a Judge, or a Rock in a Weary Land. [Jesus's choice of the word father to express his conception of Jehovah, is to be understood on the basis of the ethical values he recognized. These values were of the inner spiritual life, intimate and personal.] Of utmost importance for him was the maintenance in an individual of a proper motive or attitude, which was the having at heart of the interests of all men. For Jesus, the human race represents a vast brotherhood, all sons of a common Father. He recognized the Father as the source and preserver of all values, both those that reside in the objects of the physical environment and those that have their existence in moral relations. We pray, "Our Father who art in Heaven, hallowed be thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done on earth as it is done in Heaven. Give us this day our daily bread. Forgive us our debts" as we exhibit thy spirit in our dealings with thine other children.

Jesus considered himself the lineal descendant of Jewish religious tradition. He came not to destroy the Law, but that it might be fulfilled in the true spirit of its underlying principles. He literally preaches anew the messages of the prophets. His conception of God combines the elements of universal power and absolute goodness. God is all-powerful for good. His kingdom shall come upon earth and is being daily furthered. To be of this kingdom necessitates a state of mind of which the keynote is expansiveness of interest. If your life is to be one with God, says Jesus, exemplify in your dealings with mankind the same solicitude and love that God exhibits toward you. The Universe is friendly to you; then should you also be friendly to men. The call is to a great mission: Be ye perfect even as God is perfect. And as a preparation for this mission, recognize your own weakness and unfitness. Cleanse your heart of pride and self-satisfaction, becoming as a little child, and thus make room for the thoughts and actions that are of God's kingdom. Gain your own worth from the greatness of the cause you serve. Live in the lives and interests of others. Sow the seed of altruism and reap the harvest of a richer, deeper soul-life for yourself.

### 3. *A Religion Compatible with Modern Science*

We have watched the development of religion from its most primitive forms to its manifestation in an ethical monotheism. In the whole story of this spiritual evolution there has been little notice taken of intellectual consistency. Certainly it was present, but it operated within the easy boundaries of poetry. The point of view taken is well represented by Hocking in "The Meaning of God in Human Experience," when he says, "Taking religious ideas literally and fixedly is, in fact, a modern and Western peculiarity. The Oriental mind realizes that the spiritual atmosphere that men or gods may breathe, must be *created*; it knows nothing of empirical truth in matters of religion, truth passively taken; and postulate joins hands with poetry in constituting the medium in which all spirituality may live."<sup>5</sup>

When men began to cast their observations and theories regarding reality in the stable moulds of fact, when they left off telling tales, philosophy began. The history of Greek philosophy is a progressive record of the overthrow of simple faith in poetic creations, in favor of an intellectually consistent formulation of reality. The first mature systems of Greek philosophy were the materialism of Democritus and the idealism of Plato. Both may be called scientific, but both were speculative science. The latter has been closely connected with the structure of classical Christianity, for which it afforded an intellectual groundwork that so perfectly corresponded with the poetic religion of the Jews that for long centuries the hybrid formed of their union was able to meet the spiritual needs of the people of the Western world. But when a new spirit of inquiry, based on the observation and the manipulation of experience came into vogue in Western Europe, the speculative science of the Greeks was irretrievably overthrown, dogmatic materialism as well as dogmatic idealism falling before the critical philosophy of Kant. The story of this disintegration of the intellectual supports of classical Christianity has been told in a previous chapter and the attempts of speculative philosophy to build anew the walls of a ruined temple have been viewed and discarded. What we now propose is to take with us the method that has, in the preceding section of this chapter, described for us and made understandable the meaning and the evolution of religions among men, into the experiences of a modern life, with the expectation, not of creating a religion and a God, but of finding a vital, inspiring, and satisfying contact with reality that will prove to be the religion that we are seeking; and of then being

able to define the meaning of God with reference to the experience thus discovered.

It will be said at once by the reader and critic that the God of the ages of faith described in the foregoing section was believed in as an entity, a Being that had independent, personal existence, whereas the man who has analyzed out the elements that enter into the conception of God and has explained his existence as residing in certain values, can only be practising self-deception in making an appeal or voicing a hymn of praise and thanksgiving to his own psychological product. It is not the writer's purpose to try to underestimate the thorough-going difference in standpoint that his description involves as against the attitude of an age of faith. It must be admitted that science limits the grounds of faith. When the lightning bolt is the missile of Jove and the thunder is the voice of Jehovah, there is much greater room for religious expression than when lightning is known as an electric spark that finds its point of discharge according to physical laws, and when thunder is known as the result of sudden heating and expansion of the atmosphere. Pestilence in a scientific age does not mean the hand of God, but it signifies the presence of germ-breeding filth and bad sanitary conditions. Boils are not the special dispensation of God but are the result of bad blood. The more there is of knowledge of the conditions governing any phase of human interest and activity, the less there is of mystery. Under modern conditions of scientific agriculture it is impossible to conceive of the worship of a Baal, or soil-god. A crop depends upon known or ascertainable conditions of soil, heat and moisture. When a crop fails, instead of feeling that Baal has been unfavorable, one knows that the land needs bone fertilizer or barnyard manure; or that his agricultural project has been hindered by an unusually low temperature, or an amount of rainfall below that which is known as essential.

It will be said that scientific knowledge and control have driven mystery and prayer out of human experience; that science has banished God. Certainly a great deal of what was included in the conception of God has been removed through the prevalence of rational controls, and if God were only a particular Being with a particular sphere of influence, or if he were a concept with a specific content, once for all given and unchangeable, it would be true that God is dead and that the age of religion is past. But religion existed before any god whatsoever was thought of,—before mankind had developed an intellectual life capable of conceiving reality in terms of gods and goddesses. If religion existed before it was objectified in god-worship, it is presumed that it repre-

sents a function of experience that is present even after an intellectual criterion has developed that refuses to allow the description of the religious aspects of life in the poetical language of myth and theology. The writer takes the position that religion is a function of life, and that wherever men are alive to the meaning and possibilities of life, it will be present.]

Obviously, the next thing to be done in the development of our thesis is to present, as far as possible, the religious experience of a modern man who is as thoroughgoing in his intellectual life as the scientific attitude compels him to be. This does not mean that every modern man will have the experiences described, for religion is, like many other experiences, somewhat of a specialty. But we shall hope to describe some of the religious experiences of a man whom we shall choose and whom you will recognize, perhaps, in your colleague and neighbor, and in yourself.

The writer admits at the outset the lack of a scientific criterion of the choice of experiences that he will denominate as religious. He offers a tentative list, at the same time recognizing that he has probably erred on the side of omission, and possibly on the side of inclusion. The list as given has been chosen with reference to four criteria: first, the salient points of experience that have been taken account of in so numerous religions and mythologies; second, the literature of the occidental religious tradition (excepting always the other-world emphasis of an eschatology based on Greek metaphysics); third, the messages of modern prophetic agencies, particularly the pulpit that is in touch with modern life as seen through the medium of social science; and, fourth, such introspections into his own experience as seem to the writer to correspond to what others call religion. The method pursued is not, to be sure, rigorously scientific, but it seems to be impossible at the present writing to reduce the conception in mind to more satisfactory form.

To begin with, a certain kind of mystery enters into some of the experiences that are generally recognized as religious, as, for example, the mystery of the cosmos, of birth and of death. The mere brute presence of the universe, without beginning and without end in time and without limit in space, is a matter that presents the thoughtful man with characteristic feelings. It is not merely a puzzle that confronts him, but a mystery of a degree of finality that completely baffles him. The potency of this experience is exhibited in the cosmological proof of the existence of God, for men felt themselves compelled to explain the mystery by positing God as the first cause of it all. Kant's logic showed the futility of such an easy way out of the dilemma, but even in the presence of his proof of the im-

possibility of proof of a beginning, the existent fact of cosmic reality finds men in the same attitude of mysterious awe as caused them in a less critical age to call the name of God. The same feeling of mystery is present when one looks at a new-born babe. You may know the facts of embryology, but that does not lessen the wonder of this new-created life. Protoplasmic cells were transmuted from the commonplace materials of ordinary diet into muscular and nervous and other tissue, and now it lives, a human being fraught with all the possibilities of existence. Had it failed to wail, had it failed to breathe, it had not been. That little difference between being and not-being as a living organism is the point at which one always sticks and before which one bows in reverence. Closely akin to the mystery that accompanies the beginning of life is that which is present when death puts in its claim. Here was a man even as you and I; a friend, a business associate, who moved and talked and laughed. Now he is cold. He is not here. Where has he gone? What has happened to him? We are impatient when it is answered his heart stopped beating, his breathing ceased. A fool could say as much. But what has happened, we ask? and no answer is forthcoming.

[Then, too, men find themselves worshipful in the presence of the perfection of the natural world.] This experience was long taken as an infallible proof of the existence of God. If a thing exhibits foresight and design, men naturally think that there is foresight and design back of it. Rocks do not fall together by accident to form bridges and cathedrals; wheels and pivots do not spontaneously collect themselves into a watch. On the same analogy, the world, a larger device, does not come into existence haphazard, but by design; and, therefore, as explanatory of the perfection of nature, men have posited God as its maker and builder. One may be thoroughly familiar with the Kantian criticism of the validity of this proof, as given in other pages of this paper, but the facts that led men to embark upon that way of demonstration are yet present. One has but to think of the precision of movement of the heavenly bodies; has but to see a man and know what processes are involved in his moving and thinking; has only to observe the instinctive life of bee or bird,—to feel a sense of reverent worship in the presence of the facts observed.

Again, one has a feeling of personal insignificance as he views the sublime aspects of nature. When one looks up at the starlit heavens above him and has a feeling of the stupendous distances, the mighty masses, the unthinkable forces, that are involved in celestial mechanics; when he tries to imagine the wealth of numbers of those glowing points or to find a limit to their presence in space; when he

allows the sheer beauty and majesty and peace of it all to enter his mind and dwell there, he has had an experience that should be named religious.)

[Not only does one have this feeling of personal insignificance in the presence of the greatness and the vastness of the natural world, but before other aspects of it as well. He is reduced to awesome fear by its uncontrollable force. Rivers at flood, overflowing their banks and destroying property and life; ocean storms, with waves running mountainously, tossing about as if they were corks upon a rivulet the mightiest engines of war and commerce that man's ingenuity can produce, and swallowing up men's hopes without feeling or remorse; the devastating tornado, crumpling up the buildings of human hands as if they were cardboard and exacting its toll of death and destruction; the dread terror of the thunderbolt, instantaneous and incalculable,—all such meetings bring men upon their knees.)

[Furthermore, man is controlled, even in his most practical and commonplace activities, by contingencies that beset him behind and before, and render at naught his most cherished purposes. The seed that one plants in the ground, after toilsome preparation and with anticipation of an abundant crop, lives a precarious existence and dies fruitless for want of rain. The growing cornfield, full of promise of sustenance for man and beast, is stripped bare by the devastating hail. The life begun with every promise of success and usefulness, falls by the way, the victim of accident or disease; and you say farewell to the friend of your heart when his race stops in full career. Man's life, from the day of his birth to the day of his death, is waylaid with contingencies. To be sure, this thought is not sufficient to destroy the optimism of life, but it is certainly enough to temper our happiness with sadness, to slow up our headlong pursuits, and to give a certain depth and seriousness to character. Man can never be sufficient to himself; he can not even find self-sufficiency in his labors, his friendships, and his ideals. There is always a residue of uncharted possibility which is present to lay him by the heels; and the man who truly knows life and is reverent before it, recognizes the limit of foresight and prediction.]

[One has, moreover, a religious feeling in the presence of the benevolence of nature. As one walks abroad after a rain that has drenched the soil and brought renewed growth to the plant world and comfort to man and beast, he feels within him the stir of elemental feelings of worship that are as old as the race. The renewal of life in the springtime, after the long dominion of frost is over, and the gathering of the harvest in midsummer and autumn, no less awaken within one the sense of the goodness of his station. Indeed, if there were



not more of security than of harm, of success than of failure, of life than of death, our God would not be a loving God; our religion would not be one of hope, but would be one of despair; our deity would be a devil. To be sure, storms are comparatively few, and accidents more frequent in anticipation than in realization. We pursue our cherished ends, on the whole, successfully and unafraid. Life is rich, or tolerable, and always desirable. At the last analysis, this positive valuation put upon life is the foundation of our occidental religion and philosophy. The habit and the anticipation of success build bridges from past enjoyments of the goodness of life over the pitfalls and morasses of accident and loss and failure, to the solid ground of future realization of predominant welfare. And thus arises a conception of life as good, and of the universe as, on the whole, friendly to our personal issues.)

[The religious feelings that have so far been described have related to man's reaction in the presence of his physical environment.]

[Others, yet to be named, are representative of experiences that he has as a member of a social group. Man's ethical life has always been of profound concern to himself and others, and has, with equal unanimity of practise, been put under the protection of divinities or has been their particular and jealous interest. As a practical example of this fact, we have seen how successively widening ethical standards were automatically applied to Jehovah in the course of Hebrew history. In attempting to single out the particular feelings or experiences that are related to this aspect of religion, three seem to stand out as predominant, namely, a feeling of personal worth and significance, a pervasive and warming expansiveness of sympathy, and an invigoration of action in accordance with one's standards and ideals.]

We have said that there is something about man's natural environment that tends to produce in him a sense of personal insignificance. When he views life "*sub specie aeternitatis*," his selfhood shrivels up. But in the ethical realm he comes into his own heritage; he is on human ground. He is a significant part of the process of ethicising conduct that has gone on only through such as he. If we employ figurative language, we may say that God has always spoken his ethical messages through men. The prophet is as necessary to the act of revelation as is the spiritual, divine source. In that way the prophet takes on a divine character, too, and has personal worth. Denuded of the figures of speech, such a statement as the foregoing means that men from time to time have turned their attention vigorously and undividedly to the subject of human conduct and have gained insights that they have regarded as worthy, even divine, and

that the call has been upon them to give to others their own light. This sense of expert knowledge and of commission to speak, operates in the direction of magnifying and intensifying the feeling of personal worth.

We have spoken of the close connection between ethical invention or virtuosoship and the sense of personal worth, but it is not to be implied that the condition of originality is essential to the latter experience. One may gain an enlarged selfhood through mere enlistment in ethical enterprises,—through a personal ratification and adoption of ideals that one finds existent. Indeed, such is likely to be the beginning of all ethical enthusiasm. [This sense of rediscovery of ethical values, this enlistment in the army of the Lord, if you please, is accompanied by an experience that is unique. It is one of warmth and expansiveness of affection, of the presence of a general or universal sympathy. There is a feeling that one would do largely and well, that he would like to remake the world to a better pattern, that one would increase by one's own efforts and enthusiasm the sum-total of human welfare in the world. Probably such experiences are more frequent and more powerful in one's early life, especially during adolescence, but it certainly may be present on later occasions as well. There will be times when one seems to be better than oneself; when he would devote himself immediately and unreservedly to an ethical cause or to all ethical causes. His experience is catholic in its inclusiveness of good causes. Such meetings as these are the mountain peaks of the ethical life. It is on such occasions that one builds tabernacles and worships. One's main difficulty is that one is not able to bring all of the potentially realized power down into the plane of every-day existence. One's faith is too small to perform all the miracles that one had proposed.]

There is a parallel to the facts above described in the history of a love. There are times when mind and body conspire to make the sympathy and the loyalty of two persons for one another a very poignant realization. The lovers skip over the ever-present clods and boulders and pitfalls of moral and mental and social differences, of drudgery, of poverty, mayhap, without any realization of the existence of such things. But the pace will come to be less furious, and obstacles will have to be reckoned with. Happy is that love which finds itself able to walk and not faint, to furnish an ever-present store of affection to infuse the drudgery of life with its essence, to insure mutual contribution to compromise, to overlook the weakness, the latent incapacity, the mistakes that most lives will furnish in abundant measure. But all these things love can do and continually does do. Just so, the experiences that men have upon the mountain-

tops of ethical vision, while lost in their original freshness and poignancy, follow them down into every-day, practical life, to invigorate them in the pursuit of their vocations and to strengthen them in the service of their causes. This, then, is the third specific character that appears in the religious experience as it develops in connection with the social life: a sense of direction, a knowledge of purpose, a consciousness of satisfaction, even joy, in the doing of one's every-day duty as it appears in one's vocation, in one's family life, or in any other capacity that one's social setting establishes for him.

The objection may be raised that the elements named herein as entering into and constituting the religious experience are too few and make that experience too meager. It may be said, however, that the elements chosen are fundamental and far-reaching, embracing man's reaction to the cosmic mother that brings him forth and sustains him, and his self-expression as a man among men. Furthermore, there is no reason to suppose that religion is a complex matter. Many centuries ago, a religious expert made a pronouncement upon the subject to the effect that the essence of religion is ethical conduct and reverence before life.<sup>6</sup> These fundamental attitudes are, of course, modified and elaborated by the entire experience of the individual who exhibits them. The attitude toward nature as shown in the primitive Bushman or Algonkin, in the theologizing Greek or Jew, and in the modern man highly developed in his knowledge of causes and controls, will differ according to his understanding and means of description. The invigoration of the will of the Melanesian follows the line of Melanesian ethical standards. So likewise of the Greek, or Jewish, or any other race. The Christian of the early Middle Ages was impelled by his mystic experiences of God to seek him in terms of self-denial and the castigation of his body; the Christian of the present day finds his activity heightened in ways suggested by the prevalent social ethics.

We have described religion at the beginning of this chapter as a natural psychological product, and have tried to indicate in very brief fashion the development of religion as related to successively higher intellectual and ethical backgrounds. We believe that the term natural is correctly applied not only to the rude gropings of primitive man, but to the reaction to his total environment on the part of the man exhibiting the most highly developed intellectual and ethical standards. Our final task has been an attempt to exhibit a religion that no longer takes account of a Being called God, having

<sup>6</sup> Micah, 6: 6-8.

specific, individual reality independent of the sense of biological and ethical values as resident in the experiences of human beings.

If it be allowed that we have described a religious experience without having had recourse to the conception of God, there yet remains the question whether such religion has any use for that conception. The answer must be carefully stated. If by God is meant a Being independent of the causal series of the given natural universe, and independent of those human values and human intellectual tendencies that have, according to our description, resulted in his creation at the hands of mankind, then the answer is that the presumed existence of such a Being is contrary to facts supported by the best intellectual standards and usages of our day. If, on the other hand, by the term God is meant a name for a set of experiences that are described as religious, then there is every reason for the retention and use of the word.

The reality of religion is just the same as the reality of fear, ambition, or the paper on which you read these lines. What is fear, for example, except a name that stands for certain experiences? Detach the word fear from its meaning and it is a strange, unrelated, and crazy thing. Spell it, say it aloud, look at it detached from its setting on the page; and what have you? Or paper! What is paper but the things you do with it? the impressions you get of it? Take it apart from its meaning and you have nothing. It does not seem reasonable to condemn the significance of names because they are only names; for they lead us up into the presence of our realities and, in fact, stand so close to those realities that they are thought of and used as the very realities themselves.

The writer would use the name God in the same way that he uses any other name; in fact, in the same way many races have used the names of their religious beings. Venus was to the Greeks not merely the name of the goddess of love and beauty; Venus *was* love and beauty. The Greeks caught the reality in the name. The reality as named was their divinity. Just so, it is not thought by the writer to be in any sense derogatory to the dignity of God that he be known as a named reality. God is the symbol of a set of experiences called religious. He is not an invention of a lively brain, or the mere product of a philosophical interest. God is the name for the reality of religious experiences; the religious experiences are the reality of God. God and religion are synonymous, and both stand for the reality of a realized or realizable experience. To say that one has God in his life is to say that he is religious. Both names, God and religion, are only convenient means of representing the meant facts, without which both would be strange and meaningless sounds.

The objection will probably be raised that the use of the word God has been preempted in favor of another conception that conveys the meaning, among others, of independent, substantial existence, and that it shows a lack of initiative to take an old name to cover a new meaning. Outside of the fact that such is always the fate of words, it might be said that the similarity between the two conceptions is more important than their differences. There is the unlikeness of a slightly different projection. In the one case, God is projected beyond experience; in the other, he lives within it. But both conceptions represent the same experiences and operate through the same functions. If one wants to make himself understood when he talks about the facts of religion, he can do so by using the name of God. If he wishes to participate in the religious thoughts and feelings of another, he will translate in his own way the use which that one makes of God. Even if he is talking with some one of like mind with himself, he will use the word God as a means of clear and concise self-expression. Accordingly, there is every reason for the continued use of the name God to signify our religious experiences, as it makes for continuity in the religious tradition of the Western world, and furnishes a simple and poetic method of describing a set of experiences that are not too clearly defined but very generally comprehended.

It seems necessary to anticipate and try to meet a final objection to our thesis. It will be said that such a God as has been described is no God at all. His existence is dependent wholly upon a human individual. If that individual has the experiences herein described, then God is; if he does not have them, then God is not. The problem as stated has at least two references. One of these is to the continuity of the God experience in the life of any individual. It will be said that the feelings on which the God-consciousness hinges are comparatively infrequent; and where is God in the meantime? In answer, it may be advanced that, although the most significant meetings are occasional, they throw their influence over the intervals between; they color the whole of one's experience and finally come to infuse their spirit into an habitual way of conceiving reality and confronting life. Neither must one lose sight of the fact that in the lives of many persons who conceive of God as a Being, he sometimes appears to be absent. Even in that supreme experience of courage and self-sacrifice of Jesus, he had a feeling that God had forsaken him; and many lesser men have had the same experience for longer periods than the momentary eclipse that the Master's faith suffered. Indeed, it may be said that some men are forsaken and call in vain.

A second reference of the problem stated is to those lives that never experience God, or religion, at all. It is said that God exists

whether wicked and callous men know him or not. But how different is the position of men who do not know God under either of the two conceptions of God's being? If God is worth taking account of at all, to know him is of positive worth. That man who is hard and unresponsive, who does not expand to the meaning of life, has already had his sad reward. If the opponent is thinking of a God who will clap the sinner into hell after he dies, there may be a practical advantage, even if an ethical loss, in the conception of God as a Being. But, brought down to the level of concrete facts, the different conceptions see the unreligious man in the same light.

#### 4. *Practical Conclusions*

The practical religious situation to-day exhibits a strange medley of intellectual points of view. There are men (and I am speaking now of men who possess intellectual interests) who understand God's nature and prove his existence in terms of the dogmatic rationalism that represents the spirit of Greek thought. There are others whose intellectual setting for their religious experience is some form of post-Kantian Idealism. There are yet others who frankly say that they do not know what God is nor how to prove his existence, but their firm conviction that he is and that he is working mightily for good, affords them all the assurance they require for hearty service. On the other hand, we see a very fair unanimity of opinion in regard to the values that are worth preserving and propagating. Religion has ceased, in a large measure, to be an other-world interest and is concerned with the promotion of social values that represent the progressive ethical spirit of the times. The missionary movement, for example, is not bidding for support on the grounds that heathen may be saved from hell, but that an opportunity may be given to carry to those lands that are socially backward, those ideas and practises that make for the larger, richer life here on earth. And so, in countless lines of effort, the churches are exhibiting a concern for such values as are fully abreast of the best ethical feeling of the generation.

This substantial agreement in ethical aims that is exhibited in current religious life, as contrasted with the confusion of intellectual formulas, is a matter for congratulation. It is hardly to be expected that all men will ever reach the same plane of understanding, or that they will ever attain unanimity of belief; it is a present fact that they have already largely attained a unity of purpose. But if, as we have said and tried to show in this paper, intellectual consistency in religion is essential only to the extent of being able to free the life for wholesouled action, and the really important thing is to live

consciously and steadfastly in the presence of the highest human values, then surely disagreements in regard to intellectual settings may be discounted and largely ignored in the presence of single-minded zeal for the furtherance of the universal kingdom of peace and good-will.

## VITA.


Edward Hartman Reisner, born, Fredericksburg, Virginia, April 27, 1885. Student, Cumberland Valley State Normal School, Shippenburg, Pennsylvania, 1899-1901; Ursinus College, 1903-1906; Yale University, 1906-1909; Columbia University, 1909-1911. Professor of Philosophy and Education, Washburn College, 1911-1913. Assistant Professor of Education, Kansas State Agricultural College, 1913-1914. Associate Professor, *ibid.*, 1914. Previous degrees: A.B., Yale, 1908; A.M., Yale, 1909.

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
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## OUTLINE

	PAGE
Introduction .....	1
Part I. The Factors of Rosmini's Philosophy .....	3
Chapter I. Historical Situation of Rosmini's Italy .....	3
1. Social and Political Conditions .....	3
2. Intellectual Conditions .....	7
Chapter II. Rosmini's Personality .....	17
1. Rosmini's Psychological Dispositions .....	17
2. Rosmini's Leading Motive, Attitude, and Method .....	20
3. The Fundamental Principle of Rosmini's Philosophy .....	23
Part II. The Essential Features of Rosmini's Ethical Theory .....	25
Introductory. The Scope and Method of Ethics .....	25
Chapter I. The Metaphysical Factor of Morality .....	28
Chapter II. The Psychological Factor of Morality .....	36
Conclusion .....	45



# ROSMINI'S CONTRIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY

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## INTRODUCTION

THE philosopher's life evolves in space and time, in a certain environment and at a certain historical period, the influence of which he can not fail to undergo. And, indeed, through his education and his surroundings, his native qualities are stimulated and modified, his mind is molded to certain habits of thinking, feeling, and acting. He feels impelled to share the aim and disposition of his time and race. And thus every phase of his thought and behavior is but a concrete, effective response to those specific needs, to those human problems which, being closely connected with social life, focus the attention of all. We can not, accordingly, consider his doctrine as an arbitrary, autonomous construction of ideas; we can not imagine it to be born spontaneously or by chance. The philosopher, anxious to bring his own contribution to social order, organizes a mode of reflective thinking quite personal. His philosophy, as every organized thought, inspired and controlled by a practical motive, is but his characteristic mode of adjustment to the current state of culture, to the prevailing *Zeitgeist*, and to that peculiar situation in which he happens to be. It embodies his concrete thinking, his lofty aspirations, and his endeavors to be useful to social organization. Thus we can not doubt that his point of view, his method, his mental attitude, all his psychological situation and activity are determined and conditioned by his own genius, notions, habits, and motives, as well as by contemporary social conditions. His philosophical elaborations may be regarded rather as a human and historical document. For they mirror the experiences and strivings, the wishes and hopes, the whole intimate drama of his life. They display the tints which he, as an artist, imparts to his assumption, combination, and solution of philosophical problems which always appear anew to each age and to each individual. And while they happen to be the genuine and abiding expression of his personality, they manifest the status of vital questions towards which the general interest converges, and the social demands that haunt minds at the time in which the philosopher lives.

We may, accordingly, explain why a philosophical system has a momentous significance, and even a powerful influence on the direc-



tion of contemporary minds; and yet its justification passes away with its historical conditions. Experience, and consequently philosophy, which is the emotional and intellectual attitude of an individual towards the urgent problems of life, follows social changes. Thus, a philosophical doctrine may be a useful instrument of social adjustment at a certain age, owing to social conditions which evoke it, and it may, however, lose all its value at another age, because of new social emergencies which call out new purposes and new habitual modes of confronting problems, and then new reflective thinking.

Thus, if we want to know the meaning, character, and value of a philosophical system, we must replace it in its historical frame, in its natural background. We must regard it as the mental attitude which the philosopher assumed towards the problems which were in the air when he lived. Only thus can we retrace the genesis of his ideas, his fundamental thought, and the leading motive of his intellectual efforts. Only then may we have the surest basis for understanding and appreciating his doctrine. To regard it as something merely abstract and isolated from human conditions, as independent of its author's universe of life and love, aloof from his reality and experience, or divorced from, and unrelated to the demands and interests of his social milieu, would lead to inevitable failure.

To valuate Rosmini's contribution to ethical philosophy it is necessary to trace first the historical tableau of the times in which he happened to live. A mere outline of the salient features of the political, social, and intellectual conditions of Italy while Rosmini was alive will answer our purpose.

In addition, it is of great importance to portray his personality, namely, his psychological dispositions, the motive which controlled his mental activity, his philosophical method, and the attitude he assumed towards the problems Italy confronted at that very time. After stating the historical and psychological factors of Rosmini's philosophy, I deem it important to give, as an introductory basis of his ethical teaching, a short survey of the fundamental principle of his philosophy, for he was convinced that ethics is dependent upon metaphysics.

The introductory study of the first part will present Rosmini's philosophical endeavors in the historical light, and will enable us to understand and appreciate the essential features of his ethical theory, which will form the core of the investigation and the subject-matter of the second part of the present study. Finally, after stating what the Italian philosopher contributed to the manifold stock of ethical theories, our interest will center upon the affinity that Rosmini's ethical principles seem to have with those of precedent philosophers.

# PART I

## THE FACTORS OF ROSMINI'S PHILOSOPHY

### CHAPTER I

#### HISTORICAL SITUATION OF ROSMINI'S ITALY

##### 1. *Social and Political Conditions*

THE period of Rosmini's life was characterized by political and social disturbance.<sup>1</sup>

Italy was kept in slavery by foreign rulers. Unexpected events, however, gradually concurred, from the second half of the eighteenth century forward, to awake her dormant will. The invigorating breath of political liberty which came from England, as well as the French humanitarian ideas which were spread all over Europe, stimulated some leaders of absolute government to give Italy the first impulse to a peaceful social and economic evolution. Thus, the French Revolution, which broke out contemporaneously with this movement, seemed there, at its beginning, to be a violent and disturbing phenomenon. The republican armies crossed the Alps, ap-

<sup>1</sup> Antonio Rosmini-Serbati (1797-1855) was born at Rovereto, in the Italian Tyrol, of noble and rich parents. He spent his boyhood and youth in an atmosphere of religion and study. In 1821 he entered the priesthood. He devoted most of his life to philosophical investigations and to a religious society which he founded, having as purpose the promotion of corporeal, intellectual, and spiritual works of Christian charity. In 1848 the philosopher Gioberti, at that time minister of the king Charles Albert, trusted our philosopher with the mission of inducing the Pope to be the chief of the desired Italian confederation. Rosmini undertook it as he was convinced that such a confederation could be the salvation of Italy and of the Church. But the precipitation of political events and the entourage of Pius IX prevented the accomplishment of Rosmini's diplomatic mission.

*Inde irae!* He began to be suspected of liberalism, which at that time in Italy meant patriotism, and his philosophy began to be the object of persistent persecutions. He, however, underwent them, like Socrates, with the grandeur of mind of a genuine philosopher. Finally, he went, weary and disappointed, to seek rest and oblivion in the charming solitude of Stresa, near the Lago Maggiore. There the elite of the learned men of Italy and Europe, as Cardinal Newman, Cardinal Wiseman, Lacordaire, Manzoni, Bonghi, and some others, met together to comfort the good and afflicted heart of the great Italian philosopher.

parently induced by the desire to redeem Italy, but the outcome of their invasion proved to be in open contradiction with the principles of social and international justice, which were heralded by them with the bold and steady conviction that they corresponded to the universal needs and demands of the civilized world. They did not bring, indeed, any remedy to Italy and only sought material profit; but they proclaimed there new social ideas, which aimed at the radical destruction of the whole edifice of the old régime, as well as at the organization of a new life.

Their social gospel regarded all men as equal and free and all nations as mistresses of their own destinies. Accordingly, each nation was suggested to unite its parcelled parties and to form a single and independent state. Such notions, promising universal revival, did not fail to make wonderful and rapid strides all over Europe, while they urged in Italy the development of analogous thoughts and feelings, which were carefully disguised with literary forms. But the new principles of uniform, civil organization which Napoleon I. laid down, gave the Italians the most powerful impulse to their national solidarity. He abolished pernicious privileges all over the peninsula. Establishing a strictly laical authority, he inhibited the influence of clericalism or the religious-factionary control over public education and intellectual life. He ended municipal jealousies, local prejudices, and ancient crystallized traditions. Introducing a civil and penal code, permeated with the spirit of the Roman Law and of universal equality, he supplanted conflicting customs and jurisdictions. By the equal and regular administration of justice, he overthrew the confused and fixed forms of government, of the tenure of land, and of the whole structure of the Italian society, which was based upon feudalism. All those changes, as well as the system of military recruiting, and the construction of new roads and bridges, greatly contributed to unite the minds and hearts of all Italians. Besides, the monuments which were erected to perpetuate the memory of the most glorious events and of the greatest men, and, above all, the ambition of Napoleon to embody the greatness of the Roman empire, as the Pope, the German emperor, the men of the Renaissance, and the glorious Italian republics had endeavored to do before him, could not fail to display the beauty of the deliverance and unity of Italy.<sup>2</sup>

But, after Napoleon's downfall, the whole peninsula and the islands which crown it, were thrown again by the congress of Vienna into the same abject condition in which they were before. They were once more morcellated in small sovereign states, which were

<sup>2</sup> See "*Les Résurrections Italiennes*," by H. Béranger, E. Pelletan, Ed., Paris, 1911.

enthralled by the despotic control of Austria. Tradition and absolutism were revived by the triumphant reaction.

Napoleon's rule was regarded as an illegal attempt against order, and all his activity as propagation of revolution. Accordingly, social order was thought again to be a natural emanation from absolute government. Legislation began to be directed to check progressive tendencies and every form of revolutionary aspirations. Divine right began to be opposed to natural right, legitimacy to popular sovereignty, the state to the individual, authority to liberty. The clergy resumed its influence upon education, the censorship of the press, and some other offices which gave it control of intellectual and moral life. But the Italy of 1815 was no more the Italy of the ante-Napoleonic period. The "geographic expression" was no more quiescent and inert; on the contrary, it was permeated with a spirit of rebellion and progress. The stream of new ideas which had been brought into the oppressed country from the other nations, whose barriers had been already overthrown by the French wars, could be checked no more. The ferment within the stirred minds was powerful and pregnant with hopes of bright future.

The emancipation, the unity, and the greatness of Italy was already the magnificent ideal which focused all the energies and the heroic efforts of the best Italians; to it everything was devoted and subordinated.

Austria, meanwhile, in her hatred, stopped at no outrage, at no absurdity. She began to see conspiracy and revolution in everything and everywhere, and to suppress all feelings of patriotism and liberty in the whole peninsula. Accordingly, men of elevated mind were thrown into dungeons, or were wrenched out of their beloved country and exiled. And they, guilty only of patriotic love, wandered about over those countries, in which liberty was flourishing, and spread the sad news of their national distress. But Metternich's policy failed to extinguish the fire of rebellion which seemed to be smothered beneath the peaceful aspect of the Italian peninsula, though it still raged, like the lava under the picturesque sides of its volcanoes. Under the pressure of the persistent and brutal reaction and of the sad common experience, the vision of the national ideal became more distinct and suggestive than before. The Italian people strained its powers and brought all its possibilities to its richest unfolding. The oppressed minds seemed to be revived and inspired by the spirit of the Renaissance, which conveyed the suggestion that human personality is the source of all activities and achievements. In every province of life there was a momentous awakening. The life of the Italian race reached the moment of *experimentum crucis*. Now the problem upon which the universal in-

terest focused was not merely the emancipation and unity of Italy, but the future of her culture and civilization, in harmony with the spirit of her glorious traditions, which was threatened by her tyrannical rulers. So vital a problem evoked and concentrated all social and intellectual forces. It was a moment of great unrest and of intense elaboration of means and schemes. From the powerful fermentation of ideas three main currents of thought emerged for the salvation of the country. Men of different mental attitudes agreed in the diagnosis of the unbearable conditions of Italy; they were all determined not to sit upon her ruins and weep and lament like Jeremiah. But they were united in the common desire of driving away the hated foreigner, who was recognized as the sole cause of the distress of their beloved country. They were, however, divided in regard to the means to be used and to the method of organizing the new Italy. Some put their hope in the house of Savoy. Others thought to have found the panacea of all evils in a confederation of all the Italian states with the Pope as its chief. Such a plan was the outcome of two main factors. The congress of Vienna and the general tendency of minds in all Europe, permeated by the romantic spirit, called out the revival of Catholicism. In Italy, many learned men who did not wish to part asunder their love of the Church and their love of country were fascinated by the memory of the medieval commonwealths which were united under the protecting power of the Pope.

Besides, convinced that the unity of Italy could not be achieved by revolution, they advocated the conciliation of all forces and elements, of papacy and monarchy, of liberty and civil progress, as the most effective method of national regeneration and organization.

Mazzini's "Young Italy" stood in opposition to the other parties. He urged the Italians to join his association "in the firm intent of consecrating both thought and action to the great aim of reconstructing Italy as one independent sovereign nation of free men and equals." Education and insurrection were the means he suggested. But, beyond his own country, he looked to mankind. The idea of nationality was, according to him, the necessary lever for the realization of the cosmopolitan ideal of an international revolution and republic.

With the ascent of Pius IX. to the throne of St. Peter, the conciliatory tendency seemed to prevail over the others. While through all Europe liberalism and reaction were still in conflict, the election of such a Pope seemed to be a tribute to the national feeling of the Italians. The head of the Church, usually reproached with complicity in reviving what was already dead, and in killing what was quite alive, showed that he appreciated indeed patriotism, which

was still regarded as a crime and condemned by the Austrian bishops as the work of the devil. The Pope's liberal tendencies could not fail to foster the kindled flame of patriotic love and to unite all the Italians in the common purpose. Their enthusiasm culminated in a general cry for war against the oppressing foreigner. During those momentous days, for the first time in the history of civilized countries, Plato's ideal form of government seemed to be realized in some aspects; the political attitude, under the pressure of circumstances, became quite philosophical.

Rosmini, Gioberti, Mamiani, the most prominent leaders in the movement of thought, forgot their philosophical controversies which had hitherto divided them, and devoted their common efforts to the interest of their country. Gioberti sent our philosopher to Rome as ambassador of Piedmont to induce the Pope, whose constitutional minister was Mamiani, to take part in the war against Austria and to establish the basis of an Italian confederation. But Rosmini's mission failed, because of the reaction which once more prevailed all over Italy. Both the method of revolutionary action and of the impossible idealistic confederation, however, which proved to be only factors of bitter and general disappointment, were replaced by Cavour's diplomacy. He cleverly broke the dream of a reconciliation which was based upon impossible compromises of principles, tendencies, and attitudes, profoundly diverse, and gave the national party a new direction based upon reciprocal liberty of state and religion. He thus initiated the achievement of the political synthesis of the new Italy, free, independent, and united, as she was wished to be by her sons and by the learned abroad. But Rosmini had not the joy of seeing the final phase of so long and so epic a struggle, to which he had devoted his manifold activity, his health, and reputation.

## 2. *Intellectual Conditions*

The powerful political action which the Italians displayed for the radical reconstruction of their country was in intimate and organic connection with the unfolding of their mental forces.

An action so complex and of such high practical importance could not fail to focus the general attention and provoke reflective thought. It involved, indeed, the necessity of criticizing the old and of developing a new intellectual life. The possibility of its successful issues depended upon changing habits of mind, modes of individual conduct, and forms of social life. It had to be justified and strengthened with theoretical demonstrations of its justice and of its conformity with the principles of human nature and of modern thought.

Besides, the new ideas, the new scientific principles, which had to be the determining and controlling factors of the national thinking and willing, could not but be clothed with abstract forms, because only such forms could escape political censure. The magnificent and promising mental activity of the Renaissance, which had made Italy the cradle of modern thought, was followed by two centuries of intellectual tyranny and slumber. The religious reaction and the deadening influence of Spanish bigotry had endeavored to check the new stream of free and independent thought, and to paralyze the germs of a new life.

But at the end of the eighteenth century, Italy was again animated by the spirit of Dante and the Renaissance, and emerged from her long intellectual depression and lassitude. She entered then into the general movement of modern thought, to which she had already given the very first vital impetus.

It was natural that the Italians should feel impelled, while under the hated foreign yoke, to concentrate all their mental activities upon the reconstruction of their country, like the prisoners who, groaning under the weight of chains, long for liberty and concentrate all their efforts upon attaining it. The Italians indeed began to keep thought and action in persistent unity, until their patriotic hopes and struggles were crowned with success. Accordingly, since that very time, they began to display the same eager desire, the same method, to vindicate, to magnify, and to convert all the memories of their glorious past into a living motor force. They endeavored, impelled by a feeling of national pride, to restore the value of their culture, and to impress a national mark upon politics, art, literature, and philosophy. They did not fail, however, to throw open their minds and hearts to all the invigorating influence which came to them from foreign countries. They became, under the pressure of their awful experiences, more sensible to the beauty and wealth of thought, ancient as well as modern, which was contained either in foreign literatures, full already of juvenile vigor, or in their own. The function of literature and art became civil and patriotic. Lyric and dramatic poetry assumed an aggressive attitude against the evils which the country had so long endured. Tragedies were more or less disguised battles against any kind of despotism and tyranny; they aimed to stimulate national feeling by revealing upon the stage past injustices, by exalting deeds of national heroism, and by reviving Roman ideas of liberty, of justice, and of respect for human dignity. Satiric poetry took on a social and civil significance; it was an embellished protest against the excessive inequality between the rich and the poor, and a defense of the people trampled and dejected. Painting and sculpture revived and embodied what

could foster the consciousness of greatness. Music, through its suggestive and universal language, displayed the anguish and the hopes of all Italians. They made historical researches, not for the sake of curiosity, but because they were anxious to indicate the factors of their national misfortune, and to find in the past the flame of enthusiasm and the experiences of their ancestors, which could be translated into working forces.

The very dawn of the new intellectual life was, indeed, characterized by the critical examination of the ideas they found current and by a great interest in knowledge. Knowledge began to be regarded as a social power and as determining factor in the movement of national regeneration. They made scientific investigations to find useful truths, to modify, through experimental methods, mental habits, and thus to divert men from the frivolous life of the time and to bring them to serious reflection. Through inner regeneration, through a peaceful and normal intellectual evolution, through a national unity of mental life, they wanted to change the distressing conditions of the country. Thus the motive, which began to control the evolution of the new intellectual life, was quite practical and determined scientific work. From the beginning, the reflection upon the ideas which permeated social and individual life could afford no satisfaction. The common experience of public life could not fail to focus the attention of all upon civil laws. These were said to be an emanation from the invisible and eternal will, but proved to be the outcome of the deification of crystallized truths, of hereditary prejudices, and of changeless oppressive political systems, as well as the genuine work of the personal interest of rulers. Such laws were of no public advantage, they did not satisfy any practical need or demand; nay, they were factors in the national oppression and general unhappiness. Accordingly, accommodation to them seemed to be cowardly and shameful. Wavering confidence in the practical value of obedience to them inevitably and fatally implied an attack upon the validity of their ground. The same political situation was bound to undermine also the principles of morality, which controlled individual conduct and required the subordination to tyrannical laws and systems.

These laws were based no less upon tradition than authority, and thus they seemed also to perpetuate the unhappy conditions of the country. Many factors happened to subserve the critical and destructive attitude the Italians assumed while confronting the political problem, which involved their individual and social happiness. Authority more and more lost respect, because it was regarded as oppressive. Tradition lost the influence it had exerted upon the



national mind, because it suggested always changeless forms of impossible life.

Religious feeling wavered because the Church in Italy was, at that time, identified in the mind of the people with the prevailing political tyranny. And finally the contact with French culture permeated with revolutionary ideas contributed also to foster the feeling of rebellion against the old standards of life and fossilized beliefs.

The outcome of such great fermentation of new ideas was moral disintegration, political unrest, and skepticism. The pressure of political activity which imposed profound intellectual revolutions did not make skepticism merry, as in France during the eighteenth century, but anxious to reconstruct knowledge, already regarded as a great dynamic agency in the political regeneration of Italy. The emphasis, however, upon the practical significance of knowledge made necessary critical insight into its origin and nature. Political action required a philosophical background.

Whence the crucial question rose whether experience or the mind had to be held as the source of knowledge and consequently of ideas, which are its constituent elements; whether ideas had to be considered as innate or as the product of sensations. This problem was regarded, in Italy as well as throughout Europe, at that time, as the most fundamental problem, and was justly placed in the foreground of philosophical discussion. For its solution had to furnish the basis of moral and political sciences which were expected to enlighten and sustain the national movement. In fact, the innateness of ideas meant the previous existence of *a priori* controlling principles. Accordingly, the national thinking and will, knowledge and action, had to be controlled by abstract, eternal, and crystalized notions, as during the long years of unchanged slavery. Ideals and laws had to be regarded as eternally given, and consequently there was no hope of reference to the concrete conditions, of political change, freedom, and progress.

On the contrary, the belief that ideas were the outcome of ever-changing personal experience involved the conviction that human personality must have a conscious participation in the creation of truths, ideals, and laws, with absolute independence of every external authority. Thus the individual, reckoning the changed condition, was able to direct his own conduct and become a decisive factor in the regeneration and reconstruction of Italy. The philosophy of experience which based knowledge and morality solely upon perception, proclaimed the right of individualism and of rebellion against intellectual and political oppression as well as against every form of despotism, and thus it best responded to the urgent needs

and demands of the second half of the eighteenth century and of the early part of the nineteenth century. Of course, the interest in the experimental and positive sciences, the closer contact with the English and French literatures permeated with the spirit of modern philosophy, the loosened respect for tradition, the declining influence of the Church, the decreased feeling of the supernatural, the conviction, also, that idealism, allied with religious and civil authority, was an instrument of reaction, but, above all, the personal presence of Condillac,<sup>3</sup> were so many factors which contributed to condition and assure the prevalence of empiricism in Italy.

Gerdil,<sup>4</sup> indeed, endeavored to oppose to it a form of idealism permeated with the doctrines of Plato, St. Augustine, and Descartes, but his efforts were frustrated by the practical significance and compromise of idealism, holding fixed, innate controlling principles of individual and social ethics, and by the rapid translation of Condillac's works as well as by the teaching of Soave, who followed and exalted Locke as the greatest metaphysician since he had dared "to destroy the chimera of innate ideas."<sup>5</sup>

Colleges and universities welcomed the new philosophy, because it seemed to answer the pressing political purpose of that historical moment and to be in harmony with the intellectual temper and with the history of the philosophical thought of the Italians.<sup>6</sup>

Art and literature endeavored to assimilate and apply its principles which, spread in diluted form, could not fail to filter through the strata of national consciousness and conduct.<sup>7</sup>

The fact that Condillac and Soave were priests, and that the

<sup>3</sup> Condillac lived ten years (1758-1768) in Parma, at that time the "rendez-vous" of the best intelligences, as tutor of the young Duc Ferdinand of Bourbon.

<sup>4</sup> Sigismond Card. Gerdil (1718-1802) published a great number of philosophical works in French, Italian, and Latin. See Bouillier, "Histoire de la philosophie cartésienne," t. II., ch. XXVIII.; Ueberweg's "Hist. of Phil.," Vol. II., page 480.

<sup>5</sup> Soave translated into Italian first Dr. Winne's summary of Locke's celebrated "Essay," and later published a complete translation in the "Collezione dei Classici Metafisici" in Pavia (1819). His "Istituzioni di Logica, Metafisica e Morale" was used as a text-book of philosophy in many colleges. He was professor of philosophy in the Brera college in Milan. Let us notice here that he, like Condillac, was a catholic priest.

<sup>6</sup> What is the national characteristic of Italian philosophy? According to Ferri ("Essai sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie en Italie au Dix-Neuvième Siècle," Vol. II., page 343), the Italian mind, although fond of experience and life, has manifested a tendency to idealism; according to P. Ragnisco (*Rivista di Filosofia*, Vol. 3, 1911, page 698) the proper characteristic of Italian philosophy is naturalism.

<sup>7</sup> Foscolo, Leopardi, Giordani, Count L. Cicognara ("Del Bello"), Cesarotti ("Saggio sulla filosofia delle lingue"), Costa ("Del modo di comporre le idee"), and some others wrote under the influence of the new philosophy.

Jesuit order, whose influence was so powerful, strongly favored the imported philosophy, helped its rapid spread. It was thought that faith and ethics would not be affected by the principles of empiricism: Strange irony of history! The most striking characteristics of the empirical movement in England, where it was born, as well as in France, where it had been imported by such men as Montesquieu and Voltaire, were disregard for positive religion and opposition to the traditional beliefs presented to individuals through the medium of organized society. The antagonism to innate ideas meant opposition to the blind, undiscussed reception of old ideas, and eager desire for independent critical examination. Besides, the theory of transformed sensations assumed the denial of every authority, either religious or political, leaving conventions and facts depending upon man's imagination and will. But the new theory seemed to be in Italy an auxiliary, practical standpoint and a provisional method for political activity rather than a fixed and definite philosophical position. The evolving of political conditions gradually modified the strict empiristic attitude. The most prominent philosophers preceding Rosmini, as Gioja, Romagnosi, and Galluppi, although contemporary, formed a rhythmic movement of philosophical thought. They lacked the originality and boldness which had characterized the Italian philosophy of the Renaissance, and neglected the fresh thought of the great Vico, who was "the nineteenth century in germ,"<sup>8</sup> but displayed the same enthusiasm for the new philosophy of experience. They were permeated with the spirit of the Enlightenment, and their main interest was accordingly in the problem of knowledge and in the organization of a just social order. Thus philosophy came to be regarded, as amongst the ancient Greeks, as a social power, as a determining factor in political reconstruction, and dependent upon the demands of practical, and in particular, of political life. It assumed, then, an essentially human direction and its original mission.<sup>9</sup>

They all betrayed, however, the same aversion for the violent breaking from religious tradition as well as the same fear of the moral consequences which could be inferred from the current philosophy: whence the same preoccupation we find in all for reconciliation, the same endeavor to fuse together the two great streams of thought which derived from England and France, and to harmonize, even in spite of patent inconsistency, idealism and empiricism or sensationalism, Descartes and Locke or Condillac.

<sup>8</sup> See B. Croce, "*La Filosofia di G. Vico*," page 248, Bari, G. Laterza, 1911. English translation by R. G. Collingwood.

<sup>9</sup> Windelband, "*History of Philosophy*," page 68; Dewey, "*Essays*," p. 21.

According to Gioja,<sup>10</sup> the function of philosophy is to rule the whole of human activity for the sake of universal happiness. Accordingly, he thought that its business was the defence of human rights and the promotion of social wealth and the control of social ethics, which involves hygiene, politeness, and intellectual education. He related all inner phenomena to sensations, and sensations to the senses. But he recognized within us a certain inner activity which he called "the moving force of the soul"; this is the source of all changes, either internal or external.

Romagnosi<sup>11</sup> thought that the theory of empiricism and the theory of innate ideas could be reconciled by recognizing within our mind, above mere sensation, a peculiar natural power, endowed with an activity of its own, which he called "*senso logico*." The function of the logical sense which is prior to the affirmation and negation of our judgments, is to perceive in sensation, in the world of phenomena, the supersensible element, the element of intelligibility which is the being and the activity of things "*l'essere ed il fare delle cose*." Thus, according to him, being and causality only are intelligible or objects of our understanding. The object of the rational sense is the idea, the intelligible, the being, not sensations, which only furnish our mind with occasions to exercise its logical sense. So his teaching marked an almost complete divorce from Locke and Condillac and a definite step in a transition from empiricism to idealism.

Galluppi<sup>12</sup> assumed a different philosophical attitude towards the problems which the pressure of political conditions and the general intellectual movement of Europe brought to the foreground of philosophical interest. His teaching marked, indeed, a very important stage in the movement of philosophical thought in Italy. For he was the first to understand and welcome the revolution brought into philosophy by Kant, and to awaken the minds of his own countrymen from their dogmatic slumber and from their fond attachment to sensualism or rationalism by pointing out to them the necessity of critical investigation.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Melchiorre-Gioja (1767-1829). See Ueberweg, "History of Philosophy," Vol. II., pages 483-484; Ferri, *Histoire de la Philosophie en Italie au XIX<sup>me</sup> siècle*, Vol. I.

<sup>11</sup> G. Domenico Romagnosi (1761-1835). See Ueberweg, *op. cit.*, pages 484-85, Vol. II.; Ferri, *op. cit.*, Vol. I.

<sup>12</sup> Baron Pasquale Galluppi (1770-1846). See Ferri and Ueberweg, *op. cit.*; R. Mariano, "La Philosophie contemporaine en Italie," 1868; Palhoriès, "La Théorie Idéologique de Galluppi," Paris, Alcan, 1908.

<sup>13</sup> Kant's philosophy was known in Italy through two books published in French, *i. e.*, "Philosophie de Kant, ou principes fondamentaux de la philosophie transcendente," par Ch. Villers, Metz, 1801, and "Essai d'une exposition

His works are pervaded by both conflicting tendencies, empiricist and rationalistic. He aimed at the reform of philosophy, and accordingly endeavored to correct empiricism and Kantism, but he proved to be unable to extricate himself entirely from both philosophies, in which he found a valuable treasure for his own elaboration.

Knowledge and action, according to him, or thought, its elements, functions, and value for truth and good, are the main subject-matter of philosophy. He was aware that the problem of knowledge was in his day "the object of meditation in all Europe," and upon this problem he focused his attention. Against sensationalism he held that the mind is not only sensitive, but intelligent and reasonable, and made the distinction between sense and intelligence, sensation and thought. Against Condillac he stated that our mind is something more than a mere collection of internal states; that it is a reality, a being, a substance, endowed with the power of analysis and synthesis. He rejected innate ideas in the sense of ideas prior to sensations and independent of all experience, but he accepted them in the sense of natural ideas, or ideas for whose acquisition we have a natural disposition, "*una virtualità naturale*." Galluppi agreed with Kant that knowledge is a combination of subjective and objective elements, but he found Kant's form and matter equally subjective, and hence the failure to solve the problem of knowledge. The crucial point is to determine what is objective and subjective in knowledge. We find objective elements only in the immediate contact of the self with reality or in primitive experience; reflective experience which is based upon ideal synthesis is the outcome of the objective elements given by sensations and of the subjective elements produced by the mind itself. This was the solution which Galluppi gave the great problem of critical philosophy. His teaching, characterized by simple and attractive eloquence, permeated by the principles of the Kantian and of the Scottish school, and involving the suggestion to descend from theology to psychology, from nature to humanity, from abstractions to facts, provoked a great interest in philosophy amongst the Italians, and seemed to the national party to be a powerful instrument of political action and easy to be assimilated by the people because stripped of the obsolete and dry scholastic form.

But during the time of his teaching important new political changes which affected Italy as well as all Europe, brought out *succinte de la critique de la raison pure de Kant*," par M. Kinker, traduit du hollandais par J. Le Fr., Amsterdam, 1801. The first Italian translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* was published by Mantovani, in 1821 and 1822. Galluppi examined Kantian philosophy in detail.

changes of intellectual attitude. When the revolutionary storm was over, a reaction was inevitable. Admiration for the preceding intellectual movement changed to aversion and hatred. Reason was held responsible for the violence done to political and religious enemies. "Philosophy" was blamed for the general unrest and disorder. The French Revolution, welcomed at the beginning as a manifestation of reason and the triumph of man, stripped of religious preoccupations, culminated in excesses of bloody violence. Its issue was a manifest confession of impotence for constructive purposes and social peace. Empiricism transformed into sensualism, naturalism changed into materialism, deism degenerated into atheism, enthusiastic morals sunk into egoistic morals, proved to be unable to settle the questions which were so closely connected with individual and social happiness. The nations of Europe whose barriers had been overthrown amongst the vicissitudes of the revolutionary wars could already freely communicate with one another, fuse together their ideas, and thus participate in a general culture, but they longed for peace and order, for a new source of life, and for a new system of ideas and purposes. So it happened that the general feeling against the violences and destructions of the Revolution, the over-excitement and exhaustion produced by sensualistic excesses, the impuissance of the rationalistic and materialistic "philosophism" to reform society, the universal eager desire of a new center of gravitation, the same programme of the "Holy Alliance" which heralded the reconstruction of moral order and the regeneration of the political system of Europe on the basis of Christianity and thus the revival of religion, and finally the triumphant return of the Pope to Rome, evoked a spiritualistic reaction. The romantic movement favored the revival of the Christian religion. For it appealed to spontaneity, sensibility, feeling, emotion, and enthusiasm which are the main religious factors, and while revelling in the vast world of the unknown as well as in a new realm of marvels and mysteries, it evoked the Middle Ages in which Christianity and papacy had predominated. Besides, the satisfaction of esthetic feeling which the dominant religion afforded, the romantic conception of Christianity as perfectly compatible with the highest intellectual culture, contributed to present as "ultimatum" to the convulsed society the religion against which the revolutionary fury had been directed.

Thus, "through a common movement," says Taine, "along the whole line of human thought, causes draw back into an abstract region, where philosophy had not been to search them out for eighteen centuries. Then was manifest the disease of the age, the restlessness of Werther and Faust, very like that which in a similar mo-

ment agitated men eighteen centuries ago: I mean, discontent with the present, the vague desire of a higher beauty, and an ideal happiness, the painful aspiration for the infinite."<sup>14</sup>

But then arose in Italy the question whether or not the whole heritage of the eighteenth century had to be rejected, which age of Italian history had to be copied; whether the genuine greatness of Italy had to be founded on the revival of the age of the Roman Empire and the Renaissance, when social life and human personality were free and independent of supernatural preoccupation, and the Italians enjoyed a spiritual unity of knowledge and will; or on the revival of the Middle Ages, when the intimate union of Church and monarchy, of religion and authority, of faith and reason, of theology and philosophy, prevailed.

Men who were imbued with the spirit of classicism and of the eighteenth-century culture, took the former alternative. Those whose enthusiasm was directed towards romanticism wanted the life of the new Italy to be a continuity of the harmony of all social forces. They displayed, nevertheless, great sympathy for all modern aspirations, and endeavored to subserve their national cause by spreading, under an evangelical disguise, forbidden ideas of liberty, patriotism, and universal equality.

The conciliatory tendency was bound to prevail, under the pressure of religious and national enthusiasm. Such a tendency, together with the influence of the reactionary and theological, and of the psychologico-spiritualistic movement in France, and the powerful impulse from Germany to construct gigantic systems in order to have a comprehensive view of spiritual life, could not fail to provoke in Italy a philosophy which, by an encyclopedic synthesis should seek to unite all intellectual efforts for the sake of a common national action. The genius of Rosmini provided the needed philosophical formula of universal harmony, source of truth, and morality, of reciprocal respect and love, of social justice and individual rights, as symbol of the coming national unity.

<sup>14</sup> "History of English Literature," Book IV., Ch. I.

## CHAPTER II

### ROSMINI'S PERSONALITY

#### 1. *Rosmini's Psychological Dispositions*

AN extraordinary hunger for learning associated with a powerful intelligence, a pronounced religious tendency, and a deep feeling of sympathy for men were the important features of Rosmini's psychological inheritance. These native dispositions were developed by the social environment in which he was reared, and exerted a constant influence on his mental activity. His early tuition as well as his academic course was permeated with religious ideals. The atmosphere which he and the learned men with whom he was in continuous intercourse breathed was pervaded by religious reaction against the movement of modern thought, regarded as the main factor of social disturbance. Accordingly, his mind did not escape habits of analogous thinking, feeling, and acting, and partaking of the prevailing reactionary aim and disposition of his times and class.

The silent, beautiful scenes of immensity and mystery which the snowy Alps display provoked the eager mind of the young Rosmini to wonder and philosophy. We are told, indeed, that he began very early to incline to the investigation of truth, and to display a striking tendency to moralize. While he was a boy, playing the game of "policeman," or "catch thief," he preferred the part of judge to every other, for he liked to pose as a "wise man," and to give good advice to his little friends.

We are told also that the young thinker surprised his tutor with his advanced philosophical knowledge. Just when the good teacher judged his pupil able to be initiated in the philosophy of empiricism, he discovered that he did not need to be taught philosophy, for he knew enough and mastered Aquinas's "Summa." The precocious philosopher showed at an early age that he felt the great importance of "the queen and mother of all sciences"; philosophy was always the subject of his conversations and letters. He was so enamored of the study of philosophy, that he spent much of his youth and of the rest of his stormy life in devotion to it.

"Philosophy and the contemplation of nature," he said, "far



from wearying us, form such an agreeable recreation that I should not be disposed to sacrifice it for any other."<sup>1</sup>

"Day and night," he said, "I roamed through flowery paths, as it were, in the vast demesne of philosophical lore, feeling all that joy which the first aspect of truth infuses into the soul, feeling that security which borders on hardihood, feeling those indefinite hopes peculiar to youth when for the first time turning, with elevated and conscious reflections, to the universe and its Creator, thinking to absorb the one and the other as easily as we breathe."<sup>2</sup>

We are told that no difficulty daunted him; nay, difficulties inflamed his ardor, because in every difficulty he saw a secret calculated to arouse his curiosity, a treasure to discover. Such intellectual enthusiasm actuated him to read all the ancient, medieval, and modern philosophers, and to collect together the many scattered fragments of truth he found in their works. It is said of him that like an industrious bee, he went everywhere in quest of honey, and wherever he found any, he drew it forth. Thus here and there, the shadow of some antecedent philosophy can be retraced in his works, but he was a disciple of nobody. His immense philosophical elaboration had as its source only his intellectual and moral temper, his native genius as well as his mental habits, molded as they were by his social environment.

The bent and disposition of Rosmini's mind converged not only towards contemplation, but toward action as well. He was animated by altruistic feelings; he felt impelled to communicate his ideas to his fellow-men.

For he was convinced that high intellectual culture is refining and ennobling, and to discover truth means to discover the means of moral progress. It filled him with pain "to think that truths excellent in themselves and congenial to the human intelligence should be monopolized by a small circle of individuals, as though none but themselves had a right to possess them."<sup>3</sup>

And referring to the Scholastic attitude he says, "Is there not something odious and hurtful to human feeling in a science which, under the pretence of being scholastic, envelops itself in mystery; which seems to hate the light of day; which wears all the appearance of a sect, with a language, or rather jargon, of its own, and forbidden to the rest of men, and which assumes an ambitious, or

<sup>1</sup> Impelled by the desire of spreading philosophical knowledge, he formed an academy of young philosophers in his house. The members of the new academy, eager to imitate the Peripatetics, indulged in philosophical discussions, wandering about the charming surroundings of Rovereto.

<sup>2</sup> "Introduzione alla filosofia."

<sup>3</sup> "The Origin of Ideas," Vol. I., Ch. III., §36.

at least a strange and exclusive tone, as if it had some great secret to conceal, or some dark ends to accomplish?"<sup>4</sup>

Thus, Rosmini could not conceive philosophy divorced from human affairs and interests. "Why," he asks, "should this science, which boasts of being the mother of all the arts, keep itself aloof from, and sullenly refuse to hold friendly intercourse with, the human family? Has it, then, like some beasts of a new species, impenetrable lairs, where to abide in solitude, from fear lest its interests should suffer by being mixed up with those of the world at large? Or has heaven bestowed the gift of reason on a few individuals only? And shall, therefore, the great bulk of mankind forever have to be led, like a flock of sheep, by the command or the rod of those favored ones? Must men be for everlasting debarred from judging in a body or pronouncing on matters on which their own dignity and happiness depend?"<sup>5</sup>

Accordingly, "a good instinct" of his nature irresistibly prompted him to applaud "intentions so humane, and to feel the liveliest gratitude for those who labor with the intent of placing the very highest truths within the reach of the greatest number. . . . For if this were well and successfully done, the masses would be able to enjoy in some way the lovable aspect of those truths, and would rise to a better condition."<sup>6</sup>

Moreover, he thought that the masses, by bringing their collective judgment to bear on the interminable disputations of the learned, might, perhaps, speak out with such an overwhelming weight of authority as would effectually recall these disputants to more profitable occupations and sounder ways of thinking, and to work for the true benefit of the individual and society. Rosmini, persuaded of the social and humane mission of philosophy, could not fail to direct his attention to the national problem, which was already the focus of the general intellectual activity. He, in fact, like the élite of his time, did not make a mystery of his love for the common mother, the beloved from whom he had had "life and language."<sup>7</sup>

Eye-witness of the violences perpetrated by the French armies as well as of the angry despotism of the restored governments, he grieved over Italy's unhappy state and longed for the freedom, independence, and unity, which he openly proclaimed to be "a universal cry" that set throbbing the heart of every Italian.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>4</sup> "The Origin of Ideas," *loc. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> "The Origin of Ideas," *loc. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> "The Origin of Ideas," *loc. cit.*

<sup>7</sup> See "Nuovo Saggio sull'origine delle idee," preface.

<sup>8</sup> See "Discorso sull'Unità d'Italia."

It seems, however, that Rosmini was distressed rather by the moral disintegration than by the political situation of his country. All his works, in fact, betray a strong moral preoccupation and a persistent endeavor to point out moral reconstruction as a factor of social happiness. But the Church's declining influence, above everything else, attracted his attention. His native religious bias, under the constant influence of his social environment, became a deep and inalterable love for his parents' religion. And to such a love the Italian philosopher subordinated his whole intellectual activity. Thus, it was inevitable that a life of earnest and close adhesion to his religion would have created in his mind habits of intellectual submission and criticism not at all independent and impartial. Besides, his works bespeak his fondness for abstract, fixed, and eternal principles, his idealistic tendency, his dogmatic affirmation, his conviction of the necessity of universals, his determination to organize an absolute system, and consequently, his rationalistic type of mind.<sup>9</sup>

## *2. Rosmini's Leading Motive, Attitude, and Method*

Rosmini seemed to be convinced of the fact that the growing individualism, the ascending democracy, the progress of national feeling, and, finally, the intellectual undercurrents of social life had already brought into question the ancient beliefs and moral standards, and that even the position of the Catholic Church had been compromised, being thrown by clericalism into the political turmoil of the times. He, accordingly, felt stimulated to bring his contribution to the political, intellectual, and moral reconstruction of his beloved country. Impelled by a motive so eminently practical, he applied his mind to an etiological inquiry into the actual conditions of the Church, of Italy, and of philosophy.

Under the pressure of his native dispositions, acquired habits, intellectual temper, and of the dominant current of thought, permeated with spiritualism and religion, the Italian philosopher found out that the divorce of the Church from social and political aspirations, of faith from reason, of theology from philosophy, was the main factor in the restlessness of his social environment. He, therefore, urged the reconciliation of all the intellectual and social forces as the panacea for all the evils of his times. Besides, agreeing with the prevailing romantic spirit, he pointed to the Middle Ages as the epoch in which the ideal reconciliation he dreamed of, the genuine greatness of Papacy and of Italy, and the lofty task of

<sup>9</sup> See W. James, "Pragmatism," pages 7, 51; "Some Problems of Philosophy," page 35.

philosophy, were fully realized. His discovery, indeed, could not be otherwise! But Rosmini thought that such harmonious union had been shattered by the movement of modern philosophy. According to him, philosophy "from Locke to Kant, in spite of so many efforts, went on wandering farther and farther astray, and entangling itself in its very progress, until men grew weary of it, and lost all faith in doctrines that were continually changing."<sup>10</sup>

Thus, he believed that reason was tossed about by the waves of skepticism and opinion, and that there was no longer faith in any universally valid truth, or in the possibility of any certain knowledge, while respect for authority and tradition sank, religious feelings and ideals wavered, and individuals governed themselves.

Sensationalism and subjectivism, indeed, acknowledging no essential objectivity of ideas and then no objective measure of truth, and relying only on the relativity of individual ideas, built human knowledge as well as ethical principles upon a relativism of individual opinions, and, consequently, upon the insecurity of change and caprice. This philosophical attitude and its inevitable consequence, the absolute independence of the individual in the theoretical and practical sphere, and "the deification of human faculties and affections" plainly proclaimed by Kantian doctrine, hurt Rosmini's religious feeling, for they meant a mortal blow to religious tradition and to organized authority. Thus he felt that there was "a yearning for the invaluable boon of a true and sound philosophy," and that the yearning was due to the uncertain utterances and to the imperfect and unsatisfactory systems which philosophers had already propounded.

Rosmini was penetrated with the importance of philosophy because of its all-embracing influence, determining the source of knowledge, and thus making all sciences dependent on itself. Besides, philosophy, in his opinion, has an anthropological, a social, and a religious mission, since it is the interpreter of nature as well as of the wishes of the human heart, and it unites men amongst themselves and with their Creator. Finally, it aims at the betterment of men by discovering and transforming truth into reality, and by leading to good and to virtue, as to their natural end.<sup>11</sup> Accordingly, for Rosmini, the restoration of philosophy was an urgent need, and it could not be achieved without a firm epistemological ground.

Rosmini, agreeing with Locke and Kant, was impressed from his early youth, by the practical importance of the problem of

<sup>10</sup> "Theodicy," Ch. XXIX, No. 148. Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, 1912.

<sup>11</sup> See "Introduzione alla filosofia."

knowledge. He justly recognized that the most urgent question to be solved in philosophy was whether, above and beyond individual opinions and purposes, there is anything universally valid, true, and right in itself; whether our ideas have a really objective value and provide a firm basis for knowledge and morality; whether at that time of political and moral unrest there could be found a basis for common truth and good which might become a ground of a social agreement and political cooperation. According to our philosopher, the science of individual and social ethics, law, government, education, which the political situation threw into the front rank of intellectual interests; man's faith in absolute justice; the changeless right of nations to political independence and liberty; the necessity of suppressing despotism as well as rebellion; had to rest upon a knowledge, not transient and relative, but stable and unchangeable. Such a knowledge, however, must have for its basis, not the chance ideas furnished by sense-experience, but the ideal order, "the innate idea of the universal which is the truly real;" it must rest "on an object," says Rosmini, "which is always before us, necessary, universal, and independent of us and all created things."<sup>12</sup>

The persistent effort to indicate the idea of the universal as source of objective and absolute truth, as nucleus of the new national mental and moral life, as point of centralization of intellectual and political activity, meant the accumulation of individual energies, the absorption and submission of the individual to organized society as well as to the common supreme ideal of national solidarity and unity, and constitutes the essential characteristic of Rosmini's philosophy.

The mental attitude Rosmini assumed towards the philosophical problems which his contemporaries confronted was religious and reactionary, but softened by a spirit of conciliation that was in the air. He seemed to be determined to revive the attitude of the Holy Fathers, who did not hesitate to avail themselves of whatsoever truth the systems of pagan philosophers contained in order to secure rational support for their beliefs.

But our philosopher, like them, wanted to subordinate knowledge to the lofty ends of faith, reason to revelation, philosophy to theology, science to dogma. Besides, he endeavored to bring Christianity as an efficient factor into philosophical speculation, and thus to harmonize natural and supernatural truths. Convinced that the most striking characteristics of every true and efficient philosophical system are "unity and totality," he built, like his contemporary German philosophers, a gigantic system in which he thought it possible to take in at a glance, almost all truths, arranged in a scheme

<sup>12</sup> "The Origin of Ideas," No. 1037, Vol. II.

of beautiful unity, and enhanced with new life by "the evidence of a supreme principle."<sup>13</sup>

But in one point Rosmini gladly agreed with modern philosophers, namely, in the method to be used in philosophy, that is, a method which starts from facts. He found, however, that "modern philosophers have contented themselves with analyzing the faculties of the soul, and have paid little attention to the analysis of their product, i. e., human cognitions."<sup>14</sup>

According to him, the right method is to observe what is given by our corporeal senses and at the same time the facts of our inner life and then to accept impartially the legitimate consequences of the same.<sup>15</sup>

Our philosopher, however, almost exclusively employed the synthetic method and thus replaced the concrete by the abstract, the fact by the idea, the internal observation by *a priori* reasoning, making the study of man depend on metaphysics. He preferred deduction to induction, the *a priori* to direct observation, reasoning to experience. He proved, indeed, to be a psychologist, but he often resorted to hypothesis rather than to analysis, to syllogism rather than to experiment.

### 3. *The Fundamental Principle of Rosmini's Philosophy*

"Unity and totality" is, according to Rosmini, the main characteristic of a true and efficient philosophy.<sup>16</sup> This characteristic, which we find in the contemporary romantic philosophy, he endeavored to stamp upon his own. Accordingly, he elaborated his ethical and theoretical doctrine in close connection; his ideology and ethics are so interrelated that the one lends light to the other. Thus, the distinctive marks of the leading principles of his ethical theory can not be given apart from the general principles of his philosophy.

As we have seen, Rosmini, under the pressure of Italy's political and moral problem thought that the main business of philosophy was to build human knowledge upon a fixed basis, and thus to check the deplored outcome of skepticism and materialism, and, by placing reason in opposition to opinion, to overcome anarchical change which sensationalism and empiricism favored. But, according to him, as well as to Kant, the difficulty of the problem of knowledge lies in the possibility of the first judgment. Knowledge is judgment, and then the analysis of the first knowledge or judgment is the first step in every serious philosophical research. Now, the essence of judgment

<sup>13</sup> See "Introduzione alla filosofia."

<sup>14</sup> "The Origin of Ideas," No. 410.

<sup>15</sup> "Theodicy," No. 138, Vol. I.

<sup>16</sup> See "Introduzione alla filosofia."

consists in the union of a subject individual and of a predicate, of a particular idea and of a universal idea. Thus every judgment supposes a universal idea. Experience gives us particular ideas or the matter of knowledge. The universal idea, however, or the form can derive neither from sense-experience, for this happens within the sphere of contingent facts and reaches nothing beyond the individual, nor from reflection, which is an operation of the mind, and every intellectual operation is a judgment. The exclusion of these two possibilities, the former as insufficient, and the latter as forming a vicious circle, leaves one last hypothesis, namely, that the universal idea is prior, that is, innate. Thus within human reason there is at least a notion which is primitive, indispensable to the formation of the first judgment, and which is the first condition and link of human knowledge. This primitive idea is the light and life of reason, and the form of forms; since it is universal, it is also the most elementary and simple and it is to be found, accordingly, in every judgment, in every operation of our mind as its most essential factor. It contains necessarily as in germ all human knowledge; it is the ruling thought, and successively becomes cause, substance, finality. According to Rosmini, such an idea can not but be the "idea of being" or the "ideal being." In fact, our internal analysis shows us that our cognitions have the idea of being as a common element. This idea is at the bottom of every thought.

"The idea of being," he says, "is the most universal of all ideas. It is what remains after the last abstraction possible; and its removal puts an end to all thought and makes every other idea impossible."<sup>17</sup>

"Man has by nature an intuition of that ideal and indeterminate being which contains all entity in an indistinct state, in a way analogous to that in which a large block of marble contains all the statues which the sculptor proposes to make out of it, or a given superficies all the figures that can be designed thereon."<sup>18</sup>

This "corner-stone" of the edifice of human knowledge, virtue, and happiness, which Rosmini sought from his early youth, this nucleus, source, and rule of every art and science, this very efficient means of philosophical and social restoration, is not a production of reason itself; it does not derive from the thinking self, like the Kantian forms; but it is communicated from without, and it is, therefore, not subjective, but objective.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> "The Origin of Ideas," Vol. II., No. 411, page 17.

<sup>18</sup> "Theodicy," Vol. II., No. 668, page 159.

<sup>19</sup> See "Filosofia del Diritto," Introduzione. Pagani reports in his "Life of Rosmini" that the Italian philosopher proposed to himself the great problem of the origin of ideas when he was seventeen years old (1814), and that in the following year he discovered the fundamental principle of his philosophy.

## PART II

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### THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF ROSMINI'S ETHICAL THEORY

#### INTRODUCTORY

##### THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF ETHICS

THE science of ethics is, according to Rosmini, the director of human life, since its purpose is to direct man's rational activity. Man's goodness, however, depends upon the goodness of his will, for the will is the supreme and active rational power, which controls and synthesizes all his intellectual and moral actions. Nay, the will is precisely the same radical and immanent activity which constitutes human personality. Whence our philosopher concludes that man is moral, because his will is susceptible of good and bad activity, of moral or immoral acts and habits, or, in one word, of morality.<sup>1</sup>

Thus the crux of every theory is to discover the factors which make good man's will, or, in other words, what is "moral good" or "virtue." Man is endowed with the faculty of sensation as well as with that of intelligence. By the faculty of sensation, he perceives things as they are; by the faculty of intelligence, he perceives things as possible. This different mode of perceiving is, according to our philosopher, the cause of distinction between subjective and objective good.

The sense is the source of subjective good; the intellect is the source of objective good. Every sensible good stimulates and satisfies man; and he is naturally impelled to unite himself to such a good, and to enjoy it. Man, however, does not regard the objective or "intelligible" good as something which belongs to himself, as something which may be felt by him. He merely considers it as an object of his intelligence, of his intellectual intuition everywhere and in whatsoever mode it may be found. "The objective good is merely contemplated by the intelligence." Now, the burning question is whether the moral good is subjective or objective.

Rosmini believes this distinction to be of the highest importance,

<sup>1</sup> See "*Antropologia*," I., IV., Chs. VI., VIII.; "*Prefazione alle opere di filosofia morale*"; "*Compendio di etica*," Introduzione, §§I., II.; "*Theodicy*," Nos. 398, 410.



since the confusion of the two kinds of good has brought ruin to philosophy and morals.<sup>2</sup> He praises the German school because of its contribution to the important distinction, whereby ethics has been delivered from the motivation of happiness.<sup>3</sup>

To say that moral good is subjective, is, according to Rosmini, to base it upon the relativity of human ideas and purposes, and, consequently, upon individual opinions, preferences, and caprices; thus it can be found together with a bad will. This is the fatal consequence of the philosophy of sense. But our philosopher, impelled by the bias of his mind and character, is determined to oppose such philosophical premises and ethical consequences. He seems thoroughly convinced that the ethical conduct of life needs sure principles, that the norm and standard for the valuation of worth must be unique, fixed, and absolute, and, finally, that it may be found above and beyond individual experience, in a Platonic metaphysical atmosphere.

Rosmini, following the German philosophers, eliminates happiness, that is to say, just what the Greek thought to be its essential element, from the science of ethics. He holds that ethics is only concerned with moral good. Eudemonology is the science which deals with happiness.

Thus, the great problem the moral philosopher is called upon to solve is the problem of the nature of moral good. It is indeed a problem of the highest practical importance, since human happiness depends upon its right solution. The nature of moral good, however, may be traced only by the analysis of its fundamental factors. Now, from all Rosmini's ethical works it may be concluded that he thinks the moral good to be the outcome of two main factors, one of which we may call "metaphysical" and the other "psychological." According to him, all ethical judging, the will and its whole activity, must conform to a supreme and fundamental law of action, which is categorically imperative, universally true and valid as well as universally uniform. This is, for him as for Kant, the most significant feature of morality. Such a law, however, which he supposes to be prior to all particular laws, grounding their existence and obligatory force, is objective, absolute, and independent of all empirical motives.

This primal and fundamental law is the metaphysical and chief factor of morality; it constitutes its essence. But the law presupposes an agent, and an agent capable of adjusting himself; it presup-

<sup>2</sup> See "Prefazione alle opere di filosofia morale"; "Principii della scienza morale," Ch. III.; "Storia comparativa e critica intorno al principio della morale," etc.

<sup>3</sup> See "Principii della scienza morale," *op. cit.*, Ch. III., a. I.

poses a free will. Neither the law nor the will alone constitutes morality.

The moral situation, according to Rosmini, involves also the psychological factor, and both ethical factors, not asunder, but in reciprocal relation. The science of ethics is then confronted by another problem of no less importance: the problem of the nature of the agent and of the relation between law and the will in order to have human actions clothed with morality, and therefore good.

It is the business of ethics to answer these central problems, which form the core of every ethical theory. Let us notice here that Rosmini does not regard an ethical theory as a working hypothesis, since ethics is not for him hypothetical, conditional, and relative. He considers ethical theory as helpful to morals because of its formulation of fixed precepts for action, rather than for the scientific insight it affords into truth. He does not define ethical theory from the standpoint of principles which can provide a method of action, but from that of rules which are prescriptions for it. Ethics, however, is a science for him, not an art, as for John Stuart Mill.<sup>4</sup> It is, indeed, a science because it formulates laws, but it is a practical science, as its laws are formulated for the sake of action. It may, accordingly, be called "the theory of practise" or "the theory of action."<sup>5</sup>

Ethics, says Rosmini, is "the science which gives systematic order to the norms to which human actions must adjust themselves, and determines the relation between actions and norms."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> "Logic," Book 6, Ch. 12.

<sup>5</sup> See "Prefazione alle opere di filosofia morale."

<sup>6</sup> See "Sistema filosofico," No. 216.

## CHAPTER I

### THE METAPHYSICAL FACTOR OF MORALITY

ROSMINI, being determined to set up the ideal of reason against the relativism of sense, seems to regard as basic the conviction that the concept is the goal of science, since conception alone gives us the permanent essence of things, while the objective content of conceptual knowledge is the idea. According to him, the idea is merely the immediate and direct cognition of things in their proper essence, which is eternal.<sup>1</sup>

Since an idea is an essence, and since our judgment is always right when an idea is its rule, Rosmini thinks that an idea, a notion, is also the rule or standard according to which we must judge of the morality of our actions, and behave: that is to say that the moral law is nothing else than an idea.<sup>2</sup> The notion of "perniciousness," for instance, is the notion through which we know what actions are pernicious or not. We compare and conform our actions with such a notion, as if it were a type. The moral law is then a notion. Besides, Rosmini seems to accept the law exalted by Socrates to the principle of scientific method, namely, the law of logical dependence of the particulars upon the universal. He thinks, accordingly, that every notion supposes and depends upon another, anterior to itself, and that a series of notions supposes a primordial one that is the ground upon which all the others are based. Thus, since moral norms are nothing else but notions, according to our philosopher, they also suppose a notion which is the first of the whole possible series. And he finds that every moral law is indeed permeated with a common form or idea, as every one indicates and prescribes something common, or what is "moral good" in human action. From that he concludes that all laws are derived from a fundamental one, or, in other words, they are nothing else but applications and consequences of a primordial and basic one. That is the fundamental idea through which we form our moral judgments. Now, the question arises: What is this fundamental idea or notion? What is this primal and basal law? Rosmini thinks that such notion and law are the outcome neither of

<sup>1</sup> See "Psychology," No. 1339; "Principii della scienza morale," Ch. I., a. I., and Ch. II., a. II. "*L'essenza*," says Rosmini, "*non è se non ciò che si comprende nella idea della medesima*."

<sup>2</sup> "Principii," *op. cit.*, Ch. I., a. I.

experience, nor of reflection, as they have nothing to do with man's sensuous nature, nor with the whole world of phenomena. Man as sensuous being can afford no foundation for a law which is supposed to be supreme, and independent of all empirical motives. Its seat is indeed man as noumenon, to use Kant's language, or his reason, that is to say, his essential and characteristic part. The fundamental law, however, is not a product of reason, as Kant holds it to be. Rosmini thinks that the notion which is the root of all laws and moral norms, which is valid and uniform universally for rational beings, can not be created by reason. According to him, it is an original possession of the mind. Our mind is passive, as the law is given to it prior to all perception or individual cognition. Such a notion, moreover, according to Rosmini, is endowed with immutability, eternity, universality, and necessity.<sup>3</sup>

Now, the idea, endowed with such divine characteristics, can not fail to be the idea of being, not of this or that being, but of universal being. The idea of being is anterior to all sensations and association, and then to all ideas; it is found at the bottom of every thought; it is used by our mind as the rule of all our judgments.<sup>4</sup> Since the first Idea is the factor and source of all judgments, it follows that it is also the factor and source of all ethical judgments, and thus that it is the fundamental law, the generator and the *raison d'être* of all laws and moral standards. Besides, since it is the light of reason and since our mind, when it reasons and judges, does nothing but apply it, we ought to follow it when we perform our actions. By so doing, we follow a fixed and absolute rule and ideal of rightness, or truth itself.

But how may the ideal being, or the essence of being, be the supreme moral rule, or the rule of moral good? How may it be the means whereby we judge of the good and evil of our actions? How may it be the supreme criterion or standard of morality?

Rosmini thinks that the moral good of human conduct is a kind of good; accordingly, we can not judge of it, unless we have first the notion of good in general. By defining the moral good, we do nothing else than determine and limit the universal notion of good, and adapt it to moral science, which does not deal with the general good, but with a special good, namely, with the moral. What is then good in general?

Our philosopher makes an original analysis of the nature of good. Men, he says, usually claim as "good" the object which pleasantly stimulates and answers to our faculty of desiring, namely, the faculty which impels us to enjoy the good. Of course, an ob-

<sup>3</sup> See "Principii, *op. cit.*, Ch. I.

<sup>4</sup> See "New Essay on the Origin of Ideas," Nos. 558-574.

ject which is provocative of abhorrence rather than of longing to possess and enjoy it, is never said to be "good." Thus the real and concrete good involves some interdependence, some connection, some relation between things and our appetitive power; it implies, from one side, the adaptability, the fitness of things to satisfy our needs, our craving, our personal convenience, and, from the other, the existence of our conative impulse towards them.

Such interrelation supposes, indeed, a being capable of feeling, of desiring, and of seeking the objects which are endowed with provocative characteristics. Now, may such a being fail to desire itself? No, indeed. Its tendencies fatally converge towards the preservation and development of its own nature. It would be an obvious inconsistency to say that a being might long for its own annihilation, as annihilation is nothing, and nothingness can not be the object of an appetite. Every existing being then has a tendency to unfold itself, to better itself, and to preserve itself. Development, perfection, and preservation are its good.

The same power of desiring is nothing else but the power of aiming at its own perfection, and at everything that has the possibility of helping to reach the natural goal of every being, that is to say, its expansion of life, its totality and completion, or, in a word, its good.

Good and Being, therefore, are identical terms, and the ancients were right to define good as the end of all things and the object of universal desire. The identity of Good and Being is also confirmed by the analysis of the satisfaction of our appetitive faculty. Rosmini finds in every satisfaction two elements, namely, a general condition of well-being or an enjoyment, and a perfection, a value, or some worth which is enjoyed. The question naturally arises whether these two elements of the subjective good are necessary to constitute the concept of good, or whether one alone is sufficient. When we indicate the perfections or values of a certain nature, do we not indicate so many goods? Do we not give an account of them before considering any appetitive power? Are we not wont to attribute degrees of perfection and good even to inanimate and insensible natures? Do we not usually say that every thing is good, when it is considered in its own nature? Do we not take as synonymous terms "perfection and good"? Do we not conceive the perfections of the various natures as so many beings independently of the subject which might be stimulated by them, and might long for them? Rosmini thinks that man's idea of perfection or value is the outcome of experience. For a sensible being can not perceive any perfection if it does not feel it; and our mind can not think of a certain good, unless it is presented to it by feeling.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> See "*Principii*," *op. cit.*, Ch. II., a. I.; his "*Ideologia*."

Accordingly, the former question may be expressed as follows: Since we can not perceive and hence can not know the worth of the various natures, unless we have some feeling and appetite, does it follow that the feeling and appetite are also necessary to their existence? In other words, may a perfection, a good, exist without being sensible?

Rosmini holds that it is of the highest importance to notice that a thing to be evaluated, to be a perfection, must afford some sensible satisfaction, that is to say, its qualities must be felt by some agent. It thus implies some relation to some sense, and then to some being, for whom alone it has value. A perfection which does not give any enjoyment, does not perfect, can not be conceived as such. A perfection, therefore, involves "sensibility," that is to say, adaptation, aptitude to be felt and desired; it involves some relation to a being endowed with the power of feeling. Even the perfections of inanimate things are said to be perfections because of their relation to some being furnished with senses.

Thus, we may conclude that neither enjoyment, nor perfection, alone, is the essential constituent of the idea of good. Both are required to constitute it, as both are so closely interdependent that they can not be conceived asunder. A desirable object always presupposes a feeling subject; and an object which is enjoyed always involves a relation to some agent; the goodness of both objects implies the existence of some being. The analysis of the subjective and empirical good proves, according to Rosmini, that Being and Good are identical terms. Our philosopher proves their identity by considering the good, not only in its relation to sense and appetites, and then to some being, but even by the analysis of the concept of good, namely, by investigating what our understanding recognizes and distinguishes within the concept of good. According to him, our understanding considering good as its own object, or as concept, sees it stripped of its relation to feeling. For it is its law to forget, or, at least, not to notice what is mingled at the very beginning of the process of formation of concepts. These being formed, are kept under a synthetic condition, under a formula of what our understanding saw in the first and immediate cognition, and to it we refer, without paying any more attention to what is present in sensation. In like manner, if we examine the origin of our idea of good and perfection, we find that at the very beginning we have associated an agreeable sensation with it, so that we did not recognize any good, unless it was followed by some pleasant impression. After having acquired the habit of attributing the concept of perfection to things we have known by experience to be pleasant, we think of them, without paying any more attention to

their power of modifying us pleasantly. Thus the term "perfection" is gradually freed in our mind from its relation to the senses; it acquires a general value; it becomes a universal concept, and thus independent of its connection with sensuous nature. Rosmini notices that our understanding goes further in this process of idealization, as it also observes the pleasant or painful condition of the human body to correspond to a certain disposition of its parts, to a certain order in the measure, in the form, in the number, in the reciprocal connection and action of its parts. Thus, such intrinsic order, to which a pleasant sensation corresponds, is considered as perfection of the human body. In that case, however, we still call perfection the condition of the body coexistent with the agreeable feeling. But we afterwards generalize our own experience, and, observing the other beings, animate and sensible like us, regard them as perfect, because we are aware that they realize their ideal type, they are what they ought to be, they "*are*," namely, they conform to their essence, and, accordingly, they seem to enjoy the most pleasant existence.

In the same manner, we see inanimate beings to be more or less fit to subserve our own needs, or those of other beings, because they have a certain condition, configuration, and composition, or, in other words, they are what they ought to be, namely, useful and agreeable. In all these cases the term "perfection" has the meaning of the intrinsic order, of the most complete condition of development and realization of every being.

Such essential order, however, such completeness or perfection exists only within our understanding, because of its own process, as concept or, what is just the same for Rosmini, as essence. Thus, the essence of a being is its ideal type, or the rule or criterion, according to which we judge of the degrees of its goodness. We think its good to be what is required by its essence, what unfolds and realizes it, or, in other words, what is appropriate to its nature, and harmonizes with its existence.

The energies of every being naturally seek that end, as its most perfect and typical condition. Thus the analysis of the idea of good shows that Being and Good are two terms involving each other; that they are two aspects of the same truth. The Scholastic saying "*ens et bonum convertuntur*" is justified. Now, it is important to notice that the value, perfection, or the good of beings is contemplated, indeed, by our intelligence, but it is contemplated, according to Rosmini, as something real, objective, and then independently of the pleasant sensuous effect, as it is seen under the light of the primordial object of our mind, or, of ideal being. Whence it follows that all essences are nothing else, for our philosopher, but de-

terminations and limitations of the universal and ideal Being itself. Besides, it follows that the idea of good, like the idea of being, is more general than sensation, it is prior to it.

Rosmini notices, moreover, that, since the value or good of a being is found in the realization of its essence, it follows that everything which opposes and thwarts the process of its development is evil. Thus evil is, not absolute negation of good, but lack of some perfection. Accordingly, a series of values, of good, may be found in every being, starting from its first and imperfect existence and ending with its last stage of development and realization. The more adequately, then, a being realizes its ideal, the more entity it has, the greater is its good. Now, since Being and Good are one and the same thing, it is obvious that we know the value or the degree of perfection of a being, when we possess its idea; when we know its essence, its degree of existence, as well as its intrinsic order and how far it is realized. Besides, from the identity of Being and Good it may be concluded that the notion whereby both are known by us is the same. Since, according to Rosmini, the idea of being is the origin of all beings, it follows that it is also the origin of all goods; and as it is the means whereby we know all beings, it is evident that it is also the means whereby we know and value every kind of good, namely, the good which satisfies some agent, or subjective good, as well as the good which is independent of all personal and empirical motives, and which is good in itself, or objective good.

From the fact that Being and Good are identical Rosmini finally infers the concept of Absolute Good. As Absolute Being is the being which has the whole of essence within itself, so also Absolute Good is the good which includes the whole of good. The Complete Being is the Complete Good, which lacks nothing, and for this reason it is absolute. The Complete Being, however, is the supreme good, not only in and for itself, but it is also the supreme good relatively to particular beings. Rosmini calls the complete and absolute Being, which is by the same fact the supreme and absolute Good, "God." God, therefore, is the end of human activity. To become one with Him is the high destiny of man as rational being.<sup>6</sup>

Now, to understand Rosmini's point of view, it is of the highest importance to notice what is fundamental in his ethical theory. He holds that every real individual, realizing his own essence, does nothing but realize the essence of being. Since this partakes of the universal, infinite, necessary, and divine essence, it partakes of the Absolute Being, of God Himself. By the same fact, every real individual by realizing good partakes of the Absolute Good. Thus

<sup>6</sup> See "Principii," *op. cit.*, Ch. III, a. VIII.



the Absolute Good is the goal of rational activity, and ought to be recognized and loved wherever found.

Every man, therefore, according to Rosmini, as rational being, and thus partaking of God Himself, makes a moral demand, that is to say, he demands to be recognized and loved, because of his participation in the Absolute Being and Good. The essence of morality, then, or, the ultimate ground of every moral law, of every moral obligation, lies in the respect due to Infinite Essence. Accordingly, the principle of morality may be formulated in the following law: "*Recognize the essence of being.*" But to recognize the essence of being is the same as to recognize its goodness; we can say then that the principle of morality consists in the practical recognition of every being, according to the good it is found to possess, that is to say, according to its value and worth.

Now, since the essence of morality is identical with the essence of being, it must be endowed with the same characteristics. Since the essence of being is objective (because it is independent of every subject), so also is moral good or the essence of morality. We do not create it; we only verify it. The essential law of pure reason, according to Rosmini, consists in grasping being in itself, so also the law of practical reason is the good appreciated in itself, or, in its intrinsic and objective value, not according to the merely personal and subjective profit which may derive to the agent from his faithfulness to duty. Besides, good partakes of the immutability of Being; its stability is then eternal. The good which is object of human actions is, finally, as the essence of being, divine and infinite. God, therefore, ought to be, according to our philosopher, the focus of thought and love, the satisfaction of man's intelligence and heart. Moreover, since the principle of morality and obligation consists in the practical recognition of every being, according to its essence and goodness, it follows that we must distribute our love among things in proportion to their respective grades of being, and prefer the greater to the lesser grade. "I must prefer my country," says Rosmini, "to my life." The moral law says absolutely: "Sacrifice thyself for thy country."

But here it may be asked: How can man, a finite being, ascend to the knowledge and practical recognition of the essence of beings, which is infinite? How can he measure the degrees of entity? What is the first and supreme rule whereby we know when and how the principle of obligation must be applied? Rosmini answers that man is endowed by nature with the intuition of the essence of being. By means of this intuition, he is fitted to know and measure every essence and then every goodness. Since the idea of being is the

supreme rule whereby we conceive and measure the entity of beings, and consequently the objective good, or, moral good, end of human actions, the ethical formula "*Follow the light of reason,*" may be translated into this other: "*Follow the idea of good, as it shows you the measure of the entity of every being.*" To know its entity is to know its value, its worth, its dignity, and its right to be recognized for what it is and to be loved accordingly.<sup>s</sup>

Thus, according to Rosmini, the idea of being is the ground of ethical judgments; it is the source of morality and obligation; it is the metaphysical basis of the law of knowledge and action. Epistemology and ethics have the same foundation, independent of man's experience. This is the kernel of Rosmini's ethical theory!

<sup>s</sup> "Theodicy," No. 725.

## CHAPTER II

### THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR OF MORALITY

THE whole value, the whole good, of beings lies, according to Rosmini, in the fact that beings, realizing their own essence, partake of the infinite, immutable, and absolute essence of the Supreme Being. Their good, however, if it is known and enjoyed only by intelligence, is "objective good."

Intelligence considers them in themselves, independently of every personal interest, of every empirical motive, and, by so doing, it attributes to them that which really belongs to them, and thus it does them justice. The moral good, then, can not be anything else than the objective good. And the supreme moral law, the whole moral legislation is rooted and grounded in the objective good, or, in other words, in the Absolute and Eternal. But the possibility of man's subordination to a certain law depends upon its promulgation. Man must have knowledge of the law in question; it must be present in his mind as an idea; for when man obeys a normative rule, he adjusts his rational activity, his will, to it. The root of human activity lies in knowledge itself; action is always directed by idea; and will terminates through action in an object known and set before it by intelligence.<sup>1</sup>

The supreme moral law, therefore, or the objective good, must be, indeed, present to the intelligence, not as a mere object of contemplation. If the will does not intervene to will it, after having known it, objective good does not acquire the characteristic of moral good. A merely speculative, formal, sterile knowledge of the good can not constitute the notion of moral good. When the agent wills the good known already by his intelligence, the good is moral. Thus the moral good is, according to Rosmini, the objective good, known by the intelligence and willed by the will.<sup>2</sup>

The quality of morality is simply the relation of the objective good to the intelligent nature willing it. Now, Rosmini thinks that the supreme and fundamental law of morality has been promulgated to man from the early dawn of his life. Since the idea of being is the light of reason itself, or "a spark of the divine fire" which enables man to know the entity of beings, it performs the

<sup>1</sup> "Theodicy," Nos. 398, 631, 637, 644.

<sup>2</sup> "Principii," *op. cit.*, Ch. IV., a. VI.

function of the supreme moral law; since it is innate, it follows that we carry within ourselves the germ of morals, the source of the whole moral legislation; we bear within ourselves the reason or will of God Himself, unceasingly proclaiming what is right.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, for Rosmini, the fundamental law or notion of morality is not the outcome of the course of experience, but something imposed, originating from a transcendental, invisible authority. The mind is merely passive when it receives the principle of morality, as it can not be legislator to itself; it can impose no norms, no standards of action on itself. Accordingly, the basis and justifying principle of the ethical judgment lie outside of the mind itself in transcendental conceptions, or considerations that do not result from human experience. Our philosopher is thoroughly convinced that the principle of morality can not be empirically acquired, but that it must be implanted, because it is universal and categoric; it is truth itself, whereas experience, however repeated and multiplied, never gives anything more than particular facts.<sup>4</sup>

Reasons and laws can not be received by the senses; essentially unknown to sense, they are manifest only to rational natures.<sup>5</sup> The principle of morality is, therefore, infused into our reason. Thus, it is abstract and static!

But Being has, for Rosmini, always this essential characteristic, that it is good, and hence it can not be known except as good. Now, the knowledge of it as good implies an affection, an inclination toward it. Just as Being, in its character of "light," creates the intellect, a formal cause of the human soul, so the same being, in its essential character of "good," creates the "primitive will," as the final cause which actuates the first affection, the first volition, directed to universal being. And as the intellect is the receptive power, so the will is the active power which corresponds to it. Now, according to our philosopher, the intellect has, as its essential object, ideal being. Being is immutable, the intellect, then, has the nature of an "immanent" act rather than of a power. In the same way it may be said that the primitive and universal will has not the nature of a power, but of an immanent act, which is the principle and basis of power. Hence Rosmini prefers to call it "primitive volition," instead of primitive will.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> "Compendio di etica," Nos. 53, 54; "Theodicy," Nos. 5, 259, 262.

<sup>4</sup> "Theodicy," Nos. 138, 145, 151, 259.

<sup>5</sup> "Principii," *op. cit.*, Ch. I., a. III. Rosmini thinks that his conception conforms to Marcus Aurelius's conception of fundamental law. "*Hanc video sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam, legem neque hominum ingeniis cogitatam, nec scitum aliquod esse populorum, sed aeternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi, prohibendique sapientia.*" ("De Leg.," II.)

<sup>6</sup> "Psychology," Nos. 1008-1011. "The immanent act is that which en-

Man, accordingly, by the intuition of the essence of the universal being, is enabled to know the essence of real and individual beings, that is to say, their value, their worth, and their "claim" to be recognized and loved. For the same reason he has a natural and spontaneous predisposition toward the universal being or universal good. And since the moral principle imposes adhesion to the known entity of beings, man is by nature predisposed to act in accordance with the fundamental moral law. Such a force which tends to the whole of being, to universal good, may be called "moral," because it comes from being and goes to being.<sup>7</sup>

Thus the human will carries within itself a relation of conformity to the first and eternal law, or notion of being. Man, as a real being, is finite, but by the intuition of Being, he is also intellectual and moral, and partakes of the infinite. His tendency, however, to act morally, that which Rosmini calls "moral liberty," in so far as it is natural and spontaneous, is not meritorious. Man is necessitated to act with moral liberty, that is to say, he is determined to his action, not by external cause, but by his inner impelling bent to adhere to good in general. This natural inclination of the subject to universal good is what constitutes the will itself.<sup>8</sup>

The will, regarded as such, is not the source of merit; it deserves neither praise nor blame.<sup>9</sup> But if the will acts in accordance with this first activity, it preserves in its operation an order altogether analogous and corresponding to the order of being itself, and by this order it is determined to act with moral perfection. This point of view evidently involves a deterministic and intellectualistic conception of the will, and makes the decision of the will exclusively dependent on inner insight.

Does it mean that Rosmini does not believe in the freedom of the human will? Rosmini believes in it, and gives an original and interesting analysis of it. Liberty, according to him, springs up at a certain stage of the psychic process of action. Doubtless it does not intervene in the intuition of the essence of being, since this is absolute and necessary. This essential and divine power is given to man and he does not contribute anything to it. Nor does liberty intervene in the spontaneous and immanent tendency which the

dures with a being so long as no substantial change supervenes in it." *Ibid.*, 1205.

<sup>7</sup> See "Psychology," No. 896; "Etica," Nos. 514-525; "Teosofia," No. 1037. Such moral force is called by Rosmini "*Preponderanza morale*." It is nothing else but what is called by St. Thomas "*Bonum naturae, scilicet naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem*," Ia, IIae, q. LXIII. and LXXXV., a. I.

<sup>8</sup> See "Teosofia," No. 1037; "Etica," No. 29.

<sup>9</sup> Dante expresses the identical idea, when he says, "*Questa prima voglia Merto di lode o di biasimo non cape*." *Purg.* XXVIII., 59, 60.

idea of being or the light of reason produces in the will, impelling it to adhere to, and love, all entity and good. It may be said that the divine craves for the divine which is found in every intelligent being. Liberty, finally, does not intervene in the external action, as that depends on the will, subordinated, already, to a certain normative rule, and determined thereby. The rôle of free will, therefore, the merit or demerit of actions, and the responsibility of the agent, are to be sought elsewhere.

Rosmini thinks that man is endowed with a twofold activity; as an intelligent being he is endowed with rational activity; as a real being he is endowed with sensuous activity. Now, if he were merely intelligent, if he could shuffle off his mortal coil of animal qualities, he would be in a state of pure intelligence; he would communicate with beings by means of his reason; he would perceive their whole entity by the same means, and, by perceiving their entity, he would perceive also their value, their good. Such transcendental knowledge would, of course, induce a universal rational love for all beings; such universal love would afford intellectual delight to man, rid of his animality. This whole process would be spontaneous, necessary, voluntary, as the will of the rational nature would then follow its own natural inclination. Man, therefore, as an intelligent being, would always act morally, namely, according to his natural rational predisposition toward universal being and good, as well as in accordance with the moral demand of beings to be recognized and loved, in proportion to their entity. As a real being, however, man is endowed with feeling, with physical qualities and needs; in other words, he feels impelled by an inner physical force to act for his own satisfaction, pleasure, or happiness.

If this activity which aims, not at the good in itself, but at the good of the agent, could be naturally conformed with the rational and immanent activity, the freedom of the will would be useless. But it happens that both activities come into collision and seek to determine the will in opposite directions; either of which alone would suffice to make it act. At this crucial stage, the objects of opposite order, radically different, produce two kinds of volition. Both volitions are possible; as the one may determine the will towards the intellective and objective good, and the other towards the sensitive and subjective good. The choice between the two possible volitions is free. There is no coercion. Man has, according to Rosmini, the power of making one volition prevail over another, and thus of determining himself to action. This power which the will possesses, is called by Rosmini "liberty of indifference," "bilateral-liberty," or "meritorious liberty."

But how does the will display such a power? How does one volition prevail over another? How is the choice between two contrary volitions brought about? Rosmini holds that the will is a power which acts in accordance with the reasons that man has in his mind and proposes to himself. Whence we may conclude that the will can not operate unless man has reasons or knowledge, according to which he might deliberate, choose, and will. The reason or motive, however, does not determine the will.

The determining force, the power of free choice, or "liberty," lies within the agent himself. Liberty affords the agent, in the presence of several motives, the power of making one motive prevail over all others so that the predominating motive determines the will to act.<sup>10</sup>

Rosmini, however, does not mean that a motive might have the force of directing choice. According to him, there are two kinds of cognition. The first cognition of things is direct, immediate, instinctive, necessary, and so not voluntary. Through it we are furnished with ideas of things. The understanding forms perceptions, and such ideas as are consequent on these, in an instinctive and natural manner, and, for that reason it is not liable to error, for nature does not err. Through this first intellective apprehension we perceive the thing in its entirety, by a simple act, as if it were a simple object. Thus, the direct cognition is purely synthetic; it is the primitive, spontaneous synthesis of being and sensation. Let us notice that in perceiving the things as a whole, we have no interest to perceive them in one manner rather than in another. We are then merely passive.<sup>11</sup>

Besides, we must notice that in perceiving the entity of beings, we have a conception of their value. Accordingly, direct cognition enables our theoretical reason to make speculative judgments and acquire speculative knowledge. The first ideas, however, by which we know things are for Rosmini equally indifferent; they have, in other words, not purposive, but representative character only. Thus Rosmini fails to notice that all our consciousness is dynamogenic, and that an idea is a nascent act. Our philosopher, however, thinks that the need of action impels the will to reflection, that is to say, to turn back upon what we before perceived directly and involuntarily; it urges the rational, active power to analyze, decompose, and consider previous and direct cognitions.

This process of reflection, of analysis, which is thoroughly voluntary and practical involves a "*practical evaluation*" or "*judgment*"

<sup>10</sup> "Antropologia," Ch. VII.

<sup>11</sup> See "New Essay on the Origin of Ideas," Vol. III., Nos. 1258, 1259, 1261; "Principii," *op. cit.*, Ch. V., a. III.

of the things, known already through previous, immediate cognition. At this stage the will displays its power of liberty. For it is free to appreciate and recognize things as they are in cognition and to adhere to their entity as known, as it is free to alter their value by arbitrarily increasing or diminishing for itself the degrees of being or entity, thus substituting another entity, feigned and created by the energy of its own caprice. The volitional activity then manifests itself by "recognition," either simple or fictitious. It implies, indeed, a previous cognition as well as no alteration of its object. This voluntary recognition is an assent to immediate cognition; it is true, just, moral, if the will, in recognizing the previously known entity, does not alter its value, but is content with that measure of value which direct cognition prescribes. On the contrary, it is unjust and immoral, if the will assumes that the entity of things is different from the one contained in the direct cognition, and thus estimates it at more or at less than its true worth, recognizing it as what it is not, not as what it is.

This practical force of arbitrary evaluation is simply the reason which prevails and determines the choice. Without the practical force there is no determination, but a mere inclination which does not end in choice. Thus, given the case in which each of two volitions has in its favor a reason of equal weight, the free will can, by increasing the force of the reason which is favorable to it, choose one rather than the other. Whence Rosmini concludes that the will may conform its activity to its moral liberty or to the moral claim of beings, and thus to the good, or to the opposite, and thus be unjust and evil.<sup>12</sup>

He notices, besides, that practical esteem produces a "practical love." We act because we are impelled by a practical love which prevails over other loves. We are free to will or not to will actions, because we are free to love or not to love them, to increase or diminish our love or our hatred of this or that action. This power of ours which is called liberty is practised first on the affections of our heart, and through it on the actions themselves.

But when we love a thing, we love it because we consider it good; we may, indeed, love something evil, but when we do so, we love it "*sub specie boni*." Thus, the intrinsic nature of love involves esteem of the object loved; our personal valuation is a factor in our own loving.<sup>13</sup>

To sum up; the process of the moral act, according to Rosmini,

<sup>12</sup> See "Psychology," No. 1103; "Antropologia," Nos. 636-643; "Theodicy," No. 621; "Etica," Ch. III., a. I., II., III.; "Principii," *op. cit.*, Ch. V.

<sup>13</sup> See "Principii," *op. cit.*, Ch. V., a. III.



is as follows: we first have ideas and memories of things; we have direct and necessary cognitions; we see things as they are. After the will provokes the reflection upon these things known, this voluntary reflection is just or unjust, according as it tends to recognize faithfully the direct cognition, or to alter it. The agent, during voluntary reflection, concentrates his attention, or meditates, upon the immediate cognition. Out of this voluntary meditation springs a keen and active apprehension, which is true or false, according as the act of the will, directing reflection, was right or perverse. The apprehension ends in a practical judgment or esteem. The practical valuation produces an intellectual delight or sorrow. Such a delight is the beginning of the love that immediately follows it as its completion and end, as such a sorrow is the beginning of the hatred that immediately follows it as its mark and fulfilment.

The external action is the last stage of the complex psychic process which the will instigates, under the pressure of action, carrying out its power of liberty. Liberty, then, according to Rosmini, consists in self-determination; the will uses its power of free choice between volitions, categorically different, only when there is conflict between subjective and objective good, that is to say, between duty, virtue, moral law, and pleasure, satisfaction, happiness, or, in other words, between the ideal and the real, the infinite and finite. Accordingly, it must be the law of the rational principle to consider the value of being in itself, independently of the accidental and real action which it exercises on the rational subject. That value must, therefore, be measured by ideal being, and not by considerations of subjective advantage and disadvantage, and must be estimated by comparison with ideal being. Our practical reason must not estimate its object at a different value from that which it has in itself considered with respect to ideal being. It must act in view of the true measure of that object discovered by comparison with the essence of being intuited by the mind in universal-ideal being. To act according to this measure is to act rationally and, hence, morally; to act from the mere impulse of the real action which an object exercises on us, is to abandon the law of reason, to follow that of blind, or merely sensible, real being. To act morally, in other words, we must direct our actions to being, as it is their natural end; thus we must forget ourselves and objectify ourselves in being, or in the object of our activity, as intelligent beings. And as the object of our rational and moral actions is the Infinite, we must merge ourselves in the Infinite, Supreme Being, the Absolute Good. When we love a thing, when we think of it, we do nothing but bring ourselves into the same thing as term of our love and thought, and forget

and, in a sense, annihilate ourselves. That is what Rosmini wants us to do before the objective, infinite, moral good, the goal of our rational activity.<sup>14</sup> By so doing, we perform a voluntary recognition of what we first necessarily know; we welcome the good of the things we have perceived; we recognize what is true, nay, truth itself; and thus we subordinate ourselves to the fundamental principle of morality; we are morally good and accomplish our supreme duty.

Now, since the principle of cognition which constitutes the supreme law, according to which the theoretic reason operates, supplies, likewise, the law, according to which the practical reason ought to operate, it follows that if the law of the theoretic reason says: "Being is the object of knowing," the law of the practical reason says: "Being ought to be object of practical knowing."<sup>15</sup>

Let us notice here that Rosmini's endeavors to distinguish reason into theoretical and practical have proved to be vain. He does not, indeed, regard, like Kant, the theoretical reason and the practical reason as two faculties radically different.<sup>16</sup> He thinks that there is but one rational principle, which in so far as it knows is called "theoretic," and in so far as it acts is called "practical." But he identifies them *de facto*. And, indeed, since speculative reason is constituted by the intuition of being in general, since the practical reason is the same recognition of the essence of beings, and since good, the term of the practical reason, and being, the term of pure reason, are one and the same thing, inasmuch as they are convertible terms, it follows that both pure and practical reason have the same object and term; there is no conflict between them; they are not distinct, but are one reason, one instrument of activity; and thus the rational principle which is found in man is for practise, action, life.

Moreover, let us notice that Rosmini, making morality dependent only upon knowledge, fails to consider man in his totality, as he neglects to pay attention to the life of feeling which, as well as the life of reason, claims to be a basis of ethical judging.

Finally, it is of the highest importance to notice that Rosmini derives the conception of human dignity from the fact that man is endowed with the intuition of Being, whereby he is enabled to perceive, recognize, and love the entity of beings, and, since their entity is nothing but participation in the Absolute, it follows that man is

<sup>14</sup> "Psychology," No. 1429; "Theodicy," Nos. 384-415; "Teosofia," II.; "Principii," *op. cit.*, Ch. V.

<sup>15</sup> "Psychology," No. 1399.

<sup>16</sup> See "Theodicy," No. 161.

enabled to know, recognize, and love the Infinite, the Absolute, or God Himself.

Besides, the light of reason, with which man is by nature endowed, is participation in God's light. It is, for Rosmini as for Flavius Justin, the natural revelation of the divine and "germinant Logos." Thus, man partakes of God's dignity. Accordingly, he can not be regarded as a means, but only as an end.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> See "Principii," *op. cit.*, Ch. III., a. IX.; Ch. IV., a. VIII. and IX.; "Storia comparativa," Ch. I., a. III.; "Teosofia," No. 831; "Etica," Nos. 98, 99, 102-104.

## CONCLUSION

THE theory of ideal being is the basis of Rosmini's vast philosophical edifice; it is the unifying factor in his whole system of thought; it is the starting point of every philosophical problem he confronts and discusses, as well as of his theory of ethics. His entire philosophy, then, stands and falls with the doctrine of being.

The fundamental error in Rosmini's system of philosophy and of ethics lies in his method. He begins with the universal or idea, and attempts to descend to the particular or the phenomenal. Thus he begins with an *a priori* element, with a theory of what is prior to every experience, with the highest abstraction, since the idea of being is one of the last terms of our intellectual elaboration that supposes, indeed, a series of previous operations. Now, to assume an abstraction, as the starting point of knowledge, is to assume a psychological and epistemological impossibility. Positive facts constitute the beginning of human knowledge. Something abstract, extra-empirical, can not be the object of experience, of idealization, of desire, of interest, as it has no value, no meaning for life, and consequently it can be neither stimulus nor response to any need or demand. The function of thinking is aroused by the presence of some object, which involves reaction or adjustment.

It can not be denied, indeed, that every judgment implies the notion of being, but we can not from this fact conclude that the idea of being exists within our mind, prior to all experience, and that it may be the main factor of all our intellectual development. The substitution of idea for fact, of intuition for perception, is an arbitrary and unscientific substitution. In fact, how can we pass from the mere notion of being to real being, from a mere abstract form of our mind to life? What bridges the gulf between the ideal and the real? According to Hegel it is "becoming"; according to Gioberti it is "creation"; according to Rosmini it is an uncontrolled synthesis between perception and ideal being.

Rosmini endeavors, indeed, to solve the difficulty by holding that the idea of possible being, indeterminate in itself, is determined by the act of perception, and thus it becomes the idea of a real being.

But such a postulate is not at all justified, and contains contradictory affirmations. The idea of a possible being, as it is simple and indeterminate, can not undergo the slightest change or modification, without being no longer what it was, without annihilating

itself, for the sake of being replaced by a new idea. Thus the latter would not be a transformation, but a suppression of the first.

The phenomenon of perception proves to be impossible in Rosmini's psychological theory. Perception is an act of adjustment of the organism to the environment, and we do not need any abstraction as means of performing such a biological function.

Besides, let us remark against Rosmini's theory of knowledge what Aristotle noticed against that of Plato, that is to say that our knowledge does not begin with universal, since our knowledge of the individual precedes our knowledge of the universal.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, Rosmini, following Plato, hypostatizes the universal, attributing to it a separate existence, characterized by immutability and eternity. But we may object to Plato as well as to Rosmini that the universal can not exist apart from the individual, since, if it did so, the transition from a knowledge of the one to a knowledge of the other would be impossible. Finally, Rosmini holds the universal to be ready-made, apart from phenomena, while we may say that the formal aspect of universality is a production of the mind, and, therefore, the universal, as such, does not exist in individual things, but in the mind alone. It seems to be arbitrary to derive the universal from a transcendental entity as Rosmini does. I can not help regarding as a mere chimera the belief in any abstract idea, containing intelligible essence, and conditioning and determining, as an eternal archetype, reality, the data of experience which is concrete, particular, and determined in space and time.

To believe in such a thing is to believe that human science may be severed into two orders of objects, absolutely distinct, and having no other relation than a kind of parallelism in their development. The abstract and the concrete are characterized by profound differences, but, in spite of those differences, both are products of experience.

But Rosmini's final motive was that of Plato, and he felt it necessary to assume the same rationalistic attitude, and to base his ethics upon metaphysical, or rather mythical epistemology. He, as well as Plato, thought that the knowledge in which virtue is to consist must be the cognition of what is truly real, as opposed to opinions which may be only relative, and dependent on phenomena, on empirical and subjective motives, thus compromising true knowledge and morals. The leading motive of both philosophers proved to be ethico-social, since both wanted to check the moral disintegration of their countries and to lift up the moral standard of national life by indicating moral conduct as factor of true happiness, individual as well as social. Thus the common ideal of their philosophical en-

<sup>1</sup> "Eth. Nic.," VI., II., 1143, 65.

deavors was to win true virtue by true knowledge. So I think that Rosmini assumed as thesis of his epistemological and metaphysical doctrine of ethics, the thesis discussed, in a special way, in Plato's *Meno*.<sup>2</sup>

Plato was convinced that the fundamental principle of morals was exposed to the danger of continuous change by the Protagorean doctrine of relativity. He thought, accordingly, that as Socrates had first taught, virtue is knowledge, and knowledge of the good. But he thought, moreover, that the absolute truth of conceptual knowledge consists in the fact that it conceives in the idea the true being, independent of every change.

Rosmini, like Parmenides, Socrates, and Plato, wanted to place reason in opposition to opinion; he thought that sensationalism and empiricism, which were the prevalent currents of philosophical thought in Italy at that time of national becoming, compromised or nullified the fundamental principles of epistemology and ethics. Accordingly, identifying being with good, in a Euclidean manner, presupposed a changeless supreme idea in man, as the rational measure, rule, and end of human actions, as it is also the fundamental source of epistemological and ethical law. He intended thereby to furnish the new national life with a basis eternally immune to change; he intended to respond to the need of new ideals, of new intellectual beauty, which the revival of Christian ideals and the influence of romanticism brought into every province of life.

Rosmini, as well as Scotus Erigena, making the individual dependent upon the universal, meant to subordinate all the particular forces to the almighty authority of the Supreme Being, and of the Church. He intended, indeed, to focus the minds of the oppressed Italians as well of the oppressors of that time and of all time, upon an inexhaustible source of truth and justice, quite independent of all circumstances and motives. That is the reason why he does not account for the dynamic, progressive character of morality, and thinks the moral life to be a changeless structure. He, moreover, intended to say that duties and rights undergo no change, as the moral order does not depend upon the will and the caprices of men, but upon the Absolute, Eternal, Supreme Being.

The unchangeable moral principle consists in the practical recognition of the entity or the good, partaken of by men, or, in other words, in the love for all who enjoy the divine within themselves. Such an idea, while it suggested reciprocal love and union to the groaning hearts of the Italians, kindled also their ardent desire for political emancipation. The fundamental moral law, divine in its

<sup>2</sup> See "*Phaedo*," and "*Republic*," especially Books IV. and V.

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<sup>1</sup> "Eth. Nic.," VI, II, 1143, b5.

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Human rights are sacred as duty is sacred. Since justice is grounded in God's will, Rosmini meant that Italy's political deliverance and unity were God's will as well. Thus the Italian philosopher indirectly intended to foster the national aspirations of his compatriots and to help modify their political and social situation.

But the principle upon which Rosmini endeavored to build his system of ethics, although clothed with rational form, is religious and theological, and, therefore, more adapted to moral theology than to scientific ethics. A scientific theory of ethics can not be grounded upon an abstract and mystical presupposition, since what is outside phenomena is, by the same fact, outside the control of reason and experience, and can not be verified. The belief in an *a priori*, transcendental principle of morality involves denial of continuity in moral experience, not rational subordination, and hence the impossibility of scientific inquiry. For ethics, then, would only explain how to execute, how to carry out absolute and fixed ideals of conduct, while its function, as science, is to organize experimental results, and to show how man, free from every preoccupation, contributes in the creation of moral ideals. And man is enabled to say what is really good, or worth while in conduct, only by means of personal or racial experience. An ethics, truly human and scientific, since it exists precisely for the sake of man who lives and works in the world of phenomena and experience, can not have a basis lying outside all experience, unless it renounces a scientific standpoint, and is satisfied to be mere casuistry or dialectics. Moreover, Rosmini holds as supreme ethical formula the practical recognition of being in its order. If such practical recognition were the outcome of man, regarded in his totality, that is to say in his heart and intelligence, we could use it as a leading measure of the worth and good of beings, as well as for a rule of actions.

But Rosmini, following Kant, thought that there is an antithesis between the intelligible and the phenomenal world. He, as well as Kant, attempted to discover for ethics a rational foundation, independent of the world of phenomena. Both thought that experience is conditioned, while the moral law must be unconditioned, and its origin then must be independent of all experience. Both thought that all feeling is empirical, sensuous, egoistic, and can afford no foundation for the moral law.

Thus, both disregarded the life of feeling and emotion, which claims to build moral ideals in the process of human experience. Both have the same conception of the fundamental problem of ethics,

and begin, not with an original unity, but with a duality. Kant begins with the spontaneity and receptivity of the mind, while Rosmini begins with the idea of being and sensation. Such being, of which man has an immediate and intuitive vision, has, according to Rosmini, an objective value. But Rosmini does not prove the objective validity of the internal intuitive knowledge.

We may, accordingly, say that his "being" is nothing else than the subjective thought itself in its extreme abstraction. Thus, he does not begin with God, but, as Kant, with the human mind itself.<sup>3</sup>

Besides, since Rosmini denies to human mind the complete comprehension of the pure Being, and since he thus implicitly denies the possibility of deducing from it all the determinations of being, it follows that the pure being intuited by the mind is not the true, pure being, namely, God, but merely the being abstracted from reflection.<sup>4</sup>

Rosmini, however, does not agree with Kant in some other points. According to Kant, for instance, man is at once law-giver and subject. According to Rosmini, man can not impose laws on himself, as such an action presupposes authority, and hence he can not be legislator to himself. Moral conceptions, according to Kant, are gained from pure reason itself. Rosmini thinks that the fundamental law can not be derived from our own reason, but that it is given, and man is passive. Kant holds that duty springs neither from authority, nor from experience. Rosmini is thoroughly convinced that the source of duty is transcendental, that is to say, it is God. For Kant the characteristic feature of the ethical is autonomy: for Rosmini heteronomy. The dignity of human personality, according to Kant, depends on man's capacity for autonomy, or on his capacity for following the universal law, derived from his own reason; according to Rosmini, the dignity of human personality lies in the immediate intuition of being, in the participation of divine essence by means of the light of reason, and, finally, in man's natural capacity to incline to, and to merge himself in, God, source of moral good and happiness.

If we examine more particularly the moral edifice which Rosmini intended to build in those moments of intense national movement, we find that liberty, according to him, is an act merely intellectual; that is, not an act of mere contemplation, but an act of assenting contemplation. But is not this a metaphysical hypothesis

<sup>3</sup> See Spaventa, "*La filosofia di Kant e Rosmini*," pages 47-48; Fiorentino, "*La filosofia contemporanea in Italia*," page 23.

<sup>4</sup> See A. Franchi, "*Ultima Critica*," page 116; B. Benzoni, "*Dottrina dell'Essere nel sistema rosminiano*."

without any true ground? If the assent to contemplated being is a mere business of the intelligence, under the pressure of the idea of being (which is, according to Rosmini, leading, ruling, informing our rational life), does it not follow that the will is thoroughly determined *a priori*? Rosmini is mistaken in considering exclusively in man the intellective factor, making it the unique factor of all our inner events, and subordinating all our psychic activity to it. Conscious, however, of the necessity of accounting in the process of moral action for the active power of feeling, and anxious to explain the passage from idea to act, he discovered the practical love which he supposes to precede the realization of the will. It is an impelling force, but the intellect is, according to our philosopher, the acting force. But is there any volitional act which is not accompanied by feeling? Is there any act of the human will which is not at the same time conscious, and that, as object of consciousness, does not involve a condition, either agreeable or disagreeable? Consciousness of an object implies not only some mental presentation of the object, but also some subject to whom it is presented. The object may or may not appeal to the "whole" subject, not only to his intelligence, but to his impulsive and emotive life as well. If it appeals, it can not fail to arouse interest and desire and agreeable emotion. If it does not appeal, it stimulates aversion, and its consequent emotions. Rosmini fails to recognize that our psychic life is unique, coexistent with its factors, intimately inter-connected.

The life of intelligence and the life of feeling can not be viewed apart without renouncing the great discoveries of modern psychology. We can not, accordingly, conceive, as Rosmini does, the practical judgment as determined by mere ideas and abstract relations; for it is the anticipated representation of an act and hence has relation alike to sensibility, intelligence, and impulse. Such a representation can not fail to be accompanied by some emotion, with some active and motor reaction. Has not even the most ideal speculation an active side? Have not material representations as well as the most lofty speculations some relation to our emotive life? Have they not all some value for our personality? And since they have some value, some relation to our entire life why must moral judgments, which are quite practical, and in which mind and heart are interested, be regarded as isolated from our daily life?

Finally, moral good, according to Rosmini, corresponds to Being, made possible, indeed, by its relation to feeling, but subsistent in itself, independent of the feeling subject which apprehends it. If good, for man, is possible only in relation to feeling, how can Rosmini hold such good to be objective and subsistent in itself,

taking away every relation? That would be a catharsis, psychologically impossible, since a thing has no value and is no longer a good as soon as it has no relation to anything else. Since, according to Rosmini, an idea is constituted by matter and form, how does he imagine idea to be mere form, without any relation to matter? If subject and object, matter and form, ideal possibility and reality, are correlative terms, it is impossible to conceive one without the other. The belief in an ideal order apart from the real, and existing in itself, stripped from every previous relation to the real, is the belief in metaphysical dreams.

An ethics which claims to be scientific must present a conception or moral good that may be human, immanent, dynamic, developing through, and simultaneously with, psychological factors of individual and social order as well.—To sum up what has been said, the chief error in Rosmini's ethical theory is that it has for basis ideology, and not a psychology of human nature. His native qualities, however, his bias, his environment, the prevalence of romanticism over classicism, the great spiritual influence of Christian ideas, could not fail to determine Rosmini's mind to seek a system of morals in the region of metaphysics and of a rationalism which he thought immune to change, while everything was changing. Such a system of ethics as he considered to be the most urgently needed, the great Italian philosopher offered to his country, which he hoped to see morally renewed and become politically united and independent.

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# THE ETHICS OF EURIPIDES

## CHAPTER I

τὸ δὲ φύῃ κράτιστον ἅπαν. "Nature's way is ever the strongest and best," wrote Pindar in his ninth Olympian ode.<sup>1</sup> Like much of his teaching, the aphorism has more earnestness than originality. Indeed, it is as a commonplace of Greek conviction that I have chosen it as my starting-point and text. If it were possible to comprise in one short sentence the essential differences of the Greek genius from that of other nations and of modern times, Pindar might claim to have come near to that achievement. For there is an entire world — an entire Greek world — of meaning in φύῃ. It implies that the Greek standard, the ethical and physical sanction, is not drawn from a supra-mundane or transcendental source, but from the physical world as it is or as it tends to be.

τὸ δὲ φύῃ κράτιστον ἅπαν. Hence, in logic, the Platonic theory of ideas, inasmuch as the idea can be defined as that form of any *infima species* which is wholly and perfectly φύῃ. The logical concept to the Greeks had always a curious concreteness. It was not an abstraction so much as a formal visualisation of the object in its complete and perfect state. Hence that curious dualism in Plato, — a world of objects, and a world of ideas which always threatened to be objects also. τὸ δὲ φύῃ κράτιστον ἅπαν: the ideas were the objects φύῃ, and as such they had a particular *κράτος* or *δύναμις*, a driving power directing these material counterparts toward the perfection which should be theirs by nature.

In sculpture, that strange early development through a very limited number of fixed types is common to most early art, inasmuch as differentiation is a late acquirement. But note that the types did not stagnate into conventions, as seems to have happened occasionally in Egypt and many Oriental countries. The sculptor was never satisfied with his heritage, because he felt very vividly, "τὸ φύῃ κράτιστον ἅπαν." Fifth-century athletic art is an amazing blend of geometric formalism and realistic observation: the former (inherited from the archaic schema)

<sup>1</sup> Ol. ix. 107.

gives it the so-called classic regularity and "suppression" of unessentials; the realism saves it from conventionalisation. Greek art is a spiritual interpretation of the physical. But what that phrase means, only those will understand who realise that the generations of sculptors were studying the nude athlete in order to find that schema toward which Nature is striving without ever a perfect attainment. They worked toward the human form *φνῆ*, the bodily *εἶδος*, and not toward a mere counterpart of this Olympic athlete here and now. It is the bare truth to call Greek sculpture Platonic, in spite of all Plato's strictures on art. The canonic statue of an athlete is the visible presentation of the Platonic Idea of the athlete. Both are imaginary, yet deduced from reality, from the multitudinous members of the species, each of which is more or less completely *φνῆ*. Greek sculpture was thus for long confined by the demands of a strict development toward a logical concept. For that reason, in comparison with modern art, it impresses the unspecialized as strangely limited in imaginativeness, or, better, in that particular quality of imaginative suggestiveness which may be termed phantasy, whose stimulus is through strong emotional vagueness. Maxfield Parrish's scenes from Greek mythology, for instance, or Gilbert Murray's reimpodiments of Euripidean tragedy, are full of this modern appeal, of which Hellenic art knows so little. Compare these two versions (both of them in my judgment good poetry):

. . . ἐμὲ δὲ πόντιον σκάφος  
 αἰσσον πτεροῖσι πορεύσει  
 ἱππόβοτον Ἄργος, ἵνα τείχεα  
 λάϊνα Κυκλώπι' οὐράνια νέμονται.

(Tro. 1085-8)

" . . . and me the ships  
 Shall bear o'er the bitter brine,  
 Storm-birds upon angry pinions,  
 Where the towers of the Giants shine  
 O'er Argos cloudily,  
 And the riders ride by the sea."

In the Greek, every picture is single and concise, and refers to places and conditions actually known to the hearers. In the English, the whole effect counts upon vague pictures, indefinite plurals, unfamiliar places, and unknown men.

It has been suggested to me that I am wrong in entirely denying to the Greek this sense of imaginative appeal and that, for example, we

derive a very modern emotional stimulus from the vase-painting of the morning-stars who dive through the clouds at the approach of the sun.<sup>2</sup>

I might, of course, plead that an instance so unique is eloquent of the prevalence of the opposite condition. But I am inclined rather to question the validity of the example; for, were the mythology as much a commonplace to us as to the Greeks, the illustration of the stars as youths would have no more imaginative stimulus than a statue of Apollo as a young man. I mean that there are no vague suggestions, no half-lights nor lowering shadows, such as the Romanticists and the Celticists have made familiar. For, all these effects are obtained by a play on Nature, a suppression, a distortion, an exaggeration, an innuendo of the unusual and mysterious, a trick of the half-seen, the imperfect. But if to the Greek τὸ φυῆ κράτιστον ἄπαν, then art is at its best when it is at its most precise. And thus, in its most serious and noble work, instead of imaginative surprises with their unbalanced emphasis, there is the strictest subordination of every element in its just and logical position. I do not believe that the specialist in Greek art will dispute the real tyranny of this almost logical formulation; yet, for additional support, a reference may be permitted to the Pythagorean-like formalism in such strangely arithmetical creatures as the "canons." Greek architecture and apparently certain periods of Greek sculpture placed an almost fanatical trust in the efficacy of pure numerical ratio, and when Diogenes Laertius says of the sculptor Pythagoras of Rhegium that he was the first to use *συμμετρία*, I hold it obvious that the word cannot be translated "symmetry," but refers to the observance of arithmetical ratios between the various physical members. Derived, as this procedure seems to have been, from mathematico-physical and musical speculations on Nature's supposed inherent preference for simple numerical ratios,<sup>3</sup> it reveals the Greek artist in an effort to catch Nature's own ideal and to show in stone that which is perfectly φυῆ.

Again, in Greek ethical thought, Pindar's gnome finds a wide application. Since conclusions here are especially open to challenge as hasty or superficial impressions, I make a more exhaustive appeal to particulars, in order to show that Pindar's gnome is the key-note to Euripides' morality and that the logical concept is quite as dominant there as in Greek sculpture. To be sure, one can scarcely demand a rigorous proof

<sup>2</sup> Furtwängler-Reichhold-Hauser, *Griechische Vasenmalerei*, III, pl. 126.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Arist. de Caelo. F. 1. 300a 16. *ἔνιοι γὰρ τὴν φύσιν ἐξ ἀριθμῶν συνιστᾶσιν, ὥσπερ τῶν Πυθαγορέων τινές.* Cf. also Arist. Met. A. ch. 5.

extracted from a dramatist, who by profession holds up his mirror to a changeful and inconsistent world. And yet, as I hope to show, his ethic has in reality just this rigor, if one but apprehend the ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή, the self-sufficient and self-evident principle from which all his specific rules of conduct are deducible.

If one reads Euripides with this in view, the plays seem to conspire to emphasise a certain single ethical principle. This they exemplify in its different applications to the stuff of tragedy and human life. In fact this principle is so insistent, so explanatory of the meaning of the plays, that it runs like a *forma informans* through Euripides' dramas, as effective in his moral thought as symmetry was in the work of the sculptor of pediments or isocephalism for the early designer of relief.

The principle of which I am speaking is a tacit assumption at the back of Greek ethic generally and is its source of moral sanction. Precisely because it is basic it is seldom found expressed in Greek writers. But though the fundamental postulates of a nation's way of thought are not expressed, because they are never seen against a contrasting background, yet every honest utterance betrays them.

For the ethical principle in question, one may assume some variant of Pindar's gnome, such as, τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν εὖ ζῆν.<sup>4</sup> An English equivalent for the phrase can scarcely be said to exist. For that reason, and because clarity in terms is vital for my thesis, a more detailed analysis of the wording is essential.

φύσις is the world in which we are; not, however, the world as a haphazard congeries of matter, but as a great ordered system of organic things in growth, attained development, and decay. The world must be realised to be under law, before φύσις can be understood. The various kinds of plants differ from one another: they have different φύσις. The laws of growth keep them relentlessly to their own development, their own nature. A rose differs from a violet because of φύσις. But one rose differs also from another rose. No two members of an *ultima species* are precisely alike. What is it that makes them different? Scarcely their φύσις, for the φύσις of a rose is always the same. There are other forces at work, and these operate against the φύσις, they are παρὰ φύσιν. If everything in this world were strictly κατὰ φύσιν, every rose would be like every other one and all alike would be perfect roses. Unhampered φύσις would develop every nascent organism into a perfect exemplification of its type, its εἶδος. The type or εἶδος is a static conception; φύσις

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Diog. Laert. viii. 87. διόπερ τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν.

is dynamic, it is the complex of laws by which everything tends to attain its *εἶδος*.<sup>5</sup>

A good rose must have, let us say, its full quota of petals. The literal moth and the figurative rust must not have worked it harm. It must have had sun and rain. *φύσις* must have had full play, that from the seed it might develop stalk and leaf and bud and perfect flower. Only so can it attain its full type, its *εἶδος*. A good rose is a perfect rose. It is wholly *κατὰ φύσιν*.

Man is in a like position. Only, with him, development is not mere physical growth. The whole complex of mental and spiritual powers must expand and increase to their perfect form. Yet we can say of him what we said of the rose. As a good rose is a perfect rose, so a good man is a perfect man. He must be wholly *κατὰ φύσιν*. He must, under the unobstructed action of *φύσις*, attain his *εἶδος* as material organism, as sentient animal, and as thinking man. In so far as he exerts his powers to further this action of *φύσις*, he is acting rightly; in so far as he thwarts *φύσις*, he is acting wrongly.

Back of such an attitude of the Greek mind there must have been an extraordinary sense for the community between man and the rest of the material world. The modern mind opposes itself to Nature. With our artificialities of living and thinking, our exotic scientific diversion of natural forces, we feel that we dominate her. The supremacy of Mind marks us out from our surroundings: we feel like powerful strangers from another planet who have seized upon this earth, thanks to our unterrestrial sagacity. The Greek could not have felt so. He was part of the natural world, as plants and animals were part of it, though with a more intimate insight because of his part in its intellectual aspect.<sup>6</sup> To such a people it is not a great imaginative and poetic flight to feel that man is like the flowers of the field. It is merely a simple statement of an obvious truth.

Secondly, the Greek must have had a keen eye for formal perfection and have realized that every organism under favourable conditions develops a product which has a formal, as well as a purely material,

<sup>5</sup> But it is also the *matter* upon which that *εἶδος* is formed. Burnet in his recent book, *Greek Philosophy from Thales to Plato*, justly emphasises this aspect of the meaning of the word in the vocabulary of a slightly earlier period. (Cf. *o. c.* p. 27.)

<sup>6</sup> I do not mean that he was the care-free child of nature, the pastoral fiction of an 18th century imagination. Minds like that of Aeschylus, who was thoroughly Greek, are a sufficient contradiction to such generalities. But there is an ultimate *Versöhnung*, not an ultimate opposition, between man and the high mysteries of Nature. *ἄτη* acts *κατὰ φύσιν* and its catastrophe is so best explained.



significance. Nature, we might say, has a love of pure form. (Not that she displays a conscious aesthetic interest: there may be very simple reasons why Nature tends toward a formal articulation. For one thing, it is probably mechanically easier: at least, symmetry is mathematically simpler than asymmetry.) Rather, I wish to emphasise the mere empirical fact that Nature constantly strives toward a *formal* expression. The botanist, the zoologist, the biologist knows this. The Greek seems to have been peculiarly sensitive to it.

There results a certain optimistic confidence in Nature. Unthwarted φύσις produces, as far as form goes, superior and more perfect products. Thwart Nature, and consider the undergrown or crippled or uneven results. Formally, they are far inferior. But give the rose its proper soil and dew and sunlight, and the perfect form appears; and give to men the soil of individual freedom, the dew of material self-sufficiency, and the sunlight of good fortune, and they likewise will attain their formal and natural perfection.

A gardener working in a sandy and barren soil would not be prone to emphasise this striving toward form. His flowers would all be imperfect, with stunted stem, uneven leaf, and ill-developed blossom. So amid the misery of the ghetto, the rabble of the dusty streets of Alexandria, or the ill-fed slave-hordes of imperial Rome, in certain more unfavorable periods, the Greek doctrine would have little meaning and make little appeal. But the Greeks of the Euripidean age were an individualistic aristocracy. From their slave-tilled soil they sprang up independent and self-sufficient. Inside their city-fatherland, they had leisure and immunity enough to develop themselves physically and spiritually. To such a people the doctrine had application, and for them its significance was self-evident. Only under such conditions can a purely individualistic code of ethics succeed. Only there can there be the belief — which was the Greek belief — that the best life is the life of self-development into the perfect natural norm, the life *κατὰ φύσιν*.

It is important to realise how completely such an ethical principle would be misinterpreted by the people of to-day. Self-development is not self-aggrandisement. But many modern nations have lost the sense for form and substituted a sense for size. They have been rightly taunted with treating everything quantitatively, and many men to-day hold an individualistic creed which prompts them to believe that the more they have of the good things of the world, the better it is for them. Metaphorically, we have ceased to know that, though rain is good for the rose, the water-floods of Noah cannot benefit it. Nature, to

attain her end, must have her necessities in right quantities. Too much is often as disastrous as too little. To develop ourselves to the perfect norm, we need, not as much of everything as possible, but just so much as is consonant with the particular demands of our particular nature.

It is easy to see that this is true of the simpler organisms such as plants and animals. Overfeeding and underfeeding are both bad because both are contrary to natural requirements, — they are *παρὰ φύσιν*. Both produce in the affected organism a departure from the true norm, a formal distortion, and a consequent imperfect state. It is not hard to see that, in man likewise, the physical part is in a similar condition, that under-exercise or over-eating are detrimental. Yet we now-a-days feel our impaired state of health to be a sin against good judgment rather than against morality. But the best Greeks of the Polykleitan age, with their peculiar attitude toward athletics, would have felt it to be an offence against that formal perfection of the human body which is for man the only physical state worthy of his aspiration.

Compare the Polykleitan Doryphoros with the Herakles Farnese of a later and other age. The one is physical perfection, the other is physical exaggeration. The history of early Peloponnesian sculpture is little else than the gradual evolution of the completely and harmoniously developed type of the male human body. The slow-yielding stone bears record to that incessant striving of the Greek to allow Nature her formally wonderful self-expression, which prompted him to Olympian festivals wherein the victory was not merely a glorification of muscle and sinew, but also the visible triumph of human *φύσις* that had realized her *εἶδος*.<sup>7</sup>

Because he was so sensitive to this formal perfection which is Nature's successful self-expression, it was apparently an inevitable consequence that the Greek applied to everything the standard of material form. He saw spiritual problems as it were from a physical point of view. Man's spiritual growth was somehow similar to that material growth whose athletic perfection the Greek so greatly loved. To one and the other, the same general laws applied. The athletic training-school reappeared as a spiritual paedeutic. Man's thinking and volitional nature must be formed by exercise into a natural state of health and strength. The sophists and rhetors were but athletic trainers in the palaestra of thought. The Greek youth learned to wrestle intellectually not primarily for display or gain, but because only so was the

<sup>7</sup> Euripides' polemic against athletes is in itself a protest against the professional vulgarisation of this high athletic ideal (and not against the ideal itself). (Fr. 284).

intellectual body, with all its sinews of reason and knowledge, brought into its proper state of health. So only could the intellectual *φύσις* realise its *εἶδος* fully.

Compare again the Polykleitan Doryphoros and the Herakles Farnese. Think of them, however, as an allegory of man's intellectual and spiritual self. The Doryphoros gives us the classic Greek ideal: through self-denial if necessary, through constant energy, and unfailing self-attention, all the spiritual powers are developed in harmony with each other until they give the fullest expression to that balanced and perfect type toward which Nature always strives, but which she can attain only if the individual himself will aid her. All the right conditions must be there, before the rose at last unfolds its petals and displays the perfect flower, — a wholly natural product, this flawless plant, and yet in nature how rare!

It is a creed which is absolutely individualistic and self-centred; but it involves both devotion and painful energy. Selfishness and self-aggrandisement produce a spiritual Herakles Farnese. It needs an intense training, a deep feeling for spiritual *φύσις*, a sense of moderation and restraint in mental diet and immaterial exercise, before the perfected form, the spiritual Doryphoros, can emerge. It is not a doctrine of self-indulgence. But far less is it a doctrine of self-suppression. It is the precise opposite: it is self-expression by unwearying attention to the ways of that universal nature which guides plants and animals through their wonderful growth toward that completed individual form which they all attain in some measure, but which only those attain fully and perfectly for whom all the conditions are right. Ethics is the study of these conditions in the case of the human organism. The pursuit of these conditions is at once right conduct and the highest individual good. "To live in the norm of nature is to live rightly and well": *τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν εὖ ζῆν*.

This general attitude toward existence was so deep-rooted in the Greek mind that it became a unifying principle for all his ethical thought. From it, deliberately or instinctively, he drew his moral sanction. Like "revealed word of God," or "innate consciousness of right and wrong," it gave a starting-point outside of the individual and independent of his subjective vagaries.

How thoroughly it interpenetrated Greek moral thought I intend to show by an examination of Euripides.<sup>8</sup> By constant appeal to his

<sup>8</sup> I have thus far given no references in support of my view, because so general an attitude must be based not merely on the whole of Greek literature, but on

dramas I hope to emphasise the fact that some of the striking differences between the Greek and Christian attitude toward moral questions are largely due to this initial divergence in the source of Moral Sanction. I wish to show how far the Euripidean ethic proves itself consistent, when once its fundamental proposition is adopted. I mean, further, to suggest that the Aristotelian ethic is largely a prose statement, helped out by a certain quantity of logical fermentation, of what the tragic stage inculcated into Athenian audiences; and that the service of Aristotle in his famous *Nicomachean Ethics* was not so much that of creating a system of ethics as of supplying a logical and psychological framework for an otherwise highly developed and intelligently thought-out morality. Indeed, we should expect this to be true, on the general ground that the moral philosophers are largely engaged in rationalising the convictions of their fellow-men; so that it would be strange indeed if so intellectual and so ethical a product as the Greek drama had not already uttered all the fundamental tenets of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. But it is one thing to suspect a truth and another thing to prove it in its specific exemplification. In the following chapters, accordingly, I have gone into the logical detail of the Euripidean ethic, championed its simplicity and its rationality, and tried to show both how highly it is developed and how little change is necessary to cast it in obvious Aristotelian form.

Greek art and life as well. Euripides himself uses the actual word *φύσις* sparingly, perhaps in no case in order to give expression to a definite ethical teaching. I believe that the quotations from Euripides, which follow, will give ample corroboration for this introductory chapter; but from the nature of the subject, the evidence must be cumulative rather than specific.

I might, however, refer to the extraordinary frequency with which moral evil is spoken of as disease or sickness, to show how intimately the Greek mind connected the physical and the ethical. *νόσος* is a violation of *φύσις* in its physical aspect: moral evil is a similar malady in conduct. I add a few instances of this usage. It would be easy to treble the list: Fr. 227; 294; 431; 609; Hipp. 730.

## CHAPTER II

WE may ask ourselves how the individual is to know this norm of nature which Greek morality bids him follow. He will know it, in outline at least, from his early training. Presupposing that his teachers already understand this norm, its principles can be firmly imbedded in his childhood mind at an age when he could otherwise have no grasp of it. Right training is thus of the greatest ethical importance, and it is not surprising to see Euripides frequently emphasising its value.

Thus Fragment 926:

παῖς ὦν φυλάσσου πραγμάτων αἰσχροῶν ἀπο·  
ὥς ἦν τραφῇ τις μὴ κακῶς, αἰσχύνεται  
ἀνὴρ γενόμενος αἰσχρὰ δρᾶν· νέος δ' ὅταν  
πόλλ' ἑξαμάρτη, τὴν ἀμαρτίαν ἔχει  
εἰς γῆρας αὐτοῦ τοῖς τρόποισιν ἔμφυτον.<sup>1</sup>

In the Suppliants,<sup>2</sup> Adrastus lauds the great warriors who fell in battle before the gates of Thebes. After recounting their individual worth and valour, he praises the good training which set such courage in their souls:

τὸ γὰρ τραφῆναι μὴ κακῶς αἰδῶ φέρει·  
αἰσχύνεται δὲ τὰγάθ' ἀσκήσας ἀνὴρ  
κακὸς γενέσθαι πᾶς τις. ἡ δ' εὐανδρία  
διδασκός, εἴπερ καὶ βρέφος διδάσκεται  
λέγειν ἀκούειν θ' ὧν μάθησιν οὐκ ἔχει.  
ἃ δ' ἂν μάθη τις, ταῦτα σφύζεσθαι φιλεῖ  
πρὸς γῆρας. οὕτω παῖδας εὖ παιδεύετε.

(Hik. 911-17)

Hekabe, in the play of that name, remarks that the good are ever good and the bad are ever bad, and wonders to what cause this may be due:

ἄρ' οἱ τεκόντες διαφέρουσιν ἢ τροφαί;  
ἔχει γε μέντοι καὶ τὸ θρεφθῆναι καλῶς  
δίδαξιν ἐσθλοῦ· τοῦτο δ' ἦν τις εὖ μάθη,  
οἶδεν τό γ' αἰσχρόν, κανόνι τοῦ καλοῦ μαθών.

(Hek. 599-602)

<sup>1</sup> The extant plays are quoted from Gilbert Murray's edition, in the Oxford Classical Texts, and the Fragments from the latest Teubner text (ed. Nauck).

<sup>2</sup> Hik. 857-917.

A further instance occurs in the Iphigeneia in Aulis:

KLYTAIMESTRA: Who trained Achilles, Thetis or his father?

AGAMEMNON: 'Twas Cheiron lest he learn bad tricks of mortals.

KLYTAIMESTRA: Ah, wise the trainer; but the father, wiser.

(I. A. 708-10) <sup>3</sup>

But though for the individual this training in the norm of nature may be practicable and to a certain extent sufficient, it of course does not solve the ethical problem raised at the beginning of this chapter. How is man to learn the norm of Nature which it is his duty and highest good to follow?

The physical norm can be learned by experience and trial. The rules of the athletic training-school are empiric in their origin. The right amount of exercise, of food, of sleep, can be ascertained by experiment. The same is true of man's spiritual activities. We may violate the norm by excess or by defect; but if we are attentive to the results, we shall learn at last the due amount. The "golden mean" is thus an empiric rule. Our reason gives us merely the rule in all its generality, telling us that, since we are natural organisms, we must fit ourselves as completely as possible to Nature's requirements, and that, since we may err either by too much or by too little, our aim must be to discover the norm between excess and defect. Such advice is excellent, but not specific. In every part of conduct, in every act, we must pause and ask ourselves, "What does *φύσις* here require? Where is that balance between too much and too little, which is the perfect requirement and condition of Nature?"

This is the difficulty of Greek ethics. The fundamental principle must be elaborated in every part of life, in all the emotions and intellectual conditions, in every portion of the system of human conduct. Only if it can be shown to be true without exception, to be as infallible in practice as it is plausible in theory, only then can it be proclaimed a great and necessary principle of living. It is only then that we are justified in considering it as it were the ethical spine which makes a coherent and organic articulation out of what would otherwise be merely an invertebrate mass of precepts.

In the Hippolytos, Phaidra's nurse — a prosaic soul full of middle-class wisdom — appeals to the seven sages: <sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the chorus in the same play, ll. 561-2.

<sup>4</sup> If this inference to the Wise Men may be made from the collocation of the familiar *μηδὲν ἄγαν* and the suggestive *σοφοί*.

οὕτω τὸ λίαν ἥσσον ἐπαινῶ  
τοῦ μηδὲν ἄγαν·  
καὶ ξυμφήσουσι σοφοί μοι.

(Hipp. 264-6)

*Nihil nimium* (or, in Terence's phrase, *ut ne quid nimis*),<sup>5</sup> is a cornerstone for conduct because:

βροτοῖς τὰ μείζω τῶν μέσων τίκτει νόσους.

(Fragment 80)

The plays, in fact, are full of warnings against excess.<sup>6</sup> But it is the specific application of the general rule which Euripides never wearies of emphasising and exemplifying. And, as we saw, an empiric rule must offer precisely this proof in detail. I give, under various headings, passages in Euripides to show the poet's thoroughgoing crusade for moderation in conduct.

1. In courage and fear, the evil of excess:

μη τὰ κινδυνεύματα  
αἰνεῖτ'· ἐγὼ γὰρ οὔτε ναυτίλον φιλῶ  
τολμῶντα λίαν οὔτε προστάτην χθονός.

(Fragment 194)

τὰς τῶν θεῶν γὰρ ὅστις ἐκμοχθεῖ τύχας,  
πρόθυμός ἐστιν, ἢ προθυμία δ' ἄφρων.

(H. M. 309-10)

The evil of defect:

δειλοί γὰρ ἄνδρες οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐν μάχῃ  
ἀριθμόν, ἀλλ' ἄπεισι κἂν παρῶσ' ὅμως.

(Fragment 523)

... τοὺς πόνους γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ  
τολμῶσι, δειλοί δ' εἰσὶν οὐδὲν οὐδαμοῦ.

(I. T. 114-15)

ὁ δ' ἡδὺς αἰὼν ἢ κακὴ τ' ἀνανδρία  
οὔτ' οἶκον οὔτε πόλιν ἀνορθώσειεν ἄν.

(Fragment 241)

Praise of the right amount of courage:

νεανίαν γὰρ ἄνδρα χρὴ τολμᾶν ἀεί·  
οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὦν ράθυμος εὐκλεῆς ἀνὴρ,  
ἀλλ' οἱ πόντοι τίκτουσι τὴν εὐανδρίαν.

(Fragment 239)

<sup>5</sup> Andria, 61.

<sup>6</sup> E.g. Med. 127-8; Phoin. 539-42; 554; 584; Fr. 80; 628, l. 4; 964.

φεύγειν μὲν οὖν χρὴ πόλεμον ὅστις εὖ φρονεῖ·  
 εἰ δ' ἐς τόδ' ἔλθοι, στέφανος οὐκ αἰσχρὸς πόλει  
 καλῶς ὀλέσθαι, μὴ καλῶς δὲ δυσκλεές.<sup>7</sup>

(Kassandra in Tro. 400-3)

Praise of the right amount of fear:

. . . οὐκ αἰνῶ φόβον,  
 ὅστις φοβεῖται μὴ διεξελθὼν λόγῳ,

(Tro. 1165-6)

implying that reason should determine the due extent to which fear is justified.

2. So, in general mental and physical activity, those who are over-energetic and those who love the life of inglorious ease are both at fault. Somewhere between the two extremes runs the course of right conduct:

ὁ πλείστα πράσσων πλείσθ' ἁμαρτάνει βροτῶν.

(Fragment 580)

In the lost play *Philoktetes*, Odysseus speaks of his own folly in striving for cunning and wisdom beyond due measure:

πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοῖην, ᾧ παρῆν ἀπραγμόνως  
 ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἡριβημένῳ στρατοῦ  
 ἶσον μετασχεῖν τῷ σοφωτάτῳ τύχης;

(Fragment 785)

Similarly, the other extreme is wrong:

. . . τίς δ' ἄμοχθος εὐκλεής;  
 τίς τῶν μεγίστων δειλὸς ὧν ὠρέξατο;

(From Fragment 242)

. . . εἰ δ' ἄτερ πόνων  
 δοκεῖς ἔσεσθαι, μῶρος εἶ, θνητὸς γεγώς.<sup>8</sup>

(Fragment 396)

The right amount in energy and activity is alone right, and this is either energy as opposed to laziness:

ἐκ τῶν πόνων τοι τὰγάθ' ἀΐζεται βροτοῖς,

(From Fragment 366)

μοχθεῖν ἀνάγκη τοὺς θέλοντας εὐτυχεῖν,

(Fragment 719)

or else self-restraint as opposed to over-activity:

ὁ δ' ἥσυχος φίλοισί τ' ἀσφαλὲς φίλος  
 πόλει τ' ἄριστος. . . .<sup>9</sup>

(From Fragment 194)

<sup>7</sup> Cf. also Fr. 304; 420; 437; 745; 1038.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. also Fr. 241 and the almost identical lines in 366.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. also Fr. 235; 238; 464; 477; 745; mainly praising energy.



The apparent inconsistency in these three fragments vanishes only if we recognise that the first two praise the mean as opposed to the defect, while the third praises the mean as opposed to the excess.

3. The doctrine of the mean has perhaps its greatest value in man's emotional pursuits, where pleasure and dislike are such powerful factors, and where man is, as nowhere else, prone to rush into extremes. It is consequently the excess rather than the defect against which man needs warning and such passages are more numerous in Euripides than those which emphasise the opposite extreme. And yet there is one entire play which has this latter function to perform. I judge that with the Hippolytos Euripides is preaching as usual (but by an unusual example) his fundamental ethical doctrine that conduct contrary to nature must end in disaster. Hippolytos is insensible to the attraction of love, and because he thereby behaves *παρὰ φύσιν*, the *φύσις* which he has violated, that same power and instinct of love, reacts against him in the person of Phaidra and brings about his ruin and his violent death. In confirmation, there is a fragment from that other and earlier play of the Veiled Hippolytos, of which we should so gladly know more. There we read:

οἱ γὰρ Κύπριν φεύγοντες ἀνθρώπων ἄγαν  
νοσοῦσ' ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄγαν θηρωμένοις.

(Fragment 431)

The Hippolytos is such a brilliant and careful exposition of Euripides' fundamental moral thesis that it is essential for me to examine it at greater length. The play has been very generally misapprehended, because the author's intentions toward Hippolytos have not been understood. To a careful reader, who bears our moral thesis in mind, it must be abundantly clear that Euripides is not in sympathy with Hippolytos, but is strongly censuring an attitude which was probably prevalent in his own town of Athens and which strongly recalls the aesthetic and other "literary" movements of the closing years of the nineteenth century in England. From his first appearance on the stage, a certain preciosity is noticeable in the words of Hippolytos. He talks of flowers<sup>10</sup> and jewelry<sup>11</sup> and maintains an attitude of *odī profanum vulgus* (from whom he is *toto caelo* distinct).<sup>12</sup> He belongs to a "set" *δοῖς διδασκτὸν μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει*. (l. 79). To the last he is exclusive, and despises the bourgeois gift of demagogic oratory:

ἐγὼ δ' ἀκομψος εἰς ὄχλον δοῦναι λόγον,  
ἐς ἡλικας δὲ κώλιγους σοφώτερος.

(ib. 986-7)

<sup>10</sup> Hipp. 73-8.

<sup>11</sup> Ib. 82-3.

<sup>12</sup> Ib. 79-81; 84.

He is of the *jeunesse dorée* who spend time on horses and hunting. These very horses cause his undoing. In ancient tragedy the agents of disaster are chosen with grim appropriateness. *ἀκήρατος*, "unsullied," is a favourite word of his.<sup>13</sup> It has a self-righteous ring, a note of moral arrogance, *ὕβρις*. It turns to injured innocence in ll. 654-6 where he spurns the suggestions of the old nurse, and shows a complete lack of sympathy. He is inhuman in his *ἀναισθησία*. Just this quality in him spurs Phaidra to her fatal actions. Bitterly she says, "that he may learn not to be high and mighty about my misfortune" (*ὅν' εἰδῇ μὴ 'πὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς κακοῖς ὑψηλὸς εἶναι*).<sup>14</sup>

From his father Theseus we have further light on Hippolytos, who is taunted with a bitter reference to his reputation as a superman of refinement (*περισσὸς ἀνὴρ*).<sup>15</sup> *ἀκήρατος*, "unsullied," his favourite word, is hurled in his face.<sup>16</sup> Apparently Theseus has found his son's affectations (*κόμποι*) hard to endure. He has had to put up with his vegetarianism, religious mysticism, and literary dilettanteism.<sup>17</sup> His whole speech is the reaction of the normal man against the abnormal. Theseus is healthy in mind and body; Hippolytos seems to be neither. It is the clash of *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* with *τὰ παρὰ φύσιν*, and the latter must go under. Lest the spectator think that the approaching catastrophe is accidental or individual, due to casual misunderstanding or spite or sudden rage, Euripides makes Theseus declare the universality of his attitude. It is not Theseus against Hippolytos, it is the natural against the abnormal:

τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους ἐγὼ  
φείγειν προφωνῶ πᾶσι·

(955-6)

*τοιούτους* and *πᾶσι* are no longer specific or personal terms.

Hippolytos defends himself against his father's charges in a speech betraying affectation and self-righteousness.<sup>18</sup> He is *σώφρων*,<sup>19</sup> without sexual interest,<sup>20</sup> a virgin.<sup>21</sup>

οἱμοι, τὸ σεμνὸν ὥς μ' ἀποκτενεῖ τὸ σόν.  
Oh, how thy holy cant will murder me!

cries Theseus.<sup>22</sup> The same *τὸ σεμνόν* is one cause of Hippolytos' undoing. He was warned against it at the opening of the play by his huntsman.<sup>23</sup> But it is *ἐν τῇ φύσει*. Even when near death, he clings to his

<sup>13</sup> Hipp. 73, 76; cf. 949.

<sup>15</sup> *Ib.* 948.

<sup>17</sup> *Ib.* 952-4.

<sup>19</sup> *Ib.* 995.

<sup>14</sup> *Ib.* 729-30.

<sup>16</sup> *Ib.* 949.

<sup>18</sup> *Ib.* 983 ff.

<sup>20</sup> *Ib.* 1006.

<sup>21</sup> *ἄθικτος*, 1002. But it must be granted that his ideal in 1016-8 is both a healthy and a good one.

<sup>23</sup> *Ib.* 1064.

<sup>22</sup> *Ib.* 91-5.

Similarly:

τὸ δ' ἐρᾶν' προλέγω τοῖσι νέουσιν  
μήποτε φεύγειν,  
χρησθαι δ' ὁρθῶς ὅταν ἔλθῃ,

(From Fragment 889)

which, as we have seen, is very much the moral of the entire Hippolytos.

The self-control which never runs into excess of pleasure is known in Greek as *sophrosyne*. It does not mean abstinence or asceticism, but the ability to maintain the mean amid temptations to excess. Consequently it most frequently has reference to pleasure. But *sophrosyne* is not mere negative restraint. To understand it, we must read the *Bacchae*, a play of first importance for our thesis. I can see no sign that the drama is the palinode of an atheist or the apologia of a rationalist,<sup>37</sup> an old man in exile trying to reconcile himself with popular religion. The "orthodox" view seems obviously correct; for Euripides' own words are insistent in its favour. It is nearly the same subject as in the *Hippolytos*: the Bacchic pleasures and prerogatives — dancing, laughter, freedom from care, wine-feasting<sup>38</sup> — are natural and salutary. To treat them with austerity and suppression is therefore not virtue, but a violation of nature, and quite strictly *παρὰ φύσιν*. Hence the fateful recoil of these Bacchic elements of life on Pentheus, even as love recoiled to work the death of Hippolytos. More than this, man's *φύσις* includes more than a mere life of reason. All that fine intoxication of the spirit, with which poet and votary are so familiar, is not outside of Nature's intent. Euripides would have been turning a weapon against himself, were he to admit that poetic enthusiasm is *παρὰ φύσιν*. Rather, its suppression and denial are *παρὰ φύσιν*, and baleful. Let us be poets and Bacchantes, since we have it in us! Enjoyed in right amount, Dionysos is *κατὰ φύσιν* and a moral necessity, very different from excess or licentiousness as the chorus is careful to point out.<sup>39</sup> Nor is it true that his rites lead necessarily to dissipation:

οὐχ ὁ Διόνυσος σωφρονεῖν ἀναγκάσει  
γυναῖκας ἐς τὴν Κύπριν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει  
[τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἔνεστιν εἰς τὰ πάντ' ἀεὶ]<sup>40</sup>

<sup>37</sup> As, among others, Sir John Sandys would have us believe in his edition of the play (Cambridge, 1900, Introd. lxxv).

<sup>38</sup> All these enumerated *o. c.* 379-85.

<sup>39</sup> *Ib.* 386-8.

<sup>40</sup> *Ib.* 314-6.

The chorus states the whole matter admirably:

τιμῶν τε Βρόμιον σωφρονεῖς.

"Give Dionysos his due, and you will be σώφρων." <sup>41</sup>

Sophrosyne is not abstinence, but proper acquiescence in Nature's ways. The Hippolytos takes pains to illustrate the true meaning of the word. Hippolytos is fond of calling himself σώφρων <sup>42</sup> and Artemis agrees with his definition. <sup>43</sup> But Phaidra has a different conception of sophrosyne:

ἀτὰρ κακὸν γε χἀτέρῳ γενήσομαι  
θανοῦσ', ἵν' εἰδῇ μὴ 'πὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς κακοῖς  
ὑψηλὸς εἶναι. τῆς νόσου δὲ τῆσδ' ἐμοὶ  
κοινῇ μετασχὼν σωφρονεῖν μαθήσεται.

(Hipp. 728-31)

Which definition of sophrosyne has the poet's own approval, we may read writ large through all the play.

We should remember that because the Greeks, like most southern races, were inclined to excess, restraint was to them an inherent part of conduct. Where northern peoples are apt to phrase the ethical alternative as "to do or not to do," and make a sheer choice between extreme poles, the southern shift the problem to the intermediary zones and make the choice one of degree. The Corcyra massacres in Thucydides are an instance of the excess into which the Greek was not infrequently betrayed. Alexandrianism and Byzantinism show the ultimate assertion of these fervid tendencies which, in the preceding classical age, were controlled only by the most constant application. Indeed, one may suspect that Greek art and literature show essentially the curbs and checks of a conscious formalism trying to hold in restraint the dithyrambic excess of the national temperament. By having, in general, only the formal product preserved to us, we miss the ever-present contrast with the unrestrained world with which they struggled. <sup>44</sup> Only on such a supposition can we understand why the doctrine of the Mean forms such an apparently disproportionate part of Aristotle's Ethics and why Euripides could write whole plays

<sup>41</sup> *Ib.* 329.

<sup>42</sup> *E.g.* 80, 1365.

<sup>43</sup> *Ib.* 1402.

<sup>44</sup> The terra cotta figurines often echo the popular temperament unrestrained by artistic formalisation. Cf. the well-known caricatures mostly found in Asia Minor, and monstrosities such as were discovered in the Demeter sanctuary at Priene, illustrated in Wiegand-Schrader's *Priene*.

primarily to exemplify the value and necessity of harmonious and balanced conduct.

The references have emphasized that in love, even more than elsewhere, the need of moderation obtains. The following passages are equally illustrative of this teaching: <sup>45</sup>

ἔρωτες ὑπὲρ μὲν ἄγαν  
ἐλθόντες οὐκ εἰδοξίαν  
οἶδ' ἀρετὰν παρέδωκαν  
ἀνδράσιν· εἰ δ' ἄλλος ἔλθοι  
Κίπρις, οὐκ ἄλλα θεὸς εὐχαρις οὕτως.

(Chorus, Med. 627-31)

μάκαρες οἱ μετρίας θεοῦ  
μετὰ τε σωφροσύνας μετέ-  
σχον Λέκτρων Ἀφροδίτας,  
γαλανεῖα χρησάμενοι  
μανιάδων οἰστρῶν, ὅθι δὴ  
δίδυμ' Ἔρως ὁ χρυσοκόμας  
τόξ' ἐρτείνεται χαρίτων,  
τὸ μὲν ἐκ' εἰαίῳσι πότμῳ,  
τὸ δ' ἐπὶ συγχύσει βιοτᾶς.

ἔη δέ μοι μετρία μὲν  
χάρις, πόθοι δ' ὀσσοί,  
καὶ μετέχοιμι τᾶς Ἀφροδί-  
τας, πολλὰν δ' ἀποθείμαν.

(Chorus, I. A. 543-51; 554-7)

μετρίων Λέκτρων, μετρίων δὲ γάμων  
μετὰ σωφροσύνης  
κῦρσαι θνητοῖσιν ἄριστον.

(Fragment 505)

Finally there is the praise of love in a fragment of eleven lines ascribed to Euripides:

παῖδευμα δ' Ἔρως σοφίας ἀρετῆς  
πλείστον ὑπάρχει,  
καὶ προσομιλεῖν οὗτος ὁ δαίμων  
πάντων ἡδιστος ἔφν θνητοῖς.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. similarly, Hipp. 358; 431-2; also Fragment 449 from the earlier Hippolytos; Fr. 507; 951; Med. 635-6.

καὶ γὰρ ἄλυπον τέρψιν τιν' ἔχων  
 εἰς ἐλπίδ' ἄγει. τοῖς δ' ἀτελέστοις  
 τῶν τοῦδε πόνων μήτε συνείην  
 χωρὶς τ' ἀγρίων ναίοιμι τρόπων.  
 τὸ δ' ἔρᾶν προλέγω τοῖσι νέοισιν  
 μήποτε φεύγειν,  
 χρῆσθαι δ' ὁρθῶς, ὅταν ἔλθῃ.

(Fragment 889)

5. Similarly, the rest of man's emotions are not to be frowned upon nor treated with the unrecognising stare of a merciless self-suppression. The emotions are natural products. To deny them their due place in man's life is to attain, not a higher ethical plane, but an unhuman one. The problem of the individual is not to avoid emotion, but to avoid, now excessive emotionality, now emotional insensibility. For example, although indulgence in anger is generally injurious to men, there are instances where a lack of resentment proclaims a spiritless creature, a thing somewhat less than a man, like that Phrygian slave in the latter part of the *Orestes* (ll. 1369 ff.) whose barbaric panic and cringing submission fill us with contempt. Not to harbour just anger and desire for revenge is, in fact, characteristic of the serf; and, in Greek thought, the barbarian slave who behaves as a slave, is of a lower and different order than real man.<sup>46</sup> The free-born Greek had a duty toward his own self-respect. 'Ελευθερότης, the conduct of individual independence, was part of his φύσις. Not to maintain it was παρὰ φύσιν and ethically wrong. With just this plea Orestes announces his vengeance against Menelaos:

δράσας τι χρῆζω τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἐχθροὺς θανεῖν,  
 ἵν' ἀνταναλώσω μὲν οἱ με προὔδοσαν,  
 στένωσι δ' οἷπερ κἄμ' ἔθηκεν ἄθλιον.  
 'Αγαμέμνωνός τοι παῖς πέφυχ' . . .  
 . . . . . ὃν οὐ καταισχυνῶ  
 δοῦλον παρασχὼν θάνατον, ἀλλ' ἐλευθέρως  
 ψυχὴν ἀφήσω, Μενέλεων δὲ τείσομαι.

(Or. 1164-7; 1169-71)

Though the evil of excessive anger is often emphasised in Euripides, — as for example in the following,

πολλοὺς δ' ὁ θυμὸς ὁ μέγας ὤλεσεν βροτῶν

(Fragment 259)

\* Cf. Fr. 215.

ὀργῇ γὰρ ὅστις εὐθέως χαρίζεται  
κακῶς τελευτᾷ. . .<sup>47</sup>

(Fragment 31)

none the less, there is such a thing as justifiable anger, —

γέροντες, αἰνῶ τῶν φίλων γὰρ οὐνεκα  
ὀργὰς δικαίας τοὺς φίλους ἔχειν χρεῶν,

(H. M. 275-6)

and in the Herakleidai, when Alkmene at last holds her implacable enemy Eurystheus in her power and claims that her right of vengeance is greater than the laws of Marathon, the chorus calls her rage *συγγνωστόν*, "comprehensible," and so "pardonable."<sup>48</sup> In another play, where Hekabe takes a hideous revenge on Polymestor for the violation of the sanctity of hospitality and the murder of her son, Agamemnon, in true Euripidean fashion, holds an ethical inquest and justifies Hekabe for blinding Polymestor. The decision gains weight, because awarded by a Greek against an ally and in favour of a hereditary foe.<sup>49</sup>

In fact, where resentment is justified, it is mere weakness to indulge the opposite emotional extreme. Forgiveness and compassion may be as wrong and disastrous as wrathful implacability. Though a Fragment bids:

. . . μὴ σκυθρωπὸς ἴσθ' ἄγαν  
πρὸς τοὺς κακῶς πράσσοντας, ἄνθρωπος γεγώς,

(Fragment 410)

yet, in the Medeia, Kreon by yielding to his pity for the woman whose viperous hate and cunning he secretly dreads and understands, exposes himself to vengeance at her hands. He acknowledges his error even while he commits it:

αἰδούμενος δὲ πολλὰ δὴ διέφθορα·  
καὶ νῦν ὁρῶ μὲν ἐξαμαρτάνων, γύναι,  
ὅμως δὲ τεύξῃ τοῦδε·

(Med. 349-51)

Scarcely has Kreon left the stage when Medeia speaks contemptuously of his unwise generosity toward her as "senseless folly."<sup>50</sup> It is true Greek ethic (and good logic) to despise in a foe the weakness by which one profits.

Right conduct, here as elsewhere, lies between the two extremes.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. also Fr. 760 and 796.

<sup>48</sup> Herakl. 981.

<sup>49</sup> Hek. 1129-1251.

<sup>50</sup> Med. 371 ff.

Anger must be justified by reason, for reason alone can divine the proper norm. Medea, in yielding wholly to her passion and rage, realises that anger in her has exceeded its proper function and that she is morally at fault:

καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά,  
θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων,  
ὅσπερ μεγίστων αἴτιος κακῶν βροτοῖς.

(Med. 1078-80)

Two fragments present the same doctrine:

ὦρα σε θυμοῦ κρείσσονα γνώμην ἔχειν.

(Fragment 715)

πόλλ' ἐστὶν ὀργῆς ἐξ ἀπαιδείτου κακά.

(Stob. Flor. 20, 12. Presumably from Euripides)

"Not too much, yet not too little." It is this that makes right conduct so rare and so difficult. For the doctrine of the mean applies to all conduct, and it is our moral duty to observe the limits between excess and defect in all that we do.

6. Even love of life, it would seem, can be carried to excess. As in all other phases of human conduct, there is a mean which alone is the right and adequate action. The defect is a form of cowardice. Herakles, when about to commit suicide from despair, checks himself with the reflection that the coward thinks death easier than misfortune: the brave man holds more fast to life.<sup>51</sup> Yet the other extreme is no less cowardly. Iphigeneia, before she makes her resolve to die for Greece, has gone to such excess. It is possible *λίαν φιλοψυχεῖν*, to love one's own life overmuch, as she herself realises.<sup>52</sup> Old men, says Iphis in the Hiketides,<sup>53</sup> cling to their useless shred of life beyond its worth. And Pheres in the Alkestis is taunted by his own son for hoarding with selfish greed the few years that yet remain before death.<sup>54</sup>

It is a Greek tenet that death is better than disgrace:

. . . ἡ γὰρ αἰσχὺνὴ πάρος  
τοῦ ζῆν παρ' ἐσθλοῖς ἀνδράσιν νομίζεται.

(Herakl. 200-1)

Brave men reckon honour before life; in the choice of evils between disgrace and death it is preferable to die.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>51</sup> H. M. 1347 ff.

<sup>52</sup> Hik. 1108-13.

<sup>53</sup> I. A. 1385.

<sup>54</sup> Alk. 642-50 *et al.*

<sup>55</sup> Cf. H. M. 284-92; Hipp. 400-2; 426-7; Fr. 599.



7. In pleasure and pain,<sup>56</sup> then, in joy and grief,<sup>57</sup> in praise and envy,<sup>58</sup> in courage and fear,<sup>59</sup> in anger and humility,<sup>60</sup> in pity and compassion,<sup>61</sup> in friendship,<sup>62</sup> — in short, in all our emotional relations, Euripides exhibits to us how excess will do harm and lead man astray, while deficient sentiment will leave him too colourless and inactive, a creature below the level of that true moral agent which it is man's proper function to be.

8. But there is a large class of material and spiritual possessions, which mankind calls "the good things of this earth," against which the Few have ever preached without ever signally persuading the Many. Wealth and honour and power are good to have; and, thinks the world, the more of them one has, the better. It has always been difficult to expose the fallacy in this seemingly self-evident equation and to show that More Good does not necessarily spell Better. Greed of wealth and greed of power have been combated in many ways, — though for only one reason: because they threaten the moral equipoise of society. Moralists have cudgelled their brains to discover plausible arguments against them; obviously, as they are not at all good for *others*, the individual must be convinced that they are really not good for *him*. To produce this conviction is the aim of Plato's Republic. Of the host of other attempts, utilitarianism is perhaps the most hypocritical, as Christianity is the most sincere. What attempt at proof is there in Euripides?

Several passages praise wealth without reserve.<sup>63</sup> As they are all fragments and tell us neither character nor context, they are not evidence with direct bearing.<sup>64</sup> Had the following verses, for example, survived to us without further information than that they were from Euripides:

ὁ πλοῦτος, ἀνθρωπίσκε, τοῖς σοφοῖς θεός,  
τὰ δ' ἄλλα κόμπαι καὶ λόγων εὐμορφίαι,

Mannikin! wealth the wise man's god is,  
Everything else a wordy fraud is!<sup>65</sup>

<sup>56</sup> Above, pp. 14-19.

<sup>57</sup> Fr. 364, ll. 32-34; Herakl. 619-20; Fr. 422.

<sup>58</sup> Or. 1161; Fr. 297. <sup>59</sup> Above, pp. 12-13. <sup>60</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 21-3. <sup>61</sup> *Ib.*, p. 22.

<sup>62</sup> Hipp. 253-60. <sup>63</sup> Fr. 96; 143; 326; 327; 328; 379; 584.

<sup>64</sup> And here I take the opportunity to acknowledge freely the fallacy of taking every stray word as a reflection of Euripides' own convictions. There is a very real difficulty in distinguishing, in the work of a dramatic poet, what is said out of dramatic fitness from what is meant as the poet's own opinion; but in every case I have tried to base important steps in my argument on only such statements as seem to reflect Euripides *in propria persona*. Cf. the remarks of Decharme, *Euripide et l'Esprit de son Théâtre*, pp. 27-8; and also *supra*, pp. 3-4. <sup>65</sup> Kykl. 316-17.

we might be puzzled what conclusions to draw. How differently we treat the passage when we learn that it is an utterance of that mighty hedonist, the Kyklops, whose high god is his belly,<sup>66</sup> and for whom food and warmth and sleep and animal-like irresponsibility complete the pantheon!<sup>67</sup>

Of the fragments which praise wealth, three of the most laudatory appear to come from the lost play, Danae. A story, told by Seneca in reference to one of these three, warns us how we ought to interpret other fragments inconsonant with the attitude of Euripides in his preserved plays. In Epist. 115, Seneca gives a Latin version of Fragment 326 with its exorbitant praise of gold:

ὦ χρυσέ, δεξιῶμα κάλλιστον βροτοῖς,  
ὥς οὔτε μήτηρ ἡδονὰς τοιάσδ' ἔχει,  
οὐ παῖδες ἀνθρώποισιν, οὐ φίλος πατήρ . . .  
εἰ δ' ἡ Κύπρις τοιοῦτον ὀφθαλμοῖς ὀρᾷ(ν)<sup>68</sup>  
οὐ θαῦμα' ἔρωτας μυρίους αὐτὴν ἔχειν,

(Fragment 326)

and continues, "When these verses were spoken for the first time in Euripides' tragedy, the entire audience sprang up as by a single impulse to eject both actor and play, until Euripides himself stood up in their midst and begged them to wait and see what happened to this person who thought so much of gold." We may believe the anecdote or not. Yet, with more of the context preserved, we well might see a similar fate overtake the characters in the five other fragments which praise the power and glory of wealth. At any rate, it is fairly obvious what Euripides thought on the subject. A fragment from the *Alexandros*<sup>69</sup> sounds like a taunt against Paris himself: "Wealth and luxury are an unmanly training. Poverty, though a harsh teacher, is a good one." In other Fragments, we hear that wealth dulls the sensibilities,<sup>70</sup> that the rich are dull in body and in mind,<sup>71</sup> and that wealth without intelligence is useless.<sup>72</sup> Riches wrongly acquired are even worse than useless,<sup>73</sup> for the prosperity which they bring is transient.<sup>74</sup> Worst of all, wealth breeds a certain *ὑβρις*,<sup>75</sup> and therein lurks the beginning of ruin.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>66</sup> Kykl. 335.

<sup>67</sup> *Ib.* 323-41.

<sup>68</sup> Conjecturing ὀρᾷν to be Seneca's reading.

<sup>69</sup> Fr. 55.

<sup>70</sup> *Ib.* 163; 237; 1054.

<sup>71</sup> *Ib.* 441.

<sup>72</sup> *Ib.* 773.

<sup>73</sup> *Ib.* 822.

<sup>74</sup> *Ib.* 1027.

<sup>75</sup> *Ib.* 773; 642.

<sup>76</sup> *Ib.* 364, ll. 11-13; 421.

The preserved plays are better evidence for Euripides' own feeling. The Hekabe is devoted to the punishment of avarice. Vengeance comes at the hands of the helpless woman who has most been wronged. We call such a dénouement "poetic" justice, implying that it scarcely could occur in the real world of prose. Euripides, I hope to show, felt otherwise about the matter. Again, in the play of the Suppliant Women, Theseus characterises the march of the seven warriors against Thebes as an example of ruin brought on by greed of honour, of power, and of gain.<sup>77</sup> Later in the play, Adrastos delivers a long eulogy on the slain seven. Concerning Tydeus he says:

φιλότιμον ἦθος πλούσιον, φρόνημα δὲ  
ἐν τοῖσιν ἔργοις, οὐχὶ τοῖς λόγοις, ἴσον.

(Hik. 907-8)

His praise of Kapaneus is still more significant:

Καπανεὺς δδ' ἐστίν· ᾧ βίος μὲν ἦν πολὺς,  
ἥκιστα δ' ὀλβῶ γαῦρος ἦν. φρόνημα δὲ  
οὐδέν τι μείζον εἶχεν ἢ πένης ἀνὴρ.

(Hik. 861-3)

Adrastos and Theseus, then, disagree in their judgment on these men. But in one thing they seem to agree thoroughly, and that is in their belief that too much wealth or honour bring disaster, and that only by humility, by acting as if one had neither honours nor wealth, is it possible to avoid destruction. The clearest expression of this belief is in a Fragment:

ὅταν δ' ἴδῃς πρὸς ὕψος ἡρμένον τινὰ  
λαμπρῶ τε πλούτῳ καὶ γένει γαυρούμενον  
ὀφρύν τε μείζω τῆς τύχης ἐπηρκότα,  
τούτου ταχέϊαν νέμεσιν εὐθὺς προσδόκα.

(Fragment 1027)

These verses sound a key-note of the histories of Herodotus and the tetralogies of the Aeschylean drama. Euripides was an innovator: he brought tragedy down from its ancient exalted severity, its *σεμνότης*, and filled it with clever wrangle of disputes caught from law-trials and the sophists' corner. But he never tried to rid the Attic stage of its faith in that poetic justice which overtakes the rich and the powerful when they presume on their high fortune. On the contrary, he keeps displaying the power of this invisible requital; for it is a foundation-

<sup>77</sup> Hik. 232-7.

stone of his ethic. For him it is the one proof that in the "good things of this earth," in gold, in honour, and in power, there is a mean of right conduct, and an ever-present possibility of excess.

In the *Herakleidae*, Iolaos, an old and feeble man, suddenly displays an inexplicable folly by demanding to be armed and led into battle. Judging him for what he seems, the audience may admire, but cannot commend, his mad ambition. But later we hear, through a messenger, of wonderful feats of arms. Iolaos, the decrepit and helpless, regains his youth and strength on the field of battle<sup>78</sup> and takes captive Eurystheus, who, with implacable persecution of Heracles and all his race, has so long hounded that hero's ancient comrade. The play is entirely devoted to the fall of presumptuous evil-doing and the ultimate happiness of the innocent, through the liberation of the *Herakleidae* from the persecution of Eurystheus and their restoration to the kingship which is theirs by right. Iolaos is the sudden and miraculous embodiment of this divine retribution. As if to emphasise its unearthly origin, it incarnates itself in an outworn warrior who is unable to carry his own armour.

This is perhaps the extreme case of *justitia ex machina*. In other plays it takes a less miraculous course; but everywhere we are made to realise that something more than human agency is at work. So, in the *Hekabe*, the gauntlet is thrown down in challenge to heaven. Talthybios, the Greek herald, on seeing the former queen of Troy now a slave in the Greek camp, overwhelmed with misfortune, prostrate on the ground with grief, exclaims over her:

ὦ Ζεῦ, τί λέξω; πότερά σ' ἀνθρώπους δρᾶν;  
ἢ δόξαν ἄλλως τήνδε κεκτήσθαι μάτην,  
τύχην δὲ πάντα τὰν βροτοῖς ἐπισκοπεῖν;

(Hek. 488-91)

Still more explicitly, Hekabe herself states the challenge:

ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν δοῦλοί τε κάσθηνεῖς ἴσως·  
ἀλλ' οἱ θεοὶ σθένουσι χῶ κείνων κρατῶν  
Νόμος· νόμῳ γὰρ τοὺς θεοὺς ἡγούμεθα  
καὶ ζῶμεν ἄδικα καὶ δίκαι' ὠρισμένοι·  
ὅς ἐς σ' ἀνελθὼν εἰ διαφθαρήσεται,  
καὶ μὴ δίκην δώσουσιν οἵτινες ξένους  
κτείνουσιν ἢ θεῶν ἱερὰ τολμῶσιν φέρειν,  
οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἴσον.

(Hek. 798-805)

<sup>78</sup> Herakl. 843-63.

In the end, divine justice fulfils itself. The fatal avarice of Polymestor leads him into Hekabe's power. She herself accomplishes her revenge.

In the Suppliants, Theseus punishes Thebes for insolently refusing to allow burial to the slain Argive Seven. The chorus considers this intimation of justice to be a proof of the existence of a divine ordinance in the world.<sup>79</sup>

The plays of the Euripidean "Oresteia" are the best example of this faith in the certainty of ultimate justice. In the Aulic Iphigeneia, Agamemnon through cowardice agrees to sacrifice his daughter. Ten years later, on his return from Troy, he pays the penalty at the hands of his wife Klytaimestra. She however acted, not so much to avenge her daughter, as to cover her adultery. She has done evil, therefore, and must pay the penalty at the hands of Orestes.<sup>80</sup> Aigisthos, too, must suffer for his adultery and his participation in Agamemnon's death. Over his dead body, Elektra speaks the splendid lines which are a summary of all that Euripides is trying to establish:

μή μοι τὸ πρῶτον βῆμ' ἐὰν δράμη καλῶς,  
νικᾶν δοκείτω τὴν Δίκην, πρὶν ἂν πέλας  
γραμμῆς ἴκηται καὶ τέλος κάμψῃ βίον.

(El. 954-6)

In no instance can wickedness go for ever unpunished.<sup>81</sup> Appearances often point another way; but, in the end, justice through unknown ways fulfils herself on man. Euripides is never tired of emphasising this essential part of his faith. Thus we read that no unjust man ever prospered<sup>82</sup> and that in vain the wicked hope to escape.<sup>83</sup> The last lines of the Ion are the seal of his doctrine:<sup>84</sup>

ἐς τέλος γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἐσθλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ἀξίων,  
οἱ κακοὶ δ', ὥσπερ πεφύκασ', οὐποτ' εὖ πράξειαν ἄν.

(Ion 1621-2)

<sup>79</sup> Hik. 731-3.

<sup>80</sup> Orestes, acting purely through vengeance, seeks to fulfil justice. The death of Klytaimestra is just, but agent and means are wrong (cf. Or. 492-506). Hence Orestes too must suffer; but, because he has intended justice, he will find ultimate acquittal.

<sup>81</sup> In the Andromache, Menelaos ruthlessly breaks his faith, and the helpless Andromache has no weapon save her belief that the gods punish evil and maintain justice. Curiously enough, the efficacy of divine justice is never put to the test, since Peleus intervenes. This play, however, seems to be largely a loose series of events calculated to discredit Spartan character to the Athenian audience.

<sup>82</sup> Hel. 1030-1; cf. Fr. 646.

<sup>83</sup> Similarly, Fr. 224 and 559.

<sup>84</sup> Fr. 257; 832; cf. Hek. 1192-4.

Time will tell;<sup>85</sup> for it holds up a mirror to mankind, as to a young maiden's beauty,<sup>86</sup> and men's characters stand revealed. Time measures with a just rule,<sup>87</sup> and by it we know the good man from the wicked.<sup>88</sup>

Toward the close of the Ion, Athena says:

ἀεὶ γὰρ οἶν  
 χρόνια μὲν τὰ τῶν θεῶν πως, ἐς τέλος δ' οὐκ ἄσθενῃ.  
 (Ion 1614-5)

And this we might almost translate with the truly Greek lines:

"Though the mills of the gods grind slowly,  
 Yet they grind exceeding small."

With this belief that there is an unseen divine vengeance on all evil-doing, the last doubt vanishes and we understand how it is that, even when excess seems profitable to the individual, it cannot prove to be so for very long. The norm of human living is a demand of *φύσις*, of universal nature. If *φύσις* does not immediately and openly punish its violation, then slowly and invisibly she prepares the downfall of the offending individual.

Thus, Nemesis completes the proof of the doctrine of the Mean. The unseen ordinance of the world is such that it will not tolerate excess in any form. For, all excess is synonymous with a violation of *φύσις*; and *φύσις*, in one form or another, punishes *τὰ παρὰ φύσιν*.

The evidence which has been given is now sufficiently complete for the construction of a logical outline which will be at once a summary of the previous pages and a conclusion drawn from them. Since it is intended as a condensed exposition of the metaphysical basis of Euripidean ethics, I give it, for the sake of clarity, in schematic form:

THESES. Right action is *κατὰ φύσιν*. Every action *παρὰ φύσιν* is detrimental to the agent, and therefore wrong.

DEFINITION. *φύσις*, or the order of nature, includes:

- (a) The material and physical laws of the universe.
- (b) The material growth, maintenance, and decay of organisms, i.e., life in all its forms.
- (c) The cause of those sudden unintelligible (because unprognosticable) events which the ordinary man calls chance or fate.

<sup>85</sup> Fr. 444; 509.

<sup>86</sup> Hipp. 428-30.

<sup>87</sup> Fr. 305.

<sup>88</sup> Fr. 61.

EVIDENCE. Under each of these three aspects of *φῶσις*, our thesis must be shown to be true and operative:

- (a) Experience amply shows that man must conform himself to the universal material laws and not seek to divert them from their normal function.
- (b) The thesis is manifestly valid for plants and for animals. In the case of man, however, it needs proof:

Every violation of a norm can be measured quantitatively, i.e., it is due either to excess or to deficiency. The norm itself (which our thesis identifies with right conduct) is therefore a mean between two extremes.

We must show that:

- (1) Observance of the mean is good for the agent.

The proof is derived from the evident formal and material superiority of all organisms under their complete natural conditions.

- (2) Violation of the mean is bad for the agent.

For it throws the organism into an abnormal state in which it is less fitted to perform its function. In man, this is obviously true for his more violent emotional states. There are, however, cases where excess seems to benefit the individual at the expense of his surroundings, particularly at the expense of his fellow-men. Such conduct is manifestly harmful to the latter; but it must be shown to be ultimately harmful to the agent also. No evidence of this is immediately forthcoming, and the proof must be postponed for the moment.

- (c) Empirical observation of the unprognosticable events of "chance" and "fate" reveals certain clearly regulated tendencies and proves these very events to be a great and invisible legislation for maintaining the validity of our thesis, and furnishes the proof which we were unable to give at the end of the previous section. We call these events the working of divine justice: the force behind them we identify with the gods.

Thus, our thesis has been shown valid in each of the three aspects of *φῶσις*, and may fairly be considered established.

### CHAPTER III

THE connection between ethics and theology was not as manifest in Greek as it is in Christian ethics; yet to thinking minds the moral and the religious could not long remain unrelated. Socratic teaching put moral life into Ionian materialistic speculation. The "atheist" helped to rehabilitate the gods. For Euripides the gods are the unseen legislators of the world, who so order the apparent caprices of events that they form a moral system of punishment and reward. Yet Euripides apparently casts discredit on the Olympians. Thus, the *Ion* shows Apollo taking precariously elaborate measures in order to emerge with even superficial credit from a rather disgraceful scrape. In another play, Herakles complains bitterly against Hera's persecution: Zeus was unfaithful, Hera was jealous, and unoffending Herakles must suffer. "Who would pray to such a goddess?" he exclaims.<sup>1</sup> In the *Bacchae*, Dionysos takes a hideous revenge, such as mortals scarce approve.<sup>2</sup>

Of all the gods, Apollo suffers most from Euripides. He is vindictive and unforgiving in the *Andromache*,<sup>3</sup> immoral and underhanded in the *Ion*,<sup>4</sup> an instigator of mischief in the *Suppliants*.<sup>5</sup> It may be that there was an Athenian quarrel against the Delphic oracle. It may be that Euripides disbelieved in oracles and divination. His characters exclaim not infrequently against such practices.<sup>6</sup> In the *Elektra* and the *Orestes*, the Delphic oracle prompted the murder of Klytāimēstra, and Orestes blames all his consequent misfortunes on the god,<sup>7</sup> and Elektra joins in his censure.<sup>8</sup> But here in the end Apollo proves himself just, as Orestes gladly acknowledges.<sup>9</sup> The divine will was slow in accomplishment, — a signal characteristic, as Orestes himself declared.<sup>10</sup> In fact, it is *τοιούτων φύσει*.

I cannot enter in detail into the question of Euripides' religion;

<sup>1</sup> H. M. 1307-10; cf. 1316-20 and 339-47.

<sup>2</sup> *Bacch.* 1348.

<sup>3</sup> *Andr.* 1161-5.

<sup>4</sup> *Ion*, *passim*; cf. esp. *Ion*'s own criticisms of Apollo in 436-51; 355; 367.

<sup>5</sup> *Hik.* 138 and 219-22.

<sup>6</sup> E.g. *Hel.* 744-8; 756-60. But cf. *Hipp.* 1320-4.

<sup>7</sup> *Or.* 285-7; 414-20; 591-9; *El.* 971-3; 981; cf. 1245-6.

<sup>8</sup> *Or.* 162-4.

<sup>9</sup> *Or.* 1666-7.

<sup>10</sup> *Or.* 420.



but must be content with the assertion that all the evidence seems to me to indicate quite clearly that Euripides is so severe with the gods because he believes in them so thoroughly. From the often quoted fragment:

*εἰ θεοὶ τι δρῶσιν αἰσχρόν, οὐκ εἰσὶν θεοί,*  
 "If the gods do evil, then they are not gods,"

(From Fragment 294)

we must not conclude that there are no gods, but that the gods do no evil. The quarrel with Apollo is the only serious instance to the contrary, and this seems to be directed against the Delphic oracle for other than ethical reasons.

For, if there is to be any higher ethical sanction for mankind, the forces of the universal ordinance cannot be evil or do evil. For this reason, the gods must be purged of all their traditional immoralities. The gods can do no evil, and therefore Euripides is merciless with them. But he fights for them not against them:

*οὐδένα γὰρ οἶμαι δαιμόνων εἶναι κακόν.*

(I. T. 391)

Euripides openly declares that the gods must be purged of their evil reputations and established as that higher justice from which human morality derives its sanction. Therefore, the gods should be above revenge<sup>11</sup> and more wisely forgiving than mankind.<sup>12</sup> In a word, they can do no evil;<sup>13</sup> for otherwise we, who imitate them, would not be to blame for the evil which we perform,<sup>14</sup> since our actions take their sanction from the gods.<sup>15</sup> Thus the gods must be moral and just, for otherwise where should we turn for justice?<sup>16</sup> If there are gods at all, the just man will gain a good reward<sup>17</sup> and the wicked be destroyed,<sup>18</sup> but if there are no gods, all justice vanishes, and why should we strive to be moral?<sup>19</sup> Or, reversing the argument, if injustice prevails on earth, we cannot believe in the gods;<sup>20</sup> but "when I see the wicked fallen, I say, The race of gods exists!" (Fr. 581). In one form or another, so say most of the heroes and heroines of Euripides' plays; and, presumably, so said also the Athenian audience which beheld the

<sup>11</sup> Bacch. 1348.

<sup>12</sup> Hipp. 120.

<sup>13</sup> Fr. 294 quoted above. Yet Aphrodite often works evil; hence she is not a god, but something else, something more powerful (Hipp. 358-61), who overcomes even the gods (Fr. 434). See below p. 41.

<sup>14</sup> Ion 449-51.

<sup>15</sup> Hipp. 98.

<sup>17</sup> I. A. 1034-5.

<sup>18</sup> I. A. 1035.

<sup>16</sup> Ion 253.

<sup>19</sup> Hik. 505.

<sup>20</sup> El. 583.

ultimate triumph of the good and punishment of the overbearing, of the wicked who exceeded the due measure of the norm of life.

In conclusion, I give the important passage from the *Troïades*, which openly points a finger to the place of the gods in Euripides' ethical system:<sup>21</sup>

ὅστις ποτ' εἰ σύ, δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι,  
Ζεὺς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν,  
προσηυξάμην σε· πάντα γὰρ δι' ἀψόφου  
βαλὼν κελεύθου κατὰ δίκην τὰ θνήτ' ἔχεις.

(Tro. 885-8)

For Euripides the gods are ceasing to be persons. They are becoming the more or less abstract forces in Nature which work for universal justice.

Of human justice I can find in Euripides no clear account. He frequently gives it a partial definition. It involves religious observance and veneration;<sup>22</sup> it is punctiliousness (*ἀτρεκεία*);<sup>23</sup> it is respect for property;<sup>24</sup> it is altruistic, since it is directed toward the good of fellow-men.<sup>25</sup> But though naturally we find no analysis and systematic treatment such as Aristotle gives in the fifth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, there are a couple of passages in Euripides which are definite.

The first is Iokaste's speech to her two warring sons in the *Phoinissai*.<sup>26</sup> She is pleading for a divided kingship in Thebes; but appeals to more general principles: "The tyrant's rule is merely successful injustice and doomed to anxiety and misfortune. Be not over-ambitious; but rather, be just, and grant everyone his share. Justice is equality."

The second passage<sup>27</sup> is in similar vein. Theseus is disputing political theory with the Theban herald for the glorification of Athens

<sup>21</sup> A convenient indication of the philosophic echoes in this passage may be found in J. Adam's *Religious Teachers of Greece*, p. 299 ff., where it may be of interest to note that the important phrase *ἀνάγκη φύσεος* draws a blank, so to speak: — "It is not so clear that Euripides had any definite philosophic theory in view when he suggested that this Zeus or Aether is perhaps to be regarded as *ἀνάγκη φύσεος* — Nature's Necessity or Law. He may be thinking, perhaps, of the Atomists, etc. . . ." Mr. Adam justly suggests that the *εἴτε* clauses "are not really intended to exclude one another."

<sup>22</sup> Herakl. 901-3; cf. Fr. 1063.

<sup>23</sup> Fr. 92.

<sup>24</sup> Fr. 356.

<sup>25</sup> Herakl. 1-5.

<sup>26</sup> Phoin. 528-67.

<sup>27</sup> Hik. 429-55; v. also Fr. 429.

and the delectation of the audience. He condemns tyranny and commends written law, whereby rich and poor, and strong and weak, have equal hearing and equal redress. Such equality is justice.

But though there is neither adequate definition nor analytic discussion of justice in Euripides such as Plato gives in his Republic or Aristotle in the fifth book of the Ethics, indirectly there is evidence of ideals as thoughtful and as far-reaching.

As we have seen, he believes that justice is the gods' care and obtains a deep and universal self-fulfilment. Though occasional characters cry out that rapacious and ruthless power is so successful and complain:

πόλεις τε μικρὰς οἶδα τιμώσας θεοὺς,  
αἱ μειζόνων κλύουσι δυσσεβεστέρων  
λόγχης ἀριθμῶ πλείονος κρατούμεναι,

(From Fragment 288)

yet the conviction is strong that

οὐδεὶς στρατεύσας ἄδικοι σῶς ἦλθεν πάλιν,

(Fragment 355)

and "foolish are they who gather virtue with the point of the spear; if battle is to decide, never will strife depart from cities of mankind."<sup>28</sup> In fact, it is entirely due to evil of man that there is injustice abroad; for "the gods' deeds are just, but among wicked men they sicken and fall into confusion."<sup>29</sup>

The hidden world works for justice, for equality among men, and for requital of good and evil. Kingship and tyranny must vanish and a perfect equality arise among men. With such an ideal, what of women and of slaves?

Euripides had a profound belief in women.<sup>30</sup> He did not look on them as Plato in the interest of formal theorising once seems to have done,<sup>31</sup> as men with child-bearing functions, able to do all that men could, though hampered by a lack of strength. Euripides looked on

<sup>28</sup> Chorus in Hel. 1151-7.

<sup>29</sup> Fr. 609. The reading is more uncertain than the general trend.

<sup>30</sup> The long speech against women by Hippolytos (615-68) accords with an anti-erotic or sexually perverted nature. It throws no light on Euripides' own views. Rather, it shows much understanding of a type which has probably always been exceptional, but which has always existed. Of the other misogynistic outbursts in Euripides, I find five are mere short fragments without a background (Fr. 500; 532; 805; 1045; 1046). There remains the taunt of Jason in Med. 573-5, which is scarcely a rooted conviction of either author or character. For a good survey of the material, v. Decharme, ch. IV, § 1.

<sup>31</sup> Rep. Book V.

women quite frankly as women. He saw many faults in them, that they were scheming and unscrupulous,<sup>32</sup> inordinately jealous,<sup>33</sup> defective in a sense of honour and fair play,<sup>34</sup> gossiping and meddling.<sup>35</sup> Yet he declares a good wife to be the bulwark of a house<sup>36</sup> and a blessing to the fortunate man who wedded her.<sup>37</sup> But women are not men disguised under another sex. Their virtues are womanly, their natural functions are essentially domestic.<sup>38</sup> But justice and equality apply as much to them as to men. They have been unfairly criticised, good women and bad have fallen under a common censure;<sup>39</sup> it is men who have talked, while women have had no hearing;<sup>40</sup> had they but equal opportunity, they could recount as many evils about men.<sup>41</sup> They should have equality of speech, therefore. More than that, divorce should be a mutual right<sup>42</sup> and unchastity as much an offence in the husband as in the wife.<sup>43</sup>

It is part, therefore, of Euripides' belief in that equality which he identifies with justice, that women should have equal rights with men, provided always that they fulfil their place as women.<sup>44</sup> It is of course consonant with this that polygamy, being unequal, is unjust and unnatural. In the *Andromache*, the chorus compares a household with two wives to a city with two rulers, a play by two authors, and a ship with two pilots.<sup>45</sup>

In the case of slaves, Euripides feels none of the injustice of their position. It is not that they are morally worthless. Though he sometimes calls them so,<sup>46</sup> more often he shows a great appreciation of their self-respect, their honour, and their faithfulness. The old nurses in the *Medeia* and the *Hippolytos* are among his most human and attract-

<sup>32</sup> *Med.* 407-9; *I. T.* 1032; *Hik.* 294; *Andr.* 262-8; 380-4; 425-32, where *Hermione* seems to be the instigator; but much of the *Andromache* must be discounted as a ruthless attack on Spartan behaviour.

<sup>33</sup> *Andr.* 155-80.

<sup>35</sup> *Phoin.* 198-201.

<sup>34</sup> *Fr.* 673; *Andr.* 516-22.

<sup>36</sup> *Fr.* 1041.

<sup>37</sup> *Fr.* 164; 1042; 1043; cf. *I. A.* 749-50.

<sup>38</sup> Praise of good wives: *Fr.* 819; 820; *Tro.* 645-56; and esp. *Fr.* 901.

<sup>39</sup> *Ion* 398-400; *Hek.* 1183-6; *Fr.* 496; 658; cf. *Fr.* 497.

<sup>40</sup> *Ion* 1090-8.

<sup>41</sup> *Med.* 421-30. Cf. on the unequal and difficult position of men, *Medeia's* speech in 230-51.

<sup>42</sup> *Andr.* 672-4.

<sup>43</sup> *El.* 1036-41. Cf. however the opposite attitude of *Andromache* in the play of that name, 215-26.

<sup>44</sup> They should remain indoors, *Herakl.* 476-7; *Fr.* 525; and not strive to rule in their home, *Andr.* 213-4; *El.* 1052-3.

<sup>45</sup> *Andr.* 464-85. Cf. the equally strong opinion of *Hermione* in the same play, 173-80.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *Fr.* 49; 50; 215; and the *Phrygian* in the latter part of the *Orestes*.

ive characters. In fact, in three instances he declares them at least the equals of their masters.<sup>47</sup> Yet he never cries out against the injustice of their position. I imagine that he, like Aristotle, must have looked on slavery as a natural and necessary institution. He never expresses the possibility of doing without it. Its evils and injustice never touch his logic or brain; but that they could touch his heart, and call forth his deepest emotions of pity and sorrow, is patent to any who read even casually the great lamentations in the *Hekabe* and *Troïades*.

Slavery is a misfortune, the greatest of all misfortunes, so hopeless that death is preferable to it.<sup>48</sup> Yet there is nothing to be done. It is the order of nature and the will of the unseen ordinance. This seems to be Euripides' position; but under its reasoning we seem to hear his soul crying out with the distress of *Hekabe*, yet comforting itself with the thought that under good masters the lot of the slaves was not evil, and that in the household of *Alkestis* they were rather children than serfs.<sup>49</sup> It is rather the horrors of war, such as we see them in the *Hekabe*, that lend their gloomy colours to the spectacle of man become the chattel and the property of his fellow-beings. It is a strange position, humanity struggling for expression almost against the dictate of reason.

At the beginning of this thesis I spoke of an *ἀρχή*, a universal principle, running through Greek ethical thought. This *ἀρχή* I identified with life in the norm of Nature. To Euripides, a careful interrogation of Nature supplies the empiric rules of conduct, and so furnishes an objective standard, external to the agent. What behaviour is right in this or that crisis? what are the gods? what is the proper position of women or of slaves? To answer these and other questions of conduct, we must in every case turn to Nature. What is the *φύσις* of women and of slaves? we must ask.<sup>50</sup> If that can be determined, we shall have

<sup>47</sup> *Hel.* 728-31; *Ion* 854-6; *Fr.* 515.

<sup>48</sup> *Hek.* 357-78; 211-15. *Fr.* 247.

<sup>49</sup> *Alk.* 193-5, 769-71.

<sup>50</sup> It will be noticed that this question implies a classification by type, as if woman *qua* woman had a distinctive *φύσις*. This process of thinking by type or class is natural to a people among whom the caste-system prevails. But it is also in general a necessary stage in a process of differentiation. One is reminded of the development of artistic types in sculpture, from the undifferentiated nude male to the various distinct athletic types (the boxer, the wrestler, the runner, etc.), at which still unindividualised stage the process seems almost arrested until the fourth century. In much the same way, the Greek thinkers differentiated the moral agent into types or classes, whose functions and natural capacities (*ἔργον* and *φύσις*) they treated as limited and distinctive. So the slave, *δοῦλος* (*Soph. O. C.* 763-4), the *νομέης* (*ib.* 1118; cf. *Od.* 17, 322).

discovered their proper position and conduct. The appeal to φύσις is the great source of moral sanction. Whatever is κατὰ φύσιν is morally right; whatever is παρὰ φύσιν is morally wrong.

To the Greek mind, therefore, morality is not a matter of subjective impulse or conscience or self-interrogation. Man identifies himself in the world by a realization that he is an ordered part of it with a determined place and function. It is his duty to fulfil that function, to play his part as Nature intended.

This is the ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή of which I spoke. It has proved itself under all of Euripides' ethical feeling as the *forma informans* which alone explains and unifies his teaching. His religion, his morality, the meaning of his plays, all become clearer in the light of this single and simple principle. Thus understood, the Greek tragedian is as logical and as consistent as his fellow Greeks in philosophy and art.

The thesis is therefore concluded, — or rather, it would be, were it not that there is another and counter principle in Euripides which conflicts with this one and in certain cases supersedes it. To this other principle the remainder of the thesis must be devoted.

## CHAPTER IV

UNDER a system of ethics such as we have sketched, the individual is self-centred. His actions are not for others, but for himself. In identifying his own complete and harmonious development with his highest good, he excludes that long range of so-called Christian virtues which stretches from self-denial to self-obliteration. For how can it help the individual, if he die to save another than himself?

Yet human instincts and human nature have always been much the same, and the Greek could die for his city or lay down his life for a friend, whether or not strict logic of his ethical theories justified his behaviour. Nor could he withhold his admiration and applause if he beheld another man perform similar unselfish acts.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* we read nothing about self-sacrifice. For such an unwearied student as Aristotle, devoted to increasing his knowledge and extending his logic till it should cover every phase of human thought and action, what possible attraction or what possible meaning could there be in a creed of self-abnegation whose commands must run counter to his whole life's activity? With the instincts of the scholar, however, Aristotle combined those of a teacher, and here he experienced the desire of labouring for another's benefit. There creeps into the Aristotelian ethics, therefore, the famous chapter on friendship, with its characteristic analysis of friends into three kinds, friends for delectation, friends for utility, and friends for love of the good which is in them. The last class contains the only true friends. This meant, in the fourth century before Christ, to Aristotle, tutor of Alexander and sage of the Lyceum, three kinds of associates, — men to dine with and to jest with; influential men with power in their hands; and, last, the true intimates, pupils and followers, who could discuss philosophy. Now, philosophy among the Greeks was not a lone man's plaything, a solitary invention of secluded minds. Truth rose only out of discussion; like a child, it needed two parents. The outcome of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is a glorification of the life of philosophic speculation and an admission of the need of like-minded friends for successful pursuit of this philosophic ideal. To the last, therefore, Aristotle clung to the self-centred creed of the scholar, admitting friends not for friends'

sake, but because they were indispensable to that highest scholarly and philosophical self-development which was for him the consummate human type on earth, the realization of all the latent possibilities of the thinking animal, man.<sup>1</sup>

It is interesting to see how every distinction in Aristotle's discussion of friendship can be found already made in Euripides. Thus, there are the same classes of false friends, those for advantage,<sup>2</sup> and those through pleasure (*ἡδονῇ*,<sup>3</sup> *πρὸς χάριν* <sup>4</sup>), and such friendships may exist among evil men through the attraction of like for like,<sup>5</sup> while true friendship occurs only between the good, for it is a "love for a just and restrained and virtuous soul" (*ἐρως ψυχῆς δίκαιας σώφρονός τε κάγαθῆς*).<sup>6</sup> Misfortune is the great test of friendship, for it reveals the motive, and only that friendship which is based, not on advantage or an idle interest, but on a deep-rooted affection will endure amid adversity.<sup>7</sup> Such friends are a gift beyond all value.<sup>8</sup> Though they are admittedly rare,<sup>9</sup> there are eloquent and unforgettable examples in the pages of Euripides. Such is the friendship of Theseus and Herakles in the *Herakles Mai-nomenos*. Insanity and murder with all its pollution do not shake the loyalty of Theseus, who proclaims for friendship a higher sanctity:

*οὐδεὶς ἀλάστωρ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκ τῶν φίλων.*

(H. M. 1234)<sup>10</sup>

The last lines of the play<sup>11</sup> mark still more the sanctity and solemnity of this high friendship which no crime can shatter or alter. More famous, though not more touching, is the indissoluble comradeship of Orestes and Pylades throughout the *Tauric Iphigeneia*, the *Elektra*, and the *Orestes*. Of such a friendship must have been written the Fragment from which a line has already been quoted. Though it is not

<sup>1</sup> The *ἔτερος αὐτός* is a logical quibble to keep the ethical centre within the individual. An unselfish act for a friend now ceases to be unselfish, for the action is performed to benefit that more comprehensive Self (I plus friend, or Self plus Second Self). The strict logic of individualistic ethics is preserved, but the barriers are really already down. Why limit the extension of self to a friend or two? But if the extension is unlimited, there is no longer any individualistic ethic.

<sup>2</sup> H. M. 1224-5; Fr. 465; Hek. 1227.

<sup>3</sup> Fr. 298, l. 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.* 298; 809.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.* 364, ll. 19-20.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.* 342.

<sup>7</sup> Euripides calls such friends *φίλοι σαφεῖς* (Or. 1155; H. M. 55; Fr. 928), *ἀληθεῖς* (Hik. 867; Hipp. 927), *δρθῶς* (Andr. 377; H. M. 56).

<sup>8</sup> Or. 727-8; 804-6; 1155-7; H. M. 1425-6; Fr. 7; 928.

<sup>9</sup> El. 605-7; Hik. 867-8; Fr. 736.

<sup>10</sup> In Or. 793-4 Pylades holds the same belief toward the frenzy of Orestes.

<sup>11</sup> H. M. 1394 ff.



particularly good poetry, it has enough ethical import to justify its quotation in full:

φίλος γὰρ ἦν μοι, καὶ μ' ἔρως ἔλοι ποτὲ<sup>12</sup>  
 οὐκ εἰς τὸ μῶρον, οὐδὲ μ' εἰς Κύπριν τρέπων.  
 ἀλλ' ἔστι δὴ τις ἄλλος ἐν βροτοῖς ἔρως  
 ψυχῆς δικαίας σώφρονός τε κάγαθῆς.  
 καὶ χρῆν δὲ τοῖς βροτοῖσιν τόνδ' εἶναι νόμον,  
 τῶν εὐσεβούντων οἷτινές γε σώφρονες  
 ἑρᾶν, Κύπριν δὲ τὴν Διὸς χαίρειν ἑάν.

(Fragment 342)

The Aristotelian friend is part of the self-centred ethical system; but in this Euripidean fragment, and in the lover-like comradeship of Orestes and Pylades, of Theseus and Herakles, a new element has crept in, too strong for "system," an element which threatens the clarity of the Euripidean logic with the colouring of a fatal emotion.

It will be noted that in such a form of individualism there is no room for the rather self-destructive enlargement which classes altruism as a higher form of selfishness. Euripides could not logically claim that self-sacrifice was also *κατὰ φύσιν* and therefore commendable, any more than, for example, a gardener could claim that the extermination of the tare to give soil to the corn was *for the tare κατὰ φύσιν*. As long as immortality and a higher, external moral sanction are not involved, the individual is to be considered entirely as a material manifestation, here and now, closely analogous to any other living product of nature, whose end, and therefore, in a thinking being, whose "duty," is realization of form (in the sense of complete attainment of *εἶδος*). Self-sacrifice is in consequence eminently *παρὰ φύσιν*.

We must constantly remember this distinction between ancient naturalistic individualism and certain modern rehabilitations which can conveniently merge the individual into a "higher self" by a pleasantly indefinite transition. If we insist on our rather humble analogies and argue as if man were merely an intelligent political animal, akin to other natural forms, these rather insidious sophistications lose their force, while we ourselves shall be closer to the attitude of mind of Sokrates, with his constant adjudication of ethical problems by concrete analogies in the lowly trades and crafts, and of Aristotle, whose pregnant use of such concepts as *ἔργον*, *τέλος*, *δύναμις*, and *εἶδος*, I have throughout tried to copy.

<sup>12</sup> The reading is corrupt.

In friendships of this extreme and beautiful sort, then, the ethical postulate is in danger. Curiously enough in that other, and to our thought more intense, emotional relation, the love of man and woman, this is seldom true. Making all allowance for *ethopoia*, for the difficulty of distinguishing the *dramatis personae* from Euripides' own utterance, such is the consistency of sentiment that it seems hard to resist the conclusion that Euripides looked on sexual love as a violent and irrational thing,<sup>13</sup> an intruder into an otherwise ordered world. It is mere folly:

τὰ μῶρα γὰρ πάντ' ἐστὶν. Ἀφροδίτῃ βροτοῖς,  
καὶ τοῦνομ' ὁρθῶς ἀφροσύνης ἄρχει θεῶς.

(Tro. 989-90)

Running counter to that great system of morality and justice which Euripides calls "the gods," Aphrodite cannot be herself a god. She is something even more powerful.<sup>14</sup> She is quietly excluded from the ethical system as an irrational and uncontrollable factor.

But this other love, that bound Pylades and Orestes, caught the Greek imagination where the more ordinary love of man and woman failed. Too sane and wise to be irrational, too abiding to be fortuitous or merely fleeting and uncontrollable, it demanded with full right a place in the Greek ethical system, and such a place the self-centred creed, with which we have been dealing, was unable to give.

Love in still another form impressed Euripides with its strength and its beauty. "To all men, children are their very soul," says Andromache.<sup>15</sup> It is not a question of the pleasure which they give us. Although to some they are more to be desired than wealth or kingly power,<sup>16</sup> others may judge themselves happier without children, for they may sicken and die or grow into evil ways and, all in all, cause only care and grief.<sup>17</sup> But virtuous and wicked men alike love their children;<sup>18</sup> and there is nothing more intimate than the bond between parents and their children,<sup>19</sup> nor any sweeter love than that of mother and child.<sup>20</sup> And out of the strength of such love comes self-sacrifice, the obliteration of the individual for the sake of another.

In the Herakleidai, Makaria dies of her own will, in order to save her brothers. She justifies her act by a long speech, claiming that, first, justice demands her sacrifice; Marathon has received her and her

<sup>13</sup> Fr. 139.

<sup>15</sup> Andr. 418.

<sup>14</sup> Hipp. 359-60.

<sup>16</sup> Ion 485-91.

<sup>17</sup> Chorus in Med. 1090-1115; Admetos in Alk. 879-88; Fr. 575.

<sup>18</sup> H. M. 634-6.

<sup>19</sup> Fr. 333.

<sup>20</sup> Fr. 360.

brothers as suppliants at the risk of its prosperity and its freedom, hence she must take equal dangers on herself to save Marathon;<sup>21</sup> secondly, not to die would show lack of courage and bring shame upon her;<sup>22</sup> thirdly, the alternative, life, is not preferable, since she would not attain happiness;<sup>23</sup> and therefore, in final conclusion, it is better for her to die with honour, since to live is shameful.<sup>24</sup> In all this inhuman reasoning, how the ethical logician is trying to find a place for self-sacrifice in his "system!" Makaria may make this forensic speech; yet she acts through impulse and for love of her brothers, not through logic or for reason. Euripides admits as much. He makes Makaria realise that the deed, to be good, must come from love and not through any restraint. When Iolaos suggests that she should draw lots with her sisters to determine the victim, she refuses, and even intimates that should she be commanded by the fall of the lot, she would resist such a death; for it would resemble an execution more than a deed of virtue.<sup>25</sup> And thereby she shows that her harangue was a judicial gloss, hiding her true motive of voluntary self-devotion to save those whom she loves. In that admission, the individualistic creed of ethics breaks down. It is not shame and honour that are the motives. The individual is no longer consulting the interests of his own harmonious and complete self-development. But to do so was the fundamental demand of the system which we have been developing.

There are numerous other cases in Euripides, for the situation makes a great appeal to the dramatic instinct and that human sympathy which a great tragic poet possesses. Andromache is unhesitatingly prepared to die in order to save her son Molossos.<sup>26</sup> Hekabe wishes to take the place of her daughter whom the Greeks have voted for sacrifice to the shade of Achilles.<sup>27</sup> Alkestis, dying that her husband may live, is a familiar figure in all men's minds.<sup>28</sup> So, too, Iphigeneia's sacrifice is voluntary. When the plot becomes involved, so that apparently bloodshed and intestine strife must break out in the Greek camp at Aulis, Iphigeneia suddenly claims her right to die in behalf of the Greek cause against Troy. She has been weeping and lamenting in childish fashion: all at once, she understands her duty and her privilege, — "To all Greece didst thou bear me!"<sup>29</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Her. 503-10.<sup>24</sup> *Ib.* 525-8.<sup>27</sup> Hek. 385-7.<sup>22</sup> *Ib.* 515-19.<sup>25</sup> *Ib.* 547-51.<sup>23</sup> *Ib.* 520-4.<sup>26</sup> Andr. 406-18.<sup>28</sup> Cf. also the more difficult situation in the long fragment from the Erechtheus quoted by Lycurgus (*Kata Leokr.* 100), where the mother gives her son to die to save her country.<sup>29</sup> I. A. 1386.

So far does the power of affection reach, that even where nothing is gained, the sacrifice is offered. In the *Helena*, husband and wife, precariously reunited, vow to die together if both may not live:

ΕΛ. ψαίω, θανόντος σοῦ τόδ' ἐκλείψειν φάος.

Με. κἀγὼ στερηθεὶς σοῦ τελευτήσειν βίον.

(*Hel.* 839-40)

In the *Orestes*, Pylades insists on dying if his friend Orestes must, however needless the sacrifice seems.<sup>30</sup> His, also, are the stirring lines:

μήθ' αἱμά μου δέξαιτο κάρπιμον πέδον,

μή λαμπρὸς αἰθὴρ, εἰ σ' ἐγὼ προδοῦς ποτε

ἐλευθερώσας τούμὸν ἀπολίποιμι σέ.

(*Or.* 1086-8)

I have tried to show that the Greek individualistic ethic is incompatible with certain emotions which we class among the higher Christian virtues, and that precisely these emotions occur in Euripides. When, as in the cases just cited, life is freely and gladly given for another's sake, not out of selfish interest or a weighing of For and Against, but out of love, whether of country or of wife or of friend, the fundamental ethical thesis has been violated. The individual proceeds to efface his entire existence, and, with it, all possibility of further realising his spiritual and bodily powers. It seems to me a significant comment on all individualistic ethics that even in so logical and successful an exemplification as that of fourth-century Greek morality, though the philosopher could be self-consistent, the more human tragedian — for all his sense for logic — was driven into violating the cardinal principle of his ethical system.

This observation has its bearing on modern conditions of thought and feeling, as I intend to show. But before sketching the change of attitude in ethics since Aristotle, I wish to add at least a brief note of comparison between that philosopher and Euripides. It is almost a commonplace of Aristotelian criticism to scent an odour of the comic stage in the ethical characters so drastically and dramatically portrayed in the central books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. I offer the general tenor of this essay as an indication that Aristotle's total indebtedness to the stage is still more thoroughgoing. A system such as Euripides held needs only to be subjected to the rigorous formalising of the Aristotelian logic — and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, as Burnet has shown,<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> *Or.* 1069-72.

<sup>31</sup> In his edition of the *Ethics*.

is full of logical formalism — and to be interpreted in the light of the Aristotelian psychology of conduct, to produce almost the entire fabric of the Nicomachean Ethics.<sup>32</sup> There is the same fundamental assumption—a monstrous *non sequitur* of optimism—that, because the fulfilment of function is the aim of every organism considered as part of Nature, therefore it is also the aim or end of man as a self-conscious self-directed individual, and thus the best thing for him to do; and being best, it is thus equivalent to the Highest Good. The *εὐδαιμονία* of Book I is Aeschylean-Herodotean preaching on the transiency of prosperity, the unreliability of *τὰ ξὺ ἀγαθὰ* reconciled as far as possible with the equation of right action to action in the norm of Nature.<sup>33</sup> The immediately following books contain the explanation of the mechanism of such action — the psychological mediation between the intellectual act of apprehending the general ethical law and the practical act of conduct in the concrete. This psychological mediation effected by the doctrine of *προαίρεσις*, and the divisions of the sentient activities, could not, I admit, have been found ready-made in the Attic drama. But it is not part of the moral theory, so much as of the scientific analysis of the mechanism of behaviour. The more properly speculative distinction between *ἔξις* and *ἐνέργεια*, however, is already in Euripides; at least, the equivalent doctrine that there is no well-being without well-doing seems clear in the following fragment from the Antiope:

εἰ δ' εὐτυχῶν τις καὶ βίον κεκτημένος  
 μηδὲν δόμοισι τῶν καλῶν πειράσεται,  
 ἐγὼ μὲν οὔ ποτ' αὐτὸν ὀλβιον καλῶ,  
 φύλακα δὲ μᾶλλον χρημάτων εὐδαίμονα.

Is not this precisely the point of Aristotle's definition of Eudaimonia in Book I? Following this psychological treatise, come the practical

<sup>32</sup> On the other hand, the examination in this thesis has afforded hardly any Platonic doctrine. Is not this merely another indication that Plato was a highly original (or, at any rate, a highly specialised) thinker, whereas Aristotle was a school-logician and analytic encyclopaedist working from the normal viewpoint of the ordinary educated Athenian?

<sup>33</sup> Cf. with Aristotle's account, the following Euripidean treatment of Eudaimonia: It is transient and uncertain (Herakl. 609–18, Hipp. 981–2), and we can call no man happy before death (Andr. 100–2, Herakl. 865–6). No man is completely happy (Med. 1224–30; Fr. 46; 196). None are happy without aid of the gods (Fr. 149; Her. 609), and none are happy unless they are prosperous. For this prosperity (*τὰ ξὺ ἀγαθὰ*), children are necessary (Andr. 418–20) and wealth is necessary (Erech. 16–17). Without opportunity it is impossible to perfect and develop oneself (Fr. 738). Finally, happiness is essentially an activity, for there is no well-being without well-doing (Fr. 198).

rules for right conduct, centred and contained in the doctrine of the Mean, — the very rule-of-life which has been brought out so vividly by our study of Euripides. Then follow the “pre-Theophrastean” characters, vivid attempts at *ethopoia*, and redolent of practical play-writing. The exhaustive treatment of justice in Book V echoes mathematical theorists and is not exemplified in Euripides; but just because it is so largely a mere practical calculus for the jurynan, its purely ethical content is slight. The discussion of wisdom, pleasure, and incontinence is a more purely speculative heritage from the Sophists and the Academy. The nature of friendship is already in Euripides in strikingly Aristotelian form.

I conclude, therefore, that we estimate Aristotle’s Ethics wrongly if we treat it as moral speculation. The morality came to his hand from the Sophists and the stage. Out of it, he made a practical exposition of human behaviour. The Nicomachean Ethics is not a treatise on Duty or Obligation or Moral Sanction, but a text-book of psychology with practical hints on conduct.

## POSTSCRIPT ON INDIVIDUALISTIC SYSTEMS

THE Greek civilisation perfected itself within rather narrow geographical bounds. In the fourth century before Christ it began to affect non-Greek people. Alexander the Great gave a whirlwind impulse to a movement already begun. By the third century it was widely disseminated through the Mediterranean lands. In extending its application it naturally was modified to meet non-Greek conditions. Its art and literature and material code of life met with severe change, but endured the test triumphantly; but its ethic failed. At least, it failed in that form which the Athenian drama had taught and Aristotle had systematised. City-life grew enormously in these Hellenistic days. The great towns, like magnets, drew people from the farm and its empty routine to the energetic idleness of the splendid city-streets. The extremes of society worked ever further apart. The idle rich and the mobswelling poor now first appear as outstanding social factors. With the increased disparity of level, luxury and want, enjoyment and misery are more emphatic and more prominent. The poor and wretched cry out that life is a succession of insupportable evils. The rich revel in goldsmith's ware and marble-coated houses, in feasting and fine apparel. What meaning for either of them has the old fifth-century advice to develop the Self harmoniously and evenly in order to realize all the inherent potentialities of the organic life which Nature gave us? Especially to the ill-clothed and ill-fed rabble, this would seem a high-flown and senseless creed. Something else was needed; Stoicism and Epicureanism swept the Hellenistic world. The one thought life full of evil and counselled a high fortitude as man's best armour. The other saw that enjoyment was still possible and counselled gathering the roses while we may. Whatever the original philosophy of these creeds, this seems to have been their practical application. In this form they fitted their world and gained their votaries. But both talk much of *φύσις*, especially Stoicism (though neither can gladly and completely acquiesce in it); and both must be studied genetically as divergent growths out of the ethical system which Euripides exemplifies.

This earlier ethic hinged on self-assertion. It was applicable to a prosperous community, an aristocracy whose material needs were guaranteed by slavery. The doctrine had no application to this slave-class

itself and was in fact never extended to them even in the broadest theorising. When an ethic was needed which would apply to both classes — and for that matter to all mankind — the Greek system failed. The necessity of that failure is foreshadowed in Euripides. Constant preoccupation with tragic situations developed in him a sympathy for the unfortunate and an understanding of their suffering which is completely lacking in the theorising self-absorption of Aristotle. From the poet we learn what we should never have guessed from the philosopher, that the Greek ethic, though logically consistent for ordinary Greek conditions, in extreme human crises breaks down. An ethical study of Euripides is consequently of considerable interest because it defines the range of conditions within which an individualistic ethic can be self-consistent and satisfactory. Now, many of these conditions, after being lost in Hellenistic, Roman, and Christian times, have reappeared in the very recent world of to-day. For the first time in centuries, we can apply the lesson of Greek ethics to ourselves.

As I understand the matter, a fundamental difference between Greek and Christian ethics derives from the source of moral sanction. Christian dogma, I presume, reflects the legal tone of Roman civil administration and Hebraic religious law: it is essentially imposed, like a *corpus juridicum*, by an authority external to the individual. Christ and Caesar are parallel manifestations, to each of whom must be rendered what is his due and whatever is demanded by the laws whose administration ultimately pinnacles in them. In Christian law the emphasis shifts from this world to the world hereafter. There is thus a marked difference from Greek ethical thought.

In general, I should formulate the matter thus: Where there is the belief in a personal creative Deity and in individual immortality, there must arise an external non-earthly sanction; without these beliefs, the interest must centre in the individual, in the living intelligent Being, here and now. In the latter case, in a complex community, Hedonism or Stoicism arises as a personal guide to life, with Utilitarianism, perhaps, as a more impersonal theoretical system; while in a closed aristocracy or a socialistic community, the Euripidean and Aristotelian Individualism will make their appeal.

Now that modern wide-spread prosperity has removed much of the need for self-suppression, a material condition reappears wherein each may to some extent live for himself and develop his own faculties to the utmost. Harmonious and complete development of the various physical



and intellectual faculties once more becomes the aim in education. Hence also there is an ever more marked wane of sympathy with some of the fundamental teachings of Christian dogma, just because self-development implies self-assertion and an individualistic rather than altruistic attitude. In political as well as pedagogical theory the same trend is apparent. Socialism, in its general tenets, makes unbroken progress. It aims at an increased efficiency in the community, and, for its ideal, would give every individual the opportunity to realise his highest possibilities in the social fabric. What is this but the great doctrine of Greek ethics applied to a more complex community? Under a completely triumphant socialism — if the realisation be practicable — our attitude would approximate that of the Greeks; provided that we had sufficient sense for form and balance to keep us from the degeneration of excesses. To keep this sense alert and operative was, as we have seen, the main occupation and value of Greek ethical teaching.

Obviously, self-development can be easily confused with self-interestedness. A self-centred attitude may degenerate into greed and callow selfishness. Its true character as a high moral system can only be maintained by a people who realise intuitively that perfection does not mean the quantitatively greatest, but a difficult and rather subtle balance between the Too Much and the Too Little. Surely Euripides realised that for the Greeks this dangerous mistake was possible. Else why, with all his bold innovations, did he cling so strongly to the old dramatic theme and show, as rigorously as Aeschylus himself, that every man however wealthy or well-born, if he confuse self-development with self-aggrandisement at the expense of others, is punished by the great law of universal justice with which the gods are merged and into which they disappear.

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THE NATURE OF  
A STUDY IN METAPHYSICS

BY  
FLORENCE WEBSTER

ARCHIVES OF PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY  
FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE

No. 12, MAY, 1922



New York  
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1922

URE OF LIFE  
PHYSICAL ANALYSIS


BY  
WEBSTER, PH.D.

OF PHILOSOPHY  
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E. WOODBRIDGE

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# THE NATURE OF LIFE—A STUDY IN METAPHYSICAL ANALYSIS

## PREFATORY NOTE

I became interested in the conception of life, while a graduate student at Wellesley in 1913. The results of my study of it at that time were embodied in a thesis, entitled "A Conception of Life," that was presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a master's degree at Wellesley College in November, 1914. The first section of this paper was devoted to an examination of biological conceptions of life. The second was more definitely philosophical and began with an analysis of experience, which resulted in a recognition of two contrasting aspects of reality, variously termed mind and matter, self and ideas, the spiritual and the material, the psychical and the physical, *etc.* Life was then defined as the imperfect union of these two.

No attempt was made to discuss in any detail the spiritual or inner life, though I felt strongly that a philosophical definition of life should cover both physical and spiritual life, as ethics and religion deal with life quite as much as biology does. I was therefore anxious to continue my study of the nature of life. However, when I returned to it in the fall of 1919, I found that life appeared in so many forms that my discussion would have to be confined to certain typical cases. These are presented in chapters II-VII of the present paper under the headings: Physical Life and Nutrition, Behavior and Sentient Life, Conscious Life and Mind, Values and the Moral Life, Life and Society, and Ideals and the Spiritual Life. The aim in each case has been to discover the fundamental characteristics of life and the basis for the differentiation of its forms.

The two papers thus agree in that they both seek to define life in such a way as to include all its forms. But they differ widely in the backgrounds against which this is worked out and in the terms used to express the results. The first paper was avowedly philosophical in a historical and critical fashion with a decided leaning toward idealism. The second is far more naturalistic and realistic and was written on the assumption that things are to be understood by discovering the structure to which they conform.<sup>1</sup> The most familiar types or "kinds" of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. F. J. E. Woodbridge: "Structure," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIV, pp. 680-688.

structure are the spatial, mechanical, chemical and logical. There appear to be temporal structures as well, as is evident in music and history for example. Life also is found to possess a temporal structure in terms of which it may significantly be defined. But unfortunately temporal structures have not been studied with the care that has been given by geometry to spatial and indeed they seem to have received very little systematic attention. Therefore I have simply attempted to indicate the temporal structure of life and suggest the relation between this and its characteristic teleological organization.

This paper, which was submitted at Columbia University in February 1921 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the doctorate, in no sense pretends to be a complete discussion of the nature of life and is now offered rather as a suggestive study in metaphysical analysis than as a final definition of life.

F. W.

WOODSTOCK, NEW YORK,  
FEBRUARY 1922.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Chapter		Page
	INTRODUCTION	
I.	THE MANIFOLD TYPES OF LIFE . . . . .	3
	EXAMINATION OF VARIOUS TYPES OF LIFE	
II.	PHYSICAL LIFE AND NUTRITION . . . . .	9
	Chief characteristics: specific form, growth and re- production, metabolism, and movement.	
	Environment: realm of mechanical and chemical struc- ture.	
	Chief features or factors of physical life.	
	Organization (specificity).	
	Temporal structure.	
	Teleological organization.	
III.	BEHAVIOR AND SENTIENT LIFE . . . . .	24
	Chief characteristics: behavior, sensation and emotion.	
	Environment includes realm of primary, secondary and tertiary qualities.	
	Chief factors of sentient life.	
	Organization.	
	Temporal structure.	
	Teleology (purposive, though not purposed).	
IV.	CONSCIOUS LIFE AND MIND . . . . .	33
	Characteristics: cognition and imagination.	
	Environment includes meaning and implication, is the domain of logical structure.	
	Chief factors of mental life.	
	Organization and individuality.	
	Temporal structure: prospective and retrospective aspects of consciousness.	
	Teleology and conscious purpose.	

Chapter	Page
V. VALUES AND THE MORAL LIFE . . . . .	42
Preliminary discussion of teleology.	
Life in the realm of values or goods.	
Chief factors of moral life.	
Organization and character.	
Temporal structure.	
Teleology and design.	
VI. LIFE AND SOCIETY . . . . .	51
Life of the individual in society.	
Society as possessing a life of its own.	
Chief factors of social life.	
Organization.	
Temporal structure (in greatly extended form).	
Teleology, conscious and unconscious.	
VII. IDEALS AND THE SPIRITUAL LIFE . . . . .	56
Forms: religious, esthetic, intellectual, moral.	
Realm of Ideals: the true, the good, the beautiful,	
God and society.	
Chief factors of the spiritual life.	
Organization and personality.	
Temporal structure.	
Teleology and ideal aims.	
CONCLUSION	
VIII. DEFINITION OF LIFE . . . . .	65
In terms of its factors:	
Organization.	
Temporal structure.	
Teleology.	
The differences in its forms due to the variety of the domains in which they occur.	

# **INTRODUCTION**





## CHAPTER I

### THE MANIFOLD TYPES OF LIFE

Life is at once so intimate and so general, appearing in our most personal problems and practical affairs as well as in abstract science and philosophy, that any attempt to define it seems from the outset doomed to failure. Have the biologist and the moralist anything in common when they both talk of life or are they rather using the same word with radically different meanings? Certainly Eucken's inquiries into the basis and ground of life seem to have nothing to do with the biologist's discussion of protoplasm as the basis of life; [and the theologian appears to have something quite different in mind when he tries to expound the secret of life, from what interests the scientist when he considers the origin of life.] In fact can there be any connection or comparison between philosophies of life such as the Stoic, Epicurean and Christian and theories of life such as mechanism and vitalism? Still these all continue to discuss life, and such contrasts as that of the speculative and practical life, of the simple and strenuous life, of rational and emotional life, of plant and animal life, and even of human and divine life are common and familiar enough, as are also such phrases as industrial, business and economic life, and collective, group and community life. But is there any significance in these all being termed life or would it be more accurate to rephrase these expressions, making the adjectives into nouns and omitting all reference to life? Doubtless this might be done in some cases, but not in all, for life, I think, has a definite meaning of its own. Intellect and practise are hardly equivalents for the intellectual and practical lives, nor business and industry for business and industrial life, and even less is the physical the same as physical life, and at the other extreme eternity appears to be quite different from the eternal life. Could Santayana's *Life of Reason* be called as fittingly *Reason*, and would Eucken's insistence on the need for the independent spiritual life have as much appeal if he left out all reference to life and talked about the need of an independent spirit? Certainly it would carry very different implications.

The differences in the types of life mentioned—and the list might be extended greatly in numerous ways—are of course important as well as evident, and it is with no intention of minimizing these that I wish to suggest that these varying types are all termed life neither by accident

nor metaphor, for I think that life has a meaning that is essential to it and that occurs in these various instances and adds its content to the whole, though its contribution to the total significance of the phrases is not always recognized nor fully appreciated. It is this essential meaning of life as a universal term that I hope to bring out in the present discussion and which, if found, will furnish the definition of life that I am seeking.

The search for this definition will be conducted empirically and inductively by an examination of some of the most significant types of life. The choice of instances I trust will be fairly representative and not entirely arbitrary though it does not claim to be complete. Various typical selections might be made and the forms of life classified in different ways. Plant and animal life are naturally classed as life on the biological or physical plane, while at the other extreme the moral and religious life as well as the intellectual and rational are commonly grouped together under the term spiritual, personal or inner life. Are the esthetic and sensuous, the conscious and psychical lives to be included in the same group as the religious and moral as forms of personal or inner life? And should the simple and strenuous life, business and economic life be included in the same class as well? Or should the last two be classed with national and tribal life as forms of group, community or social life? Many of these evidently have strange and often perplexing likenesses as well as differences.

In spite of this bewildering richness and variety of forms in which life appears, it seems to me that the more important kinds may be included under a few general headings, though in some cases it is difficult to find a name that adequately covers each and they show a tendency to overlap. Most clear and unequivocal appears what we may term biological life or life on the physical plane: bodily life in general whether of plants or animals, unicellular or multicellular, in lower or in higher forms—the life of organisms as the subject matter of biology. This aspect of human life is the main interest of the science of medicine and the principal concern of hygiene and sanitation. But these latter usually seem unsatisfactory if they wholly disregard the so-called higher aspects of human life, for mind and emotion often seem quite as important as nourishment and care of the body. In a somewhat similar way descriptions of animal behavior lead naturally to the use of terms that are commonly associated with mental or psychical processes. In fact a discussion of bodily life in its various manifestations seems to lead inevitably over into the realm that is commonly claimed by psychologists. We might then naturally turn from the discussion of life as presented by biology to examine it as seen by psychology. But

here new difficulties confront us. Varied as is the subject matter of biology and its many allied sciences and much as different investigators may disagree as to the ultimate terms of explanation, there is comparatively little doubt of what they are studying, since organisms can be concretely exhibited. On the other hand the subject matter of psychology seems to be rather uncertain and doubtful. Is it consciousness or behavior, mental life or the dynamics of mind? In the text-books of psychology we find much physiology, some physics, and discussions of sensations, perceptions, instincts, emotions, thought, memory, reason, association, attention, habit, will and similar subjects—certainly a varied list. Are all these to be grouped as mental states or psychical processes and mind conceived as “an integration of co-ordinated psychical elements or processes—personal memories, tendencies, desires, wishes and the like”?<sup>1</sup> An effort seems to have been made to regard everything that is not physical, in the Newtonian sense of being expressible in terms of *m*, *l*, and *t*, as mental and so legitimate subject matter for psychology. But this attempt appears to fail for two quite opposite reasons: first psychologists are very much interested in many admittedly physical things, and secondly they are but little concerned with many of those aspects of life that are often termed spiritual. Of course we have psychologies of religion and of morals—in fact all forms of human activity may be treated psychologically—but it is not to such accounts that we look for accurate and vivid pictures of the religious, moral or spiritual life.

Therefore, in the interest of clearness and simplicity, I suggest that we do not attempt to consider at the same time all the forms of life with which psychology may deal. I propose indeed that in the division of our discussion we follow the lead of the material rather than that of the sciences that have treated it. We may then, after considering physical life as it appears in connection with growth and metabolism, turn to that type of life which appears as the common domain of biology and psychology and which may be roughly identified with animal life as exhibited in behavior and sensation. In other words, I propose that we first discuss vegetative or nutritive life and then sentient life. In connection with the latter the question of consciousness naturally arises and we shall devote a chapter to a consideration of mental life.

For an adequate discussion of life it would also seem necessary to consider the many attempts that have been made to interpret the meaning and value of life, for moral and religious teachers are quite as much interested in life as biologists and psychologists and indeed talk

<sup>1</sup> H. W. Carr: “The Interaction of Mind and Body,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. XVIII, p. 2.

a great deal more about it. While people may be quite as much interested in their spiritual and mental health as in their bodily well-being, and the desire for "more abundant life" is by no means limited to physical health and vigor.

What an endless and hopeless mass of questions are suggested! Quite so; and I wish to say at once that I have no intention of attacking them all. In comparison with what might be attempted in this connection, I think that my problem may appear fairly simple and definite, though I admit that from other angles it might seem impossibly broad. But it is not my aim to attempt to decide the question of vitalism *versus* mechanism, nor to solve the problem of the relation of mind and body, nor pass judgment upon the rival theories of the meaning and value of life. In fact I am not setting out to explain or evaluate life but simply to define it.

With this end in view, the first thing to do is to get before us as clearly as possible the subject of our discussion. As has been already suggested, I do not wish to limit the definition to any single form or type of life but to include everything that is covered by the term, the life of the spirit as well as the life of the body, conscious and unconscious life, instinctive and intellectual life, moral and religious life, social and individual life, family and national life, *etc.*, *etc.* As we evidently can not examine each of these separately, it seems best to consider some of the most typical groups of them. Therefore I propose that we begin by examining life on the biological plane, as it appears in connection with nutrition and then as exhibited in behavior, *i.e.* in the forms of vegetative and sentient life. We shall then devote a chapter to the consideration of mental life, instead of attempting to include sentient and mental life together as forms of conscious life or life on the psychological plane, for we have seen that psychology does not appear to furnish a clear basis for defining a type of life. After discussing life on the mental plane, we shall turn to consider life in the moral realm, follow that with an examination of social life in its varied forms, and then conclude our investigation of the various types of life by trying to get as clear a picture as possible of what may be termed the inner life or life in the spiritual domain.

In each case the aim will be to discover the fundamental factors or characteristics of life in the realm under consideration and to state these as clearly and generally as possible. We may then see in how far these agree in all cases as well as in what their differences consist and may thus arrive at the essential or fundamental meaning of life and also at the principle of the differentiation of its various forms. It should then be possible to formulate the definition of life that is the aim of the present discussion.

## **Examination of Various Types of Life**



## CHAPTER II

### PHYSICAL LIFE AND NUTRITION

Turning now to biology for an account of life on the physical plane, it is somewhat surprising to find that biologists as a rule have very little to say about life and a great deal about organisms and their various forms and functions. The taxonomist and naturalist describe the immense variety of forms in which life appears in nature, noting in what ways they resemble and differ from each other, for they aim at a comprehensive and adequate classification of all forms of life as the result of their comparative study. The embryologist on the other hand may confine his attention to the study of the development of a single type of animal, and as yet relatively few have been studied in great detail so that rather hasty generalizations have been made in this field. Still much has been done to add to our knowledge of the growth of organisms. In the branches of biology so far mentioned the main interest has been in the organism as a whole, but physiology and anatomy, as well as histology and bio-chemistry, are primarily concerned only with portions of the organism, whether these be organs, cells or chemical elements and whether interest be centered in their structures or their functions.

Before proceeding to a consideration of what biology has to teach concerning the fundamental characteristics of living matter, it may be well to note something of the great variety of organic forms in which life is here found. The distinction between plants and animals seems obvious enough and so are the more general divisions within each of these kingdoms. Flowering plants and trees are evidently different in many ways from ferns and mosses, and green plants from parasites and saprophytes such as mushrooms and fungi. In the animal kingdom the differences between vertebrate and invertebrate, between mammal, bird and fish, between insect, worm and mollusc are evident. With the added contrast of the unicellular organisms with the multicellular already mentioned, and a recognition of the great variety of microscopic life both animal and vegetable, it might seem as hopeless to try and discover the fundamental characteristics of life on the biological plane as does our more general undertaking to define life on its many planes. The difficulty of the task must be admitted in both cases, but the fact that it has often been attempted in the first may give us courage to hope that it may be accomplished in both.



Great as is the variety of organisms, their difference from inorganic nature as it appears to the physicist and chemist would seem to be clear and unequivocal. But this difference, like that between plants and animals, it has proved difficult to formulate in such a way as to be unambiguous in all cases. Indeed there seems to be no single feature of life that can be taken as its distinctive or defining characteristic, since each that is offered turns out to be too broad or too narrow; and as a result most attempts to define biological life consist of an enumeration of some of its more prominent features. These are variously given but I think that they are reducible to a few fundamental ones. Driesch says, "All living bodies are specific as to form—they 'have' a specific form, . . . exhibit metabolism; that is to say, they stand in a relation of interchange of materials with the surrounding medium, . . . and, in the last place, we can say that all living bodies move."<sup>1</sup> Hodge gives as the properties of life, nutrition, including all the processes of anabolism and katabolism, reproduction and growth, and irritability, including the fundamental functions of conductivity and contractibility.<sup>2</sup> Minchin's list is the power of automatic movement exhibited by living protoplasm, amoeboid when not enclosed in an envelope and streaming when so confined as in plant cells, metabolism, *i.e.* anabolism and katabolism, including respiration also and resulting in growth and reproduction.<sup>3</sup> Mitchell gives a similar list of the alleged differences between the organic and the inorganic, namely difference in structure, phenomena of movement including irritability and instability, reproduction and mode of origin, but points out that none of these are absolute and concludes that the real distinction is chemical—the presence of proteid.<sup>4</sup> Karl Pearson in his *Grammar of Science* examines consciousness and the laws of motion applicable to living and lifeless matter, but finds that neither furnishes the desired distinction and he concludes that life can be defined only by secondary characteristics: the most important ones for him being the presence of protein, the method of growth by inner instead of outer addition, reproduction and the necessity of a peculiar environment with certain conditions of moisture and temperature.<sup>5</sup> Henderson in his attempt to define life as a basis for his discussion of the "fitness of the environment," emphasizes complexity both structural and functional, metabolism which he later holds is to be con-

<sup>1</sup> *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, Vol. I, p. 16.

<sup>2</sup> "Living Matter" in the *Baldwin Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*.

<sup>3</sup> "Protoplasm" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed.

<sup>4</sup> "Life" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed.

<sup>5</sup> Second edition, London, Black, 1900, pp. 338-345.

ceived in terms of equilibrium, and regulation which is later reduced to organization.<sup>6</sup> Schäfer emphasizes the importance of the co-ordination of parts and the due regulation of their activity in the maintenance of life,<sup>7</sup> while Troland says "regulation seems to be the most striking active characteristic of living beings."<sup>8</sup>

Many other similar lists of the important characteristics of living organisms could be given, but they would in general merely repeat in different ways the features already noted. Much repetition is obvious even in the few examples given, though these were chosen with a view to showing as much variety as possible. Indeed it seems to me that the chief features of biological life fall into four main groups: the first of which may be described as specific form and complexity of structure, the second as development covering growth and reproduction, the third as metabolism or nutrition and including respiration, and the fourth as movement. Such characteristics as organization and regulation are found in connection with these and will appear in the discussion (description and analysis) of the four characteristics just mentioned which I now propose to consider in greater detail.

When plants as well as animals are considered, specific form or structure is perhaps the most obvious characteristic of organisms. It furnishes the chief basis for biological classification and has been particularly emphasized in the descriptions given of organisms by taxonomist and naturalist. The immense variety and wealth of organic forms has already been mentioned and is so evident that there is little need of considering it in detail, but it is worth while, I think, to note that definite and complex structure is not limited to multicellular organisms. The structure of plants and animals is so commonly thought of in terms of organs and tissues composed of cells, that there is a tendency to regard the cell itself as simple and structureless. But the study of one-celled animals (the protozoa) shows that they possess definite and specific structure comparable in complexity and function to that of the metazoa, and Ritter maintains that definite organs and tissues are discoverable, which can be denied these names only by so defining them as to require that they be composed of cells.<sup>9</sup> Though less is known about the structure of bacteria, they are by no means formless, as is evident from the fact that so many varieties of them

<sup>6</sup> *The Fitness of the Environment*, New York, Macmillan, 1913, pp. 30-35. Cf. *The Order of Nature*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1917, pp. 80-84.

<sup>7</sup> "The Nature, Origin and Maintenance of Life," *Scientific American Supplement*, Vol. LXXIV, p. 227.

<sup>8</sup> "The Chemical Origin and Regulation of Life," *Monist*, Vol. 24, p. 96.

<sup>9</sup> *The Unity of the Organism*, Boston, Badger, 1919, Vol. I, p. 240.

are recognizable under the microscope. Embryology and histology have also emphasized the variety and complexity of cell structure,<sup>10</sup> especially in the case of ova and spermatazoa, and also their specificity for each species. For not only are the adult forms of each species true to type, but so also are all forms of the organism from germ cell to adult. Careful microscopic observation shows that seeds and eggs are specific and typical, while we all know that acorns develop into oaks and not elms or cabbages and that chickens are hatched from hens' and not turtles' eggs. The eggs of our wild birds differ about as much as do the birds themselves and careful study reveals specific differences in the eggs of fish of different varieties. The same specificity of form is found throughout the growth of each individual. This is particularly impressive in cases where there are intermediate forms quite different from the mature organism: the caterpillar and butterfly, tadpole and frog, larva and mosquito are perhaps the most familiar examples, while the descriptions given of the development of sea-urchins and other simple forms of marine life show it quite as clearly. Indeed specific form is not merely a characteristic of the adult but extends over the entire life history of the organism. Thus "the living form may be called a 'genetic form' or a form considered as a process,"<sup>11</sup> for it is a temporal as well as a spatial affair and in fact it seems to be its temporal rather than its spatial aspect that distinguishes the specific form of organic life from other physical objects. This would seem to be the reason why attempts to define the specific form characteristic of living beings in merely spatial terms have failed to distinguish them from other physical structures such as crystals and certain liquids and colloids. It has, of course, been customary to point out the greater complexity of their parts, their closer inter-relatedness and more perfect integration and organization. But though these latter categories are important in any consideration of life, they do not appear to be adequate for a description of specific form, as this can be understood only in connection with the life histories of the organisms under consideration. In fact, so far as organic life is physical it conforms to the mechanical structure of its environment, and thus it is not possible to differentiate organisms from other physical objects in merely mechanical and spatial terms. For it is in their relation to time rather than to space that they differ from their inorganic environment, since their specific forms are worked out only through temporal processes and develop according to specific patterns

<sup>10</sup> Cf. E. B. Wilson: *The Cell in Development and Inheritance*. New York, Macmillan, 1900.

<sup>11</sup> Driesch: *Loc. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 20.

in time as well as in space. They thus possess temporal as well as spatial and mechanical structure and in fact their characteristic differences seem to be due to the former rather than to the latter.

The case appears to be very much the same when we turn to consider the chemical composition of living matter. For, though chemical analysis is constantly adding to our knowledge of the composition of protoplasm and the list of elements found in it seems to increase with more accurate methods of investigation, no element peculiar to living matter has been found, so that the difference between organic and inorganic matter is apparently due to its organization or structure rather than to its elements. Of organic compounds the most common are carbohydrates, fats and proteins, and the latter are especially emphasized in discussions of life as they are the most complex and characteristic. Loeb points out that they differ for different genera and even for different species of the same genus,<sup>12</sup> and that they may even show family and individual differences is suggested by experience with blood transfusions. Thus not only is there no discoverable living element, but the chemical structure of protoplasm varies with different genera so that Ritter maintains that the term should be used in the plural—protoplasms—rather than in the singular.<sup>13</sup> Thus the specificity so characteristic of organisms is seen to hold for their chemical composition. But it is not to be attributed to unique living elements, for organic matter is made up of the same chemical elements that are found elsewhere in the physical world. The difference is rather the result of the method of their composition which appears to be a temporal as well as a chemical affair—living compounds being produced only from other living forms. It is thus the temporal factor which appears to be at the bottom of the difficulty of synthesizing living matter in the laboratory. The chemical elements can be brought together in the right proportions but the temporal pattern can not be compressed into the comparatively short time at the scientist's disposal. That is, the structure of protoplasm is temporal as well as chemical and this is true both of living matter in general and of each individual form. Thus if we are to understand the nature of living matter we must take account of both the long history of life upon the earth and the specific life histories of the forms under consideration.

This is further emphasized by the facts of heredity, however much confusion may be caused by the various theories upon the subject. If Castle's definition, which Ritter commends so strongly because of "its non-commitment to any theory" (*i.e.* "by heredity, then, we mean

<sup>12</sup> *The Organism as a Whole*, New York, Putnam, 1916, p. 68.

<sup>13</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 148.

organic resemblance based on descent")<sup>14</sup> be accepted, it appears to be but one way of expressing the relation of individual to species that may be described from another point of view in terms of reproduction. In either case the important thing to note is that the specific form (and function as well for that matter) of the species is maintained through a succession of individuals, each of which develops "in accordance with a scheme or pattern characteristic of the species to which the organism belongs, so that any particular individual in the series resembles those which have gone before it."<sup>15</sup> This by no means excludes variation, which is also characteristic of organic development and must be reckoned with as a fact however it may or may not be explained by the theories of heredity.

In all development then, whether it be individual growth or reproduction, there is continuity in the midst of change. In some of the most familiar cases of animal growth this appears as the maintenance of specific form amid slowly but constantly changing matter, but a study of the development of any individual from germ to adult shows changes in form as well as in matter, while the fact that all organisms arise from other organisms emphasizes the material continuity of life. This brings the temporal nature of life to our attention again and suggests the wide range of temporal structure, the importance of which has already appeared in our examination of the specific form of organisms. In fact development and form are seen to be very closely related, since the specific form of an individual can only be understood by reference to its inheritance and growth, while development proceeds specifically and produces characteristic forms at all stages and can only be understood in connection with these. The temporal structure characteristic of life thus possesses definite direction.

As for the mechanism of reproduction and growth much is surmised and comparatively little is known. There seems to be a correlation between the chromosomes of the germ and certain definite characteristics of the adult forms, but the cytoplasm as well as the nucleus would seem to be important in determining development and the germ though a single cell is far from structureless. But this does not necessarily mean that it contains a preformation of the organism that is to develop from it, which, indeed, in view of the great complexity and variety of forms that often intervene would seem quite impossible.<sup>16</sup> But fortunately it is not necessary for the present purpose of definition

<sup>14</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 315.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 322.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. E. B. Wilson: "The Problem of Development," *Science*, N. S. 21, pp. 281-294.

to explain all the phenomena of life, so the problem of epigenesis *versus* preformation and evolution may be left to the biologists to decide by observation or theory as best they can.

The process of growth proceeds by differentiation and integration or organization. With the metazoa this is closely connected with cell division, the organism arising from a single germ cell by a process of successive divisions that result in the differentiation of the cells of the various tissues together with their organization or integration into organs and the organism as a whole. Of course differentiation and integration proceed together: the germ is the organism as a whole in a one-celled stage and throughout the process of development the organism always exists as a whole but it is constantly becoming more complex as its tissues and organs become differentiated, but it remains a single whole throughout, as its organization keeps pace with the differentiation. With the protozoa all individual growth is confined to a single cell, though this may be described in terms of differentiation and organization as these tiny animals possess a complex structure comparable to the tissues and organs of the higher forms. Here cell-division means reproduction; and in a similar sense most of the growth of multicellular organisms can be described as reproduction since it proceeds by cell division while what in these cases is specifically called reproduction may be regarded as a special instance of their growth. The mechanism by which this is brought about becomes increasingly complicated especially in the case of sexual reproduction, but the great interest in this latter form should not blind us to the essential similarity of the process in all cases.

All growth and development proceeds upon the basis of metabolism, which in fact is sometimes regarded as the fundamental characteristic of life and especially of the life of the cell. In this broad sense metabolism may be regarded as covering nutrition and respiration as well. It is customary to distinguish anabolic from katabolic processes as respectively constructive and destructive. In general anabolism may be regarded as including the absorption of food-stuffs which are obtained from the environment both organic and inorganic and the conversion of this material into the organic compounds characteristic of the organism, thus making possible both growth and repair within the living body. Katabolism, on the other hand, covers the breaking down of organic compounds with the liberation of energy. Neither process is entirely synthetic or analytic in the chemical sense, since all organic compounds that are taken in as food are broken down into simpler complexes before they are finally synthesized into compounds characteristic of the organism employing them, while the fact that synthetic

processes accompany the analytic in katabolism is apparent in the neutralization of certain poisonous products resulting from the dissociations characteristic of katabolism. Chemically at least the metabolism of plants appears to be radically different from that of animals, as is evident from the different rôles played by oxygen and carbon dioxide in the two cases and the fact that green plants can utilize inorganic material to an extent that is impossible for colorless plants and animals. Certain micro-organisms seem to possess different chemical powers from either plants or animals:<sup>17</sup> an important example being the power possessed by the nodule bacteria, found in the roots of leguminous plants, of fixing the free nitrogen of the air so that it is available for the use of plants, while other forms of bacteria liberate the nitrogen in dead organic compounds so that it is again utilizable.<sup>18</sup>

But it is with the general characteristics of metabolism rather than the details of its mechanism that we are at present concerned. In this connection it is to be noted that all organisms are capable of taking materials from their environment and building these into their own structure. This is accomplished by a process of dissociation and reintegration, as compounds are broken down into simpler substances before being absorbed and built up into the tissue of the organism. The resulting compounds are probably specific in chemical composition<sup>19</sup> and it is certainly through this metabolic process that the specific form of the organism is developed and maintained. In this sense metabolism as well as growth may be regarded as teleological if this means that a definite end is attained through a variety of means<sup>20</sup> or that the individuality of the whole is maintained through constantly changing matter, or if "all processes leading to factual wholeness" are regarded as teleological.<sup>21</sup> Each of these expressions is inadequate and in some ways objectionable and we shall later examine in greater detail the meaning of teleology, so that all I wish to do here is to call attention to the fact that organic development is in a sense teleological. The teleology here apparent is evidently closely connected with the tendency of organisms to develop in definite ways: that is, it is to be understood in terms of tendency and direction and so seems to be closely related

<sup>17</sup> Cf. J. Johnstone: *The Philosophy of Biology*, Cambridge, University Press, 1914, pp. 267 ff.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. E. O. Jordan: *General Bacteriology*, Philadelphia and London, Saunders, 1918, Chapter 34.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. J. Loeb: *Loc. cit.*, Chapter III.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. E. A. Singer, Jr.: "The Pulse of Life," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XI, pp. 648-649.

<sup>21</sup> H. Driesch: *The Problem of Individuality*, London, Macmillan, 1914, p. 3.

to the temporal structure that we have seen to be characteristic of living beings.

As the anabolic processes furnish the basis for the development and growth of organisms, so the katabolic appear as the foundation of their activity and movement. Reference has already been made to the amoeboid and automatic movements that are said to be characteristic of protoplasm in all its forms. As I propose to consider behavior in connection with sentient life, we may here simply note the fact that irritability, conductivity and contractibility are characteristic of all protoplasm and may be regarded as the basis of all types of behavior, while we shall reserve a detailed discussion of behavior for the next chapter. This is admittedly a limitation of the biological conception of life which may appear arbitrary to many biologists. But as has already been suggested, my present interest is in the description and analysis of the nature of life as it appears in many different realms and connections. In each case my aim is to get as clear a view of life as possible, while my interest in defining the different domains themselves is decidedly secondary. It is not my purpose to dictate to biologist or psychologist what they should study nor what the relations between them should be, but to go to them for a description of life as they see it. But as psychology does not seem to present a single definite picture of conscious life, but rather a confused variety, it has seemed better for our present inquiry to consider sentient life, as characterized by behavior and sensation, as distinct from mental life. Since the first interests both biologists and psychologists and their treatments of it overlap to a considerable extent, as they both deal with the same material and differ rather in their presuppositions and explanations than in the facts with which they are concerned, I have chosen to consider this common field separately rather than to assign it to either.

Our examination of the characteristic features of living organisms has, I think, shown the important factors of life on the biological or physical plane. First, the biologist emphasizes the fact that he deals with life only as it is found in connection with matter, for the question of disembodied life has no interest for him. Life here then possesses spatial and mechanical and also chemical structure. It is this aspect of life that seems all important to biological mechanists and they therefore hope to be able finally to explain all life phenomena completely in physico-chemical terms. Such a hope may seem to be supported by the fact that chemical analysis reveals no new element peculiar to living matter and that organisms possess no unique mechanical structure. This is hardly to be wondered at since living organisms maintain themselves in a physico-chemical environment upon which they depend for



the material required for their development. They thus show a certain continuity with their environment as well as among their own forms. But if physical life were indistinguishable from its mechanical environment, we might as well abandon the term life in this connection and confess that we were dealing with only the physical. The mechanists however are hardly willing to go so far as that and usually admit that life possesses a peculiar structure of its own. Chemically this may be expressed by saying that protoplasm and protein are peculiar to organic matter, not in the sense that they can not be analyzed into simpler inorganic elements, but rather that they have not been synthesized from these elements. Of course many compounds that were once regarded as organic because they were found only in connection with organisms have now been synthesized in the laboratory, and chemists may hope sometime to do the same with the higher organic compounds. However that may be, certain chemical compounds do not seem to occur in nature apart from organic matter, though their distinction from inorganic compounds is not expressible in terms of the chemical elements which they contain, but is rather a function of the peculiar architecture of the mixtures due to their long history as well as to their high complexity.<sup>22</sup> "In other words, the present physical and chemical structure of organisms must be explained not only in terms of atoms and molecules but also in terms of the history of living matter upon the earth."<sup>23</sup> In fact, as we have seen, life is characterized by its temporal rather than by its mechanical and chemical structure.

Its temporal structure was also emphasized by our consideration of organic development. Here, as in connection with chemical composition and specific form, the historical aspect is usually most stressed, but as has already been suggested a future reference is involved as well. An acorn is not only the result of its past but may also be said to hold its future "in suspension." An attempt to understand life, then, seems to necessitate a consideration of the nature of temporal structure and an investigation of some of its more important "kinds."

To be noted first is the difference between time as it appears in mechanics and in biology. The former may be called physical or mathematical time and appears as a succession of instants which are only externally related, and is thus essentially atomic. Like space, it may be regarded as a type of separation or mode of extension and may be described as a univocal form of connection whose elements are accordingly indistinguishable in themselves and so devoid of indi-

<sup>22</sup> P. C. Mitchell: "Life," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed.

<sup>23</sup> Comstock and Troland: *The Nature of Matter and Electricity*, New York, Van Nostrand, 1917, p. 194.

viduality. It may then be regarded as analogous with space or even as a fourth dimension of space. In this sense time appears an an independent variable in the differential equations of mechanics. Here its direction is unimportant and the distinction between past and future is lost and the time sequence may be regarded as reversible or repeatable. This time, "flowing equably in measurable lapses"<sup>24</sup> and "measured in terms of simultaneous displacements,"<sup>25</sup> is by no means identical with the temporal structure to which biology directs attention, and in fact even in chemistry there appears to be "successive or genuinely temporal displacements" which seem to indicate the existence of essentially temporal structures.<sup>26</sup> And the importance of history in such physical sciences as geology for example in its explanation of the formation of strata, seems to assign to time a rôle quite different from that played by it in mechanics. In these last cases we seem really to have something that may be described as simple temporal structure characterized by succession and direction, but in other respects resembling physical and mathematical time.

But the temporal structure that appears to be characteristic of life on the biological plane is still more complicated and less like the time of mechanics. Whitehead conceives it as rhythm which involves a pattern that differs somewhat in each exhibition, since "the essence of rhythm is the fusion of sameness and novelty; so that the whole never loses the essential unity of the pattern, while the parts exhibit the contrast arising from the novelty of their detail."<sup>26</sup> Certainly many life processes are obviously rhythmic, so that life without doubt possesses a rhythmic temporal structure, but this seems hardly to be the distinguishing feature of life as molecules and solar systems also exhibit rhythm and it is an essential feature of music as well. Here the unit is no longer the instant of mathematical time but rather an appreciable duration that possesses a pattern within itself so that "the more perfect rhythm is built upon component rhythms,"<sup>26</sup> and the present is no mathematical instant, but in Royce's words a "time span" of greater or lesser length, and is not to be conceived as the sum of a definite number of instants any more than a line is constructed from a certain number of mathematical points.<sup>27</sup> Rhythmical or musical time then seems to possess direction and to consist of unique and individual

<sup>24</sup> A. N. Whitehead: *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge*, Cambridge, University Press, 1919, p. 1.

<sup>25</sup> F. J. E. Woodbridge: "Structure," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIV, p. 681.

<sup>26</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 198.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. E. G. Spaulding: *The New Rationalism*, New York, Holt, 1918, pp. 451-454.

elements, in such a way as to render it irreversible but not irrepeatable, for a certain repetition, albeit with variation, seems essential for rhythm.

Bergson's discussion of duration comes nearer to characterizing the temporal structure that our examination has suggested as an important factor in the conception of life. This he sharply contrasts with mathematical or spatialized time, as an intensive in contrast to an extensive manifold. Its elements are unique and individual, yet interpenetrate, that is they may be said to be internally rather than externally related, and form irreversible and non-repeatable series.<sup>28</sup> Though such a statement leaves much to be desired in the way of clearness and precision, it is highly suggestive, I think, as pointing out the immense difference between time as it appears in the mechanical and in the biological realm, and so helps to free us from the domination of the former in our investigations of the latter. Here time as duration does not appear to be homogeneous and amorphous, but to possess a definite structure describable in terms of differentiation and integration, of organization and direction.

Sketchy as the preceding discussion of time has been, I think that it suggests the possibility of a great variety of temporal structures. The description of time as one-dimensional with the implied comparison of it with a line, whose most essential characteristic is its division into two parts, past and future, by a point called the present would seem to very strictly limit or even to exclude the possibility of variety of temporal structure. But the difficulty here seems to be due to the comparison of time with a line rather than to the fact that it is regarded as one-dimensional, for the great variety of series, including discrete, denumerable, dense and continuous, suggests that variety of structure is not dependent upon multiple dimensionality. While the possible wealth of temporal structure may perhaps be suggested if it is recalled that the third dimension of space, though describable as an added axis to the coördinates of a plane, makes possible a complexity of structure in three dimensions that would be quite inconceivable to a two-dimensional creature. For example, a circle may be the cross-section of a sphere, cylinder or cone, while each of these may have ellipses as cross-sections as well. Thus if time were to be conceived as a fourth dimension, it would be most inapt to call it a line unless our three-dimensional space were then regarded as a single point of that line. It would seem that in a sense mechanics can do this, though in thus assimilating

<sup>28</sup> See *Creative Evolution*, trans. by Mitchell, New York, Holt, 1911, pp. 1-23. Also *Time and Free Will*, trans. by Pogson, New York, Macmillan, 1912, Chapter II.

time to space it appears to limit itself to a special type of temporal structure and to disregard all others. To refer to the preceding example, extension in time as commonly conceived has an effect analogous to that which gives a cylinder when a circle is extended into three dimensions, the other possible structures such as the sphere and cone of which the circle may be the two-dimensional representative being wholly disregarded. In other words, in regarding time as a fourth dimension, it is frequently conceived as simply extending spatial structures in a new direction in the way in which a cylinder may be regarded as a circle pulled out into three dimensions, and the immense increase in variety and complexity of structure that it would make possible seems to have been overlooked.

In fact it would seem that temporal structure has received little consideration for itself, but rather has been dominated by the practical concerns of men. This may account for the predominant place assigned to the present and the feeling that what temporal structure there is must be historical and in some way condensed into the present. It is true that the here-and-now is the position of our effective action, that the past appears to us as the irrevocable and the future as the realm of possibility, but we can no more act in all parts of space than in all parts of time and I wish to suggest that temporal structures are not to be necessarily expressed in terms of past, present and future, any more than spatial structures are in those of right and left, front and back, up and down with reference to ourselves. In other words, I am urging that temporal structure like spatial structure is not dependent upon particular existences, but is rather a principle to which they conform. If this is the case, temporal as well as spatial structures and the formulae of mathematics would seem to belong to what the neo-realists term the subsistential in contrast to the existential realm or in Platonic terminology to the realm of ideas or essences. The future then as well as the past would be included in temporal structures in the same sense that the distant is in spatial, which evidently means that both distinctions are due to our interests and position and not inherent in the structures themselves. Of course this is not to be taken as implying that the future course of existence is predetermined, for all structure is inert and no causal efficacy is to be attributed to it.<sup>29</sup> But important as efficient causes are in controlling all things, they are by no means adequate for our understanding of the universe or ourselves, since an inquiry into the "reasons why" includes the "in order that" or "for what" as well as the "because," and purposes as well as causes

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Woodbridge: *Loc. cit.*, p. 688.

have to be considered. We are thus naturally led to a consideration of teleology.

The contrast of the teleological and mechanical is often expressed as that between efficient and final causes, when it is easy to make teleology appear ridiculous as maintaining that a non-existent future can produce something in the present. But if our analysis of temporal structure is correct, this contradiction does not arise unless we attempt to treat teleology mechanistically, which inevitably leads to confusion as it involves an abandonment of the distinction with which we were operating. As teleology is commonly discussed in terms of purpose or value, anything like an adequate examination of it will naturally be deferred until we have considered some of the other forms of life in which it is more prominent. Here we shall only note the form in which it appears in biological life. Organic growth and development are teleological in the sense that specific ends are attained through a variety of means<sup>30</sup> or that "a great many of the processes occurring in the organism bring about this *wholeness*, or restore it if it is disturbed in any way."<sup>31</sup> This would seem to imply a close relation between teleology and organization, coördination and regulation and Henderson's examination of fitness and adaptation apparently leads to the same result.<sup>32</sup> So far then as biology is concerned, if reference to consciousness be excluded, teleology seems to be closely connected with the temporal structure and organization characteristic of life. But it is equally true that the organization characteristic of biological life may be defined in terms of teleology and temporal structure, while an adequate description of the latter seems to require reference to both teleology and organization.

In fact organization seems to be a very important feature of biological life. Indeed it is so common and general a characteristic of organisms that it is expressed by quite a variety of terms according to the emphasis and context in which it occurs. Thus we speak of the integration, coördination, correlation and regulation of life processes and in its more static aspect we describe it as a complex system, "creative synthesis" or organic whole, and refer to its structure, spatial and temporal. Different as are some of the connotations of these terms, they all seem to emphasize a fundamental characteristic of organic life that implies a certain relational unity and durability based on multiplicity and complexity. This may suggest Singer's comparison of life to a wave moving freely through an ocean of mechanism,<sup>33</sup> which

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Singer: *Loc. cit.*, pp. 648, 649.

<sup>31</sup> H. Driesch: *Problem of Individuality*, p. 3.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *The Order of Nature*, pp. 204 ff.

<sup>33</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 650.

brings us back again to the dependence of life upon mechanism as evident by its physico-chemical basis and environment.

The characteristic factors of life as it appears on the biological plane—namely its mechanical basis, temporal structure, organization and teleological aspect—then seem to be closely interrelated, at least so far as they appear as the features of life, though each in itself may be definable apart from the others and from life. Certainly mechanism can be so treated and probably some forms of temporal structure. At the other extreme teleology may be regarded as independent of the others, while organization appears to be most dependent upon the rest. Our analysis therefore can not claim to have reached the ultimate or simple elements of life, but I hope that it has proceeded far enough to show certain important features in terms of which life may be significantly defined. If this be admitted, life on the biological plane implies a mechanical basis, temporal structure and teleological organization.

## CHAPTER III

### BEHAVIOR AND SENTIENT LIFE

As we found it convenient to limit our discussion of biological life in the preceding chapter to its metabolic aspects, omitting any examination of behavior, we have now to consider that aspect of life which is treated by both biologists and psychologists. It may well be termed sentient life. We approached it in the last chapter in connection with movement, and might there have considered tropisms and reflex and instinctive actions, but this would have naturally led to a discussion of habit and learning, of acquired and of voluntary actions and so have carried us over into the domain commonly assigned to psychology. It therefore seemed wise first to consider physical life as expressed by the growth and development of specific forms through metabolic processes. As this is the most evident aspect of plant life, it may be termed vegetative life or described as nutritive life, as nutrition is its most marked feature, or it might be called physical and chemical life as it is dependent upon and conforms to the physical and chemical structure of its surroundings. With animal life other aspects of the environment become important, for animals react to many qualitative differences. We have therefore to consider sentient life and, making use of whatever biologists and psychologists have to offer in this connection and avoiding questions of explanation, endeavor to get as clear a picture of the facts as possible. Therefore let us try to approach our material without presuppositions and not trouble ourselves with such puzzles as those of the objective and the subjective, the possible criteria of consciousness, or such questions as whether animals or even other men have minds. We are concerned neither with why things are as they are nor how it is possible for them to be so, but desire simply to find out what they are in so far as that will throw light on the nature of life.

Turning then to an examination of organic behavior, we may first note that it extends over a wide range and differs greatly in complexity and variety, as might be expected from the great number of different forms of organisms. Though movement and behavior are of course most obvious in animal life, they are also evident in some forms at least of plant life and there would seem to be less difference between the behavior of certain plants and some of the lower animals than between the latter and higher animals: thus the heliotropism of

certain sessile animals very closely resembles that of plants, while the movement of certain motile plant forms is very like the behavior of some of the lower animals.<sup>1</sup> In this respect as in many others there seems to be no sharp break between plant and animal life. Though it is natural to contrast these simple forms of behavior with that of the higher animals and especially with human behavior, it none the less seems impossible to find a clear dividing line between them. This is only what might be expected if the continuity of animal life is accepted. As we attempted in the last chapter to consider biological or physical life as exhibited in nutrition and growth in all its varied forms of plant and animal, unicellular and multicellular, so we now propose to make our examination of organic behavior as wide and inclusive.

Jennings has given us illuminating accounts of the behavior of some of the lower organisms, including amoeba, paramecium and other forms of protozoa as well as a few of the metazoa.<sup>2</sup> Loeb's discussions of tropisms contain descriptions of plant as well as of animal behavior. Animal psychology has been collecting great masses of material concerning the behavior of animals of various types, including rats, guinea pigs, dogs, monkeys, *etc.*,<sup>3</sup> while behavioristic psychology treats human behavior after the same fashion and would leave out all reference to consciousness. For the present I propose to follow this lead and consider behavior as an organic process and postpone the discussion of consciousness. This does not necessarily imply that we must consider that all behavior is purely and completely mechanical, for we have already seen that biological life can not be fully expressed in mechanical terms. The world is not so simple that the unconscious is necessarily mechanical. Further we have seen that teleology does not appear to be dependent upon consciousness and that teleology and mechanism need not be contradictory. In fact teleological processes may move through a mechanical world or conform to mechanical structure, and causes and uses appear to be categories of different levels and so may be applied to the same things without contradiction.

As before, our interests lie in description and analysis, not in explanation. Jennings in describing "the daily life of paramecium"

<sup>1</sup> Cf. J. Loeb: *The Mechanistic Conception of Life*, Chicago, University Press, 1912, pp. 28, 29. Also his *Studies in General Physiology*, Chicago, University Press, 1905, Chapter I.

<sup>2</sup> H. S. Jennings: *Behavior of the Lower Organisms*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1906.

<sup>3</sup> See M. F. Washburn: *The Animal Mind*, New York, Macmillan, 1917, for some brief accounts of results, and especially for a list of titles dealing with the subject.



says "the animal swims about, continually hesitating as it reaches regions where conditions differ, trying new directions, and changing its course frequently. Every faint influence in the water affects it, for the animal is very sensitive."<sup>4</sup> "Its behavior is in principle much like that of a blind and deaf person, or one that feels his way about in the dark. It is a continual process of proving all things and holding to that which is good."<sup>5</sup> Its movements are of course limited by its structure, and its "action system" includes only a small number of definite movements. With greater complexity of structure, a greater variety of actions becomes possible and the higher animals possess very complicated mechanisms of response.

As we have already had occasion to note, the protozoa are by no means structureless, and even the amoeba, which Jennings describes as a "simple naked mass of protoplasm," "reacts to all classes of stimuli to which higher animals react (if we consider auditory stimulation merely a special case of mechanical stimulation)."<sup>6</sup> In the higher forms of life we find definite organs developed to perform the various functions that in the simpler seem to be characteristic of protoplasm. Thus the higher animals possess sense organs, nervous system and muscles which coöperate to bring about the response to stimuli that is characteristic of behavior. These structures, of course, vary greatly in complexity with different types or grades of animals, but their function and principle seem to be the same throughout. The sense organs become differentiated to correspond with specific qualitative differences in the environment which affect the organism, while the function of the nervous system is not only conduction as is commonly stated, but also integration, as Sherrington has pointed out.<sup>7</sup>

Various types of action thus become possible and we find behavior described as reflex, instinctive, habitual, learned, intelligent, purposive, etc. These distinctions evidently rest on different bases and some imply the contrast between conscious and unconscious action. Reflex action is considered the simplest type and in diagram form the specific stimulation of a sense organ is supposed to bring about a definite reaction quite automatically, as the "spinal frog" wipes off acid or we wink when something moves near our eyes. This is evidently dependent upon the sensitivity of the receptor organs and indeed all organic behavior seems to be dependent upon the sensibility of the organism. Thus behavior seems to indicate unequivocally the fact of sensation.

<sup>4</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 104, 105.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 107.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>7</sup> *The Integrative Action of the Nervous System*, New York, Scribner's, 1906.

The sensibility of organisms doubtless varies greatly in range with the differences in their structure and "action systems." Though the lower animals react to all types of stimuli, their reactions vary so little that it seems likely that they only discriminate between edible and inedible substances, possessing what is sometimes called the chemical sense.<sup>8</sup> They, of course, react to mechanical contact, though not always in the same way, and their avoidance reactions may be connected with a sense of pain or unpleasantness rather than with definite sense qualities. With the development and differentiation of sense organs, the chemical sense is developed into those of taste and smell. With the development of ears, sound becomes differentiated from mechanical contact and finally tones are distinguished from noises. Many animals and plants are sensitive to changes in the direction or intensity of light and the development of eyes of increasing complexity of structure makes possible the discrimination of a great variety of color and form.

Life now seems to move in a vastly richer and more varied world than that assigned to it in the last chapter: light and heat are important aspects of it, while smells, sounds and colors are distinguished. In fact sentient life moves in a realm that is characterized by secondary as well as primary qualities. Psychologists experiment with sensory discrimination and deal directly with sounds, tastes and odors as well as with lights of different colors, intensity and direction. Now if sensation is understood to be one form or kind of consciousness, it may be said that we have gone beyond the domain of physical life and entered that of psychical. As these are commonly considered to be mutually exclusive and quite distinct, and even of opposite nature, it is rather strange that we have passed so easily from the one to the other. But I think that there is much to be said against regarding sensations as elements of mind, as I hope will be clearer after our discussion of mind and consciousness in the next chapter. For the present I simply want to point out that sensation may be regarded as a physical or physiological fact or event, a function of the organism and specific aspects of its environment, and expressible in terms of interaction between them. Sensation is thus dependent on both the organism and its environment and varies with either of them. Thus a rose may appear red to most people, but not at twilight or to a color-blind person. Similarly there are physical or physiological explanations for the so-called illusions of the senses that have caused so much trouble when treated as epistemological problems: thus the straight stick partly immersed in water appears bent because of the difference of refraction of air and water; the tepid water feels hot to one hand and cold to

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Washburn: *Loc. cit.*, Chapter V.

the other because it is warmer than the one and cooler than the other; and parallel lines seem to converge and square towers at a distance look round because of the laws of perspective and optics and affect the sensitive plate of a camera in the same way that they do our eyes.

Of course I do not mean that we may not be conscious of sensations but only that they are then objects of consciousness and not its elements. Their existence is thus not dependent upon consciousness but upon the functioning of an organism. The same seems to be true of pain and pleasure and of feeling and emotion as well, as these appear to depend directly upon the condition of the organism and to be intimately connected with its behavior. Emotional life may thus be regarded as one form of sentient life. The chief characteristics of the latter would then be sensation, emotion and behavior. We have already indicated something of the close relation between these and also the wide range and variety of animal behavior; probably sensation and feeling differ quite as much, the former depending largely upon the degree of the differentiation of sense organs, the latter probably upon the complexity and organization of the bodily processes, especially the nervous system. But this is not to be understood as implying that the lower animals including the unicellular are without sensation and feeling, for Jennings has found that they respond to stimuli in different ways and possess discriminating sensibility. He also notes that they appear to desire and hunt food and react to injurious agents as if in pain.<sup>9</sup>

We have now to examine these characteristics of sentient life to see what light they throw on the nature of life as it appears in this realm. Behavior here appears to be an interaction of organism and environment in a fashion somewhat parallel to metabolism in vegetative life. The difference between them is most evident in the higher forms of animal life where different systems of organs have been developed for each, while their close relation is more evident in the lower forms where there is less differentiation of function. But everywhere the behavior and metabolism of the organism are closely interrelated and sentient life is continuous with nutritive life.

What an organism does in any situation is dependent upon its condition and the nature of the stimuli affecting it: that is, behavior is a function of both organism and environment and is thus dependent upon both internal and external factors. The fact to be noted first is that activity and movement appear to be characteristic of organic life; external stimuli thus influence rather than cause behavior, and the energy required for this activity is derived from the metabolic processes within the organism and is not furnished by the stimulus,

<sup>9</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 329-332.

the action of which rather resembles the pulling of a trigger than a mechanical push. The action of an organism also depends upon its structure and the character of what Jennings calls its "action system": thus the lower organisms possess only a very limited number of possible responses, while greater differentiation of organs together with their integration by the nervous system places a great variety of action at the disposal of the higher animals. The behavior of an organism is thus dependent in a general sense upon its past growth and development as supplying the mechanism and energy for action. Even so a given stimulus does not always set off the same response, as the specific state of the organism at the moment is important as well as its general character: for example hungry and well-fed animals react differently to food.<sup>10</sup> Even Loeb's attempted reduction of instincts to tropisms shows that these vary with physiological conditions so that "in ants, the winged males and females become intensely positively heliotropic at the time of mating . . . after copulation the female loses its wings and also its positive heliotropism. It becomes now intensely stereotropic."<sup>11</sup> Similarly a caterpillar that is forced by its heliotropism to climb up a plant stalk to the leaves, after feeding upon these "loses its positive heliotropism almost completely and entirely."<sup>12</sup> Now the condition of an organism is, as we saw in the last chapter, closely connected with its temporal structure. This is most commonly expressed in a recognition of the effect of the past upon it, but behavior seems also to possess a future reference. Thus an adequate description of the behavior of organisms requires reference to their temporal structure.

This of course becomes more important and evident with the development of higher forms of behavior and with the increasing prominence of learning. Indeed in the learning processes of the higher animals the temporal structure of sentient life becomes very obvious. Much experimental work has been done in this field, especially with the ability of animals to learn to run mazes and to manipulate simple locks and puzzle-boxes. Learning here progresses by the method commonly called that of trial and error, useless or harmful movements being gradually eliminated and the desired result more rapidly attained.<sup>13</sup> Here a teleological as well as a temporal aspect seems evident, as acts

<sup>10</sup> Cf. S. J. Holmes: *The Evolution of Animal Intelligence*, New York, Holt, 1911, pp. 150 ff.

<sup>11</sup> *Forced Movements, Tropisms and Animal Conduct*, Philadelphia and London, Lippincott, 1918, p. 158.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 162.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Washburn: *Loc. cit.*, pp. 257-285.

are usually performed in order to obtain food or to avoid punishment. The same would seem to be true of a great part of animal behavior, which appears to be in general adaptive in that it keeps or brings the organism into conditions that are favorable to the continuance of its life processes. The simplest forms of behavior seem to be food getting and avoidance of injurious stimuli. With the higher organisms, especially man, other ends are sought and attained, but self-preservation, together with the sometimes incompatible aim of preserving the species, certainly remains fundamental in the types of life that we have so far considered. Thus Singer would define life as purposive behavior and give self-preservation as the defining purpose.<sup>14</sup> But definitely purposed or voluntary action would seem to require consciousness in the sense discussed in the next chapter, and thus to go beyond instinctive and emotional reactions. It thus seems that the teleology characteristic of sentient life is still unconscious and of the same general type as that which we found to be one of the features of biological life.

➤ Indeed vegetative and sentient life appear to be continuous and in fact may be regarded as but two aspects of biological or physical life. This is particularly evident with the lower organisms, for their behavior and metabolic processes are so closely connected that it would seem unnatural to assign them to different worlds. But with the higher plants and animals the case seems different, for we recognize a high degree of organization in the former without any corresponding development in behavior, while with the latter behavior and sensation may be developed to such an extent that their connection with other aspects of physical life is obscured and they may come to be conceived as phases of conscious life. The distinction between the two seems to be expressible in terms of the domains or realms in which they move, for it seems possible to conceive of vegetative life existing in a purely physical and chemical environment and we imagine that plants may have existed on our earth before the appearance of animals. Similarly the metabolic processes of biological life seem to be largely expressible in physical and chemical terms if once the organism with its temporal structure is given. In other words nutritive life moves in a mechanical and chemical domain, while with sentient life we seem to have moved into a wider and more varied realm. Light and temperature, taste and smell, sound and color become important factors; *m*, *l*, and *t* are no longer sufficient for its description and even a recognition of the differences of chemical elements is inadequate. Sentient life thus moves in a world of great wealth and variety of secondary and even tertiary as well as primary qualities.

<sup>14</sup> "The Pulse of Life," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XI, p. 650.

But however different the realms of vegetative and sentient life may appear, the continuity of these two forms of life is quite as evident. The biological organism whose development and organization we examined in the last chapter, appeared in the present one as an individual center of activity. In both cases our analysis of life has shown the importance of its temporal structure. In the case of vegetative life this was most evident in the growth and development of the organism, but appeared to be essential as well for an understanding of its specific form and chemical composition. While in that of sentient life it was specially obvious in connection with learning, which possesses a future reference as well as depending upon past experience; but all behavior and sensibility, so far as their appearance in concrete cases is concerned, appeared to be dependent upon the temporal structure or life history of the individual organism of which they are functions.

The teleological aspect of life that we noted in connection with organic growth was made more prominent by our examination of behavior. Here it is evidently to be conceived in terms of use, as the helping or hindering of definite tendencies. The organism appears as a specific center of interest to which its environment contributes in varying degrees. We have seen that the lower organisms react to a stimulus according to its influence upon their life processes, that they seem to discriminate only between food and injurious stimuli and thus appear to be sensible of pleasure and pain as connoting "normal, unhindered functioning" and the interruption or hindering of such functioning. Indeed this seems to be the nature of sensuous pleasure and the "specific quale of this type of value lies in its helping to fulfil a certain fundamental tendency resident in the organism," namely "to perpetuate its own normal unhindered functioning."<sup>15</sup> Thus teleology in so far as it appears in connection with sentient life seems to be very closely connected with its temporal structure; for life processes are specific and directed tendencies, such for example as those evident in the growth and development of their specific forms, but characteristic also of their metabolism in general; now anything that aids these tendencies is of use to the organism, while anything that hinders them is injurious to it. Other things and processes thus have positive or negative value for it in so far as they help or hinder it in its life processes. If "the value of an object consists in its helping to complete or fulfil some tendency already present,"<sup>16</sup> the close connection

<sup>15</sup> W. H. Sheldon: "An Empirical Definition of Value," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XI, p. 115.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 121.

of teleology and temporal structure is evident, for in a world that was permanent or whose changes were chaotic or undirected there would be no specific tendencies to be helped or hindered and so values in the sense just defined would be impossible. Indeed it is only in a world that has temporal structure that progressive change and development can occur and action be directed toward ends. The temporal structure here indicated evidently implies both duration and direction and is not to be identified with the mathematical time of physics.

## CHAPTER IV

### CONSCIOUS LIFE AND MIND

Life as pictured in the last chapter, moving in a world of colors and sounds as well as possessing mechanical and chemical structure, doubtless appears to resemble very closely what is often termed conscious life. But we were there dealing with physical and physiological facts and there seemed to be no need of introducing any mysterious subjective factor. Indeed sentient life seemed quite clearly to be a special aspect of biological life: thus we could speak of vegetative and sentient life as two forms of bodily or physical life in the broad sense of the term; and behavior and sensation seemed to be physiological processes quite as much as did metabolism.

We are now to consider conscious or mental life, and may begin by indicating how it differs from sentient life and why we are treating it in a separate chapter. The common tendency to treat sensation and emotion as forms of consciousness parallel with thought or cognition perhaps makes our division seem strange and artificial, and anyone who prefers may regard the preceding chapter as dealing with one aspect of conscious or psychological life rather than, or as well as, with biological life. Of course most psychologists would do so and that was my original intention, but the division between the facts with which psychologists and biologists deal did not seem to be at all clear and indeed the whole range of psychology appeared so confused that it seemed best to divide our discussion of life as the material with which we were dealing seemed to indicate rather than try to follow the lines of demarcation between the various sciences that treat it.

The fact that psychologists may question the existence of consciousness, often preferring to define their science in other terms, and seldom attempt to tell what they mean by consciousness aside from giving varied and confused lists of what it is supposed to comprise, further made it doubtful whether we could get much help from them as to the exact nature of conscious life. If we turn then to recent philosophical discussions of the nature of consciousness, we find that epistemological problems and difficulties have caused considerable, not to say bewildering confusion in this field. But examination shows that a part at least of the trouble is the result of confusing the facts of sensation and emotion with their possible cognitive relations and of treating sensation *per se* as cognitive. Thus consciousness is defined in terms of the



interaction of organism and environment, which obviously gives a definition of sensibility and behavior, but fails to distinguish these as unconscious from their conscious phases. This has seemed less absurd than might have been expected, since subconscious and unconscious psychical processes are generally admitted and though psychical and conscious are commonly taken as synonyms, to call the former unconscious does not appear to most people a contradiction in terms. The whole situation seems to be the result of a philosophical conception that set consciousness over against the physical world, made the gulf between them impassable for either and had to manufacture an unconscious consciousness, or to cover the contradiction an unconscious psychical realm, to contain what might be conscious but was not so at any given time. Of course in some systems this latter function was neatly performed by God or the Absolute.

However our present concern is not with philosophical systems, but with the facts of conscious life. I propose therefore to identify consciousness with awareness or cognition rather than with the vague realm of the psychical. But anyone may include what was said in the preceding chapter as well as much that will be discussed in the following chapters as aspects of conscious life if he so prefers. My present interest is not to defend any particular concept of consciousness nor in fact the definitions of any of the realms in which life is found, but rather to get before us as clear a picture of life as possible in each case.

What then is the fundamental characteristic of conscious or mental life? It is in a word knowledge, cognition or awareness. Sensations and emotions enter consciousness when one is aware of them, but when they remain below the level of consciousness they are simply physical and physiological processes and as such were treated in the last chapter. How they look outside of consciousness we of course can not know, for it is impossible to know an object without being aware of it. But the so-called "ego-centric predicament" appears to be no different here than elsewhere, for it is always impossible to know objects outside of knowledge. We have then to examine more carefully the nature of knowledge if we are to get a definite picture of mental life. An identification of knowledge with awareness emphasizes immediately its relational aspect and also the wide range of its objects, for one may be aware of chairs and tables, solar systems and ethical ideals, in fact the whole realm of objects of possible knowledge, universals as well as particulars, past and future as well as present. It is thus evident that the domain in which conscious life moves is vastly greater than those of vegetative and sentient life; for one thing its effective environ-

ment is greatly extended in both time and space, but that is by no means the only difference between unconscious and conscious life for things have a meaning for the latter that they did not possess for the former. In fact meaning seems to be the essential feature of consciousness. If this is the case, the sensations and images or ideas that are commonly regarded as its elements rather appear to be its objects, the bearers or carriers of knowledge than knowledge itself. They thus figure as symbols or signs whose function it is to suggest something beyond themselves and thus require interpretation. Life thus comes to move in a realm where things have meanings and implications as well as mechanical and chemical structure. The self-transcendence of objects here suggested shows that they belong to a logical structure that may be termed "mental" or "transcendental,"<sup>1</sup> and regarded as neither temporal nor spatial, though these same objects may also belong to temporal and spatial structures as well. Indeed in many, if not most cases, this self-transcendence of the objects of consciousness appears to possess a very definitely spatial and temporal aspect, since consciousness is both retrospective and prospective and its stimuli may recede in both space and time as consciousness develops.<sup>2</sup> That is, for conscious life the meaning and implications of its objects depend upon the fact that memory and imagination are essential and fundamental as well as awareness, and indeed are implied by it.

Like other forms of cognition, memory always seems to possess a sensational (images here being included as well as sensations proper) basis, which appears to be important as the carrier of meaning rather than as the memory itself; and the images may vary from a vivid picturing of the past through all degrees of sketchiness to merely verbal images, and if these all refer to the same fact or event they would be recognized as so far the same memory however different were the images on which they were based. Here again meaning rather than sensuous content seems to be the essential characteristic of consciousness or mind. But in this connection the meaning must be recognized as referring to the past, which shows the importance of temporal structure for conscious life. Though memory is usually referred to as reproductive imagination, it is evidently no mere repetition and frequently possesses a productive aspect as well, as is particularly apparent in learning. In a similar way, so-called creative or productive imagination possesses a past as well as a future reference and the same is true of anticipation. Thus if the term imagination is

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Woodbridge: "Structure," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIV, p. 683.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. W. P. Montague: "A Realistic Theory of Truth and Error," *The New Realism*, New York, Macmillan, 1912, pp. 278-285.

used to cover all these aspects, it clearly indicates the importance of temporal structure for conscious life; especially when we realize that in experience all awareness, whether perceptual or conceptual, is really a special case of imagination where we have no particular interest in its temporal reference whether past or future. For the meanings that things have for us are so universally connected with our past experience and our interests and purposes that we often give the fact but scanty attention.

Our discussion of consciousness thus brings us again to a consideration of purpose, the importance of which has already been suggested in connection with behavior. Perhaps the most commonly emphasized characteristic of purpose is its relation to temporal structure, for purpose would seem to be meaningless in a non-temporal world. The temporal structure here required would evidently be one in which direction was important, or in other words it is "duration" and not merely mathematical time which is in question here. The same is perhaps even more evident in connection with memory, since the cumulative aspect of duration is here especially prominent. Unfortunately the future seems to have been always more difficult to deal with than the past, because it somehow seems easier to conceive that the past is preserved in the present than that the future can be operative in the present. Now it seems to me that at least a part of the difficulty has been due to the fact that practical and theoretical considerations have been allowed to become too thoroughly intertwined, with the result that we have nothing like as clear a conception of temporal as of spatial structure. This appears to be one reason why we are constantly trying to compress all temporal structure into the present and treat memory as though it made the past present, and anticipation and purpose as though they could make the future in some inconceivable way present. But that neither memory nor anticipation in reality aim at such an accomplishment would seem to be evident enough from the fact that their intention is to refer to past or future without being them. As a past event is not made present by being remembered, so a future event is not made present by being imagined; for in either case it is the idea or image that is present, while its meaning is its past or future reference. In fact meaning always seems to require a transcendence of present date, as is perhaps even more evident when it is expressed in terms of implication, and though this can evidently be developed in logic without reference to temporal structure, its appearance in conscious life seems to be dependent upon the temporal structure characteristic of life, in much the same way that the mechanical

and chemical structure of biological life can be understood only in connection with its temporal structure.

However, purpose is characterized not only by its temporal aspect, but is evidently also closely connected with what we have called teleology: in fact purpose is often identified with teleology or taken as its defining characteristic. But in the sense in which we have been using the term teleology, purpose appears to be merely a special case of teleology that becomes possible with consciousness. Indeed consciousness gives new efficacy to both the temporal and teleological factors of life. On the physical plane they appeared rather as characteristics of life than as factors in its processes.<sup>3</sup> The growth and development of biological organisms quite clearly conform to temporal structure, and in fact we have seen that no aspects of living beings could be adequately understood aside from their temporal structure and teleological organization, but neither of these appeared as effective factors in bringing about their own embodiments: efficiency in this realm apparently being confined to mechanical and chemical factors. In other words, temporal structure and teleology appeared as characteristics of life rather than of the physical realm in which it was finding embodiment. With sentient life that domain seemed to be extended considerably, as it included what are commonly called secondary and tertiary qualities as well as the primary ones; there seemed also to be recognition or rather feeling of use in the discrimination of food and the avoidance of injurious stimuli. But with conscious life both temporal structure and teleology gain immensely in importance; the past is definitely remembered and used and the future is consciously planned for. The varied uses of things are recognized, advantage and disadvantage are anticipated and means taken to gain the one and avoid the other.<sup>4</sup> Consciousness thus seems to open the door to a most varied world and in fact appears to be so essential to many other forms of life, some of which will be considered later, that the term conscious life might be used to cover all these as well as sentient life. But in the narrower sense of the term which we have for the present adopted in the interest of clarity, mental life is to be conceived as moving in the realm of logical structure which is definable in terms of implication and meaning. Its elements may be anything so long as they conform to its structure; they thus include physical objects, sensations, ideas, universals, values, ideals—a varied host, indeed anything that may be known. Conscious life in the broad sense of that term is of course concerned with many of their aspects, but mental life in so far as it is contrasted with other

<sup>3</sup> Cf. F. J. E. Woodbridge: "Natural Teleology," *Essays in Modern Theology and Related Subjects*, New York, Scribner's, 1911, p. 323.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 323.

aspects of personal life, is to be conceived as moving in the realm of logical structure, rather than as including all the forms of life that would be impossible without consciousness.

✓ The preceding discussion has shown, I think, that the characteristic feature of consciousness or mind is meaning and that sense qualities are rather a basis of knowledge than knowledge itself, that is they are the objects of knowledge or its signs or symbols and the same is apparently true of pleasure and pain. Though it has been customary to regard these latter as well as knowledge as aspects of consciousness, we have tried to clarify the discussion of psychological or conscious life by distinguishing between sentient and mental life. The characteristic marks of the former would be sensibility in its two aspects of sensation and feeling, both of which are to be understood in terms of the relation or interaction of organism and environment and thus as a function of either according to the way in which one wishes to express it. But in so far as they are physical facts only, they would not seem to be rightly called conscious, which they become only as they assume meaning or are related in special ways either among themselves or with other objects. But though in general we readily distinguish things from their meanings, in the case of sensations and feelings the two seem to have been pretty thoroughly confused, so that in this case the objects of consciousness have been assimilated to consciousness, and some of the neo-realists having noted this fact have carried it farther and identified consciousness with a class of objects<sup>5</sup> of any sort. Now it seems to me that objects are no more consciousness than they are time or space and in fact their relation to logical structure is similar to their relation to mechanical and chemical structures.

Meaning and logical structure thus might be independent of organisms, and mental life go on without any connection with physical life if it could build up a progressive organization of elements derived from a logical environment: that is, if there were objects that possessed only logical structure, an independent mental life might be possible, but I should think that it would be useless and at any rate speculations concerning it are idle as conscious life as we know it is found only in connection with physical life. On the other hand there may be sentient life that can not rightly be called conscious, and it would seem to be this of which we find clear evidence in the case of animals. Singer's discussion of sensibility<sup>6</sup> and Jennings's descriptions of the behavior of

<sup>5</sup> E.g. E. B. Holt: *The Concept of Consciousness*, New York, Macmillan, 1914, p. 182.

<sup>6</sup> In the *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIV, pp. 337-350.

the lower organisms seem to show clearly that we are there concerned with sentient rather than with mental life. The same is apparently the case with many of our reflex and habitual reactions which depend directly upon the proper functioning of our sense organs, but still are generally recognized as unconscious. If this is the case, sentiency or sensibility may well be identified with a type of behavior and is properly a subject for biological investigation; in fact much that is now studied under the title of psychology would seem to belong under this head. Sensibility is then one of the characteristics of physical life, at least as it appears in many animal forms, varying in degree with the development of the organisms and the increasing differentiation of their sense organs and integrative action of their nervous systems. Sensation so conceived as an object of knowledge and not as a type of consciousness would be a purely physical or rather physiological process, and the same would be true of pleasure and pain and indeed of all the affective aspects of "consciousness." But these various vital processes also often figure in logical structures, they are related by way of meaning and implication or "act as a part of a system of symbolization"<sup>7</sup> and thus enter consciousness.

Since our conscious life is based directly upon sensibility in its various forms, the connection between sensation and cognition has been taken or rather mistaken for one of degree rather than of kind, so that sensation is conceived as an elementary form of knowledge, or inference as an unsatisfactory substitute for intuition. But if our analysis has been correct, sensation and knowledge are radically different however closely they may be connected in practical life. As meaning has been shown to be the essential factor of our cognitive experience, it appears as the distinguishing feature of mental life. So conceived mental life would not include our entire inner or spiritual life, but rather appears as one aspect of it perhaps roughly parallel with our moral or our esthetic life. It may thus be regarded as one phase of our personal life stressing certain aspects of it, namely the interpretation of meaning and logical relations. That is, mental life is lived in the realm of implications and meanings, just as biological life occurs in the domains of physics and chemistry; or mental life may be said to operate within logical structure as biological life does within mechanical and chemical structures. But in neither case is life to be identified with its medium or environment, though this may furnish the distinguishing mark of the different kinds or grades of life.

<sup>7</sup> A. Meyer: "Misconceptions at the Bottom of 'Hopelessness of all Psychology,'" *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. IV, p. 178.

The logical domain, which may be called "mind in a metaphysical sense" as distinct from mental life or from individual minds, appears to be as timeless as are the spatial and mechanical domains, but spaceless as well, for logical structures "have that kind of aloofness from time and space which we indicate by the ordinary word 'mental' and the extraordinary word 'transcendental.'" <sup>8</sup> Objects within this domain are related by implication and suggestion. Thus sensations and feelings appear within it as signs or symbols that may be variously interpreted. They, like all other objects and events, appear to possess a great multiplicity of meanings or implications, and mental life seems to consist in the selection and organization of certain of these into individual wholes. The possibility of such an organization appears to be dependent upon the temporal structure characteristic of life. In other words, life on the mental as well as on the biological plane appears to be continuous with its environment from which it selects the elements which form the basis for its characteristic organization, which in turn can be expressed only in terms of its temporal structure. The importance of this in connection with such conscious processes as memory and anticipation is evident and our analysis has shown that the same is true of all cognitive processes, for as Dr. Carr says "to be conscious or aware of an object is not to contemplate it but to recognize it. Recognition implies precognition, . . . presupposes memory and also constructive imagination."<sup>9</sup> That is, consciousness as it occurs in concrete forms is very definitely a temporal affair, however timeless mental or logical structure may be in itself.

This clearly indicates that the organization characteristic of mental life is not to be unthinkingly identified with logical structure. Perhaps the difference between them can be most pertinently expressed by pointing out that mental life is always connected with individuals which may be called mental organisms after the analogy of biological organisms, though they are probably more commonly spoken of as individual minds or as selves. But the latter terms seem to imply greater richness and variety of content and organization than seem to belong to mental life in the restricted sense in which we are now using the term, for they are commonly understood to include the entire inner life, moral and religious as well as mental. Individuality thus appears to be one of the fundamental characteristics of mental life. This was suggested on the biological plane by the importance of specific form and is commonly considered in psychology under the heading of personal identity. The fact that this is most evident in recognition and memory, and in

<sup>8</sup> Woodbridge: "Structure," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIV, p. 683.

<sup>9</sup> "The Interaction of Mind and Body," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. XVIII, p. 10.

anticipation and hope shows very clearly that it is closely connected with temporal structure, which is evidently required for the continuity and development of the self and indeed for its very organization. For the characteristics of an individual mind depend upon its past experiences and its aims and interests, both of which determine the selection that it makes from the many meanings and implications presented to it. ✓

In conclusion, it may be interesting to compare mental and physical life as their characteristic features have been brought out in this and the preceding chapters. In both cases life presented a typical organization of elements that were derived from its environment or medium. The fact that these possess very different structures in the two cases, would account for the difference between mental and physical life. The adjectives thus appear to characterize the domains in which life is found rather than the nature of life itself, and thus describe the elements which furnish the basis of its organization. This organization, characteristic of life, seems to be most naturally expressed in terms of differentiation and integration, or of selection and assimilation, and can be understood only in connection with its temporal structure. It also seems to require individualization. Biological organisms are so obviously individual centers of activity that we failed to note this as one of the essential characteristics of life on the physical plane, but the attempt to distinguish mental life from mind in general showed how important is this aspect of life. Driesch and Singer<sup>10</sup> have suggested it in their discussions of the teleological aspect of life and indeed it may be the best way of calling attention to the non-mechanical aspect of life. Thus life so far as its elements or material is concerned appears to be continuous with its environment or the plane on which it is moving, but the principle of its organization seems to be at right angles to this, if we may use a spatial figure in such a connection, and to involve the selection and assimilation of those elements which can be built up into the individual form of life in any given case. This principle of organization is sometimes described as teleological, though a term with less confused connotations would be desirable. Still it is difficult to find terms to express the exact meaning which seems to require some combination of individuality and teleology; and we shall continue our examination of it in the next chapter. ✓

<sup>10</sup> For example Driesch's constant emphasis upon the importance of factual wholeness of the individual organism and definition of teleology by reference thereto. (Cf. *Problem of Individuality*, p. 3.) While Singer's discussion of purpose and freedom and especially his selection of self-preservation as the defining purpose of life show a similar tendency to connect teleology and individuality. ("The Pulse of Life," *Journal of Philosophy*, XI, 645-655.)



## CHAPTER V

### VALUES AND THE MORAL LIFE

We saw in the last chapter that consciousness made possible a recognition of the uses of things and so the conscious utilization of them. Life thus comes to move in a realm of recognized values, and the selection and organization of these goods may be regarded as characteristic of the moral life—in Woodbridge's words, "with consciousness, the world's teleology is a moral teleology."<sup>1</sup> We may therefore pause for a survey and consideration of the aspects of teleology that have already come to our attention before proceeding to a direct examination of the moral life. Here we shall need to keep in mind constantly that our problem is merely one of definition with no attempt at explanation, for most discussions of teleology have been greatly confused by attempts to explain it. But our present aim is to analyze and define teleology in such a way as to make its significance as clear as possible, especially in reference to its relation to life.

The discussion of life on the biological plane has already shown how inevitably we regard life processes as teleological and the examination of behavior further emphasized the purposive aspect of life, while with consciousness it became even more evident in conscious purpose and planning. The facts thus indicated are numerous and have been variously expressed by such words as fitness and adaptation, selection and use, purpose and design. Thus organic growth and development may be described as teleological in the sense that through the selection and assimilation of material derived from its environment the organism preserves its individuality. As has already been suggested, this aspect of life seems so important to Singer that he defines life as purposive behavior and gives self-preservation as the dominant purpose.<sup>2</sup> Indeed an examination of the behavior of organisms shows that life processes are most naturally described in teleological terms. This does not mean that they are not at the same time mechanistic in the sense of conforming to the mechanical and chemical structure of their environment. For the same thing may be both mechanical and teleological without the distinction between the two categories being in the least blurred. For example, a machine is the common symbol of perfect

<sup>1</sup> "Natural Teleology," *Essays in Modern Theology and Related Subjects*, p. 324.

<sup>2</sup> "The Pulse of Life," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XI, pp. 647-650.

mechanism and its action conceived as purely mechanical, but it is at the same time one of the most obvious instances of design and purpose. Thus there appears to be no incompatibility between mechanism and teleology as descriptive terms and the common opposition between them appears to result from an attempt to determine their relative merits as explanations on the same level. In the battle over these, evident facts have been lost sight of, facts and theories have been confused, and interest in the latter has obscured the former until unprejudiced description seems to have become almost impossible. We have now to attempt to find our way through this tangle with the hope of making as clear as possible the nature of teleology and its connection with life.

Attention has already been called to the teleological aspect of the growth and development of organisms. The acorn develops into the oak, as has so often been remarked, and the germs of animals into adults of the same species, and individuals maintain themselves amid considerable changes in their environment and within limits adapt themselves thereto. Their metabolism, which is so obviously chemical, has a teleological aspect as well, since it proceeds by selection as well as assimilation and is most naturally described as the maintenance of the individuality of the whole through constantly changing matter or the attainment of a definite end through a variety of means. In fact teleology and the organization that has appeared to be characteristic of life seem to be very closely related, as both emphasize the importance of individuality and wholeness in contrast with undifferentiated multiplicity. We had thus been led to define life in terms of its selection and organization of elements, not forgetting that these processes are distinctly temporal and non-static. In fact it is one of the interesting features of teleology that it seems to imply temporal structure as well as use or value. Value here must be understood in a very general sense as covering use, adaptation, fitness as well as planned or purposed ends, and I would use it to indicate the aspect of teleology other than its temporal structure.

The teleological aspect of life on the biological plane is probably even more evident in connection with the behavior of organisms than in their growth and metabolism. Mechanistic attempts to give an account of the behavior of animals in terms of merely mechanical and chemical reactions show how inadequate such terms are to furnish complete descriptions of the facts under observation. The behavior of the bee gathering honey or the man going to buy a new house may perhaps be best "explained" in terms of tropisms and chemical stimuli, *etc.*, but these evidently furnish but a poor and ridiculously scanty description of the activities which are certainly more naturally and adequately

to be goods or values. Would it be better then to attribute value to both means and ends? If we do, we shall have to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic, between immediate and instrumental values, for the distinction between means and ends must be maintained if there is to be any teleology and value. Under the circumstances may we not follow the lead suggested by our analysis of consciousness and conceive value like mind as a relation rather than as a term, attribute or quality? Sheldon would give an affirmative answer to this question for he finds "the same logical structure" in all cases of value, namely "given any tendency, in dead nature, in living organisms, in conscious minds, which presses toward a certain end: any other tendency that furthers this is for it a good, and any that resists it is for it bad."<sup>4</sup> Thus "'good' is the *relation between* the fulfilment (or furthering) and the tendency; a relation uniquely determined, and sufficiently determined, by the two."<sup>5</sup>

Such a definition of value in terms of tendency seems to require directed change and so would be impossible in either a static or a chaotically changing world. In fact its temporal aspect can be emphasized until teleology is identified with any future reference or even with the future portion of temporal structure. But however closely teleology and temporal structure are related, they certainly are not identical. The confusion of them is apparently the result of using both as explanatory categories in the sense of final causes that are effective, probably through the medium of consciousness, in bringing about action in the present. Now temporal structure as we have been using it could never be employed in a causal sense, for it is essentially an inert principle to which existences conform. We have also urged that the distinctions of past, present and future are the result of our practical interests and that an adequate comprehension of the nature of temporal structure would require a treatment of it that would transcend these distinctions in the same way that geometry has that of near and far. This is not to be understood as a denial of the close connection of teleology and time in all concrete cases. Again the relation seems to be very similar to that noted in the case of mind or consciousness, for there logical structure or mind in a metaphysical or universal sense appeared to be quite unconnected with time, or timeless and eternal, while particular meanings as they occur in individual minds are very evidently connected with the temporal structure that these possess. Similarly the important aspect of teleology as descriptive of a new

<sup>4</sup> "An Empirical Definition of Value," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XI. p. 121.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 122.

order of being is value or use, while its temporal aspect would seem to be ascribable to its concretion in particular instances. This is perhaps most obvious in connection with conscious purpose whose anticipatory aspect is so evident, for consciousness seems to make possible a more extended temporal range.

It is in this world of values that the moral life moves: it appears to be a realm of varying extent, which may be nearly as wide as that of consciousness while in a sense it may include certain aspects of the unconscious as well. For though morality would be impossible without consciousness, conscious and moral life are not commonly identified, morality being more closely connected with the teleological order of things than with their logical structure. Thus the values with which the moral life is concerned, are by no means confined to the mental or intellectual values but include as well "goods of the physical sort, such as health, bodily comfort, sensuous pleasure," "the goods of artistic appreciation," the goods of human character and of social life, such as friendship, courtesy, honesty, peace, coöperation, *etc.*<sup>6</sup> In fact it would seem to be because of the plurality of values of varied types that the problem of ethics so often appears to be the determination of a single *summum bonum*. For evidently it is impossible for a single life to include all values because of their multiplicity as well as their incompatibility, as "Professor James writes piquantly: No man can be 'a great athlete, and make a million a year, be a wit, *bon-vivant*, and a lady-killer, as well as a philosopher; a philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and African explorer, as well as a tone-poet and saint';" and "to each of us, of all the possible careers—not remotely or hypothetically possible, but reasonably available under realizable conditions—one alone becomes actual."<sup>7</sup> Indeed moral life like physical life requires definite organization and an attempt to include all values would be as disastrous here as it would be on the physical plane for an organism to try to absorb everything that came its way or to develop into all forms of organic life at once. Organization requires selection and sacrifice, the psychical as well as the animal organism must be something definite to be at all, and like the germ or embryo maintains itself by assimilating what favors its task.<sup>8</sup>

In other words the moral life appears to be a particular organization

<sup>6</sup> S. P. Lamprecht: "The Need for a Pluralistic Emphasis in Ethics," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XVII, pp. 562-3.

<sup>7</sup> J. Jastrow: *The Qualities of Men*, Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910, p. 65.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. E. Gilson: "Essai sur la vie intérieure," *Revue Philosophique*, Vol. LXXXIX, p. 33.

of values. Now the method of this organization is variously described in terms of discrimination and integration, of selection and assimilation, of rationalization, socialization or idealization. However in every case they seem to imply a process directed toward a more or less definitely conceived end and conforming to the temporal structure that we have everywhere found characteristic of life. This temporal aspect of the moral life is of course evident in discussions of moral progress or development, and Dewey and Tufts emphasize "the dynamic, progressive character of morality" and speak of the moral life as "a moving process, something still in the making;"<sup>9</sup> but it also appears in any adequate analysis of character, for it is impossible to understand a person's character without knowing both his past experience and training and also his purposes and aims, for a man is not only what he has been but also what he is going to be. As a seed is at once the result of the past and the possibility of the future, holding in suspension as it were its potential growth, so moral character may be said both to concentrate the results of its past and to hold in suspension the potentialities and possibilities of its future. As I have suggested before, such descriptions of the temporal structure of life seem to me unsatisfactory, since they attempt to compress the past and the future into the present. Now I think our examination of life has shown the inadequacy of such a conception of temporal structure, though we have not yet found the exact terms in which to describe it. However we see again that life is no instantaneous or momentary affair, for moral life requires both duration and direction.

This brings us to the teleological aspect of the moral life itself in contrast to that of its domain: for the moral life appears to be teleological in two ways. As we have already seen it moves in the realm of values or goods, or of means and ends; in this sense it is related to teleology or value much as mental life is to logical structure or meaning. But, further, the organization of the moral life is teleological in the same sense as are the other types of life that we have examined. That is, moral as well as physical growth or development is progressive and in specific directions. Just what its aim or end is or should be has been the concern of many ethical theories, which have variously described it as happiness, pleasure, self-realization, self-sacrifice, *etc.*, and unsatisfactory and contradictory as these may appear, they agree in pointing to the need of a definite plan of action, guiding principle or life purpose. The difficulty with them seems to be in part at least due to their failure to recognize the need of specific plans for individuals, for they tend to insist upon a general formula for all cases,

<sup>9</sup> *Ethics*, New York, Holt, 1908, p. 4.

something as though one should try to make all biological organisms conform to a single type. That is, I think that ethical theory should recognize a greater variety of forms of moral life. On the other hand an ethics that would explain moral life wholly in terms of the integration of experience and deny all reference to ends, in avoiding the abstractions of the opposite type, would appear to be self-contradictory if its denial of the teleological aspect of the moral life were taken too literally and uncritically. Thus though Holt scorns an ethics of ends, his quarrel is with final causes as motive forces, while his and Freud's "wishes" are evidently both temporal and teleological and the integrative process that he so warmly advocates as the formula for this ethics "from below" must possess at least as much temporal structure and teleological reference as does organic growth.<sup>10</sup>

Thus the moral life seems to possess the same fundamental features that we have found to be characteristic of the other forms of life that we have so far examined—for like biological and conscious life it is to be defined in terms of an organization that conforms to a definite temporal structure and possesses a teleological reference. Its continuity with these other forms of life is evident and is especially stressed by such writers as Holt and Gilson, who emphasize the importance of reflexes and impulses as the basis of the higher forms of action, and evidently without behavior conduct would be impossible as we could hardly be moral agents if we were not capable of action. Morality also requires consciousness as well as sentiency, for as is commonly recognized an action to be moral must be voluntary and that implies knowledge on the part of the agent as well as the power to act.

The relation between intelligence and morality has been variously construed from that of identity to that of opposition. Erskine has pointed out the Anglo-Saxon distrust of intelligence and glorification of will and character,<sup>11</sup> while Holt on the other hand would agree with Socrates that wisdom and virtue are one.<sup>12</sup> The fact of the case would seem to be that the relation of mind and morality varies somewhat with the circumstances and especially with the connection of morality with custom and social tradition. Thus society may extol the good or brave fool in contrast with the brilliant knave and point out that there is no necessary connection between morality and intelligence. On the other hand, if the individual attempts to go beyond mere conformity to tradition and custom and to be truly or rationally moral rather than merely conventional, intelligence appears to be essential.

<sup>10</sup> *The Freudian Wish and Its Place in Ethics*, New York, Holt, 1915.

<sup>11</sup> *The Moral Obligation to be Intelligent*, New York, Duffield, 1916, pp. 4 ff.

<sup>12</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 138-140.

Consciousness and some slight degree of intelligence would seem to be required for morality, but beyond that it appears possible for mental and moral life to develop independently, as is not surprising if the teleological order of things is not identical with their logical structure. Thus some of the best things of life do not appear to be the result of our conscious efforts, and beautiful characters may develop who do not seem to be conscious of their dominant aims, showing that some of the higher as well as the lower forms of teleology may be unconscious. I do not wish to minimize the importance or value of intelligence but rather to suggest that there appears to be a difference, though no discontinuity, between mental and moral life and further that the difference seems to be expressible in terms of the domains in which they occur.

## CHAPTER VI

### LIFE AND SOCIETY

What may be called social or group life has two quite different though closely related phases, the life of the individual in society and the life of the community itself. In the first case the adjectives appear to describe the type of environment in which the individual life is carried on; thus we speak of the military, political or business life of individuals, contrast a man's family life with his public life and compare the advantages of village and city life. On the other hand the life of a group appears to be something quite different from the life of any or all of its members. The life of a nation or tribe may extend over centuries and wide areas as is perhaps even more evident in the life of a church such as the Roman Catholic. The same of course applies in lesser degree to smaller groups, such as the family, clan, business and political associations, clubs, colleges, armies, special regiments, etc. College life may thus mean either the life of an individual in a special type of environment or the continued life of the college itself.

Fortunately for our present purpose it will not be necessary, I think, to decide the question whether any or all these groups are persons or superindividuals, and whether there is a group consciousness over and above the consciousness of the individuals that compose the group. For all these problems arise mainly in attempts at explanation. The difficulties in dealing with them appear to me to be considerably increased by confusions in the concept of consciousness and by the tendency to identify it with life. Now as we have so often pointed out, our present aim is not explanation, but analysis and definition, so that we are concerned only with the facts of the matter, and nations and other groups appear quite definitely to live as well as sometimes to die, whether or not they are conscious persons. This is hardly surprising; as life does not seem to be identical with or even dependent upon consciousness. It should therefore be possible to examine social life without being drawn into the present controversies as to the nature of the community.<sup>1</sup>

Before going further I may point out that I do not wish to confine

<sup>1</sup> Such for example as those discussed by the American Philosophical Association in 1919. For a preliminary presentation see the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 547-597.



in turn owe a great deal to the communities in which they live. "In fact, what we call an individual man is what he is because of and by virtue of community, and communities are not mere names, but something real.' Already at birth the child is what he is in virtue of communities: he has something of the family character, something of the national character, something of the civilized character which comes from human society. As he grows, the community in which he lives pours itself into his being in the language he learns and the social atmosphere he breathes, so that the content of his being implies in its every fibre relations of community."<sup>9</sup> In fact without the family, state and some sort of educational and religious organizations, the life of the individual would indeed be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short," for "in such condition, there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious buildings; no instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death."<sup>10</sup> Not of course that such a state of affairs ever existed, but it may serve to indicate how much individuals owe to society.

The hereditary group is evidently based on the fact of biological inheritance and emphasizes and extends the dependence of the individual upon earlier forms of life. This has its importance for mental as well as physical life as is evident in the great importance of education, by which the accumulated knowledge and customs of the group are passed on to the individual. A "man without a fellow" thus seems almost as impossible as a man without an ancestor, and it has often been pointed out of late that the development of self-consciousness is probably due to comparison and contrast with our fellows, since it is through their attitudes toward us and ours toward them that we come to know both them and ourselves.<sup>11</sup> McDougall evidently has the same point in mind when he emphasizes the need of contrasting and rival groups for the full development of the "group mind."<sup>12</sup>

It is hardly necessary to point out that at the present stage of civilization human individuals depend upon their social environment not only for most of the necessities of life but also for many of its

<sup>9</sup> E. Barker: *Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day*, New York, Holt (Home University Library, No. 98), pp. 62, 63.

<sup>10</sup> T. Hobbes: *Leviathan*, Part I, chapter 13.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. J. Royce: *Loc. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 129 ff. Also E. A. Singer, Jr.: "Man and Fellow-Man," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. X, pp. 141 ff.

<sup>12</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 226 ff.

values and ideals. This is so true of the moral life that discussions of primitive morals consist largely in a description of primitive social customs and institutions, and in fact much of the importance and significance of moral life is due to its social setting, for many of the virtues would be impossible or meaningless unless men lived and worked together and without social relationships human life would be poor indeed, for friendship and love as well as rivalry and competition would be gone. The religious life also has quite definitely social aspects and discussions of primitive religions as of primitive morals, not only emphasize these but seem to make religion wholly a social affair. With the more developed forms, it is common to distinguish between the religious experience of individuals such as James describes in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* and the social aspect of religion as expressed in organized churches. We shall consider the religious life as a form of the spiritual life in the next chapter, but we may here note not only that churches such as the Roman Catholic evidently possess a type of life very similar to that of nations and states, but also that most forms of religion have a social as well as a personal aspect. Thus again is the continuity of the different forms of life brought to our attention. Though society may be conceived as an ideal we have not attempted to discuss it here as such but have left such a consideration of it for the next chapter and have confined ourselves in the present one to an examination of society or rather of a multitude of different types of groups and associations as facts and have simply inquired into the nature of social life as it exists.

Our discussion of social life, both as the life of society and as that of the individual in society, has shown the same fundamental features to be characteristic of these types of life as we have previously found in the case of the other forms of life that we have examined. All forms of group life were found to possess some definite organization, however much this might vary in different cases, and it was further discovered that this organization could be understood only in connection with its temporal structure and teleological reference. Here we found the temporal aspect of life particularly prominent, as the growth of customs and language as well as the importance of history showed the great extent and range that its temporal structure must cover. In the case of the individual this was especially emphasized by the importance of education. On the other hand the teleological aspect of life is less obvious here than in the moral life and appeared to resemble in some cases that found on the biological plane, being frequently unconscious, though of course with some types of association it becomes more evident and deliberate.

## CHAPTER VII

### IDEALS AND THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

So far we have been concerned with what might be termed the various forms of natural life, though in the last chapters especially our attention has been directed to certain ideals toward which some aspects of life seem to point. I therefore propose now to examine life as it appears in connection with these ideals. The moral life can be considered from this angle, *e.g.* when it appears as the worship of an absolute good; and perhaps the categorical imperative belongs here as well, as it seems out of place in the naturalistic ethics that we discussed in a preceding chapter. However that may be, it is quite possible to conceive the ends or aims of the moral life in ideal terms, and similarly society or humanity may appear to be an ideal rather than a fact. Thus though the religious life perhaps stands out as preëminently connected with the ideal, the true or the beautiful may sometimes take the place assigned by religion to God, and the intellectual or contemplative life and the esthetic or artistic life appear as aspects of the spiritual life.

Our discussion of the spiritual life will thus have to be very general and confined to an examination of its fundamental characteristics without any attempt at exposition or evaluation of its many forms. For we are not here so much concerned with special philosophies of life or the various answers that have been given to the question of its meaning and value, as we are to get clearly before us the subject matter with which these theories deal. For as I have had occasion to point out before, I am not attempting to explain or evaluate life, but simply to examine some of its forms with the hope of discovering its nature. Thus the aim of the present chapter is limited to a portrayal of the characteristics of the spiritual or inner life and our interest in the many interpretations of it is quite secondary and entirely limited to what light they can throw upon its nature. Though most of the discussions of this form of life are primarily concerned with an interpretation or evaluation of it, I hope nevertheless that it will be possible to make clear the subject matter itself and so get before us a picture of life at this level as well as at the others that we have considered in the preceding chapters.

As has been suggested already, I intend to deal with a great variety of related forms of life. The inner life is commonly recognized to

possess several aspects: Gilson names the intellectual, esthetic, moral and religious, and Santayana discusses the Life of Reason in society, religion, art and science as well as common sense. The religious life appears in many forms such as the ascetic and saintly, the mystic and unitive lives, and also as a life of love, faith, loyalty or piety, and the various religions and sects each offer their theories of life and try to lead their disciples to a fuller, richer, better or more abundant life. We are thus concerned with many forms of what may be called in general personal life or the life of the spirit. Certain aspects of this have been touched upon in the preceding chapters: we have had occasion to note the social aspects of the religious life in particular, while the close connection between moral and spiritual life is too evident to require comment. This serves to show again the continuity of life in its various forms despite the obvious differences in the realms in which it moves.

As the religious life is the most commonly recognized and discussed form of the spiritual life, we may well begin our examination with it. However much religions may differ in many respects, they agree in giving us "another world to live in." How this other world is conceived, of course, varies greatly with different religions and might to a large extent be used to differentiate them. But however that may be, the spiritual life appears to move in a realm very different from those in which we found the types of life already examined. Just how this new world is to be defined seems far from clear, and it is not my present aim to defend any particular conception of it, for it is life and not spirit that we are considering. We may content ourselves therefore with saying that the religious life moves in a spiritual realm, while the various forms of worship, sacrifice and prayer help one to maintain or regain contact with it. Naturally most of the interest in discussions of religious life have thus turned upon the nature of God and spirit, of the joys of living in this wonderful world and of the means of reaching it. Religious life as the saintly or ascetic or mystic life, and even more in its aspects of the future or eternal life, may thus come to be regarded as moving in a realm quite apart. But in its more common forms religious life is clearly continuous with the other types of personal life. Gilson can thus refer to religion as the superior hygiene of personality<sup>1</sup> and call it the maker of men or producer of personalities.<sup>2</sup> So conceived religion gives meaning and value to life. It furnishes the individual with a pretty coherent view of the world and an idea of what his life in it should be. In Santayana's

<sup>1</sup> "Essai sur la vie intérieure," *Revue Philosophique*, Vol. LXXXIX, p. 52.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

words it gives him spiritual nationality,<sup>3</sup> and defines the meaning of life for him so that Gilson says that to deprive a man of his religion in order to set him free is like freeing an animal of its skeleton and nervous system.<sup>4</sup> Or more baldly put, our personal life as well as our physical life must have specific form, for in Gilson's words, to be is to be determinate.<sup>5</sup>

Though the religious life may be regarded as the most complete and perfect form of the spiritual or inner life, other forms are to be considered as well. Gilson emphasizes the esthetic and moral aspects and in a different category the intellectual. These evidently have close connections with the types of life that we have examined in the preceding chapters. Sentient life may be regarded as the natural basis of the esthetic and artistic life; thus Gilson calls art a hygiene of sensibility,<sup>6</sup> and emotion as well as sensation appears to be essential for both artistic creation and esthetic appreciation. Thus Noyes says, "a work of art is the statement of the artist's insight into nature, moulded and suffused by the emotion attending his perception,"<sup>7</sup> and "it is not thought that constitutes appreciation; it is emotion."<sup>8</sup> But the artistic and the esthetic life are evidently not identical with sentient and emotional life, for the latter in many cases appears unconnected with art, while in all art we go beyond mere sensation and emotion. For art requires and expresses a special type of selection and organization of elements not peculiar to it. Thus both sentient and esthetic life in a sense move in a world of sense qualities, but they perceive objects with such different interests that art appears to transform this world. The difference may be most briefly indicated by referring it to beauty, thus suggesting the importance of the ideal for the esthetic life. Or more concretely, sentient and emotional life views its world quite naturally in relation to itself, while for artistic and esthetic life the same world is significant only because of its inner meaning and harmony. Perhaps this difference is more commonly stated by regarding the one as a bodily and the other as a spiritual function or activity. This may be a very suggestive and satisfactory mode of statement if it is not understood, as is sometimes the case, as implying the discontinuity of these forms of life.

A very similar connection may be noted between conscious or mental

<sup>3</sup> *The Life of Reason*, New York, Scribner's, 1916, Vol. III, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 54.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50.

<sup>7</sup> *The Gate of Appreciation*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1907, p. 241.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

life as it was discussed in Chapter IV and what may be termed intellectual or speculative life. Both evidently move in the domain of logical structure, while differing considerably in their attitude toward it. Thus one may come to worship and serve truth in a truly religious fashion as did the hunter in Olive Schreiner's dream, or he may be rather polytheistic in his intellectual devotion and recognize many forms of truth; but in any case the ardent seeker for truth, whether monistically or pluralistically conceived, seems to be living in a world quite different from that described in connection with conscious life, and here again the difference seems to be expressible only by reference to the ideal.

In like manner the good may be conceived as an ideal rather than a fact, and thus be treated religiously rather than morally. The distinction here is probably less generally and clearly recognized than in the two previous cases, for the division here may be regarded as coming within the moral life rather than in the contrast between the moral and religious aspects of the inner life. But in whatever terms it is expressed and whether values and ideals be identified or contrasted, there seem to be two very different attitudes toward them. If value is defined as in the preceding chapters in terms of use and tendency, then ideals seem to take us into a new realm or dimension of being, which of course is sometimes described in terms of value and may then be contrasted with its more practical aspects. In other words the ideals that we are now considering appear to be quite different from the type of value that we have elsewhere discussed in terms of means and ends. For one thing those values were to be used and employed, while ideals appear rather as the objects of love and service.

Among these ideals God and society may also be included. Of course both may be treated as facts as well and we have attempted to present such a discussion of society. But that it may be an ideal also is shown, I think, by the fact that it may be treated as an object of religious devotion and as such served. Thus Comte tried to institute a religion of humanity; and in some of our churches to-day social service of one sort or another seems to take the place of what was once regarded as the truly religious office of the church. Royce's emphasis upon the "beloved community" in his discussion of the *Problem of Christianity* may be regarded as an attempt to interpret the present social interest of religion in terms of Christian dogma and he certainly treats the community as an object for loyalty and devotion in a quite religious fashion. Similarly God may be conceived as an ideal rather than as a natural fact, but the God that means the ideal of life is not to be identified with the God which means the forces of

nature.<sup>9</sup> The opposition that the former conception often arouses is due I think to a feeling that ideals are less real than facts or that they are merely subjective. Would any one object to God being called ideal in the Platonic sense? For is not this just the way that he is most adequately conceived? And in this sense are not ideals more truly real than anything else? In such a discussion real is apparently a value rather than an existential category. But we are not at present undertaking to defend any particular theory of the nature of ideals, but rather to examine the spiritual life as it is lived in their presence.

For as sentient life moved in a world of sense qualities, mental life in one of meaning and implication, and moral life in one of means and ends, so the spiritual life is lived in the presence of ideals. Life thus comes to move in a world where things are beautiful as well as pleasant and useful; truth may be loved and sought for its own sake and society be an ideal to be served as well as an environment in which one lives. In other words the world possesses an ideal dimension and it seems to be on this plane that our spiritual life occurs, for in Santayana's words "man is spiritual when he lives in the presence of the ideal."<sup>10</sup>

Before proceeding to a more direct analysis of the spiritual life it may be well to pause for a brief parenthesis on the domains or planes of being to which reference has been so frequently made. The comparison with a layer cake, in which each plane rests upon the one below it, though perhaps the readiest to hand does not appear to be accurate, as it would arrange them in a hierarchy in which each level would rest upon the preceding one and thus appear to be dependent upon it. But this does not seem to be the case: for example we saw that value does not appear to be dependent upon consciousness, as such a scheme would seem to require. Now it seems to me that the realms or planes of being that we have had occasion to consider, could be more accurately likened to the various types of ether waves, such as those of light, heat and wireless telegraphy, which pass through the same space without confusion or interference, using the same material while each preserves its specific identity. Similarly concrete things conform to different structures or orders in a perfectly simple and natural manner. Thus the river which conforms to mechanical and chemical structure, may also possess meaning in so far as it enters into logical structure, and may further possess value as it serves for transportation or irrigation, and finally it may appear as a special expression or embodiment of beauty and possibly even be worshipped as a god.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. G. Santayana: *Loc. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 169.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 193.

There then appears to be no discontinuity between the ideal and the natural and Santayana insists constantly that every ideal has a natural basis while all natural processes have ideal fulfillments. Similarly the spiritual life is continuous with the other forms of life and the inner or personal life may be understood to include some of the types discussed in earlier chapters as well as those considered in the present one, while human life may evidently move in all the realms or planes of being that we have considered. Thus the terms "person" and "self" may be used with very different extensions as James has so well pointed out in connection with the self, for "*in its widest possible sense, however, a man's Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account.*"<sup>11</sup> In other words the self lives on the physical, mental and social planes as well as on the spiritual, and although James's introspective analysis did not show him a purely spiritual element,<sup>12</sup> it was apparently because he looked for it among sensations. In a similar fashion Hume failed to find any self at all and James later came to question the existence of consciousness.<sup>13</sup> Now the conclusion to be drawn would seem not to be the one commonly adduced, namely that spirit or self or consciousness does not exist, but rather that the methods used in investigating them were at fault. In fact psychological methods appear to be better adapted to an investigation of sentient than of spiritual life.

But at present our primary concern is with the spiritual life, which we have seen moves in a much richer and more inclusive world than does sentient life, for the ideal as well as the natural is important for it. When now we try to see just what are the fundamental features of the life of the spirit, we find them to be essentially the same as in the other forms of life we have examined, the differences in all cases being due to the nature of the environment in which life is found and not to the nature of life itself, which seems to be everywhere the same. Thus the organization characteristic of personality is often described in terms of selection and assimilation, as for example by Gilson, or of discrimination and integration, as by Holt; while for an adequate understanding of it, it is necessary to take account both of its temporal structure and teleological reference. Royce of course stresses the purposive aspect of the individual self and also emphasizes the need of a

<sup>11</sup> *Psychology*, New York, Holt, 1899, Vol. I, p. 291.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 300.

<sup>13</sup> See "Does Consciousness Exist?" *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1912, pp. 1-38.



coherent plan in the religious life as well as elsewhere.<sup>14</sup> This he very definitely connects with the temporal structure of personal life: in his own words, "a self is, by its very essence, a being with a past,"<sup>15</sup> and "my idea of myself is an interpretation of my past,—linked also with an interpretation of my hopes and intentions as to my future,"<sup>16</sup> also "our idea of the individual self is no mere present datum or collection of data, but is based upon an interpretation of the sense, of the tendency, of the coherence, and of the value of a life to which belongs the memory of its own past."<sup>17</sup> Though some of the phrases here are suggestive of a particular philosophical theory, they none the less indicate very clearly certain important features of the personal or spiritual life. The future aspect of its temporal structure is brought out especially well, I think, in Fosdick's discussion of "Faith and Life's Adventure."<sup>18</sup> For example he describes life as "a continuous adventure into the unknown,"<sup>19</sup> demanding insight and daring,<sup>20</sup> and further says, "if one tries to imagine the world with all faith gone—knowledge supposedly having taken its place—he must conceive a world where no conscious life and effort remain at all."<sup>21</sup> In other words it is impossible to conceive our personal and spiritual life without reference to temporal structure.

The teleological aspect of life is also especially prominent here in connection with ideal aims and ends. Thus while the personal life may possess a great variety of purposes, which indeed could be used to distinguish some of its different forms or types, in its more generally recognized spiritual forms these usually are quite definitely connected with ideals of some sort or another. Thus the spiritual, like the other forms of life, is seen to possess a characteristic organization which can be adequately expressed only in terms of its temporal structure and teleological reference.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. II, pp. 3-4.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.

<sup>18</sup> *The Meaning of Faith*, New York, Association Press, 1921, Chapter I.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

## **CONCLUSION**

Turning then to the consideration of temporal structure, we have seen that life everywhere implies growth and development, whether of organism, consciousness, character or personality; thus life is always a process even if at times it does not appear to show progress as well. It exists in time in something the same way that matter exists in space: that is, life is essentially temporal. This is evident I think in all its varieties; it is especially emphasized when life is identified with one's career or the duration of an activity as when we speak of the "life" of a motor. Though this latter figurative expression only emphasizes the fact that life has a temporal aspect, the examination of its more essential forms has shown that it possesses temporal structure as well. Thus we saw that organisms not only grow and develop, but also that their very nature and character can be understood only in terms of their history and future: an acorn is not only so much matter of a certain mechanical and chemical structure, it is also so much growth of a special kind as well as the result of past growth. And not only organic forms but protoplasm itself seem to be dependent upon their temporal structure as well as upon their spatial structure and chemical composition. By reference to these latter features alone it seemed impossible to adequately differentiate living organisms from the inorganic world in which they are found, for protoplasm contains no unique chemical element, nor can living beings be defined in spatial or mechanical terms in such a way as to clearly separate them from physical forms that are not alive. Its temporal structure however does seem to definitely distinguish physical life from its environment.

The temporal structure of life is perhaps even more evident on what we called the plane of sentiency for want of a better term. The behavior of the organism at any time depends upon its past experience and history, as well as upon the present situation in which it finds itself. The future aspect of behavior is of course most obvious in purposive action, but its presence elsewhere is evident and will be more readily recognized when it is not confused with the question of consciousness. Though the temporal aspect of emotional life is perhaps not so obvious as that of instinctive and impulsive life, its importance is none the less readily seen when it is realized how important are not only our own pasts but probably those of even our remote ancestors in determining the character of our emotions at any time, and the same is probably true, though perhaps to a less degree, in the case of sensations. The future reference of both emotion and sensation is evident in their relation to the activities of various sorts that depend upon and follow from them.

With mental life these processes become conscious, the past is re-

tained in memory and the future is planned and hoped for, and the effectiveness of the past and future is clearly recognized. This is evident in varying degrees and extensions. All our knowledge, however momentary or eternal it may seem, appears to be understandable as it occurs in definite and individual form only by reference to our pasts and futures: in Carr's words, "all cognition is *recognition*" and the pragmatists are also right in emphasizing the future reference of all consciousness. This does not necessarily imply that mind in the metaphysical sense evolves or that truth is not eternal; but only that knowledge as it occurs in mental life is dependent upon the temporal structure of life, just as the physical form and chemical composition of the biological organism depend upon the temporal structure of life as it is found on the physical plane. In other words, though logical, mechanical and chemical structures are quite independent of temporal structure, their definite forms in connection with life do depend upon its temporal structure. Or we may say that life is essentially temporal and that while each of its various types conforms to the structure of the realm in which it occurs, everywhere living beings can be understood only in connection with their temporal structure. Thus any attempt to explain them wholly in terms of the domains in which their temporal structure is worked out, inevitably results in a failure to differentiate them from non-living things within the same domain.

The examination of social life only made more clear its temporal aspect by exhibiting it in more extended form and wider range in connection with history and education and in the formation of communities of memory and of hope.

Growth and development were also found to be important characteristics of the inner, moral and religious life as well as of physical life. Spirit may be permanent and unchanging and ideals eternal and immutable, but the spiritual life requires the progressive organization and expression of them. This is perhaps most commonly recognized in connection with the development of character and personality; for not only do we hope for progress here, but what we are at any time is a function of both our past and future, of our memories and experiences, of our purposes and hopes.

Thus life not only extends through time in the same way that physical objects exist for varying periods of time, but it possesses a peculiar temporal structure that differentiates it both from them and from eternal realities. It seems to be particularly difficult to make clear the exact nature of this structure, perhaps because of our tendency to spatialize time as Bergson has so eloquently urged. The difficulty seems to be due to a number of causes some which Bergson has stated

and some of which appear to be very different from those that he has most emphasized. For one thing I have urged that our difficulty in understanding the nature of temporal structures is due partly to the fact that we have treated them from too practical a standpoint and have not accorded them the independent investigation that has made us so familiar with the variety of spatial structures. On the one hand time has been treated only as it appears in connection with physical nature. It there resembles space in being a mode of separation between things or events and is conceived as a succession of instants or simultaneities. Its parts are all alike and in themselves quite indistinguishable. In this way time has figured as an independent variable in the equations of physics. So science has dealt rather with durationless instants than with temporal structure and when time has been thought of as having any structure it is commonly compared with a line as a one-dimensional series. It is this spatialized time that Bergson contrasts with duration which he tends to identify with life. I think that he is quite right in maintaining that what we have been terming the temporal structure of life is very different from time as it appears in the physical sciences. But his discussions of duration seem to me to be dominated too much by practical and immediate interests to be wholly clear in a technical and metaphysical sense, for the treatment of temporal structure wholly in terms of past, present and future is too much like trying to develop a geometry in terms of here and yonder or of in front, behind and beside with reference to the point at which we happen to be. I am not questioning the possibility or the value of such distinctions but only suggesting that if such a basis had been insisted upon, our knowledge of spatial structure might be in as elementary a state as is our knowledge of temporal structure and we might find ourselves quite as much at a loss for adequate terms in which to describe spatial structures as we now do for temporal ones.

Now with a full recognition of the difficulties before us, let us try to make as clear as possible the nature of the temporal structure that appears to be characteristic of life. It is most naturally expressed, if we use the terms of the common distinction of past, present and future, by saying that life unites or transcends them, or that it makes the past and future effective in the present. But this immediately gets us into trouble, for how can past and future be present and if life transcends the distinctions of past, present and future, does it not cease to be temporal? This not only emphasizes the inadequacy of the terms at our disposal for a description of temporal structure, but indicates as well how quickly an attempt at analysis and definition runs over into questions of explanation. As the aim of the present examina-

tion is not explanation but definition, we need not attempt to explain how the past can be preserved in the present, nor how the future can be effective now. What I do wish to make as clear as possible is that life possesses a temporal structure that is not confined to the moment. In Montague's words "action at a distance in time" is characteristic of living beings as well as "action at a distance in space," and this quite regardless of how these are to be explained and whether or not it is necessary to suppose connecting media through which effects can be propagated. But temporal structure is not to be confused with activity or movement, it being no more productive or effective than spatial or other structures, all of which are merely the inert principles to which all activity conforms, while all efficacy resides in concrete and individual things. That these may operate in complex temporal as well as spatial structures is especially evident in the case of living beings for whom things distant in time may be quite as real and effective as things distant in space. Indeed living things may be said to extend in time as physical things extend in space and the operations of the former conform to temporal structure as those of the latter do to mechanical structure.

Whether life is to be identified with temporal structure or rather with a special kind of temporal structure is not clear, as the conceptions of time and temporal structure have not yet been adequately considered. An examination of all kinds of temporal structure is obviously beyond the range of the present paper; we may however point out some of the characteristics of it as it appears in connection with life. As has already been noted, the growth and development so characteristic of life clearly indicate its temporal aspect and show that life transcends the moment—that life can not be compressed into an instant. Every attempt to understand the characteristics of living forms as they appear at any time requires reference to both their pasts and their futures. On the mental plane this is very evident in memory, purpose, anticipation and hope; consciousness does not appear to create this temporal structure, but rather to recognize and utilize it. In fact temporal structure seems to be characteristic of life rather than of consciousness. Of course the same individuals may be both conscious and living, but that is only the more reason for not confusing the categories of life and mind. It is the failure to make this distinction, I think, that is responsible for a great part of the confusion that has attended the discussion of each of them. If mind can be defined in terms of logical structure and life in terms of temporal structure, it should be possible to distinguish the two and avoid the confusion that has naturally resulted from an unconscious blending of such different categories.

But returning to our examination of temporal structure, we may note that in connection with life it appears to be closely related to teleology, while in the physical world time is often considered in connection with causation. In fact it is possible to conceive teleology as the future aspect of temporal structure, while there is certainly a tendency to conceive past time in causal or at least deterministic terms. The future would then appear to be radically different from the past and if teleology and causality are taken as opposite and conflicting categories, it is not surprising that the attempt to express past, present and future in the same terms is productive of so little but confusion. If the past is the realm of the irrevocable, the future that of possibility and the present that of efficacy and actuality, there is little wonder that they can not be arranged in a simple one-dimensional series, and it might be well to recognize that the past, present and future are distinct dimensions of time. But such a distinction can be maintained only by reference to the present, which is too variable and practical to form a satisfactory basis for an adequate conception of temporal structure. This also seems to be the reason for much of the difficulty we have in conceiving events as they pass from future to past, and what was considered to be teleological and free is described in terms of causality and necessity. It is evident then, if temporal structure is to be expressed in terms of past, present and future, these can not be reduced to a single dimension. But I have been urging that it should be possible as well as desirable to find more adequate and serviceable terms in which to describe time, for past, present and future are united in temporal structures, if not in a single dimension, and the distinction between them seems to be a practical and existential affair that should conform to temporal structure rather than define it.

However closely teleology and temporal structure may seem to be connected, they are hardly to be identified, I think, for though the distinction of means and ends points to the future, it implies more than temporal structure, as "the definition of natural teleology involves . . . the recognition that uses are specific, in specific and controlled directions, and of comparative value in view of these directions."<sup>1</sup> In fact it is generally recognized that teleology requires reference to value as well as to time. But unfortunately recent discussions of value, which are amongst the most perplexing and unsatisfactory of those of contemporary philosophy, seem to have been generally confused by the introduction of epistemological and psychological material, which has befogged the subject of investigation and raised unnecessary questions, largely in connection with the relation of consciousness and value. That

<sup>1</sup> Woodbridge: "Natural Teleology," p. 322.

teleology is not dependent upon consciousness seems evident; our examination of life has shown the presence of use and adaptation on the physical plane as well as upon others, and Woodbridge and Henderson agree that teleology is found in inorganic nature also though their treatments of it differ widely. Now as physical nature is admittedly mechanical, this recognition of its teleological aspect might be regarded as implying a conflict between the two; but I think that the situation is much better described when mechanism and teleology are recognized as categories of different levels as suggested by Haldane in his use of the terms lower and higher,<sup>2</sup> or in other words that there is no contradiction involved in anything being both mechanical and teleological so long as the fundamental distinction between them is not forgotten: that is, use has nothing to do with causation—"if a thing is useful, it is useful irrespective of the causes that produced it."<sup>3</sup>

Now our examination of life has shown that teleology occurs on other planes of being than the mechanical and is present in all types of life as well as in inanimate nature. It is found in the biological realm in connection with growth and development, becomes more obvious in behavior, is generally recognized in the domain of consciousness as purpose, and becomes highly significant in the field of morals as design, while in the spiritual realm ideal ends and aims become important. Thus we find life presenting a teleological aspect at all its levels, for the distinction between means and ends is always important for it and it everywhere seems to require organization with reference to specific ends, though the nature of these ends varies with the different types of life. In fact much that is written about the moral and spiritual life concerns the problem of what ends should be chosen, and the question of the meaning and value of life evidently centers in its theological aspect and is usually answered in terms of its organization with reference to particular ends.

Life, then, possesses an organization that is temporal and teleological, so that it may be defined as that type of organization which possesses temporal structure and teleological reference or more graphically as individualized temporal structure. But suggestive as this latter definition is, it does not appear to be wholly adequate, as there seem to be other forms of temporal structure, such as those characteristic of music and of the history of non-living things like the earth's crust. Further differentia of life therefore seem to be required and unfortunately we do not know enough about temporal structure to be able to find them in terms of its different kinds. We shall therefore

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Mechanism, Life and Personality*, New York, Dutton, 1914, pp. 95-99.

<sup>3</sup> Woodbridge: *Loc. cit.*, p. 313.



have to look again to our analysis of life to get its further characteristics. We have seen that life processes have a teleological as well as a temporal factor: they are in specific directions and definite ends are attained through a variety of means. Life means progress as well as accumulation, and growth and development possess a teleological reference as well as a temporal structure. Thus Singer would define life as purposive behavior.

As we have already seen, the teleological and temporal aspects of life are very closely connected but the exact relations between them are far from clear. Teleology is sometimes identified with the future portion of temporal structure, or taken as the defining characteristic of the future dimension of time. But though the distinction of means and ends points to the future, it hardly seems to be identified with it. If value were not such an uncertain and controversial term, it would be natural to say that teleology differed from temporal structure primarily because it implied reference to values. The distinction is probably less ambiguously stated by defining teleology in terms of the distinction of means and ends, which, though conforming to temporal structure in their operation, would not serve to define it.

We have further seen that while all life is teleological, ends vary greatly with the different types of life. The development and maintenance of specific form is most in evidence on the biological plane, while behavior seems to be directed toward a great variety of ends generally connected with the preservation of the organism or the species. With consciousness a greater range of ends becomes possible, and the moral life is so concerned with ends that morality has been called "the realm of ends," while with the spiritual or inner life ideal ends are sought. Means as well as ends naturally differ with the different types of life, as they have to conform to the structure characteristic of the realm in which it moves. Thus on the biological plane life attains its ends by the use of means that conform to the mechanical and chemical structure of that domain, and similarly on the other planes as well, living beings conform to the structure of their environment. In fact life seems always to make use of elements derived from its environment as the means for obtaining its ends. In this sense it may be said to be continuous with its environment or the realm in which it is moving. But attempts to define any of its many forms wholly in terms of those domains fail to differentiate them from other objects found therein, since the essential characteristics of life are not limited to any one of the planes on which it occurs but cuts them all, so that different types of life appear to be continuous with each other. Thus there appears to be no break between physical and sentient life.

nor between sentient and mental life, while the moral and spiritual lives are continuous with mental life and social life is possible only because of the existence of individual life of various types.

In conclusion we may note that the individuality and activity, so evidently characteristic of living beings in all realms, are due to the fact of their particular and concrete existence and do not appear to be a defining characteristic of life. Their activities conform to the temporal structure of life as well as to the structures of the different domains in which its various forms occur. The individuality of living things seems to be the result of the particularization of the organization characteristic of life, an organization that we have seen is dependent upon temporal structure and teleological reference. Life thus seems to be definable ultimately in terms of temporal structure and teleology, but an adequate picture of it would also include reference to the different realms in which it occurs. It is then seen that each type of life is continuous with its domain and can be conceived as a particular organization of elements derived therefrom, by a process of selection and assimilation, of differentiation and integration, but a careful analysis of this organization shows that it is dependent for its characteristic form upon the temporal structure and teleological reference of life.

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*teleology - fact or quality of possessing final cause; that  
chara. of nature showing itself in rational &  
purposeful adaptation*

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
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In Its Original and in Its Traditional Setting

BY  
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## PREFATORY NOTE

Early Greek philosophy is studied altogether too much in a reverse direction; a beginning is made with late historical accounts and then in their secondary light the earlier sources are interpreted.

The method of this investigation is to begin with the fragments of Empedocles. Their terminology is collected, its interrelationships are examined, and analogies are traced in contemporary writings. The attempt is then made to determine just what Plato was attacking in certain of the Socratic arguments, and to find why he was not sympathetic to those viewpoints. We will thus be in a position to show the irrelevancies of the setting in which Aristotle and his successors tried to record or ridicule the early naturalistic philosophy.


The purpose is as much negative as positive, *i.e.* to determine what part of the tradition belongs to the recorders rather than to the early Greeks.

The writer is indebted to Professor Frederick J. E. Woodbridge for the general conceptions of Greek philosophy, for much of the method, and above all for the inspiration which he has derived from Professor Woodbridge's lectures and seminar at Columbia. His gratitude is also due to Professor John J. Coss for many helpful suggestions and for the great interest he has shown in the writer's work for a number of years.

It is also the author's wish to express at this time his thanks to the founder of the William Bayard Cutting Travelling Fellowships and to the Trustees of Columbia University for the opportunity afforded him of studying in England.

WALTER VEAZIE


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## CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. Introduction. . . . .	1
II. The Fragments. . . . .	4
III. Plato . . . . .	9
IV. Aristotle and Theophrastus. . . . .	15
V. The Doxographers. . . . .	18
<u>VI. Summary. . . . .</u>	26



## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

"Some physicians and sophists," writes Hippocrates,<sup>1</sup> "say that no one can know medicine who is ignorant as to what man is, how he first came to be, and whence he was originally compounded and that whoever would cure men properly must learn this. But this doctrine belongs rather to philosophy, as *e.g.*, Empedocles and others who have written *Περὶ φύσιος*."

To understand Empedocles' conception of psychical processes one must get at his conception of a living being and this in turn is founded on his cosmic philosophy.

In another place<sup>2</sup> I have discussed the general question of the underlying conception of early Greek philosophy and the present work is in a sense a special application of this study. We determined there that in the search for *φύσιος* the early naturalistic philosophers were not primarily interested in "matter," but for that in the universe which, in Aristotle's language, "in its primary and strict sense is the essence (*οὐσία*) of those things which have in themselves *per se* a source of motion" (*Metaph.* Δ, iv), what it is that makes things "get a move on."

This procedure had at first taken the form of explaining cosmic origins from the standpoint of generation,<sup>3</sup> but absolute beginnings were totally inconceivable to the philosophies of Empedocles' time, so that Empedocles faced the problem of accounting for plurality and transformation or motion in an eternal universe.

The orthodox modern account of Empedocles' philosophy, which we inherit from Zeller, attributes to him a conception of "matter and energy" somewhat resembling that of our nineteenth century physics, upon which is vaguely reared a crude materialistic doctrine of sensation. Perhaps the most precise statement of this interpretation is that given by Windelband.<sup>4</sup> With respect to Empedocles' general position Windelband writes, "He was the first in whose theory *force* and *matter* are differentiated as separate cosmic powers. Under the influence of

<sup>1</sup> *On ancient med.*, 20: ed. Kvehlewein.

<sup>2</sup> "The Meaning of *φύσιος* in Early Greek Philosophy," *Studies in the History of Ideas*, edited by the department of philosophy of Columbia University, Vol. I, 1918, p. 27.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. F. J. E. Woodbridge, "The Dominant Conception of Early Greek Philosophy," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. X, 1901.

<sup>4</sup> *History of Ancient Philosophy*, 1899, pp. 74, 78.

Parmenides he had accordingly so conceived the world-stuff that the ground of motion could not be found in it itself."

With regard to psychical processes Windelband considers that: "It is of especial interest that he conceived the process of perception and sensation as analogous to his universal theory of the interaction of elements. He explained this process as contact of the small parts of the perceived things with the similar parts of the perceiving organs, wherein the former were supposed to press upon the latter, as in hearing; or the latter upon the former, as in sight. . . . Hence it follows for Empedocles that all perceptual knowledge depends upon the combination of elements in the body and especially in the blood, and that the spiritual nature depends on the physical nature."

In contradistinction to this current interpretation we maintain that Empedocles was dealing, both cosmologically and anthropologically, with a problem of *φύσις* and that he was looking for *those features of things which would account for their present development*; for that aspect of the world at large which has in itself the power of motion, or development, and for the natural source of life and thought in man.

For Empedocles all things in the universe are a combination of the six elements—air, earth, fire, water, love, and hate. Just what is the relation of the last two to the others is not altogether clear. According to Tannery,<sup>5</sup> "ne sont nullement des forces abstraites; ce sont simplement des *milieux* doués de propriétés spéciales et pouvant se déplacer l'un l'autre, milieux au sein desquels sont plongées les molécules corporelles, mais qui d'ailleurs sont conçus comme tout aussi matériels que l'éther impondérable des physiciens modernes, avec lequel ils présentent la plus grande analogie."

Empedocles apparently recognized as the great motive force the attraction of like for like. "L'attraction des semblables n'est pas, chez l'Agrigentin, une force abstraite transcendantale; c'est une propriété immanente à la matière" (*l.c.*, p. 309).

From a universe of elements having this source of motion in itself, the world and its inhabitants "live and move and have their being." A man or an animal is a *definite, organic complex*. A man has in himself this source of motion and in his surroundings the conditions thereof. Psychical processes are activities occasioned by the meeting of the organism with its cognate environment. It is an activity latent in the elements and complex structure of the man, determined by the nature of his sense organs and "central nervous system," causing him to react to certain conditions. The organic structure of the man is the determining factor along with the immanent tendency to motion.

The individual organs of perception were involved in the discussion

<sup>5</sup> *La Science Hellène*, 1887, p. 306.

and what chiefly troubled the ancient commentators was the so-called relation or perception of like by like in these special cases. It was not recognized that they are here discussing *organs* and that the attraction of like to like, in so far as it may have figured, was the starting to activity, the bringing into relation of the organism to the object through physical contact set up by way of the organ. The famous fragment (84) of Empedocles on the structure of the eye is obviously a discussion of the problem of obtaining a connection between the object and the eye.

Subsequent Greek philosophers and historians of philosophy, in giving their account of this naturalistic psychology, rewrote it into the language and doctrines of their own or contemporary systems and made nonsense of most of it. Plato alone took the position seriously and with some appreciation, and it is from his controversy that most is to be learned.

Some light is thrown on the subject by examination of the genuine works of Hippocrates who was bred in the tradition and was in a high degree capable of appreciating it. It is also in this connection interesting to note that, although all traces of the meaning of the early view have died out in philosophical literature by the time of Theophrastus, they apparently survived to an extent in Galen, the physician (second century, A.D.).<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Chauvet, *La philosophie des médecins grecs*, p. 367 sq. (N. B. p. 371).

## CHAPTER II

### THE FRAGMENTS

For Empedocles *νόημα* is in, or is the blood about the heart (*Fr.* 105) and is shared by all things along with *φρόνησις* (*Fr.* 110). *Τὸ φρονεῖν* is by the will or pleasure of chance (*Fr.* 103) and along with the feeling of pleasure and pain is from the elements, including love and strife (*Fr.* 107.) *Τὸ φρονεῖν* different things lies in growing to be different (*Fr.* 108), while *τὸ φρονεῖν φίλα* and “accomplish friendly(?) works” is by *φιλότῃ* (*Fr.* 17).

*Φρόνησις* and *νόημα*, I submit, are used more or less synonymously and the meaning of these words is something far more elemental and general than our word “thought.” Such is the meaning and use of *φρόνησις* in the Hippocratic treatise *On the sacred disease*<sup>7</sup> which is summed up by Foesius<sup>8</sup> thus: “*φρόνησις* signifies wisdom, but is used for sense [*sensus*] or sensitivity [*sentienti vis*] in the book *On the sacred disease* (p. 125, 10 [ed. Bebelii, Basil, 1538]). *Καὶ οὕτω τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν τοῖσι μέλεσι παρέχει*, ‘and thus it imparts sense and motion to the members.’ It arises from the air and breath which, coming into the lungs, is dispersed through the veins and gives sense and motion to the members. On the other hand, when it is excluded from the veins and lungs by phlegm, the man is deprived of speech and is benumbed, *i.e.*, is without sense and motion.”

Empedocles was not quite so advanced in his physiology, but the placing of sensibility in the flowing blood, traveling to all parts of the body, is a very similar theory—and one, by the way, with a large family tree.

In Hippocrates *φρόνησις* is supplied to the brain by air and from it along with motion to the body through the arteries and veins. That is, the anatomical apparatus involved is the same, although the mediating stuff is in the one case air, in the other blood and the seat for one the brain, for the other the heart. In Empedocles all things have a share of *φρόνησις* and it is by all that we partake thereof (*Fr.* 107). It is connected with the feeling of pleasure and pain and by *φιλότῃ* we *φρονούμεν φίλα* (*Fr.* 17), “have yearning feelings” and “accomplish the coördinate deeds.” So in Hippocrates, motion is a concomitant of *φρόνησις* and it is from the brain that (p. 609, 1, 11 sq.) “we have

<sup>7</sup> Kühn, Vol. I (i.e. XXI of series), pp. 596, 600, 601, 609, sq.

<sup>8</sup> *Oeconomia Hipp. alpha. serie*, A. Foesio, Basil, 1518; Art. *φρόνησις*.

pleasures, glad thoughts, wailings, feeling (*φρονεῖν*), perception (*νοεῖν*), sight, hearing, the knowing (*γινώσκειν*) of the ugly and the beautiful, the bad and the good, discriminating some by custom, others perceiving (*αἰσθάνεσθαι*), by their usefulness."

For Empedocles the senses are "instruments" or "powers" (*παλάμαι*) spread over the body (*Fr.* 2), "openings" (*πόροι*) into *τὸ νόησαι* (*Fr.* 4), "highroads" (*ἀμαξιτός*) into the *φρήν*. Hippocrates says (*l.c.*, p. 612), "the air supplies *φρόνησις* to the brain, while the eyes, ears, tongue, hands, and feet work hard to supply those things which the brain utilizes (*γνώσκειν*)."

Hippocrates gives us in this treatise, *On the sacred disease*, an elaborate description of the changes in the brain such as overheating or cooling, superabundance of moisture, *etc.* He is here chiefly concerned with mania, but in the work *Concerning airs, waters and places* he makes the more general statement: "With respect to the lack of spirit and cowardliness of the men, the main causes of the Asiatics being less warlike and of a milder character than the Europeans are the seasons whose temperature variations are slight and constant. Thus there are no irritants for the mind (*γνώμη*) nor any marked changes of the body from which the disposition would be rendered wild (Kühn, Vol. I, p. 553)." In fragment 108 Empedocles says that "in so far as men grow to be different, so far it is in their power to *φρονεῖν* other things."

Hippocrates passes here from the field of simple sensation or sensibility and so also this last statement of Empedocles introduces us to a broader field.

First, "one is convinced only of that which he chances upon" (*Fr.* 2); "wisdom grows in men by experience," (literally, "according to what is before them" (*Fr.* 106); and "everything *πεφρόνηκεν* by the will of chance" (*Fr.* 103).

Secondly, "wisdom," or teaching, is said to "grow into the *ἦθος*, where is each man's *φύσις*" (*Fr.* 110). Now each of the elements, including love and strife, is said (*Fr.* 17<sup>29</sup>) "to have its own value (*τιμή*) and *ἦθος* and to gain the upper hand in its turn as time revolves." *Φύσις*, as we quoted before, "in its primary and strict sense is the essence of those things which have in themselves *per se* a source of motion." Empedocles in fragment 8 contends that there is no *φύσις* of mortal things, but only mixing and dissolution, "but it is called *φύσις* among men." So in fragment 110, when he says the *φύσις*, or vital force of men lies in the *ἦθος*, we will be disposed to connect this *ἦθος* in some way with "mixing and dissolution." The force does not lie *primarily* in the mixture but in the elements. Wherefore his protest against the use of the term.

The *ἦθος* or character of a mixture would consist in its form. Now turn to fragment 125: "Changing their forms (*εἶδεα*), he made dead

from living"; and fragment 137: "The foolish father, praying, takes his own son in changed form (*μορφή*) and slays him." I do not mean to infer that *εἶδα* and *ἦθος* are synonymous terms for Empedocles, but that they represent different phases of the same general idea. We note here that in fragment 20 of the parts (*γυῖα*) of men are said to be made one by love and in fragment 107: "All things, fitted into order from these [*i.e.* the elements], are made solid and by these they *φρονέουσι* and feel pleasure and pain."

Certain parallels may be traced in other of the early Greeks. Diogenes of Apollonia, a forerunner of Hippocrates, uses *φρόνησις* in much the same way as Empedocles uses *νόημα* and Hippocrates *φρόνησις* — not for "intelligence," as is generally translated, though it may include his idea of "intelligence." In fragment 4 we find: "For men and other animals who breathe live by the air which is *ψυχή* and *νόησις* to them, as will be made plain in the following account. If the air is taken away, they die and their *νόησις* is left behind." Fragment 5: "It seems to me that *νόησις* is the so-called air. . . . Air, which is hotter than that outside in which we are, but much cooler than that near the sun, is the *ψυχή* of all animals. This is not alike in different animals, nor indeed in two different men. However, it does not differ greatly but according as they are more or less alike. Differentiated things can not, indeed, be exactly like one another until they become the same, but as there are many kinds of differentiation, so there are many and different kinds of animals, resembling one another neither in mode of life (*δίαίτα*) nor *νόησις* through the great number of differentiations. Nevertheless, all by the same thing live and see and hear and have their *other νόησις* from this."

Heraclitus' use of *ἦθος*, though literary and loose, is interesting. Fragment 119: *ἦθος ἀνθρώπων δαίμων* and fragment 78: *ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνῶμας, θεῖον δὲ ἔχει*.

Philolaos in fragment 13 points out the connection between *νοῦς* and *ἐγκέφαλος*. Hippocrates (*l.c.*, p. 612, 613) combats the error of those who have assigned the functions of the brain to the heart or diaphragm.

The whole line of thought and most of the terms come out all together in fragment 16 of the *second* part of Parmenides' poem:

ὥς γὰρ ἐκάστοτ' ἔχει κρᾶσις μελέων πολυμήμπτων,  
τὼς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρέστηκεν τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ  
ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν  
καὶ παντί· τὸ γὰρ πλεόν ἐστὶ νόημα . . .

"For just as is the union of twisted(?) parts in each case, so νόος is present to men. For the φύσις of the parts in men, one and all, is the same as that which thinks. For excess(?) is νόημα."



In this fragment the connection of φύσις and κρᾶσις is obvious, while φύσις, as "that which φρονέει," must be some power or force lying and having its source in the μέλεα, i.e. in this instance in their constitution or κρᾶσις. Further, the connection of νόος with the φύσις, κρᾶσις and μέλεα in this way indicates that it is intended to cover more elemental phases of psychosis than merely intelligence. Νόημα is the term we found in Empedocles. Τὸ πλεόν accords with the basis in physiological change that we have been discussing.

We come now to a further development. There are three words in Empedocles which are certainly synonyms, i.e. φρήν (Fr. 3, 23<sup>9</sup>, 114, 133, 134, 17<sup>14</sup>, 15),<sup>9</sup> σπλάγχνα (Fr. 5), πραπίδες (Fr. 8), while νόος (Fr. 2<sup>8</sup>, 17<sup>21</sup>, 136) is probably equally so.

This φρήν, etc. is that into which sight, touch and the other senses are "highways" (Fr. 133) and is accordingly the place where whatever travels along these highways is "kept." Empedocles has no word for memory, but in fragment 3 is the expression, "to keep or hide in a dumb φρήν" and in fragment 17 that "learning increases the φρένας." Accordingly, to νόος is attributed "carelessness" (Fr. 13). Φρήν may be "surpassed" by "fraud" (Fr. 23<sup>9</sup>), opposed by "truth" (?) (Fr. 114) and is where one "surmises" (Fr. 15). By the σπλάγκνα we "divide a λόγος" (Fr. 5).<sup>10</sup> By the νόος we may "contemplate (δέρκεσθαι) love" (Fr. 17<sup>21</sup>), and try to "comprehend" (περιλαμβάνειν) (Fr. 2<sup>8</sup>). A prophet "strains" to see the future with the πραπίδες (Fr. 129. Fragment doubtful?) and finally God is a "sacred and unspeakable φρήν" (Fr. 134).

In connection with "comprehension" cf. Hippocrates (Kühn, I, 612), ἐς δὲ τὴν σύνεσιν ὁ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ διαγέλλων "The brain is the messenger to the understanding." Στεγάζει, "to keep," δέρκεσθαι, "to look at," "contemplate," περιλαμβάνειν, "to get possession of by seizing round," διατμήγειν, "to divide," are the terms which may be said to represent the higher modes of mentality for Empedocles.

Significantly the Hippocratic word for the whole process is σύνεσις, "a joining together." "I think," he says, "that the brain has the greatest power in men, for this is the interpreter to us of those things which come from the air when the brain is healthy. . . . The brain is the messenger to the understanding" (Kühn, I, p. 612).

We have already quoted above the list of the things which arise from the brain, i.e., pleasures, glad thoughts, etc. In short the brain receives that from the outside world upon which it reacts with reference to its being pleasant or unpleasant, good or bad.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Hippocrates (Kühn, I, p. 612), "The Diaphragm has obtained the name φρένες from accident, as it possesses no such quality."

<sup>10</sup> With MSS. and Burnet, not accepting Diels' correction.

After the same manner, I think, we may interpret Empedocles. Beings are things put together in certain ways in virtue of which *way* they do certain actions when brought into contact with other things. Their *φύσις*, or source of activity, lies immediately in their character as compounds, ultimately in the character of their elements. Two elements will react to each other's nature or character; compounds will react in a compound fashion. Men are things put together in very complicated ways and react in very complicated ways to very complicated circumstances; even the nature of God consists in the form of the universe as, spherical and round, he sits "rejoicing in his circular solitude."

The eyes, ears, *etc.*, are the way of approach into man's nature which in its intricate fashion receives, passes around, separates and combines and reacts against the force (impression) of the outside intruder. Reception is one side of the process, reaction the other. We are told to "contemplate" love, and then again love is said to "accomplish" works in us. Mentality is a process accompanied by feeling toward its object, that is, by pleasure and pain. Increase of knowledge from what is accessible to the powers of man is one half of his teaching, action the other half. But (*Fr.* 135):

"That which is lawful for all stretches continuously throughout the wide ruling air and the boundless light."

These activities do not go on haphazard; there is order in the universe so that things move regularly and certainly and we may learn thereof "as much as human cleverness can bring to light." Law shows no mercy, <χάρις>στυγέει δύσκλητον 'Ανάγκην (*Fr.* 116), and even the gods are bound by the "great oath" which reminds us of Heraclitus and his "Erinyes, the handmaidens of justice," who police the heavens and keep the sun in his place. Strife acts in a time set by this mighty oath (*Fr.* 30).

Aristotle brings the charge against Empedocles' system that it is not able to give an account of error, but the avenues through which external things affect a man are "circumscribed" (*Fr.* 2) and error consists in partial knowledge with its consequent misreaction. A "wise man" is one who can see as much as ten or twenty generations (*Fr.* 129). We know by "chance" (*Fr.* 103) who is a goddess of error, while the *test* of truth or error is the good or bad results which may ensue to us. "Happy is the man who has acquired the riches of divine understanding; wretched the one who harbors an obscure opinion of the gods" (*Fr.* 132).

## CHAPTER III

### PLATO

Plato's psychology was built up to support two fundamental interests: his theory of knowledge and his ethical philosophy, including in both cases the question of the immortality of the soul. Accordingly he needed a metaphysical psychology radically different from that of his predecessors, but we can gather from his criticisms of other psychological theories several points which will shed light on the philosophies that went before.

Plato undertook to deduce the soul from cosmic organization (*i.e.*, the existence of a world soul) in much the same way as his predecessors had done from *φύσις*, but he was troubled with how to account for judgments of truth and falsehood in terms of activity or motion. It would seem that he thought very much in these terms himself.

The tenth book of the *Laus*, undertaking to prove the existence of the gods so as to have some ultimate basis for law and right, gives a clear presentation of the relation between Plato's cosmic soul and the naturalistic philosophers' understanding of *φύσις* together with the derivative origin and nature of individual living beings.<sup>11</sup>

*Ath.* But then again, tell me, Cleinias—for it is necessary that you be a partner to this discussion—perhaps it is possible that the one who says this thinks fire, water, earth and air are the most primitive of all things and calls these four *φύσις* while he looks upon the soul as a later development from these. Rather it seems that this is not a mere possibility, but that he thus actually demonstrates this to us in his argument. . . .

line 891 c

Nearly all of them, my friends, are perhaps ignorant of what sort the soul is and of the power which it has and of other facts about it, especially its origin that it is among the most primitive things, generated before all bodies and rather than the latter originates all their changes and rearrangements. Now if this is so and the soul is older than the body, is it not necessary that what appertains to the soul be before what appertains to the body?

892 a

*Cl.* It is necessary.

*Ath.* Then opinion, conscious direction, reason, art, and law will antedate the hard, the soft, the heavy, and the light. Indeed the great primitive works and acts will be those of art for these are first, whereas the works pertaining to *φύσις* and *φύσις* itself—

<sup>11</sup> Burnet's edition, Oxford, N. D., 891B.

although the word is incorrectly applied by them to these things—will be later and controlled by art and reason.

*Cl.* How is it incorrectly used?

*Ath.* They wish to say that φύσις is the productive cause (γένεσις) of first things, but if it is evident that the soul is primitive and arose among primitive things and not fire or air, then more truly it would be said that the soul is by φύσις. Such is true, if you prove that the soul is older than the body, but not otherwise (892A).

As the Athenian proceeds to argue (895A):

If all things were together in a state of inactivity, as the majority of such thinkers presume to say, which of the above-mentioned motions must first arise among these things? Self-movement must indeed arise, for by no means could things be altered by something else, if no change had previously arisen within themselves.

This self-moving power he calls "life" which is the sign of the presence of a "soul."

The ultimate source of activity according to his predecessors had lain in the cosmic elements, *i.e.*, "the roots of things." Motion and its source are where they are found—in things. It is found first in its simplest, not in its most complicated form. "Manners, characters, wishes, reasonings," *etc.*, Plato says, "are prior to length, breadth, *etc.*, . . . of bodies, if soul is prior to body," which would be a very good reason to Empedocles for saying that soul was not prior. These things are not actually found in nature first but last; they are the activities of *organic* beings.

In the *Theaetetus* we have a controversial discussion of the problem of knowledge. Socrates elicits first the definition, "Knowledge is nothing else than sense perception" (151E), and identifies this with the famous adage of Protagoras (152A): "Man is the measure of all things, of the things which are, that they are, and of things which are not, that they are not."

But, continues Socrates (152D), by the Graces, was not Protagoras, who was all-wise, telling riddles to the common herd like us while he told the truth in secret to his disciples.

*Theaet.* What account then would you give of the matter, Socrates?

*Soc.* I shall speak of a by no means unimportant doctrine according to which nothing exists of itself [alone]. You may not rightly denominate anything as such and so, but if you speak of anything as large, it appears also as small, and if heavy, also as light and so on, so that nothing is of any particular sort, but from transposition, change, and admixture arise all things which we incorrectly say exist for nothing at any time exists, but everything

is always becoming. On this doctrine all the philosophers successively—except Parmenides—are in agreement: Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles . . .

Then again (156A):

Their principle, on which everything we have just mentioned depends, is that everything is motion and that there is nothing except this. Of this motion there are two kinds, both infinite in extent, one active, the other passive. From the union of these two motions and from their rubbing against one another arise a limitless progeny which is in turn two-fold, *i.e.*, the object of sensation and sensation which always breaks out and arises together with the object of sensation. . . .

But note the conclusion. The attempt was to explain that all these things were, as we said, in motion and that the movement was either rapid or slow. Whatever is slow exercises its motion on itself and against things near it and in this manner begets. [Text which follows is corrupt. Cousin conjectures<sup>12</sup>: *et que ce qui est ainsi produit a plus de lenteur: qu'au contraire, ce qui se meut rapidement, déployant son mouvement sur les objets plus éloignés, produit d'une manière différent, et que ce qui est ainsi produit a plus de vitesse, car il change de place dans l'espace et son mouvement consiste dans la translation.*] Whenever then the eye and some other thing fitting it are near together there arises whiteness and the cognate sensation which did not arise from either of these going to the other thing. Then these two moving through the intervening space—*i.e.*, the "visual image"<sup>13</sup> to the eyes and the whiteness to that which conjointly produces the color—then the eye is filled with the visual image (*ὄψις*) and becomes not an image but a seeing eye, while the object which coöperates in forming the color is filled with whiteness and becomes not whiteness but white whether wood or stone or whatever thing happens to be colored with this color. And the same follows for the other sensations as the hard, the warm, *et al.*; nothing is of itself, as we said above, but all things of all kinds arise in their intercourse with one another by motion since, as they say, it is not possible to think of the agent and patient as separate existences. The agent is nothing until it is joined with that which receives the action, nor the patient before its union with the agent. That which is an agent in contact with one thing appears as patient with another. And thus from all this argument, as I said in the first place, it results that nothing is one of itself, but is always becoming something. Being should

<sup>12</sup> *Oeuvres de Platon*, tome 2, 1852, p. 77. Cf. however Burnet's text.

<sup>13</sup> *ὄψις*, for the meaning of which cf. 193B: "False judgment only remains in the following case: whenever, knowing both you and Theodorus and having the impression (*σημεία*) of both of you in the wax as of a signet ring and not seeing you sufficiently well on account of the distance, I endeavor to assign the impression of each to its proper visual image (*ὄψις*), fitting it and adjusting it to the traces [which it has previously left] in order that recognition may come about, . . . "

be entirely disposed of, although we have been compelled already many times to use this word from custom and ignorance. It is not necessary, according to the learned, to allow either the word "something" or "of something" or "of me" or "this" or "that" or any other name which indicates permanence, but rather *κατὰ φύσιν* to say things come to be, act, perish, and metamorphose and, if anyone gives permanence to anything in his discourse, he is easily refuted. It is necessary to speak thus both of individuals and aggregates such as are presented in "man," "stones," or a particular animal or species.

This last definition of man as an aggregate, which *κατὰ φύσιν* is changing its form (157B), corresponds with what we said in connection with fragment 8 of Empedocles regarding man's *φύσις* as the form of the mixture.

But Socrates continues (157E):

Now let us not neglect what remains of this doctrine. For it remains to speak of dreams, diseases, and of madness especially, and what are called illusions of hearing, sight, and other mistakes of sensation for you know that in all these cases this seems to be a recognized refutation of the doctrine we have just expounded.

The defense which the champions of "appearance" would advance Socrates imagines as follows (158E):

May that which is in every respect other, Theaetetus, have in any way any power similar to that possessed by its opposite? And note that we do not ask in regard to a thing partly the same and partly different, but of that which is entirely other.

*Theaet.* If anything is altogether different, it is impossible that it should have any similarity to its opposite either in power or any other way.

*Soc.* And then it must be admitted to be different, must it not?

*Theaet.* So it seems to me.

*Soc.* If then it happens that anything becomes like or unlike either itself or something else, in so far as it is the same we say it is like and in so far as it is different we say it is unlike.

*Theaet.* Necessarily.

*Soc.* Have we not said before that there are an infinite number of agents and also of patients?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* And that they come into connection at one time with one thing and at another time with another and in the different connections different results arise?

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Let us speak then in this way of you and me and other things as, for example, of Socrates well and Socrates sick.

*Theaet.* In speaking of Socrates sick you mean Socrates as a whole and similarly of Socrates well, do you not?

*Soc.* You have understood me very well; I said exactly that.

*Theaet.* They are certainly unlike.

*Soc.* And therefore, since they are unlike, they are other.

*Theaet.* Necessarily.

*Soc.* And would you say the same Socrates sleeping and of all the other states of which we have already treated?

*Theaet.* I should.

*Soc.* Is it not true that each of the things whose nature it is to do something whenever they encounter Socrates well act differently towards me than when encountering me sick?

*Theaet.* How else could it be?

*Soc.* And I who am the patient and that which is the agent will produce a different result in each of the cases.

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* Whenever I, being in health, drink wine it appears pleasant and sweet?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* For, as we acknowledged before, the agent and the patient produce sweetness and a sensation, both being in motion together and the sensation being carried to the patient, produces a sensing tongue and the sweetness, carried to and about the wine makes the wine both to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

*Theaet.* It has already been acknowledged by us to be thus.

*Soc.* But when I am sick, does it not in truth act upon another and not the same person, for it affects one who is different?

*Theaet.* Yes.

*Soc.* For Socrates in such a condition [sick] in combination with the drink of wine produces a different result, *i.e.* a sensation of bitterness arises in and is carried about the tongue and bitterness arises in the wine and this latter becomes not bitterness but bitter and I not a sensation but a sensing [man].

*Theaet.* Certainly.

*Soc.* Having sensation in this way I shall not become something different, for another sensation would be of another thing and another thing would make the one sensing different. Nor can that which produces this effect in me, encountering another person, produce the same effect in him for the different factors will produce a different result and the agent become different.

*Theaet.* That is true.

*Soc.* I am not then of myself in a certain state, nor is that which affects me of itself in a certain state.

*Theaet.* Indeed not.

*Soc.* It is necessary that I have a sensation of something whenever I am sensing, for it is impossible that there be a sensing which is a sensing of nothing. For this something must be present to the person whenever sweet or bitter or any such arise. For it is impossible that anything should be sweet which is sweet to no one.

*Theaet.* Entirely true.

*Soc.* It follows then, I think, for us that with respect to being and becoming we both are and become one thing with reference to another, since our being is necessarily relative but not relative to any other [*i.e.* a third thing] nor to us ourselves. It results that there is a mutual relation. Thus whoever says anything is or becomes something, he says it is or becomes *to*, *of* or *with reference* to something; he must neither say nor permit any one else to say that it either is or becomes anything of itself. This the argument which we have been expounding indicates.

*Theaet.* Altogether true, Socrates.

*Soc.* Then is it not true what acts upon me is relative to me and not to another and that I have a sensation of this [object] and not another person?

*Theaet.* How could it be otherwise?

*Soc.* Then my sensation is true to me—for it is always of my being—and I am judge, according to Protagoras, of the things which are [relative] to me, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not.

*Theaet.* So it seems.

Perception is a relation entered into between perceiver and perceived, a form of motion. The eyes and ears are the "highroads," to use Empedocles' term, over which this motion travels. Socrates bitterly tastes the embittered wine, while bitterness is the attribute of the sensation as an operation. Accordingly "when I am sick, [the wine] in truth acts upon another and not the same person, for it affects one who is different," or, as Empedocles says (*Fr.* 108), "in so far as men grow to be different, so far it is their power to *φρονεῖν* other things."

Plato has here cleverly laid the foundation on which to build his objections, *i.e.* the emphasis on the individuality and discreteness of perceptions. From this he thinks he can show the impossibility of judgments as to truth and error and its consequent ethical implications. We need some criterion and a soul to hold it, some "measure of things." We are not, however, here interested in the remaining details of Plato's argument as to how true and false opinion may be a false or correct identification between the memory image in the "block of wax" and a present perception.



## CHAPTER IV

### ARISTOTLE AND THEOPHRASTUS

#### I

"The *ἐμψυχον* seems to differ from the *ἄψυχον* chiefly in two ways, i.e. motion and perception. These are approximately the two characteristics of the soul which we have received from our predecessors" (*De anima*, 403 b 25). Under these two headings Aristotle accordingly makes his attack on these predecessors.

How can the soul be the self-mover, he asks? In which of the four ways could the soul move, i.e. locomotion, qualitative change, diminution or augmentation? For it would have to have a place of rest and be of such a nature as to be moved under constraint, "but what kind of forced motion and states of rest there can be of the soul, it is not easy to say even for one wishing to draw on his fancy" (406 a 25).

Not the least of his objections is that "they attach the soul to and place it in the body without demonstrating through what cause this comes about and how the body is in this relation. But this would seem to be necessary. For it is through their community [i.e. that of the soul and body] that the one acts while the other is acted upon, the one is moved while the other moves. Now nothing of the sort takes place between any two bodies which happen to come together. They only attempt to give an account of what sort the soul is, but they have nothing to say of the body which contains it just as in the Pythagorean myth any soul could happen to enter any body. But each [body] seems to have its own peculiar form and shape. This is just as if they talked of the transference of the craft of carpentry into a flute. For the craft must use its tools and the soul [in the same way] the body" (407 b 15).

This is the natural and inevitable attack on the Platonic position as we have set it forth in Plato's arguments against the naturalists, but entirely irrelevant to the latter. The answer crudely put is that the soul is, in so far as it has the attributes of motion, and that the body is its seat of manifestation. If Aristotle in any way refers this to Empedocles (as perhaps he might have in relation to the blood as *ρόημα*) he is confusing a Platonic soul with a discussion of the way activity is transmitted throughout the body. The naturalists began in the way and place that Aristotle indicates as lacking.

Those who consider the soul primarily as *knowing* and *perceiving*,<sup>14</sup> Aristotle continues, identify it with their first principles, "for they not unreasonably assume the soul to be that amongst first principles or primary elements which is by its nature capable of causing motion" (Hicks' rendering, p. 226). This theory, Aristotle says, is based on the assumption that like is known by like. How then, he asks, can the soul know quantity and qualities, *etc.*, unless it is composed of these two and how would it know complex things such as God or flesh unless it has their compounds? At the end of all these objections, he throws in inadvertently, "but they assume that perceiving is a sort of being affected (*πάσχειν*) and being moved and so also thinking and knowing" (410 a 25).

Aristotle makes one other point in connection with what he calls the definition of the soul as a *harmony*. We might ask Empedocles, he argues, "inasmuch as he says that each of these [parts] is in a certain proportion (*λόγος*), whether the soul is a *λόγος* or does it rather arise in the parts of the body as a separate being?"

We gather, then, from Aristotle that Empedocles understood the process of *αἰσθάνεσθαι* to be affection and movement of a complex, definite, organic body. Aristotle's argument is that you can not get things into a soul which is some place or thing, while he gives in his account a position entirely irrelevant to this argument, *i.e.*, that perceiving is the relation of a complex organism to an object by way of the relation that holds between similars.

## II

The fragment of Theophrastus, *De Sensu et Sensibilibus*, has been the chief source on Empedocles' psychology for modern historians of philosophy. It is without qualification the worst! Theophrastus has taken two minor features—the question of likes or opposites affecting each other and the problem of "pores"—and from these he has written out a psychology.

"There are many opinions with respect to sensation all of which can be reduced under two heads: some think it to be accomplished by like perceiving like, others by contraries. Parmenides, Empedocles and Plato by like, the followers of Anaxagoras and Heraclitus by contraries.

"The former argue that different things are compared by their likenesses and that it is innate in animals to recognize those of their own kind. Sensation is by an effluence in which case like is carried to like.

"The others understand sensation to be by qualitative change. Anything is not affected [changed] by that which it resembles but the

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Zeller, *Presoc.* Vol. II, p. 167.

opposite, being affected by this, produces thought. They think that evidence is given in the fact that in the case of touch anything which is of the same temperature as the flesh is not felt" (Wimmer, p. 321).

After this general introduction Theophrastus takes up each of the men separately.<sup>15</sup> "Empedocles speaks in the same way of all the senses, and says that perception is due to the 'effluences' fitting into the passages of each sense. And that is why one can not judge the objects of another; for the passages of some of them are too wide and those of others too narrow for the sensible object, so that the latter either goes through without touching or can not enter at all." In other words an atom of water running across another of its kin gets a friendly recognition or has a bright idea.

Sight and smell he explains in detail, but sound is by a process altogether different from effluences and pores; taste and touch, he says, Empedocles failed to explain, although these would have been the easiest.

Then comes a long attack, beginning with the objection that one can not, under this conception, differentiate the *ἐμψυχα* from other things with respect to sensation; then that thought and perception can not be differentiated; and finally raising some dialectical objections with respect to filled or empty pores and the denial of a vacuum.

We have little or nothing to learn from Theophrastus, but it is interesting to note how he could pick out a minor point from the tradition, couple it with a description of the eye and work it up into a discussion which, as we see, is far removed from even the Aristotelian account.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Burnet, *Early Greek Philos.*, p. 284, from whose translation the following is quoted.

## CHAPTER V

### THE DOXOGRAPHERS <sup>16</sup>

During Hellenistic and Roman times there was compiled a number of histories or collections of the opinions of previous philosophers. The three most important remnants which have come down to us are Diogenes Laertius' *Lives and opinions of the philosophers*, the *Eclogae physicae* of John Stobaios and the pseudo-Plutarchian *Placita philosophorum*. The latter is by far the most valuable.

None of these authors had access to any original sources. Their relations to each other and to traditional predecessors has accordingly been a matter for extensive research. Diels (*Doxographi graeci*) traces them all ultimately back to the *Eighteen books of physical opinions* of Theophrastus of which the fragment, *De sensu*, treated above, is practically all that remains to us.

This controversy does not in general concern us here, but in discussing them as sources of our knowledge of early Greek philosophy I have thought it worth while to show at some length that these *placita*, as they have come down to us, are written from the point of view of the late Hellenistic philosophies. They have taken the topics of interest to controversialists of the *late* Stoic, Skeptic, Epicurean, and Peripatetic schools and shown what, with reference to their point of view, the earlier philosophers had to say. Those we have remaining are particularly Stoic. If this can be shown, we can properly understand at least the kind of difficulties that lie in the way of properly interpreting the collections. Whether much is to be learned of the early Greek philosophy from these later interpretations may be doubtful, but at least we can determine on what basis the doxographers chose their material or left out that which was at hand.

Further, I think that it will be apparent that this tradition did not come from Theophrastus, as Diels suggests, for it neither contains the same material as the fragment *De sensu* nor is it written from the same point of view.

A mere superficial reading will show the great preponderance given to the late Stoic and to a less extent Epicurean doctrines themselves, as, *e.g.*, the lengthy accounts in Diogenes Laertius. The important part played by Plato's *Timaeus* is also apparent and will be shown more in detail.

<sup>16</sup> Note especially the "Prolegomena" to Diels' *Doxographi Graeci*.

## I

The first and most striking evidence of the field of discussion in which these histories of philosophy were set out is to be found in a comparison of the tables of contents of Aetius' *Placita*, as found particularly in the pseudo-Plutarchian *Epitome* (*Placita philosophorum*), with those of Lucretius' *De rerum natura*, Sextus Empiricus' *Pyrrhonorum hypotyposeon*, Book III, and *Adversus Mathematicos*, Book VIII, Chrysippus' *Placita*, and the detailed outline of Stoic doctrine in Diogenes Laertius, Book VII, and less clearly on Epicurus in Book X. The arrangement is analogous to that into which the Epicurean fragments fall as given by Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 169 *sq.*, and those of Zeno and Cleanthes in Arnim, Vol. I.

We have the three divisions of philosophy: *Logica* (*Canonica*), *Physica*, and *Ethica*, though only one or two of these divisions may be represented in any particular case. Plutarch gives this triple division in his introduction. The tables of contents are too long to be given here at length but we may in general note the following correspondences. Arnim (p. 110 *sq.*) arranges the physical section of Cleanthes' *Placita* as follows:

B. *Physica et Theologica*

1. *Physica fundamenta*
2. *De Mundo et meteoris*
3. *De animalibus*
4. *De anima hominis*
5. *De fato*
6. *De natura deorum*
7. *De providentia et divinatione*

The pseudo-Plutarchian *Epitome* shows signs of bad mixing and *lacunae* (e.g., Book IV: "Having taken a survey of the general parts of the world, I will take a view of the particular members of it." He then in the first section discusses the overflowing of the Nile and in subsequent chapters the soul and related subjects), but as the sections come to us we have the *physicae fundamenta*, *de fato*, and *de natura deorum* grouped together in the first section; Books II and III are *de mundo et meteoris*; *de animalibus* is represented in a jumbled condition in Book V and more satisfactorily in the *Eclogae* of Stobaeus, chapters 42-7; finally *de anima hominis* occupies Book IV with the exception of the first chapter which is on the River Nile. The first and fourth books are the ones of chief importance for our purposes.

The first book corresponds most nearly to the divisions into which Diogenes Laertius says the Stoics classify Natural Philosophy, "accord-

ing to species": περί σωμάτων τόπον, καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν, καὶ στοιχείων καὶ θεῶν, καὶ τεράτων καὶ τόπου, καὶ κενοῦ (VII, 132), and it corresponds much more minutely to the actual contents. The fourth and fifth books of Plutarch are to be compared with the third part of the Stoic division "according to genera," i.e., ὁ αἰτιολογικός, in which Diogenes Laertius says they inquire: περί τε τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ γινομένων, καὶ περὶ σπερμάτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ὁμοίων.

Now more minutely. The general introduction to the pseudo-Plutarchian *Epitome*, which in our text is the introduction to the first book, starts out by quoting the Stoics on the divisions of philosophy, i.e., natural, moral, and logical. The *Epitome* is to be on the natural, i.e., περὶ κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ.

This use of natural philosophy is entirely un-Aristotelian. At the end of the introduction he gives what purports to be the Aristotelian division, i.e., theoretical and practical. He might possibly have gotten such a division out of Aristotle (cf. *Metaph.* A. I, 993 b 20), though it is not the regular triple division of πρακτική, ποιητική, and θεωρητική. What is more, it is entirely irrelevant to Plutarch's work. Apparently this was a *later* Peripatetic division, as, e.g., in Strato, who seems to have discussed "physics" and "ethics," including under the first the topics which we here find in Plutarch: *primum Theophrasti Strato physicum se voluit, in quo etsi est magnus, tamen nova pleraque et perpauca de moribus* (Cicero, *Fin.* V, 5, 13).<sup>17</sup>

The introduction of the pseudo-Plutarch should be compared with Diogenes Laertius' introduction which also takes for granted the Stoic division: Μέρη δὲ φιλοσοφίας τρία, φυσικὸν, ἠθικὸν, διαλεκτικόν. φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ περὶ κόσμου, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ. ἠθικὸν δὲ, τὸ περὶ βίου καὶ τῶν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. διαλεκτικὸν δὲ, τὸ ἀμφοτέρων τοὺς λόγους πρεσβεῖον (I, 18).

The first chapter of the *Epitome* on "What is φύσις" is most unintelligibly confused. He quotes Aristotle to the effect that "φύσις is the principle of motion and rest in a thing in which it exists principally and not by accident," a definition which corresponds roughly with *Phys.* II, 1, 192 b 14 (Cf. *Metaph.* Δ, IV). "For all things," Plutarch continues, "which are seen, as many as are neither by chance nor necessity nor are divine nor have any such cause are called φυσικά and have their own proper φύσις, e.g. earth, fire, water, air, plants, animals and those things which arise as rain, hail, thunderbolts, lightning, winds. All these have some ἀρχή and were not from eternity but arise from some ἀρχή. So indeed animals and plants have a beginning of generation. Φύσις is in these primarily the ἀρχή not only of motion but

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Zeller, who quotes Cicero, (*Aristotle*, Vol. II, p. 454).

also of rest. For whatever receives a beginning of motion this also can receive an end."

This section gives us in a garbled way the latter field of discussion over φύσις with an Aristotelian flavor, such a discussion as one would expect to find in Strato, and so Cicero gives it: *nec audiendus eius [Theophrasti] auditor Strato, is qui 'physicus' appellatur, qui omnem vim divinam in natura sitam esse censet, quae causas gignendi augendi minuendi habeat, sed careat omni sensu et figura* (*De deor. nat.* I 35).

For Epicurus we have Plutarch, *adv. Coloten* (Usener, 74), ἐν ἀρχῇ δὲ τῆς πραγματείας ὑπειπὼν τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν σώματα εἶναι καὶ κενόν ὡς μᾶς οὐσης εἰς δύο πεπoίηται τὴν διαίρεσιν, . . .<sup>18</sup>

The Stoics called the four elements *naturae*. (Cicero, *de deor. nat.*, II, 32, 84).

The second chapter is entitled, τίινι διαφέρει ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖα. It starts with the assertion that Plato and Aristotle so differentiated. This might well hold for Plato's *Timaeus* (Tim. 53 C-D., Cf. *Phaedr.* 246 C), but certainly does not for Aristotle who considered the elements as a kind of ἀρχαί (*Metaph.* 5 Δ 1. 1013 a 2D). Diogenes Laertius, however, at the beginning of his account of Stoic natural philosophy (VII, 134) writes, διαφέρειν δὲ φασιν [*i.e.* the Stoics] ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα. τὰς μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἀγενήτους <καὶ> ἀφθάρτους, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα κατὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν φθίρεσθαι.

At the end of the section Plutarch says, "For there are some things prior to earth and water from which these come, *i.e.* ἡ ὕλη ἄμορφός οὐσα καὶ ἀειδὴς καὶ τὸ εἶδος, ὃ καλοῦμεν ἐντελέχειαν καὶ ἡ στέρησις. These are Aristotelian terms all right, though Aristotle never so gives a list of ἀρχαί. We find in Diogenes Laertius on the Stoics (VII, 139; Arnim, 300), δοκεῖ δ' οὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὄλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν, τὴν ὕλην· τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον, τὸν θεόν and Seneca, *dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri: duo esse in rerum natura, ex quibus omnia fiunt, causam et materiam, materia iacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura, si nemo moveat, causa autem, id est ratio, materiam format* . . . (*Ep.* 65, 2—Arnim, 303).

The fourth chapter of Plutarch is an original rather than historical discussion of how the κόσμος arose. It is a typically late discussion and parallels Lucretius (V, 416 sq.), detail for detail.

The gist of Chapter VI on "Whence men derive their knowledge of the Gods," is that it is first from nature, secondly from myths and thirdly from the laws. This is the famous Stoic<sup>19</sup> argument from nature and common consent. *Nec ulla gens*, says Seneca (*Ep.* 117<sup>6</sup>),

<sup>18</sup> Note also quotation from Sextus Emp. on Epicurus (Usener, 76).

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Arnold, (*Roman Stoicism*, p. 223 sq.), who gives quotations.

*usquam est a deo extra leges moresque projecta, ut non aliquos deos credat; and Cicero deor. nat. II 6, 17: tantum vero ornatum mundi, tantum varietatem pulchritudinemque rerum caelestium . . . si non deorum immortalium domicilium putes, nonne plane desipere videre?*

## II

Plato's *Timaeus* was the work which attracted the notice of the schools which followed him and its doctrines come down to us through all subsequent tradition. Aristotle bases his criticism of Plato in the *De Anima* on this dialogue and it was, significantly enough, the only one of Plato's works preserved to the medieval schools.

Its peculiar doctrines have been the cause of many attempts to reconcile them with the rest of the Platonic canon, even to the extent of the dialogue being considered spurious.<sup>20</sup>

It is therefore interesting for us to note that the *Placita* of Aetius is practically dependent on this dialogue, or some source familiar with it, for its account of Plato's philosophy. We give here the parallels in the first part of the *Placita* and will speak of Book IV below:

*Placita, Book I*

Chapter 2	.....	<i>Timaeus</i> , 53C-D. Cf. <i>Phaedrus</i> , 246C
Chapter 3	.....	<i>Timaeus</i> , 28-9, 51 sq. Cf. <i>Cratylus</i> , 389-90
Chapter 5	.....	<i>Timaeus</i> , 31. Cf. 32D and 33
Chapter 7	.....	<i>Timaeus</i> , 52
Chapter 9	.....	<i>Timaeus</i> , 52C, 50; 49A; 50D. Cf. Arist. <i>Phys.</i> 4Δ3, 209b10
Chapter 10	.....	<i>Timaeus</i> , 29
Chapter 11	.....	From the general position of the <i>Timaeus</i> . Cf. <i>Philebus</i> , 28, 30
Chapter 12	.....	<i>Timaeus</i> , 63D-E, 49; 52. Cf. Arist. <i>Phys.</i> 4Δ2, 209b10
Chapter 17	.....	<i>Timaeus</i> , 56
Chapter 19	.....	<i>Timaeus</i> , 49 sq. Cf. Arist. <i>Phys.</i> 4Δ2, 209b10
Chapter 21	.....	<i>Timaeus</i> , 37D
Chapter 22	.....	<i>Timaeus</i> , 38B, 37D (direct quotation)
Chapter 25	.....	<i>Timaeus</i> , 47E. Cf. <i>Laws</i> , 904
Chapter 26	.....	<i>Timaeus</i> , 47 sq.
Chapter 27	.....	<i>Timaeus</i> , 47. Cf. <i>Laws</i> , 904 (N.B.)
Chapter 29	.....	<i>Laws</i> , 889

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Ladevi-Roché, *Le vrai et le faux Platon ou le Timée démontré apocryphe*, Paris, 1867.



*Book II*

- Chapter 4.....*Timaeus*, 33 (*Contra Laws*, X)  
 Chapter 5.....*Timaeus*, 33C  
 Chapter 6.....*Timaeus*, 31-2, 34, 52D; 53C, 55 sq.  
 Chapter 7.....*Timaeus*  
 Chapter 9.....*Timaeus*, 80C  
 Chapter 10.....*Timaeus*, 62

Book I, Chapter 8, "On daemons and heroes," is not from the *Timaeus* nor relevant to it (perhaps *Republic*, 427B or *Laws*, 717B).

## III

These are the chief general discussions of the first book and sufficient to show the kind of topical arrangement we have been discussing. We now turn to the fourth book which more immediately concerns us. Here we find the Stoic epistemological position with an Epicurean mechanism of sense perception, together with some peculiar statements attributed to Plato.

In Hellenic philosophy the soul and its activities, sensation, *etc.*, are discussed under two separate branches. The soul in general comes under physics as a part of zoölogy, so to speak, while most of the discussion of sensation and knowing is included in dialectics. This is significant inasmuch as it marks the epistemological interest.

Now Plutarch has the conventional divisions: on the soul, its parts, sensation in general, and the special senses. In addition he gives two chapters which come from the dialectical division, one on: *εἰ ἀληθεῖς αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ φαντασίαι*; the other *τίνι διαφέρει φαντασία φανταστὸν φανταστικὸν φάντασμα*. This should be compared with Diogenes Laertius on the Stoics (VII, 49 sq.): "The Stoics choose first to give an account of *φαντασία* and *αἴσθησις* as this is the criterion by which they know the truth of things." This discussion found an important place in Crysippus' *Placita* (Arnim, Vol. II, p. 21 sq.) prior to the discussion of sensation and gives the epistemological setting to the whole.

Of the five sections on sensation or the senses in general two are entirely given over to the Stoics (11 and 21) and the rest begin with their doctrines (8, 9 and 10). Chapter fifteen on the visibility of darkness is also occupied with Stoical doctrines. The other philosophers mentioned in these general sections are Empedocles, Leucippus, Democritus, Plato, and Heraclides. In the case of the special senses the Stoics are not mentioned, but we find here Alcmaeon, Empedocles, Democritus and Leucippus, and Plato.

The Platonic definition of the soul in the passage is from *Timaeus*,

34C sq.<sup>21</sup> The definition of sensation attributed to Plato, *ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος κοινωνίαν πρὸς τὰ ἐκτός*, might have come from the *Timaeus* or elsewhere. The argument for the immortality of the soul that "when it departs, it goes to the soul of the universe which is of the same nature" might have been derived from the *Timaeus* (Cf. 90 sq.); it certainly is not in harmony with the teaching given in the *Phaedo* and elsewhere.

In this setting the only pre-Socratic philosophers who get noticed to any extent with respect to the soul and its activities are Empedocles and Alcmaeon.<sup>22</sup> Plutarch asks certain questions and gives the following answers for Empedocles:

*Where is the soul situated?*

It arises in the blood.

*Are sensations and imaginations true?*

Sensations arise in every case through a symmetry of the pores, that which is peculiar to a particular sense being adapted to it.

*Concerning sight.*

The rays (of the eyes) (*ἀκτίς*) are mingled with the images (*εἶδωλα*), and the resultant is called *ἀκτιν-εἶδωλον*.

*Concerning hearing.*

Hearing is caused by the striking of the air on the cartilage which hangs on the inside of the ear like a bell and is struck upon.

*Concerning smell.*

The scents are introduced into the inhalations of the lungs, for whenever breathing is difficult one can not smell readily as in the case of a cold in the head.


It must be obvious that we have little to learn from this account, for the reason that Empedocles had nothing to say on the Stoic problem. The thing to be guarded against, however, is not the slight accounts of the mechanism of perception, but the taking of this exposition as a representation of the naturalistic position with respect to man and his activities. Writing from Plutarch's point of view nothing of importance could be said of this early Greek philosophy.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. note by Hicks, *Tim.* p. 106.

<sup>22</sup> Stobaeus has some additional opinions, especially those attributed to the Peripatetics.

It remains also to be pointed out that at least this part of the *Placita* has no relation to Theophrastus' *De sensu*. In his work Theophrastus presents a very striking doctrine which is not here represented. We hear nothing of likes and opposites. Even in detail the accounts are not similar as is especially marked in the explanation of sight which is quite different in the two works.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Theophrastus, *De sensu* (Burnet, *Early Greek Philos.*, 1892, p. 264) and Plutarch, Book IV, 13.





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